McNair Paper Number 47 Chapter 2, January 1996

ETHNIC PROBLEMS

One of the most significant domestic problems faced by these states is that they "were never intended to be truly ethnic states." The names given to them under the Stalin regime were derived from their tribal designations--Uzbeks, Kazakhs, etc.--and they "were created primarily as a mechanism of divide and rule." The rationale was "to destroy any idea of a united 'Turkestan,' which, with its combined powers, could have threatened Moscow's hold over the region."(Note 1) Commenting on this issue, Marthat Olcott notes:

Stalin drew the map of Soviet Central Asia not with an eye to consolidating natural regions, but rather for the purpose of reducing the prospects for regional unity. Five separate republicswere formed, creating national units for ethnic communities that had yet to think of themselves as distinct nationalities. Moreover, boundaries were set to insure the presence of large irredentist populations in each republic.(Note 2)

A related problem is the ethnic diversity of Muslim Central Asia, which promises to be the root cause of a multiplicity of ethnic conflicts. In a region where economic underdevelopment is acute, deep resentment related to the advantageous status of one ethnic group is likely to cause a considerable number of violent outbreaks and indeed even chaos, especially from those groups who regard themselves as victims of exploitation. Another root cause of ethnic conflicts goes back to Stalin's mass relocation campaign. The intent was to dilute the ethnic strength of one dominant group by creating in its midst pockets of ethnic minorities; consequently, when one examines the ethnic breakdown of these republics, one is struck by the prevalence of ethnic diversity.

The major example of ethnic diversity is the republic of Kazakhstan, which contains two major nationalities, Kazakhs and Russians, where Kazakhs are in the minority and where the Kazakh language is not spoken or understood by a majority of population. As Kazakhstan sets out to develop its national personality, it has to fight political battles with Russians (and to a lesser extent, with other ethnic groups) to keep the country intact. The northern and eastern parts of that country are inhabited predominantly by Slavs, and there is always a danger that if they do not like future political developments, they may attempt to secede or ask Russia to take over those regions of Kazakhstan. Even the political parties in Kazakhstan reflect the binational character of that country, with the Endinstvo (Unity) movement and the Azat (Freedom) party representing and reflecting the fears, aspirations, and political preferences of Slavs and Kazakhs, respectively.

Another problem related to ethnic makeup is that a majority of the productive sectors of Kazakhstan are in the hands of non-Kazakhs. As the country aims its industrial and agricultural policies aimed at privatization, the non-Kazakh part of the population is likely to resent deeply the redistributive policies of the government that are destined to lower its privileged status.

Kyrgyzstan is another state where Russians have a large presence--21.5 percent of the population. Even though President Asker Akaev has been adamant about maintaining ethnic and cultural pluralism in his country, the Slavic population is destined to feel discriminated against as more and more nationalistic policies are adopted. It should be noted, however, that ethnic problems in Kyrgyzstan do not appear as ominous as they do in Kazakhstan.

Ethnic problems are slightly different in Uzbekistan, the most populous republic of Muslim Central Asia (19.9 million). The presence of Russians, though problematic given their traditionally privileged status, might be diminishing in its deleterious potential because they are leaving Uzbekistan. A potentially destabilizing problem of Uzbekistan is the presence of the Tajik minority, and in fact, two famous Tajik-speaking Islamic centers of Central Asia--Samarkhand and Bukhara--are part of Uzbekistan. When one adds this confused intermingling of ethnic groups with the fact that Uzbeks, because of their number, cause much fear among minority groups that are likely to be assimilated in the larger culture, one is looking at a potential ethnic explosion.

Anticipating this mishmash of various ethnic groups that are either suspicious of each other or even do not like each other, and recognizing that artificially drawn borders among republics might cause an outbreak of hostilities, these republics have carefully guaranteed the permanence of borders in all bilateral agreements. One of the key provisions of the new commonwealth also underscores the inviolability of the present borders.(Note 3) For Kazakhstan, this is a major fear, stemming from a potential change of heart in Moscow, especially if Boris Yeltsin is replaced by a hardline Slavic chauvinist leader. Other republics also manifest the same concern.(Note 4)

THE ECONOMY

The greatest need for the Muslim Central Asian states is to acquire economic self-sufficiency, which has several characteristics. First, the Central Asian states are interested in breaking away from the old Soviet economic ties in which all were assigned a specific economic role with the chief aim of serving the Soviet economy. At the same time, they are busy reformulating this association in the form of a Central Asian Commonwealth. Second, the Central Asian states are looking for avenues of economic integration with other Muslim states of the Middle East and Southwest Asia, in which they would not play the role of suppliers of raw materials only. The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) has become an important vehicle in this regard. The third characteristic of their quest for self-sufficiency motivates these countries to seek arrangements for industrialization and joint ventures with Western countries. Appendix 1 and the following briefs provide economic profiles of these six republics.

Azerbaijan

This country rates high on the scale of industrialization, with its industry accounting for more than 40 percent and its agriculture for 30 percent of the net material product (NMP) of the former Soviet Union.(Note 5) Azerbaijan led the former Soviet Union in economic growth from 1971 to 1985. It has large oil reserves, estimated to be around 1 billion metric tons. Its annual production declined in recent years, from 13 to 11 million metric tons, about 80 percent of which is produced offshore.

Azerbaijan is one of the few Muslim Central Asian republics that not only exports more than it imports, but whose exports and imports are largely finished goods and industrial raw materials, respectively. Its exports were 46 percent and imports 37 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1987 to 1990. Over 90 percent of its exports are refined oil products, machinery, textiles and wines that are shipped mainly to Russia and Ukraine. Of its imports, 70 to 80 percent come from other republics of the former USSR. These include industrial raw materials, crude oil for reexport as a refined product, and processed foods. These figures are destined the decline because of the Azeri-Armenian conflict involving Nagorno-Karabakh, and also because of Azerbaijan's status as a newly independent republic.

Kazakhstan

This nation rates as the most industrialized republic in the region. Kazakhstan's unique feature is that its industrial and agricultural sectors are highly developed, with agricultural products forming 37 percent of its NMP in 1991. Its industrial sector is "geared mainly toward metallurgy, heavy machinery and machine tools, petrol-chemicals, agro-processing and textiles."(Note 6)

Kazakhstan is well endowed in mineral resources. "As of 1990, the country's proven mineral reserves represented over 90 percent of total USSR reserves of chrome and close to 50 percent of the USSR reserves of lead, wolfram (tungsten), copper, and zinc; it accounted for 19 percent of USSR coal production and 7 percent of oil production." The chromite deposits of northwest Kazakhstan, for example, supplied virtually all of Soviet production, with output in the mid-1980s reaching 4 million metric tons annually.(Note 7) Other important mineral resources for Kazakhstan include its gold reserves, which accounted for one-sixth of total Soviet production. Besides raw materials extraction, Kazakhstan also enjoyed a developed chemical and steel industry. Of the total annual Soviet output of phosphate (600,000 metric tons), Kazakhstan produced four-fifths.(Note 8) Kazakhstan's steel industry, however, was developed under ideological guidelines, rather than available resources. While possessing sufficient energy and coking coal, the steel mills at Karaganda depend on both imported iron ore and water.(Note 9)

Given the development strategy of Moscow, Kazakhstan's industry was heavily tied to that of the other republics. In some fields Kazakh plants produced the lion's share of a given product. In the chemical and smelting industry, Kazakhstan was often the most vital of all Soviet sources. But even this country is also a victim of specialization that was idiosyncratic to the economy of the former Soviet Union. About one-third of the finished goods consumed in the country are imported. By the same token, three-fourths of its total exports, including interrepublican trade, are intermediate goods and raw materials.(Note 10)

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan's economy is primarily agricultural, but its unique characteristic is the presence of a sizable private sector.(Note 11) In some major crops, the share of the private sector is between one-third and one-half. Agriculture accounted for 40 percent of the NMP in 1990-1991, while the industrial sector accounted for about one-third of the NMP. Another feature of the Kyrgyz economy is its excessive dependence on imports, especially from republics of the former Soviet Union. For 1990, an estimated 98 percent of its total exports were sold within these republics.

