McNair Paper Number 48 Chapter 7, January 1996
CONCLUSION
In retrospect, the very existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran belies Skocpol's contention that the military must disintegrate because of outside pressures for the revolution to succeed. In spite of the fact that the Pahlavis had the most powerful, well-equipped and well-trained military machine in the region, it was unable to prevent their fall from power.
On the one hand, the Khomeini regime neutralized the military socially and politically from within, thereby partially negating its effectiveness. On the other, the military's hierarchy was structured in such a manner that it was emasculated without the Shah to direct it. The Shah's insistence that the military chiefs deal directly with him, coupled with the prohibition that they have any contact amongst themselves, prevented effective joint coordination to engage in contingency planning to counter the revolution and undermined the military's already feeble command and control structure at a time when cross-communications were a vital necessity.
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the Khomeini regime came to power not only in spite of the armed forces, but because of them as well, in contrast to Skocpol's theory. The Khomeini regime identified the incorporation of the armed forces into its power structure as the crucial element to successful power consolidation and took active measures before and after the revolution to accomplish this. Its appeals to the armed forces to desert the monarchy (who were the backbone of the Shah's power) during the last days of the Pahlavi regime and join with the Imam's forces had an impact on the collective military psyche during the turbulent transition from monarchy to Islamic Republic.
Having incorporated the armed forces unto itself, the Khomeini regime left the infrastructure of the military intact.
It then embarked upon a purge of the monarchists from the upper ranks, replacing them with "ideologically pure" officers. The IRI also employed constitutional measures to ensure that the military would legally and unequivocally fall under its control.
The Khomeini regime demonized its enemies (perceived and real) throughout its power consolidation process, labelling those with whom it was displeased as "enemies of God" and "corruption on earth," which carried a strong jurisprudential seal of disapproval under the laws of the nascent IRI. Throughout this demonization process, the IRI used its own unique theological and jurisprudential justifications to engage in power consolidation by purging those it deemed to be "impure."
In the end, the Iran-Iraq War served as the catalyst that gave the Iranian Armed Forces a sense of cohesion and identity and put them on course toward becoming an effective fighting force capable of defending Iran from external threat.(Note 1) Under the Islamic Republic, the military command and control structure was realigned and subsequently used with fluctuating effectiveness in the war with Iraq. Although there was a great deal of mutual suspicion between the professional military and the Revolutionary Guards during the initial stages of the war, the exigencies of combat produced a grudging, mutual respect born out of the shared experience of defending the country from foreign aggression.(Note 2)
In spite of its defense of Iran from external aggression, the military was (and still is) viewed with distrust by the IRI Government. This distrust could be found during the "Reign of Terror," when the government used the Pasdaran instead of the armed forces to suppress the Mujaheddin-e Khalq.(Note 3) Even after the Islamic Republic had consolidated its hold over the military, dissident elements were to be found among the ranks. In connection with an August 1982 plot to overthrow the government masterminded by former Foreign Minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh, 70 military officers were executed.(Note 4) After the termination of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the military, seen as the saviors of the nation, enjoyed increased popularity.(Note 5)
The death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989, marked the passing of an era for Iran. The defeat of Saddam Hussein at the hands of the U.S.-led coalition and the breakup of the Soviet empire also altered the context of Iran's views of itself and the rest of the world.(Note 6)
There has been a great deal of discussion regarding future use of the military vis-a-vis the IRGC, although Iran's social, political, and economic problems far outweigh any civil-military affairs issues. While the military is still an integral part of the IRI's power structure, it is held at arm's length while more responsibility has been transferred to the IRGC. However, the military has slowly and steadily been built up both in manpower and equipment since the end of the war.(Note 7)
Today the military is part of the government structure and will be the primary tool to withstand any external or internal threats that may confront the IRI, although its primary task remains the defense of the country from external attack.
The regime has counted on the military to attain and maintain its power (as Skocpol's theory suggests) and the Iranian Constitution will ensure the military's subservience to the IRI for the foreseeable future. The IRI has engaged in a military buildup that concerns the United States and its allies in the region. Purchases and planned purchases of state-of-the-art weaponry also raise questions about the intended use of such weapons. The reason could be the simple truth that the leaders of the Islamic Republic have recognized from the onset of the revolution: a strong military under the control of Tehran is essential for the maintenance and exercise of power.