McNair Paper Number 58, Searching for Partners:  Regional Organizations and Peace Operations, Chapter 2, June 1998

Containment of communism defined the national security policy of the United States for more than four decades. The strategy provided coherence and a persuasive rationale for policy initiatives on a global scale. With containment as the strong strategic focus, successive American administrations helped to organize new international organizations, form alliances, and develop close ties with government leaders of varied ideological outlook. Throughout much of the post-World War II period, the United States formed "coalitions of the willing" on the assumption that its partners shared similar security concerns. Some such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proved enduring; others such as the ill-fated Baghdad Pact in the Middle East fell of their own internal contradictions. Rarely did the United Nations loom large in the U.S. security spectrum during much of this period.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its own attendant network of alliance partnerships has yielded new challenges in the post-Cold War era, a period characterized by some as one of political fragmentation and "Third World chaos." Containment is no longer a basis on which to build coherent policies and a supporting rationale. Different policy tools and intervening capabilities are needed to deal with internecine civil wars, the collapse of governing institutions in war-ravaged societies, and the displacement of populations as a result of such conflicts. The challenges posed demand responses far more complex in some respects than the zero-sum arithmetic of the Cold War demanded.

In his celebrated 1992 report to the Security Council, Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali underscored the productive roles that regional organizations could play in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peace operations, and postconflict peace building. He urged the United Nations to husband and encourage regional organization activity in these fields. Noting that the Security Council could continue to retain primary responsibility under the Charter for "maintaining international security," the Secretary-General opined that regional bodies could "not only lighten the burden but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus, and democratization."¹ Agreeing, the Security Council in January 1993 invited regional organizations to examine "ways and means to strengthen their functions to maintain international peace and security within their areas of competence." Among the areas identified: "preventive diplomacy, including fact-finding, confidence-building, good offices, peace building, and, where appropriate, peacekeeping." Nowhere was there mention of military units to be made available to the United Nations Security Council for Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (enforcement) operations.

The proposals set forth by the Secretary-General were not well received by many U.N. veterans with substantial experience in peace operations. One of them expatiated in 1993 that regional organization are not the best first line of defense against most conflicts because "they do not cover some conflict areas in any sensible way." A special defect, the former official observed, revolves around the accepted principle of "impartiality:" "It frequently happens that regional organizations are regarded as less objective and less impartial than the U.N." Moreover, he contended, such organizations "really don't have the capacity for things like peacekeeping." He suggested their potential lay as partners with the United Nations in some conflict intervention operations where an "unacceptable degree of massive retribution" by U.N. mandated forces will lead adversaries "to come to the bargaining table more than they want to fight." Because most regional organizations lack the capacity to organize and direct large-scale military operations, proponents of this view tend to favor the creation of a U.N. standing force of several brigades (15,000 to 20,000 personnel) for crisis prevention and enforcement purposes. Despite rhetorical outpourings of support by some member states and private interest groups, most U.N. members have proffered only lukewarm support and, given the substantial funding required for such a force and existing budget shortfalls, the issue appears to be a dead letter diplomatically.

At the opposite end of the debate is a "regionalist" bloc of member states who, since the organization's founding at San Francisco in 1945, have argued for recourse to regional bodies as a means to counter perceived U.N. "dominance" -involving weakening Security Council "Perm Five" hegemony in matters of peace and stability. The "regionalist" bloc included several British Commonwealth member states, the Arab League, and the Latin American States. The Organization of American States (OAS) was particularly outspoken in this regard, its members contending that the OAS should serve as a pillar of regional collective security. The initial American view was to tilt U.S. policy in favor of the United Nations as the progenitor of actions intended to maintain international order and stability. Ultimately, however, the U.S. Government acquiesced in support of the OAS position, producing a Charter that, in the words of Innis Claude "conferred general approval upon existing and anticipated regional organizations, but contained provisions having the purpose of making them serve as adjuncts to the United Nations and subjecting them in considerable measure to the direction and control of the central organization."² The U.N.-NATO "partnership" approach in Bosnia at the height of the crisis (1993-95) demonstrated the basic impediments involved in any arrangement for joint military operations under U.N. auspices and civilian direction.