Tajikistan

This is the poorest of all the Muslim republics. Its economy is highly dependent on agriculture, which accounted for 38 percent of its NMP in 1990. It is also a major producer of cotton, and accounted for 11 percent of the total cotton production of the former USSR. Tajikistan's industrial sector is substantially state owned. The state's share of fixed industrial assets was around 98 percent in 1990. For the same year, Tajikistan's share of interrepublic trade was between 80 percent and 90 percent of its exports and imports, respectively.(Note 12)

Turkmenistan

This republic lies "at the lower end of the scale in terms of social development indicators, with the highest infant mortality rate and the lowest life expectancy at birth."(Note 13) Its economy is primarily agricultural. Cotton is the major crop grown, accounting for more than 50 percent of its arable land and 60 percent of its total agricultural production. Production and processing of energy are also important for its economy. Turkmenistan's gas reserves are estimated to be 8.1 trillion cubic meters; its energy reserves are estimated to be around 700 million tons. The significance of cotton and mineral resources is reflected in its industrial development. In 1991, 61 textile enterprises generated about one-third of its total industrial production. Thirty-eight large state-owned chemical, gas, oil processing, and electricity-generating industries accounted for another third of its industrial production.

Uzbekistan

This is a state where agriculture, oil, and mineral deposits dominate economic activities.(Note 14) Agriculture represents about 40 percent of its NMP and 30 percent of employment, while its industrial production is around 30 percent of its NMP and 18 percent of employment. Its heavy trade dependence on the states of the former Soviet Union is underscored by the fact that its exports to these states form 34 percent of its GDP, while "foreign" exports are only about 4 percent of its GDP. Similarly, its imports from its former Soviet partners and from "foreign" sources are reported to be 30 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of its GDP. Uzbekistan is the fourth largest producer of cotton, which accounts for 40 percent of its entire agricultural production. It also has large reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and coal. Uzbekistan was a major natural gas producer of the former Soviet Union.

RESOURCES

Perhaps the most critical resource for future development is energy. The six Central Asian states account for 9 percent of CIS oil production, but are known to have 12 percent of total in the CIS proven reserves. Of these, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan "have oil resources comparable to those of the minor OPEC production."(Note 15) For these states, oil reserves not only guarantee a measure of economic independence, but also represent a potential source of hard-currency income, such as Kazakhstan's recent deal with Chevron to exploit the Tenghiz oil field. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan contain large amounts of natural gas, and Kazakhstan is moving to attract foreign investment and development of oil and gas fields at Karachaganak, where oil and natural gas reserves were estimated to be around 1 trillion cubic meters and 80 million tons, respectively. Kazakhstan's energy reserves also include major coal deposits. The coal fields at Karaganda and Ekibastuz were the third largest in the former Soviet Union; annually, some 130 million tons of coal were extracted from these fields for shipment to the Ural steel mills or for use in regional electrical generating plants.(Note 16)

In the former Soviet Union, however, Central Asia was also a primary source of natural gas. Because of Central Asia's large reserves and its relative proximity, it met 40 percent of the European half of the Soviet Union's natural gas demand.(Note 17) Though there are some reserves in other republics, the most important source for natural gas was Turkmenistan. During the eleventh Five-Year Plan, before the economic disruption of reform, Turkmenistan produced 84.7 billion cubic meters of gas annually and held 70 percent of all Central Asian reserves.(Note 18) Given their large proven and estimated reserves of energy, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan can enjoy a greater degree of autonomy as a result of their domestic energy self-sufficiency.

The other states in the region have fewer sources of energy, which include some hydroelectric stations. The hydroelectric stations of Tajikistan, however, depend on skilled technical workers, many of whom are Slavs. Thus the loss of Slav technicians could result in a temporary decrease in output. Uzbekistan also has energy resources of its own. In 1990 its estimated natural gas output was about 41 billion cubic meters, and its petroleum production was about 2.8 million tons. The recent discoveries of oil in the Namangan and Ferghana regions promise to make Uzbekistan self-sufficient in energy.(Note 19)

Energy reserves are only a fraction of the natural resources located in Central Asia, albeit the most important. Given the new post-Cold War global order, the location of uranium mining facilities in the region may prove to be a tempting delicacy for a third power, regional or not. Though most of the former Soviet Union's uranium was mined in this area, most processing took place in Russia.

Besides yellow gold, Central Asia was known more for its white gold: cotton. Development of the cotton industry dates back to the 1860s, when the American Civil War deprived Russia of American cotton. Though Central Asia as a region is important for cotton production, cotton growing is concentrated mainly in Uzbekistan, which contributes some 61 percent of total production.(Note 20)

The extent and importance of cotton production were increased under the Soviet authorities, especially during the past 30 years. The expansion of production in this arid region has come as a result of a massive increase in irrigation, largely from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. From 1961 to 1986, land under irrigation in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan increased 62 percent.(Note 21) The expansion of the cotton fields has had several negative impacts on the states of Central Asia, however.

Examining the socioeconomic conditions of the region, one can see the impact of the cotton monoculture. Unfortunately for the local population, cotton proved to be extremely profitable for both Moscow and the republican Communist leadership, who benefitted the most from the cotton profits. In an economy suffering from shortages and poor delivery systems, cotton proved to be the ideal crop. Whereas Soviet agriculture tended to lose 20 percent of a given crop between farm and market because of rough handling or spoilage, cotton has the distinct advantage of being imperishable. Fruit or vegetable production requires expensive refrigeration, but cotton can be simply piled on the ground.

Given the Central Asians' reluctance to leave their traditional, rural life, cotton seemed to offer an effective means of exploiting the situation. Cotton production in Central Asia is labor intensive: over one-half of the harvested cotton is collected by hand. The combination of a high birth rate (Central Asia's average for 1986 was 35 births per 1,000 population), a propensity to remain rural, and a lack of investment in production-related industry translated into growing unemployment. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, unemployment in Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan was estimated to be 16 to 20 percent of the potential labor force.(Note 22)

The concentration of cotton production in Uzbekistan led to an especially acute situation. Unemployment in the late 1980s was estimated to be around two million people, almost 10 percent of the total population. James Critchlow, in his examination of the Uzbek economy, writes that unemployment was repeatedly cited as a factor in the 1989 Faarghana valley riots in that country. These riots, he maintains, resulted in making more than two-fifths of the Uzbek population "dependent on others, whether relatives or the state."(Note 23)

