McNair Paper Number 54, Chapter 6, October 1996

Despite the considerable regional and international action to combat drugs, collaboration in the Caribbean is not limited to drugs, as a brief examination of the Regional Security System (RSS) here shows. However, before turning to the RSS, it is important to probe the logic behind security collaboration in the region. (Note 1)

WHY COLLABORATE?

An underlying assumption of any meaningful regional security cooperation is that there are common regional threats, or at least the perception of such threats by the relevant political and military elites of the countries concerned. In addition, as suggested in the discussion on countermeasures, countries also cooperate because of capability limitations. Such limitations are pronounced in the region, and they involve money, natural resource base, manpower, weapons, technology, and training. However, capability limitations are not uniform, and there are countries within the Caribbean with sufficient individual capabilities to execute some security missions efficiently by themselves.

The assessment of common threats and the existence of capability limitations should not mask the reality that there are challenges to cooperation. Sometimes it does, however, providing the basis for frustration when expectations and objectives are not fulfilled. One such challenge is the capability challenge. This challenge does not merely arise because of the actual constraints and limitations with regard to money, equipment, training, etc. It does so because inherent in the capability disparities of cooperating states is to need for those with fewer deficiencies to give relatively more to the collective effort.

Achieving what amounts to capability progressiveness, akin to taxation progressiveness in a domestic context, is not always easy, because sometimes

• The political elites of some countries are unwilling to commit resources to the collective effort when it is not clear that there will be commensurate returns

• Some political elites are unable to see the national interest value in participating in a cooperative venture, but, paradoxically, the venture itself may be jeopardized because of capability dilemmas that are resolvable by the reluctant or recalcitrant partners

• Domestic political considerations, such as changes in the configuration of governmental power, public opinion, and timing may make it difficult for the country with the least deficiency to deliver on pledges made earlier.

Beyond the capability challenge there is a sovereignty challenge. The capability disparities themselves are a reflection of power asymmetries within the area. But while, because of power deficiencies and the nature and scope of some of the threats involved, paying continued credence to the traditional notion of sovereignty is challengeable, sovereignty is both a prized integer of nationhood and part of schema for dealing with some of the threats, especially by the very small states. The larger states in the partnership therefore need to be mindful of sovereignty sensibilities in dealing with the group, and in relation to both the decision-making and execution sides of collaboration.

Over and above this, there is need for acceptance of both substance and symbolism; that while some states may not be able to "ull their weight,"inclusiveness in planning and executing missions is still important. The symbolism of inclusiveness is not only invaluable for sustaining the partnership of state actors, it is also important for the psychological aspect of efforts to deal with non-state "nemy"actors. Such actors, the drug operators in particular, must sense or perceive inclusiveness and partnership by the states confronting them.

One further challenge that is a perennial bugbear in some places pertains to bureaucratic politics. Whether we like it or not, there will be jurisdictional turf battles and coordination difficulties involving army and coast guard/navy, army and police, army intelligence units and police intelligence outfits, etc. Some of these battles and difficulties can undermine security initiatives within a single country. Thus, the potential dangers involved when several countries and agencies are involved are even greater. All the countries and agencies involved need to be constantly mindful of these dangers, and accept that there is often value in subordinating the ego, pride, or interest of an individual bureaucracy or service to some greater purpose or larger interest.

REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

As was noted earlier, it was the perception of common threats and recognition of capability limitations that gave rise to the RSS. The RSS was established in October 1982 through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by five Eastern Caribbean countries: Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. St. Kitts-Nevis joined the following February, and Grenada in January 1985.

Concerns about militarization by Barbados and St. Vincent and the Grenadines stymied efforts in 1986 to upgrade the MOU to a security treaty and thereby give the RSS international legal personality, but those efforts were not altogether abandoned. The MOU was revised in 1993, and a treaty was finally signed between the end of February and the beginning of March 1996, with March 5, 1996 being the treaty date. According to the operational head of the RSS, all member-countries were expected to ratify the treaty by June 1996. (Note 2) Under the treaty the RSS is required to prepare contingency plans for and assist member-countries in national emergencies. In operational terms, this mandate includes drug interdiction, search and rescue, customs and immigration control, protection of off-shore installations, and natural and other disasters and threats to national security.

As figure 4 shows, the structure of the RSS involves a Council of Ministers, which comprises national security ministers, as the central policy-making body. Operational command falls under a Regional Security Coordinator (RSC) who heads a Central Liaison Office (CLO), which is located in Barbados. Barbados also provides the RSC, currently Brigadier Rudyard Lewis, who is substantively Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defense Force. (Lewis is the founding RSC.) The CLO plans and coordinates in conjunction with a Joint Coordinating Committee comprising army commanders and police commissioners. (See the appendix for a list of military and police heads for the entire Caribbean.) Figure 4 identifies the participating forces. As is also evident from it, not all RSS member-countries have armies. A key component of the police forces of the countries without armies is the Special Service Unit (SSU), elite paramilitary police with the equivalent of S.W.A.T. training and weapons. They deal with crises above the capacity of the regular police.

The RSS gained notoriety in 1983 for its role in the U.S. intervention in Grenada, namely mopping up and postinvasion policing, roles that were more politically expedient, given the controversy over the intervention, than militarily necessary. (Note 3) However, the RSS had become involved in the Grenada crisis even before the intervention, by conducting intelligence missions and designing plans to rescue Maurice Bishop, all of which became subordinated to U.S plans once the decision to intervene was made in Washington. Apart from its roles in Grenada and continuous interdiction and other measures, the RSS deployed forces in Trinidad and Tobago following the coup attempt there in July-August 1990, to support the local military and police forces. Troops and police were also deployed in St. Kitts-Nevis during November 1994 following a mass prison riot that was part of a larger drug-driven crisis.

RSS forces have been deployed annually since 1985 in military training exercises, in conjunction with forces from other Caribbean countries, the United States, and, at varying times, from Britain, France, and the Netherlands. The first exercise, Operation Exotic Palm, was held in September 1985 and focused on counterinsurgency. The 1995 maneuvers, Tradewinds '95, were held between March and May, and dealt with amphibious missions, mainly coast guard search and rescue, oil pollution management, and port management. The 1995 exercises involved all Anglophone Caribbean countries, reflecting the growing participation that began significantly in 1989. In addition to Caribbean and U.S. forces, French troops also participated, mainly in the St. Kitts-Nevis leg, and on a bilateral basis with St. Kitts-Nevis.

To acommodate the May 7-8 Barbados meeting of Caribbean military officials, along with U.S. military officials responsibile for the region, Tradewinds '96 was held betweeen March 4 and April 28, 1996. As with previous maneuvers, Tradewinds '96 involved not only RSS military and police forces, but also troops from the United States, the Bahamas, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica. Following successful operational models based on previous maneuvers, the 1996 exercises were conducted in four phases, centered on different islands and focusing on different issues. The 1996 focus included disaster preparedness, marine pollution, and search and rescue operations. (Note 4)

Because of capability limitations of member-states, the RSS has had to rely on foreign material and political support. The original foreign benefactors were the United States, Britain, and Canada, operating on a bilateral basis with member-countries. But given the geopolitical changes, budget pressures, and other factors identified earlier, the level of support has diminished over the years. At the same time, RSS-member states themselves have been experiencing economic difficulties, preventing them from fulfilling their financial obligations to the System, thereby aggravating the dependency problem. The combined effect of this reduced foreign support and the delinquency of member-states can only serve to compromise the operational readiness of the System, and consequently, its ability to rise to the challenge of helping to cope with threats and apprehensions in the region. (Note 5)