The initial U.S. response to Boutros-Ghali's recommendations has been to consider a triangular crisis management approach involving the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad hoc coalitions. Each leg in this strategic tripod has certain strengths and weaknesses, and the decision as to which one or combination to use in a given situation is high policy indeed. The regional crisis that arose from Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait generated wide international concern and a U.N. authorized ad hoc coalition of military forces under U.S. leadership that succeeded in expelling the Iraqis. However, that coalition became increasingly frayed; by early 1997, it was exhibiting geriatic infirmities. Another U.N.-organized and -directed force, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), performed abysmally in Bosnia and had to be replaced by a combination of NATO and other forces (U.S. led) in 1995-96. In Somalia, a mixed command arrangement under the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), in which command and control arrangements were truncated, produced a shattering debacle in 1993 and the collapse of the U.N. mission shortly thereafter. Earlier, however, the U.N. proved eminently successful in organizing national elections in Cambodia and "stitching together" a national coaltition to govern the country. Notable achievements were registered elsewhere: in Mozambique, by ending civil war and establishing civilian authority, and in South Africa, by monitoring elections in 1994 that produced a postapartheid multiracial government.

The Security Council, over four-plus decades, authorized seven distinct types of peace operations: interposition, observation, humanitarian support, election monitoring, containment as well as disarmament of forces, and peace enforcement. Apart from the single peace enforcement operation (Congo, 1960s), the United Nation's very real successes in the majority of its operations were predicated on the consent of the contending parties.

The Security Council itself levied these obligations on this inadequately funded and undermanned U.N. "system." The United States bears special responsibility, as the leading member of the Council's "Perm Five" bloc, for having placed unsupportable burdens on the Secretariat since the end of the Cold War, all in the name of a collective security concept characterized as "assertive multilateralism." Little serious thought was apparently given to the changing nature of post-Cold War conflict situations in which the center of gravity was shifting from interstate rivalries to complex internal wars. Hitherto, the Secretariat peacekeeping culture had been conditioned to manage holding operations rather than direct multifunctional operations needed to deal with failed states, ethnic feuds, and political separatist movements. The Council now insisted on intervention, often under Chapter VII enforcement mandate, but discovered that the U.N. was ill-suited for agile use of armed forces linked with civilian agencies for ill-conceived political purposes.

The integration of disparate civilian and military Secretariat elements such as Field Operations into a unified DPKO was a major part of the reforms. These changes of the past several years have given the United Nations its first integrated apparatus for managing the expanded responsibilities of "second generation" peacekeeping. These include:

As the Department of Humanitarian Affairs issue was resolved, the U.N. member states, in the form of the Chiefs of State Summit Security Council session of December 1991, charged Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali with the responsibility of defining the appropriate role for the United Nations in the post-Cold War era. In Febuary 1992, the Secretary-General issued U.N. document A/47/277-5/2411/, "An Agenda for Peace," in which he outlined a comprehensive range of U.N. peacekeeping activities: from preventive diplomacy through traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement and finally on to reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged or destroyed societies. This ambitious document was well received initially but a backlash ensued. In a sober reevaluation of his "Agenda," issued in 1995 and entitled "A Supplement to the Agenda for Peace," the Secretary-General modified his original conceptual approach.

Essentially, the modification called for a division of labor, differentiating between the authorization of international peacekeeping operations and their implementation. Accepting the very real practical and political limitations of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali proposed that the United Nations continue to be the authorizing authority for the full range of peacekeeping operations (in the form of Security Council resolutions) but would actually implement only those not requiring the use of coercive force (that is, Chapter VII or peace enforcement operations). Enforcement of Chapter VII type operations would continue to be authorized by Security Council resolutions but would be implemented by "contract" to an existing regional organization (e.g., NATO) or an ad hoc coalition led by a lead nation (e.g., the United States in the Gulf War).

Proliferating conflict situations, financial stringencies, the reticence of some U.N. members, and competing interests within the United Nations currently impede additional reform measures. Despite improved oversight capacities, the Security Council "Perm Five" have indicated that they intend to be cautious in authorizing new peacekeeping operations, especially when cease-fire agreements by disputants are absent. As a result, major U.N.-directed peace enforcement operations are less likely in the immediate future.