Expansion of the cotton monoculture was achieved at great cost in other areas as well. For instance, even though cotton was grown in the Central Asian states, its processing was done in Russia. The underlying intent was to deprive these states of industrialization and keep them dependent on the Soviet Union for the processing of their vital commodity. Second, tax rates heavily favored the Soviet Union. Ahmad Rashid cites telling figures on this issue: "There was an average tax of 400-600 roubles on one ton of raw cotton, while on finished products the tax was in region of 1,200-1,700 roubles."(Note 24)

To increase production, most arable land was given over to cotton production, and as cotton production increased, an almost equal and dramatic loss in food production also materialized. Now Central Asia, which used to grow enough food to sustain itself, is dependent on food imported from other republics. This trend has been especially evident in the loss of the many fruit orchards. In Uzbekistan, trees used to grow on an estimated 15 percent of the arable land, but by 1987 that percentage had decreased to only 1 percent. As the Soviet Union collapsed, food shortages became quite common in the region. The new states have made efforts to increase the amount of land devoted to food production, but the damage cannot be immediately reversed. As Russia itself tries to reform its agriculture, Central Asia must begin to look for other sources of grain and other foodstuffs. Some Muslim states have moved to fill this need; already Saudi Arabia has donated 800,000 tons of grain to Uzbekistan.(Note 25)

Certain other economic characteristics likely to affect the political dynamics and future stability of the Central Asian Muslim republics are worth noting. For instance, the economy of northern Kazakhstan, because this region is predominantly inhabited by the Russian population, is heavily industrial and is more closely linked to Siberia and the Russian republic than it is to its own agricultural south. In Kazakhstan one finds the Baykonur space complex and its related technology, yet the region is also marked by extreme poverty and backwardness.

In the past, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan mainly exported raw materials to other republics for final processing. For example, Uzbekistan produced 5 million tons of cotton annually, but 90 percent of this cotton was exported raw. During 1992-1993, however, that country set out to establish its own cotton processing industry by importing it from the West.

Of these republics, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan appear determined to make steady progress toward becoming liberal and market-oriented economies, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan--because they are highly authoritarian states--are manifesting greater central control over their economies. It will be some time before Tajikistan, which is experiencing a civil war, will determine its own course of economic development. Much of its economic direction will depend on the type of government that emerges at the conclusion of the civil war. Azerbaijan is also likely to forge ahead with market-oriented reforms in the future. However, like the Tajik civil war, another ongoing political conflict--this one involving Nagorno-Karabakh--will have a major impact on its political leadership, as well as on economic priorities.

ECOLOGY AND HEALTH

Environmental neglect and destruction are not restricted by ideology, and the extent of the ecological damage in the former Soviet Union approaches the realm of science fiction. The following most aptly describes the former Soviet Union's crimes against nature in Central Asia:

Nowhere has the link between the misuse of the land and filthy water been manifested more clearly than in Central Asia. There, a combination of unfiltered drinking water, untreated sewage, and large quantities of pesticides, herbicides, defoliants, and fertilizers has done massive damage to the population's health, not to mention causing severe economic losses. For decades, pure water from the region's rivers has been diverted to irrigation projects (especially for cotton), and the water remaining in rivers and streams is almost always badly polluted. Noting that more than three billion cubic meters of agricultural, industrial, and human waste flowed into the Amu Darya each year, the minister of health of Soviet Turkmenia [present day Turkmenistan] described that waterway several years ago as "little more than a sewage ditch."(Note 26)

This systematic neglect and even gross abuse of the environment that the Muslim Central Asian states experienced has its roots in some of the idiosyncrasies of the centrally planned economy of the former USSR.

A substantial portion of resources in the former Soviet economy (approximately 85 percent) were allocated to "production group A." These resources include heavy industries, mining, energy, transportation sectors, and the manufacture of the means of production. On the contrary, only 15 percent of resources were invested in the consumer-oriented sector. "The result was production for its own sake, which increased stresses on the environment."(Note 27) Another reason environmental abuse went unattended, especially in Muslim Central Asia, was "the depth of corruption" in that region.(Note 28) The result was a systematic distortion of statistics, by underreporting the death rates and by falsifying reasons of deaths on a national scale. In other words, when the Communist system was not even willing to face the gross abuse of the environment and its attendant consequences, there was no hope that it would do anything about it. It was only in the early 1970s that Soviet authorities decided to take "positive action to combat first air and then water pollution."(Note 29)

The pollution problems of Kazakhstan are more traditional: air pollution from the old, centrally controlled industries and factories, and some radiation problems around the Semipalatinsk weapons test site. In the agricultural (especially cotton) regions of Central Asia, however, the drive to expand cotton production at all costs has presented its bill: water shortages in countries like Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and poisoning of the land and people of the region; the massive diversion of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, leading to a dramatic change in and even perhaps the slow death of the Aral Sea, which is fed by these rivers. The development of a massive system of irrigation canals caused only one-eighth as much water to reach the Aral Sea from the two main river systems in 1989 as in 1960.(Note 30) In fact, in the 1980s it was reported that the Syr Darya no longer reaches this sea. Unless corrective measures are taken soon, the Aral Sea will disappear in our lifetime: its capacity has shrunk by 80 kilometers, its depth has decreased by 123 meters, and it has lost 69 percent of its original volume of water.(Note 31) While solutions remain difficult to identify, the cause is more obvious.

Adding insult to injury, the massively developed irrigation network is extremely inefficient. Irrigation canals require not only initial investment for construction, but also continued capital inputs for upkeep. As was often the case in the former Soviet economy, such additional funding is not available. The results are staggering. An estimated 50 to 90 percent of the water diverted for irrigation never reaches the fields, becoming absorbed into the earth in the many unlined and poorly maintained canals.(Note 32) The water that does reach the fields often achieves undesired results. The constant use of field flooding as a means of irrigation has over time led to the salinization of the soil.(Note 33) In addition, some of the irrigated lands have become useless through rising water tables. In the cotton area, an estimated 8.6 million acres have become waterlogged and have had to be removed from production.(Note 34)

The picture of environmental disaster gets worse. As land was lost, and as cotton yields decreased, the leadership moved to reverse the trend by increasing the use of chemicals. Thus after flowing through the fields, the water that remained was heavily polluted. To combat resistant insects, the local authorities applied 49 pounds of chemical per acre.(Note 35) That remaining water, polluted and saline, constituted the drinking water for the region's population.

A further problem is that infrastructural investments have not been made in water purification plants and this heavily polluted drinking water has taken its toll on the people. In the autonomous republic of Karakalpak (in Uzbekistan), mothers who nurse their infants run the risk of poisoning them.(Note 36) In the entire region the drinking water crisis has become particularly acute. Given the chemical cocktail contained in its drinking water and the low state of health care, Central Asia has the highest infant mortality rates of the former Soviet republics. In Turkmenistan, for example, three-fifths of the maternity clinics, wards, and pediatric hospitals cannot supply hot water, and an additional 127 hospitals have no piped water, resulting in an infant mortality rate of 111 per thousand.(Note 37)

Drinking water is also a problem for the region's mostly rural population, which lives mostly in the cotton belt, is actively involved in cotton production, and is engaged in actually cutting the chemically dusted cotton by hand--and thus faces even further water and health problems. In the republics of Azerbaijan (also a cotton producer), Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, between 44 and 48 percent of the townships have no sewer systems; their waste simply flows into the already stagnant runoff.(Note 38) In some areas, the population is left with no choice but to quench its thirst by drinking directly from these stagnant ponds, since their collective farms do not have any piped water. As Murray Feshbach notes, "only 23 percent of the collective farms in Uzbekistan, 20 percent in Kirghizia, 14 percent in Tajikistan and just 2 percent in Turkmenistan has piped water for farmers' residences."(Note 39)

As the Central Asian states embark on the path of democratization, the lingering problems inherited from "Czar Cotton" will leave their mark. The possibilities contained in the potential oil and gas wealth are seemingly outweighed by the ecological disaster in the region. Restoring the health of the people is inherently tied to the health of the land. As the Aral Sea slowly disappears, the region's climate will also change, with unknown consequences for regional agriculture.

