McNair Paper Number 52, Chapter 9, Notes, October 1996

1. While the idea of getting a rough "feel" for a magnitude that we can neither directly nor precisely measure may initially seem peculiar, it is no different from discussions of Ageneric distance" in Aanimal design space" in the field of evolutionary biology. As Dawkins, Fisher, and others demonstrated, we cannot today measure "genetic distance" other than in a conceptual or qualitative sense. Yet, just as examining "Poincar( sections" (surfaces in phase space used to test the periodicity of dynamic systems) yields qualitative insights into dynamical systems not attainable by crunching standard equations, discussions of small versus large leaps in animal design space yield fruitful insights into evolution (see, for example, Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 72-74 and 231).

2. Commander Jon M. van Tol deserves thanks for reminding me that even complex air-to-air engagements have seldom involved the numbers of discrete "shooters" typical in tactical interactions on the ground.

3. Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 23; also Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace 1943-1945 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 18.

4. Mark E. Hubbard, "The Long Reach: Deep Fighter Escort Tactics," in Eighth Fighter Command, intro. by Major General William E. Kepner, 29 May 1944, 10. This wartime publication was developed by asking some of Eighth Air Force's more seasoned fighter pilots and fighter leaders for accounts of their own experiences flying long-range-escort missions over occupied Europe in late 1943 and early 1944 (ibid., 3). It consists of 26 such accounts plus General Kepner's introduction.

5. Kepner, 33. Lt. Col. John C. Meyer (24 air-to-air kills in World War II plus two more in Korea), Capt. Robert S. Johnson (27 kills in World War II), and Major George Preddy (26.83 kills) also emphasized the importance of avoiding the unseen attacker (ibid., 39, 42, and 53).

6. Raymond F. Toliver and Trevor J. Constable, The Blond Knight of Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 173. Hartmann had exceptional visual acuity that usually enabled him to spot enemy planes long before his comrades.

7. Forces Journal International, May 1974, 30; R. Frank Futrell, William H. Greenhalgh, Carl Grubb, Gerard E. Hasselwander, Robert F. Jakob, and Charles A. Ravenstein, Aces and Aerial Victories: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1965-1973 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History and Air University, 1976), 157. The U.S. Air Force was credited with 135 fighter kills (plus two more by B-52 tail gunners) versus 60 losses; the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps fighters scored 55 kills against 15 losses.

8. Project Red Baron III: Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia, vol. 1 (Cameron Station, VA: Defense Documentation Center, June 1974),24. As of the summer of 1975, instructors at the U.S. Navy Fighter Weapons School (Topgun) were briefing that 55-60 percent of the American crews downed in Southeast Asia did not see their attacker until after they were hit, and another 25 percent saw the bogey before weapons impact but not in time to do anything about it (Barry D. Watts, personal notes, Topgun Class 04-75, 24 June 1975 lecture). Israeli experience in 1982 revealed a similar pattern. Israeli F-16 pilots, who accounted for about half of Israel's kills in 1982, reported that, excluding gun kills, 60 percent of their victims did not react prior to weapons impact (Colonel James Burton, "Letting Combat Results Shape the Next Air-to-Air Missile," unclassified briefing, January 1985, slide 6).

9. The complex, unfolding dynamic of some options falling aside or receding while others emerge or approach underscores the genius of Clausewitz's image of "an interplay [Spiel] of possibilities [M(glichkeiten], probabilities [Wahrscheinlichkeiten], good luck and bad [G(hck und unG(hck]" weaving its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry of war. Clausewitz's image may be "merely" a metaphor. Yet, given how much effort is needed to improve upon it, to say nothing of adding anything new, it is a powerful metaphor nonetheless.

10. During the AMRAAM OUE, situation awareness (SA) was defined as "the perception of the whole picture, not only location but also likely future activity, both friendly and enemy" forces (Veda, "The Influence of 'Operational Factors' (U)," briefing slides, 14 February 1985, unclassified slide "(U) Definitions (Continued)." SA involves processing enough information to have a reasonably accurate picture of where all the participants in an aerial engagement are, and where they are likely to be in the near term (measured in seconds). By 1988, U.S. Air Force pilots were generally using the term "situational awareness" in lieu of "situation awareness" (Major Donald Stiffler, "Graduate Level Situational Awareness," USAF Fighter Weapons Review, Summer 1988, 15-20). Pilots like Stiffler also identified SA with the orientation step of John Boyd's observation-orientation-decision-action loop. Boyd's appreciation of the central importance of SA in air combat can be traced back to a 1974 briefing that focused on a concept for creating "an outstanding air superiority fighter while reversing the increasing cost trend normally characteristic of such an endeavor" (Colonel John R. Boyd, "Conception," Development Plans and Analysis, Air Staff, Washington, DC, summer 1974, slide 2).

11. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Fighter, Missile Gains Pressed," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 4 April 1977, 12.