In February 1992, members of the CIS (with the exception of Ukraine) signed an interrepublican agreement, "On Cooperation in the Area of Ecology and Environmental Protection," in which the parties agreed:

To promote environmental protection through the drafting and enforcement of environmental legislation and regulations, monitoring and assessing environmental quality, pursuing sustainable economic development, preserving wilderness areas and biodiversity, and supporting environmental education

To harmonize methodologies, procedures, and standards of environmental assessment and regulation and to make them compatible with international practice

To pursue joint environmental research and protection programs, including the dismantling of chemical and nuclear weapons

To create an "interstate ecological information system" and common list of endangered species

To form an "interstate ecological council" composed of the environment ministers of the participating states

To finance an "interstate ecological fund" aimed primarily at rendering disaster assistance.(Note 40)

Turkmenistan refused to be a party to financing the activities of the interstate ecological council. Given the grossly poor record of environmental management, the signing of this document is definitely a leap forward. Now, it remains to be seen how seriously the signatories will adhere to the letter and the spirit of the document.

POLITICAL PLURALISM

The issue of political pluralism is very complicated in Muslim Central Asia. Yet, the future dynamics of this topic will not only determine the political personality of all these states, but it will also determine how stable these countries are likely to be in the coming years.

Like human beings, states are affected by their social and political milieu. This milieu includes historical, cultural, and political traditions not only of the Central Asian societies but also of their immediate neighborhood. Culturally and historically, these countries are tribal and nomadic societies that were not allowed free existence. The czarist regime incorporated them in its empire, and when the imperial rule came to a bloody end, the Communist "czars" proved equally determined, and no less ruthless, in maintaining the system of colonial rule and subjugation of these states. Under both systems, the Muslim states were forced to exist under an assumed and alien entity, first as part of the Russian empire, then as citizens of the Soviet empire. Although their ethnic identity was maintained as an administrative necessity, their real existence as Muslims was suppressed and denied. According to one study, Stalin's policies were clearly aimed at shattering the "hopes of pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic movements " in Central Asia; he divided the Central Asian people in separate ethnic groupings, killed their hopes for having "a common homeland, a common language, and a common destiny" and clearly wanted to "pit one republic and one ethnic group against another."(Note 41) This was not enough. The Communists invested their best efforts in eradicating the presence of Islam through massive anti-Islamic propaganda, by banning the use of Arabic and replacing it with a Latin script first and then Cyrillic, and by closing mosques. This anti-Islamic campaign was effective: there were 26,000 active mosques in 1971, but by 1985 there were only 400. These systematic anti-Islamic policies were explained away by the Communist rulers by saying that they were, in reality, attempting "to create a new Soviet man."(Note 42)

One of the reasons no independent political movement took root in Russia was because the native elites were extremely small in number, remained deeply divided, and failed to broaden their support base among the masses. Consequently, when the Communists won the civil war after the 1917 revolution, they co-opted the Muslim elites into the Communist system and thus made the political transition from czarism to nationalism, and then to socialism within a single generation. Muslim leaders who refused to go through this transformation were killed. This treatment of Central Asian Muslim leadership "was only a continuation of the early refusal of the Bolsheviks to acknowledge any of the local political trends or popular aspirations."(Note 43) The Soviet system thus established a veneer of indigenous educated elites, who identified themselves as both Soviet and Communist, and a majority population in Muslim Central Asia that identified itself as neither. Moreover, a substantial part of this population remained uneducated and inward looking, and, most important, continued to identify itself with Islam.

In the 20th century, the political traditions with which the Central Asian states are familiar are either communism, which prevailed in the former Soviet Union, or authoritarianism, which prevailed in the Middle East. There is also the Turkish model of democratic secularism; however, the chances of its incorporation on a permanent (or even for the long-term) basis are questionable, at best.

When the Soviet Union collapsed from within, Muslim Central Asian leaders were reluctant to accept the sovereign status of their republics. In every state, these leaders were handpicked by the authorities in Moscow, because of their impeccable credentials as loyal Communist apparatchiks. When the Communist Party was disbanded in Moscow, these leaders scrambled to find a new and a "democratic" identity, because democracy came into vogue in almost all corners of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe-- but these leaders had no experience with democracy. More important, they were presiding over societies that were similarly lacking any experience in democracy and were economically underdeveloped. Some of the most significant questions faced by the Central Asian leadership were how to preside over such societies; how to bring about economic development without being autocratic; and whether to allow political pluralism (or how much pluralism to allow) as they endeavored to move toward market economies (otherwise known as economic pluralism).

Another crucial question was whether political pluralism and economic pluralism would be simultaneously introduced. The Gorbachev experience--his decision to introduce glasnost and perestroika eventually brought about the collapse of the Soviet empire--was an uneasy reminder that the simultaneous introduction of both economic and political pluralism may lead to cataclysmic changes. No Central Asian leader was willing to accept such a potential outcome. They were, however, aware that pluralism had also been introduced in a number of Eastern European countries, so the path they had to take was not clearly marked. There were serious risks hanging over their respective political horizons. The actual performance of the Muslim Central Asian leaders regarding political pluralism requires closer examination.

The politics of Azerbaijan since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been turbulent. Because it was a part of the Soviet empire for so long, and because it had no political experience with democracy, its post-independence approach to democracy has been shaky. Even its membership in the CIS was consummated on an undemocratic basis, when the former President Ayaz Mutalibov signed an agreement to join in December 1991, despite opposition from many Azeri nationalists. Today, the future of democracy and political pluralism in that country rests with the future dynamics of two major issues: the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the pace of economic development. At times, the country appears to be so consumed by the Karabakh conflict that the political fortunes of major politicians are made and destroyed by episodic development involving this conflict. For instance, when the Armenian forces killed several hundred Azeri civilians in the Karabakh town of Khodzhaly, President Mutalibov was forced to resign on March 6. The election of President Abulfaz Elchibey, who was the chairman of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (AZPF), in June 1992 was carried out in the aftermath of another skirmish over Karabakh--which resulted in the fall of Susha to the Armenian forces (figure 3).

In the absence of any resolution of the Karabakh conflict, one can only hope that the emergence of political pluralism in Azerbaijan rests largely with the ability of some politicians "whose program promised economic wealth to rival Kuwait's."(Note 44) The number of politicians with radical solutions to this conflict appears to be growing as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or the neighbors of Azerbaijan, continue to fail in their attempts to negotiate a political solution. A continued impasse on this conflict appears to be a time bomb close to the heart of political pluralism in that country; in fact, in June 1993, that time bomb exploded when rebel commander Colonel Surat Husseinov seized power from President Elchibey. This power struggle was directly related to the way the Karabakh conflict was handled by the Elchibey government. The Azeri parliament voted to strip Elchibey of all his power, and Heydar Aliev, who was appointed as speaker of the parliament by Elchibey in an attempt to avert the impending civil war in that country, took over. Aliev's rising political fortunes also cast a dark shadow on the political landscape of that country because of his checkered career under the former USSR, as a former KGB general, a Communist Party boss of Azerbaijan in the 1970s, and a politburo member in the 1980s.(Note 45)

The future of political pluralism appears better in Kazakhstan, simply because President Sultan Nazerbaev--a former Communist--has adopted a steady course for his country. Even though Nazerbaev cannot pass for a genuine democrat, given the special character of his country he has been quite successful in bringing about a political transition for Kazakhstan from a Communist society to one that is independent and relatively open. The source of concern related is that his personal leadership has become too important an entity for the future of Kazakhstan. In other words, the notion of political legitimacy that is so crucially linked with political institutions as a precondition for the evolution of democracy is sorely lacking in Kazakhstan. Instead, political legitimacy is revolving around the personality of Nazerbaev. Consequently, whether Kazakhstan would be able to make a successful transition from personal legitimacy to institutional legitimacy remains a question.

While one considers the issue of legitimacy, one should not forget that in 1993 Kazakhstan became one of the hopeful symbols of the capability of a Muslim Central Asian state to develop political pluralism. This is a country next door to Russia, whose northern half is predominantly Russian and which keeps a wary eye on political developments in Russia. Kazakhstan is also a nuclear state. It is a society where the indigenous population as well as its Slavic section remain overly sensitive about their respective future political status and fortunes. Kazakhstan is a polity where even political parties thrive along ethnic lines. Where possible, Nazerbaev has sought to limit the contentious nature of governing a multiethnic, multireligious state. His opposition to Islamic political parties is matched by his opposition to all religious parties. Though an atheist, he states his opposition to religious organizations not on dogmatic grounds, but rather on political realities.(Note 46)

Despite the political sophistication with which Nazerbaev has been managing political events, it should be noted that he has expressed his ambivalence toward the evolution of political pluralism and democracy in his country on more than one occasion. He is reported to be "nervous about relinquishing his personal power too rapidly" and has expressed profound agreement with the view that "the path from totalitarianism to democracy lies through enlightened authoritarianism."(Note 47) He might have been thinking of the Gorbachev experience when he observed that "one would have to possess a heart of ice and a mind of concrete to limit freedom to small doses for people who have been deprived of it for nearly seven-and-a half decades."(Note 48)

Kyrgyzstan is a shining example of a Muslim Central Asian state's experience with political pluralism. This country is led by the physician-cum-politician Askar Akayev, who takes pride in the fact that he was responsible for the establishment of the first multiparty democracy in the area and who apparently does not share the apprehension of Nazerbaev about rushing headlong into democracy. Akayev also believes in the simultaneous evolution of political as well as economic pluralism, and his example is likely to be watched with interest by the political leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Unlike Azerbaijan, however, Akayev's country is not saddled with a conflict of the size of Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, unlike Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan does not have to worry about the presence of a very large number of Russians whose political alienation could result in a division of his country. The evolving political and economic pluralism does face one disadvantage--Kyrgyzstan relies heavily on the technical talents of Slavs.

The other two Central Asian republics--Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan--rate highly on the scale of authoritarianism. In both states, former Communist bosses are serving as Presidents--Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and Sepermurad Niyazov in Turkmenistan. Karimov has "a reputation as the most authoritarian leader in Central Asia."(Note 49) His political preference is precisely summarized in the phrase, "stability at any price."(Note 50) This preference was also expressed when President Karimov stated that China continues to serve as a role model for economic reform in Uzbekistan.(Note 51) Although he later denied ever making this statement, it is clear that as a former Communist who is presiding over a former Communist state, he was intrigued by one "central principle" of the Chinese strategy: "encouraging economic but not political initiative."(Note 52) As a result of his extensive trip to Southeast Asia, Karimov is reported to have been fascinated with the "Indonesian model" of economic development. There are a number of factors in common between Uzbekistan and Indonesia--Islam, large population, history of colonial domination, etc.--but it appears that Indonesian economic development under authoritarian political rule is the reason for this interest.

Turkmenistan's President Saparmurad Niyazov, like his Uzbek counterpart Karimov, insists that political stability is the most important variable for fulfilling the vision of a democratic and secular state that he wants for his country,(Note 53) but that explanation becomes his excuse for presiding over another highly authoritarian state of Central Asia. Political power in this country remains firmly in the hands of the old Communist Party nomenklatura, and "the overall direction of policy is under Niyazov's personal control."(Note 54) Niyazov's own views of democratic freedoms are reflected in the treatment of this issue in the Turkmenistani constitution. "In sections of the constitution dealing with basic rights and freedoms, one-third of the articles leave the final say to bureaucratic agencies."(Note 55) In an interview on the subject of personal freedoms, Niyazov noted, "These freedoms are all observed at present [in our country], although during the transitional stage the state must regulate the functioning of these concepts in the interest of society as a whole."(Note 56) One cannot help noticing the striking resemblance of this statement to the old Marxist rhetoric related to establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a state of transition toward the creation of a classless society. This condition is supposed to bring about the "disappearance of the state."

The supreme ruling body of Turkmenistan is known as the People's Council, a vehicle devised by Niyazov. This council "masks the authoritarian nature of Niyazov's rule with a structure intended to hark back to the tribal assemblies of Turkmenistan's past."(Note 57) Moreover, there are no officially recognized political parties in Turkmenistan.

No definite statement can be made at this time about political pluralism in Tajikistan, where a civil war has been in progress since May 1992, the purpose of which is to dislodge the rule of former Communist President Rahman Nabiyev, who was heading another authoritarian regime in that country. This civil war has been variously described as a battle between ex-Communist and anti-Communist forces, or a struggle between ex-Communist and nationalist-Islamic forces. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, a specialist in the Tajik affairs, describes it:

The battle in Tajikistan is not propelled by ideology: the driving forces are not Communist, Islamic, nationalist or democratic values. These ideologies are only labels used in the legitimization of different regional clashes. Strong regional rivalries ("mahalgaroi," translated as "regionalism" or "localism"), which have been encouraged by the Moscow policy of divide-and-rule since 1924, determine today's political loyalties.(Note 58)

The real reason for this civil war is a combination of the second and third positions: it is a struggle between ex-Communist and nationalist-Islamic forces, in which "regionalism" or "localism" is also playing a catalytic role (figure 4). These different groups, led by different "warlords," seem "to be organized around two major regions (Leninabad in the north and the southern Karategin faction) which enjoy clientele relationships with other towns and cities."(Note 59) Because the conflict is brewing in a Muslim country, it is only inevitable that Islam will play a role in it, especially when "the speedy politicization of Islam [was] carried out by ambitious groups of interested people."(Note 60)

The troubling aspect of the role of Islam in this conflict is related to two developments. First is the position taken by the united opposition--a grouping of the Democratic Party, the Rastokhez National Front, and the Islamic Revivalist Party (IRP)--during the antigovernment demonstrations held during April-May 1991. This group made "vague promises of a future Islamic state but [had] a more pertinent goal of re-Islamization [read renativization] of society to replace the "Sovietization" of institutions."(Note 61) As a response, the progovernment groups and the Russian army portrayed the opposition as "Islamic Fundamentalists." The speaker of the parliament, Emomali Rakhmonov, blamed Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, the Qazi (religious judge) of Kalan, for conducting the civil war. But in reality, "only a small minority of the fighters actually belonged to the Islamic Revivalist Party; most fighters were politically secular."(Note 62) Although the ex-Communist forces (still Communist in all but name) gained an upper hand and the nationalist Islamic coalition forces suffered a setback, the civil war is far from over. If the ex-Communist forces gain a clear victory, authoritarian rule will be reinstated in Tajikistan. Even then, in all likelihood, Tajikistan will remain an unstable polity.