12. Lt. Col. R. E. Guild, "AIMVAL Analysis," Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Studies and Analysis, briefing, 25 February 1978, slide 3 ("Test Objectives"). For details on the five IR missile concepts tested on F-15s and F-14s during AIMVAL, see Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Aerial Combat Test to Advance," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 April 1977, 28-30.

13. Colonel E. J. Griffith, "ACEVAL: Origin, Description, Results, Applicability," briefing, undated, slide 2 ("ACEVAL"). Griffith was the Blue Force commander.

14. Guild, "AIMVAL Analysis," slide 6 ("Test Trial Matrix for AIMVAL").

15. Griffith, "ACEVAL," slide 8 ("Test Matrix").

16. "No-Win War at Dogbone Lake," U.S. News and World Report, 9 January 1978, 56.

17. I. A. Kaufman (Project Leader), "Multiple Air Combat Evaluation (U)," WSEG Report 247, Institute for Defense Analyses Study S-440 September 1974, 2.

18. For a hardware-oriented reading of AIMVAL, see Maj. Gen. Frederick C. "Boots" Blesse, "The Changing World of Air Combat," Air Force Magazine, October 1977, 34-37. Blesse was credited with shooting down ten MiG-15s during the Korean War. For an interpretation of AIMVAL that highlights human interactions rather than hardware differences, see Major Barry D. Watts, "The Changing World of Air Combat, or Plus (a Change, Plus C'est la M(me Chose," Air Force Magazine, December 1977, pp. 35-35. By the end of ACEVAL, the overriding concern expressed by most of the aircrew participants was that the results would "be incorrectly interpreted and used to support weapon systems concepts reflecting industry's desires and not operational needs" (John Boyd and Lt. Col. Burkley, trip report from 7-9 December 1977 visit to Nellis, 29 December 1977, 1).

19. Lt. Col. S. R. Dvorchak, "Getting It On in the All-Aspect Arena (U)," Tactical Analysis Bulletin, vol. 79-2 (special), 25 July 1979, 3-4 and 18. As Dvorchak later observed, if you view ACEVAL strictly as a test of competing hardware, the results become "incomprehensible" (telephone conversation, 6 October 1986).

20. Veda, "AMRAAM OUE," slide 9 [A(U) "MRAAM OUE Test Matrix"].

21. Guild, "AIMVAL Analysis," slide 7 ("Summary Observations-Test Environment"); Griffith, "ACEVAL," slide 3 ("Test Design") and slide 7 ("Test Hardware").

22. S. R. "Shad" Dvorchak, "On the Measurement of Fog," briefing to the Military Operations Research Society, June 1986, slide 7 ("Foggy Variables Are Important"). The source of this conclusion was Veda's "AMRAAM OUE (U)," SECRET, 3 August 1983, slide 41 ("(U) Overall Comments"). This slide was later declassified.

23. The Red fighters that were initially not targeted quickly inflicted two losses on the Blue side, thereby reducing the fight to a messy 2-v-2.

24. The primary source of this observation was the ACEVAL 4-v-4s, including training missions, invalid trials, and valid trials. These some 140 engagements were examined for sorting well after the test was flown. Not a single case of perfect sorting was found (S. R. Dvorchak, phone conversation with the author, 1 December 1995).

25. Billy R. Sparks, phone conversation with the author, 1 March 1984.

26. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119 and 120.

27. Major Lewis D. Hill, Doris Cook, and Aron Pinker, Part I: A Statistical Compendium in Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. V, A Statistical Compendium and Chronology (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 653-654; John M. Deur, "Wall of Eagles: Aerial Engagements and Victories in Desert Storm," unpublished page proofs. Prior to Desert Storm, U.S. and Israeli pilots had only recorded a total of four BVR missile kills during Rolling Thunder (1965-1968), Linebacker I/II (1972-1973), the Yom Kippur War (1973), and Operation Peace for Galilee (1982)Csee James Burton, "Letting Combat Results Shape the Next Air-to-Air Missile," briefing, January 1985, slide 3. Note that in at least three of the 16 Desert Storm engagements that began with BVR shots, the kill was either accomplished by another missile launched within visual range or, in one case, by the Iraqi fighter running into the ground.

28. "Darts and Laurels," Armed Forces Journal International (October 1995): 80; 390th Fighter Squadron, 366th Wing, "F-15C JTIDS Operational Special Project (OSP)," briefing, undated, Mountain Home AFB, ID, and discussions with Major Gary L. Crowder, 31 July and 8 November 1995. The 390th's OSP ran from September 1993 to September 1994 and involved 20 JTIDS-equipped F-15Cs (AF-15C JTIDS Operational Special Project (OSP)," slides 6 and 7). Engagements varied in size and complexity from 4-v-4 to 8-v-18 with the JTIDS F-15s having AWACS support on 70 percent of the scheduled missions (ibid., slide 7). JTIDS-equipped F-15 pilots reported their "situation awareness drastically increased" (ibid., slide 11). Besides knowing where the friendlies and adversaries were, JTIDS greatly enhanced accurate sorting and targeting.