What is most disconcerting about this civil war is the participation of Uzbek and Russian troops on behalf of ex-Communist forces; neither state has "behaved as if it considered Tajikistan as a genuinely sovereign and independent country."(Note 63) In 1995, Tajikistan as a sovereign state exists only on paper. The Rahmonov government is too dependent for its existence on the presence of the Russian and Uzbek forces. The government's supporters in the southern part of that country are not interested in a political compromise that will lessen their political power. The opposition parties are divided between those who seek a political solution and power sharing, and those who want an all-out victory over the Rahmonov government. The Russian, Uzbek, and Tajik axis, to its credit, has expressed its interest in seeking a political dialogue with the opposition forces under the intense scrutiny and criticism of such entities as international amnesty groups and some European countries over their treatment of the opposition forces and gross violations of human rights.

The prospects for the reemergence of Tajikistan as a truly sovereign nation are not exactly dim, however. Imagine the ominous implications of the precedent of a potential disappearance of a nation-state due to the ethnic-based warfare in the entire region. At the same time, one has to recognize the immensely complicated nature of the protracted civil war in that unhappy country, which is also tied to an equally complicated and protracted civil war that has been continuing in Afghanistan.(Note 64)

To summarize, the prospects for political pluralism are, at best, mixed in Muslim Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is the best example of political pluralism, while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have a mixed record. At least Kazakhstan is stable and benignly authoritarian. Azerbaijani politics have some way to go before a stable pattern of political pluralism is to emerge. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are under authoritarian regimes that are likely to plunge into civil war, if their present acute economic underdevelopment continues. The Tajikistani example is keeping the attention of both Niyazov and Karimov. But in all likelihood, they both are likely to increase the level of authoritarian control over their populations since they value political stability so much.

ISLAM AND THE FUTURE OF

POLITICAL STABILITY

A discussion of political stability in any Muslim polity must also take into consideration the role of Islam. The absence of the Western notion of separation of church and state in Muslim countries makes it only inevitable that Islamic parties of all shades--the moderate as well as the radicals--will enter the political arena. Given this reality, the important question is, what will be the relationship between Islam and the state in the Central Asian countries in coming years?

The Tajik civil war does not bode well for the peaceful and constructive evolution of this relationship, and the prospects for a peaceful and stable future in any of these Central Asian countries do not look very bright. To begin with, almost all states, save Kyrgyzstan, are under authoritarian rule, which means that the present regimes are not likely to allow for political compromises among a number of groups--especially Islamic groups--on various crucial political, social, and economic issues faced by these countries. It is worth noting that political compromise has its roots in the character of a democratic political culture. It is nurtured through a process of socialization at all levels. Political leaders are old hands at forging compromises before they reach the uppermost echelons of decisionmaking.

The political culture of Central Asia, on the contrary, has been heavily influenced by tribalism, centralized control, political and religious repression, and democratic centralism. All these characteristics, save tribalism, are typical of Communist societies. When the Soviet Union collapsed, those who were at the helm of affairs in Central Asian countries were trained Communists. As such, they not only ignored the "forewarning of the impending collapse" of the USSR, but "supported the failing union to the end, making no contingency plans for its possible demise."(Note 65) After they reluctantly became independent, they changed the names of Communist parties in their respective countries to some sort of "democratic" parties, but those parties in reality remained Communist. These leaders had no experience with democracy. They were also presiding over polities that were teetering at the brink of political chaos if direly needed economic development and progress did not materialize. In order to focus on economic development, a number of them (save Akaev of Kyrgyzstan) were convinced that they must continue with authoritarian control. Such a political posture allows no room for compromise, unless pressure becomes acute. Even then, a natural reaction of an authoritarian regime is to retaliate against those who are perceived as "enemies" of the regime. Regarding the Islamic parties, a "standard" response of a number of Central Asian states is to either outlaw them or repress them so much they go underground.

As in all Muslim polities, however, the relationship between Islam and government must be worked out over a period of time. In this regard, the Central Asian states share an important characteristic with other Muslim polities, where the relationship between government and Islamic parties is far from settled. In most Muslim societies, this relationship has been a rocky one: Egypt and Algeria are recent examples. In others, Islam and government are so fused that the latter has tried to sound like the extension of the former. Pakistan is an example of this, as is Saudi Arabia, where the ruling family has been acting not only as the guardian of Islamic shrines, but, arguably, also as a "guardian" of Sunni Islam.(Note 66) (Indeed, the Saudi religious elite has remained, since the founding of this dynasty, a symbol of legitimacy for the Saudi rule, and as such, the religious elite serves the political objectives of the Saudi rulers.) The prevailing relationship between the government and Islam in these countries, however, cannot in any way serve as prototypes for any Central Asian country. Central Asian countries must develop their own relationships with Islam, relationships that reflect the political and economic realities that prevail within each Central Asian country, or within the region. Islam is destined to figure prominently in the politics of these states, and the present rulers of Muslim Central Asia are well aware of this likelihood. That might be one reason why they are striving so hard to postpone the inevitable.

An Islamic revival is underway throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union, from the Caucasus to the Pamirs. Indeed, one can identify a trend among republican leaders to co-opt Islam as a means of securing legitimacy, in the same manner others pursue national identity. As the strength of the Communist Party began to dissipate, many leaders began to associate themselves publicly with Islam, such as Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan.(Note 67)

Despite their profession of Islamic faith, many of Central Asia's leaders have been anything but hospitable toward the different Islamic-oriented political movements in the region. Given the region's proximity to Iran, raising the excuse of "fundamentalism" has given them a convenient means to secure their political end-- to maintain power. As the Moscow-based Islamic Renaissance Party began to spread throughout Central Asia, it encountered many obstacles. In Tajikistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party was not allowed to register as a political party until after the aborted August coup of the Soviet Union in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Religious-based parties are still not allowed to register.(Note 68) Efforts to portray Muslim politicians as ruthless "fundamentalists" are present in almost every state; for example, in Uzbekistan, Muslim followers of the Muahid sect were blamed for starting the Ferghana riots of 1989. The highly authoritarian ruling style of President Karimov and his deep fear of a potential repetition of the Tajik-syle civil war in his country might be two variables that are driving his continued suppression of Islamic parties in Uzbekistan.(Note 69) Similarly, in Kazakhstan, the Islamic movement Alash has been harassed and labelled a "fascist" organization, and the former leader of Tajikistan, Nabiyev, categorized members of the Islamic Renaissance Party as fundamentalist extremists who want to create a new Iran on Tajik soil.(Note 70)

The real threat from the Islamic Renaissance Party, however, lies not with any religious fundamentalism, but rather with its strength as a political movement. As in many other republics of the former Soviet Union, there is a growing desire among many people to purge the government of the old Communist nomenklatura. While the Islamic Renaissance Party does profess a desire for all Muslims to live in accordance with the Quran, they also state the desire to achieve such a goal through constitutional means.(Note 71) Even in conflict-ravaged Tajikistan, the local Islamic Renaissance Party has continued to express its desire to achieve an Islamic order slowly through legitimate, peaceful means. In an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, Chairman of the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party Mukhamad-Sharif Khimmatzoda stated:

This is what we want. We realize that 100,00 or 200,000 people attending a rally do not have the right to foist their will on the entire republic. People are not ready yet. We believe the time will come when the children and grandchildren of those who today oppose Islam at the nationwide referendum, will say "yes."(Note 72)

The Islamic question is a multidimensional one. Attempts to portray the Islamic parties as "fundamentalist" or "extremists" are just as erroneous as claims of a pan-Turkic threat to the region. Besides the split between Sunni and Shia Muslims, the Muslim community around the world does not act as a monolithic or unified bloc; why should Central Asia prove to be the exception? Many regional problems in Central Asia aggravate trends toward a splintering rather than a fusing of Islamic forces. The rural-urban divide and the existence of regional loyalties are important factors in this regard. Many of the main parties or factions are centered in urban areas and almost exclusively comprise intellectuals. When 50 to 60 percent of the population is rural, largely uneducated, and living in squalid conditions, it cannot be taken as a given that the urban Muslims speak for the rural believers. The divide between the two also represents the deepest split among Central Asian Muslims: the Muslim intellectual elites with their jadidist (reformist) heritage and the rural masses, who view Islam as a populist movement.(Note 73)

In the near future, Islamic parties are likely to emerge among the major opposition parties in almost all Muslim Central Asian states. Whether these parties will play a role in stabilizing or destabilizing these polities depends on two factors:

The extent of success of economic development in these states. If these states were to make effective and steady economic progress, then the purported "necessity" for sustaining authoritarian rule (as presidents of various republics claim) would disappear. Under such circumstances, Islamic parties are also likely to participate, along with other political groups, in the political process.

How Islamic parties are likely to be treated by the ruling elites, regardless of the pace of future economic progress in those countries. If these parties are suppressed or outlawed, then they will have no choice but to acquire the form of insurgencies. Under such circumstances, their political posture and rhetoric might also be dominated by radical elements. If, on the other hand, the Islamic parties are allowed to remain as part of conventional opposition in these states, then their own style and rhetoric is likely to remain moderate.

SECURITY

In only a few Central Asian republics does the titular nationality have a majority. Even these republics have a sizable group of minorities living within their border, and many of these minority groups are geographically concentrated. In Kazakhstan, for example, most of the Russian minority lives in the northern areas, where Kazakhstan's industrial base lies. For the three republics sharing the fertile Ferghana Valley, the Soviet-drawn borders have encompassed sizable groups of minorities from the surrounding republics. Central Asia thus represents a quilt of nationalities.

The danger of ethnic conflict is not based on long-standing hostilities, such as in the former Yugoslavia. Before the Soviets entered Central Asia, many of these people did not even identify with a national group; rather, they differentiated among themselves through their lifestyle--settled or nomadic. In the context of social upheaval, however, the prospect of using the "new nationalism" as a source of legitimacy brings with it many risks. Currently there exists a movement to establish an identity separate from the Soviet period, removing traces of Russian domination. The Tajik party Rastokhez, for example, bases its program on a "renaissance of national language, culture and the better traditions and customs." The attempts to legislate issues of national identity, however, are fraught with conflict, especially in the multiethnic realities of the Central Asian states. For example, attempts to create a "Slavic University" in Bishkek were met with widespread protest by many Kyrgyz nationalists.(Note 74)

Attempts to solidify national identity on religious or linguistic lines have also led to a dramatic emigration of many Russians or other groups. Unfortunately for the new states, these groups often possess the vital technical skills needed to run the factories and energy plants, thus their exodus could lead to a short-term worsening of the economic situation. The Tajik conflict has already spurred a massive emigration of Russian-speaking inhabitants. Of the 400,000 Russian speakers living in Tajikistan before the civil war, not more than 70,000 remain there today.(Note 75) Perhaps in efforts to stave off such an exodus and calm fears among minority groups, the states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan originally declined membership in the Islamic Conference Organization and moved to restrict Islamic movements from the political scene in their states.(Note 76) Such moves, naturally, run the risk of alienating "national" support for such leaders. In the ongoing civil war in Tajikistan, we can see the potential for conflict, either interregional or interethnic.

When the new government was formed after Nabiyev's removal from power, many of the residents of the Leninabad oblast threatened to secede to Uzbekistan, a valid threat because the oblast is heavily populated by Uzbeks living in Tajikistan. In the fighting in Dushanbe, many of the attacking soldiers claimed they were Uzbeks, and many of the vehicles used in the assault on the capital had Uzbek license plates.(Note 77) By the summer of 1993, the continuing civil war was changing the political landscape of Tajikistan. There was a sizable presence of Russian forces, who were responsible for both internal and external security. Russia was regularly using the excuse of protecting the interests of Russian minorities in Tajikistan, not only to continue its intervention in the internal affairs of that country, but also to push the rubber-stamp Tajik legislature to pass a dual citizenship law. The passage of such a law was to be used to legitimize future intervention, at a time when the Russian troops would no longer be stationed in Tajikistan.

The Uzbek troops and air force were reportedly also present in Tajikistan, making sure that the Russian presence had the semblance of a CIS-wide approval. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, fearing a domino effect of this civil war on their own polities, also gave their approval to the presence of Russian and Uzbek forces in Tajikistan. However, both these governments remained wary of the future implications of the growing activism of Russia and Uzbekistan for their own sovereignties.

Another aspect of the fighting in Tajikistan is the creation of large groups of homeless refugees now moving around the region. Refugees have been fleeing the conflict and violence into the surrounding states, including Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan. The number of refugees crossing into Afghanistan has been particularly high because of its proximity to the southern regions of Tajikistan, regions involved with the opposition forces. During the height of the Communist reconquest of Dushanbe, an estimated 100,000 refugees crossed into Afghanistan.(Note 78) Perhaps concerned for Kyrgyz people living in Tajikistan, Vice-President of Kyrgyzstan Felix Kulov called for the introduction of peacekeeping troops from his republic into the fracas in Tajikistan.(Note 79)

The collapse of the Soviet Union has also raised the specter of regional border conflicts, not only between the new states but also over disputed territory with China. The Chinese claim territory currently held by the states of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, having in fact over 12 different disputes with the latter state.(Note 80) Given the presence of nuclear weapons both in Russia and, for now, in Kazakhstan, it is unlikely that China will act on these claims. Of greater interest might be the destabilizing factor within China resulting from the independence of the Central Asia states. Many of these peoples--Kazakhs, Uighurs, Kyrgyz--have relatives across the border in China. How these Turkic groups will react to changes in the region is a question that will be answered only over the next decade or so. Kazakhstan has authorized citizenship to any Kazakh in the world wishing to return to the homeland. Moscow and Beijing long tried to instigate rebellion in each other's Turkic hinterlands, and now that Soviet Central Asia has gained its independence, Beijing finds itself in an uncomfortable position.

The final element, which could lead to conflict in the region, is the densely populated Ferghana Valley. Not only is the valley a mixture of ethnic groups and languages, it is also the agricultural heart of the region, with the greatest concentration of population. As clean water becomes scarce and competition for agricultural resources increases, this tension could rapidly spread in an area already marred by ethnic violence. Another important element has also entered the picture: the Uzbek discovery of oil near Namangan, which happens to lie in the Ferghana Valley. As the new states seek to rebuild, modernize, and diversify their economies, foreign capital will prove to be extremely important.

CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The issue of nuclear weapons in the CIS is a source of considerable concern in the West because, aside from Russia, the other republics where nuclear weapons are stationed are Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The first two have shown their reluctance to give up these weapons. Ukraine was consistently opposed to this transfer without obtaining certain guarantees and payoffs from the West; Kazakhstan later adopted a similar policy. It was apparent that the variable that was to play an important role in determining whether they would give up their nuclear weapons was the dynamics of domestic politics in these countries, especially true in the case of Ukraine.(Note 81) In the West, however, this was largely viewed as a proliferation issue. The Western countries regarded possession of nuclear weapons by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus as inherently destabilizing, and because these states were viewed as "both unstable and not sufficiently 'mature' to deal with the command and control of nuclear weapons on their territory," Western thinking was (and continues to be) that they might, wittingly or unwittingly, become sources of leaking of these weapons to other states.(Note 82)

In the case of Kazakhstan, there was that perennial Western fear of the emergence of an "Islamic bomb." That country had based at Derzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobe 104 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the largest missiles in the inventory of the former Soviet Union. Kazakhstan also contains the Baikonur-Tyuratam space launch facility, the mainstay of the Soviet space program, and Sary-Shagan, a site for an anti-ballistic missile air defense system.(Note 83)

Kazakhstan's own nuclear policy was greatly shaped by the attitude of Ukraine on this issue, even though the former sought closer economic and security ties with Russia because of its binational character--about 40 percent of its population are native Kazakhs and the other 40 percent are Russian. In the case of Ukraine, its reluctance to give up nuclear weapons is largely related to its fear of the Russian imperialism that enslaved that country for centuries; as Lepingwell notes:

The Ukrainians argue that they are being asked to disarm even though the Russian parliament continues to raise questions concerning the Crimea's status as part of Ukraine. To eliminate nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory under such circumstances will require a combination of strong incentives and reassurances about Ukraine's territorial integrity.(Note 84)

A number of other aspects of Ukraine's position on nuclear weapons influenced Kazakhstan.(Note 85) Ukraine stated that its own willingness to ratify START I was contingent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. First, Kiev sought guarantees from the leading Western nuclear states that Russian nuclear weapons, and especially those transferred from Ukraine, would not be directed against it. Second, Ukraine linked the ratification of SALT I to the "need for economic assistance [from the West] to dismantle and destroy its nuclear weapons." Third, Ukraine wanted "compensation for the nuclear material contained in the dismantled warheads."

Another variable that was not well publicized but played a critical role for both Ukraine and Kazakhstan, was that the ownership of these weapons was a source of national prestige. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, it seems that the West has paid attention to countries like Ukraine or Kazakhstan largely (if not solely) on the issue of nuclear weapons. These two countries understood this reality and were keen on exploiting it to their advantage.

Originally, Kazakhstan refused to make a firm commitment to acquire a nonnuclear status by transferring its nuclear weapons to Russia. In January 1992, President Nazerbaev agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear state. This was his gesture to Washington and other Western states that his country would not be the source of the transfer of nuclear weapons to a Muslim country of the Middle East. Kazakhstan was to transfer its weapons to Russia in early 1992. By April of that year, however, Nazerbaev had another change of heart, when his country announced that it would retain nuclear weapons on its territory. In so doing, Kazakhstan noted its security concerns emanating from the presence of nuclear weapons in two of its important neighbors, Russia and the People's Republic of China. Alma Ata also attributed its change of policy to the growing signs of imperial tendencies in Russia. At the same time, in order to soothe Western concerns, Kazakhstan announced its willingness to sign the NPT as a nuclear state.

This apparent change on the part of Kazakhstan was not a real change if one closely examines the controversy. Alma Ata not only ratified the "Lisbon protocol" to the START I treaty but the treaty itself, in which the former USSR agreed to eliminate half of the SS-9s and SS-18s that were much feared by the United States. The START II treaty provided for the destruction of SS-18s and eliminated the loophole (contained in START I) whereby the former USSR could transfer these missiles to any other state. From Kazakhstan's perspective, this provision was not acceptable since it would foreclose any opportunity for it to acquire Russian nuclear missiles in the future.(Note 86) Nazerbaev's flip-flop on the issue of nuclear weapons was, as previously noted, closely tied to the domestic politics of his country. After he signed the Lisbon protocol, "one of the Khazak opposition parties warned that it would call for the resignation of the government if the parliament ratified the nonproliferation treaty."(Note 87)

In November 1994, the Ukrainian Parliament agreed to join the NPT. This "strategic deal" struck in January 1994 between President Clinton, Russian President Yeltsin, and Ukraine's then- President Krevchuck was regarded as directly responsible for the Ukranian decision of November 16. This deal linked the U.S.-Russian nonproliferation objectives to the security and economic concerns of Ukraine. The most important aspect of Ukraine's decision for this study was that it set an excellent precedent for the Kazakh leadership, especially the part of the strategic deal that linked Ukrainian willingness to transfer nuclear weapons to Russia to the security assurance furnished by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Equally important were provisions of this agreement in which the United States agreed to furnish economic assistance to Kiev. Undoubtedly emulating the Ukrainain example, Kazakhstan, as a precondition for transfering its nuclear weapons to Moscow, was expected to insist on Russia's "respect" for "the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders" of Kazakhstan; the application of the "CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest [i.e., the interests of Russia and the United States] the exercise by" Kazakhstan "of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantage of any kind;" the promise of U.N. Security Council action to furnish assistance to Kazakhstan as a nonnuclear weapon state, if it were to face an act of aggression or a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used; and economic assistance from Washington and the Western European countries.(Note 88)

As it turned out, Kazakhstan got a similar deal from Washington for agreeing to transfer the 104 long-range SS-18 missiles with 10 atomic warheads to Moscow. The United States appropriated $91 million for that country in 1993; that amount was expected to go up to $311 million for 1995. Some of the money was to be used for dismantling the warheads. What Kazkhstan did not get from Washington or Moscow was explicit guarantees respecting its borders and provisions of security that were given to Ukraine. After the discovery of 25 million tons of oil and gas reserves in Kazakhstan, Washington was beginning to perceive that country as "a valuable strategic ally." However, the implications of such an American perception for Alma Alta remained unclear, given its proximity to Russia, and the presence of a sizable number of Russians within its borders.

A major breakthrough on the nuclear issue involving Kazakhstan came when that country agreed to transfer more than half a ton of bomb-grade uranium to the United States. This action might turn out to be the beginning of a symbiotic relationship between Washington and Alma Alta. The United States was extremely concerned about the possible acquisition of weapon-grade uranium by Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. Kazakhstan, taking advantage of the American concern, worked out an agreement for the transfer and gained that country tens of millions of dollars. More to the point, by agreeing to transfer that uranium, Kazakhstan expected a variety of economic and trade agreements from the United States and the West.(Note 89)

In summary, the signing of the NPT by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the strategic deal among the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, and the transfer of weapon-grade uranium from Kazakhstan to the United States, along with the related economic packages offered by Washington to Alma Alta and Kiev, have greatly lessened the specter of nuclear proliferation in that region. However, the continued economic problems, the attendant political uncertainties, and the availability of a large pool of unemployed and underemployed nuclear scientists in the former Soviet states warrant continued vigilance on the part of all those who do not wish to see the emergence of new nuclear states in or around Central Asia.