Within the past 2 years the United States has turned to the second leg of the tripod, regional organizations, to relieve mounting pressures on the United Nations in the areas of crisis prevention, peace operations, and peace making. Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter provides legal and political foundation for this approach. The Chapter suggests that regional organizations should serve as "courts of first instance" in seeking to resolve local disputes. Such regional organization involvement can occur at the invitation of the states involved in disputes or "by reference from the Security Council." (The Charter is mute on the question of intra-state conflicts.) On the other hand, Delegation of responsibility to regional institutions is not total. Chapter VIII makes clear that the Security Council does not surrender its right to investigate or otherwise intervene in a dispute by turning to regional organizations, nor are disputants precluded from bringing their disagreements directly to the Security Council.

Chapter VIII stipulates that no enforcement action may be initiated by regional institutions without prior Security Council authorization. This does not preclude regional body enforcement action because the Security Council may "where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority." This approach was taken by the Council in urging member states and NATO in particular to provide military support for its UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia 1993-95.

In short, Chapter VIII provides the opportunity for regional organizations to act in the face of impending crises that threaten regional peace and security. Significantly, they are not required to do so absent specific authorization or urging by the Security Council. When regional bodies do determine that action is required the measures taken must not be at odds with the U.N. Charter, most particularly its "Purposes and Principles:"

As noted, some limitiation is placed upon regional organizations. Of particular significance, enforcement action in theory may be taken only with the specific authorization of the Security Council. Under Article 5l of the Charter, however, organizations are not precluded from exercising the "inherent right . . . of collective self-defense." Article 5l provided the foundation for the formation of NATO in 1949, and its justification was to be found in the Rio Treaty of 1943, long before the creation of the United Nations itself. Even this provision does not remove the obligation to keep the Security Council informed of any regional organization action contemplated that might impact adversely on "international security."

By 1994, recognizing that the United Nations was suffering "system overload" with respect to peace operations and humanitarian programs, Boutros-Ghali determined that a burdensharing approach involving close consultation with regional organizations would be appropriate.Responding to an inquiry from the Security Council and the expressed interest of the General Assembly, he launched consultations with major regional organizations as to appropriate roles they could play in the maintenance of international peace and security. Invited to participate in the consultations were representatives from: the British Commonwealth; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); CSCE; Economic Community of West Africa; European Commission; the Arab League; NATO; OAU; OAS; Organization of the Islamic Conference; and the Western European Union.

The February 1996 meeting included representatives from nonregional groupings (League of Arab States), some primarily economic (European Union), and subregional (Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS). Only NATO and CIS participants represented organizations with significant military capabilities. The February consultations evidenced reluctance on the part of most regional organization participants to assume broadened responsibilities for the purely military aspects of peace operations. Their hesitance was largely driven by the limited financial resources available to them for such operations, rivalries among member states in several of the organizations, inadequate military expertise on the part of some, and fears that their organizations might become enfeebled if burdensharing responsibilities were assumed prematurely. The participants were prepared, however, to share responsibility with the United Nations in the fields of preventive diplomacy, elections and human rights monitoring, and police "monitoring."

Despite the hesitancies of the February participants, "regionalization" of peace operations is likely to be on the U.N. agenda for the remainder of this decade and beyond. NATO's direct involvement in the form of an implementation force (IFOR) beginning in late 1995 was an important element in the ongoing effort to bring peace and unity to Bosnia. Russian involvement, in the name of the CIS, in peace operations in Tajikistan and Georgia is part of an ongoing pattern for most "Near Abroad" republics. Nigerian influence over ongoing Liberian peace operations is also likely to be a given, as is American involvement in Haiti.

Regional organizations have both advantages and disadvantages as potential partners in complex emergency type peace operations. The sentiments of "ownership" member states feel in regional organizations encourages a greater sense of legitimacy in deliberations and decisions taken. The more modest scope of these deliberations and decisions tends to allay concerns over blatant interventionism and derogation of sovereignty. Being more homogeneous than the 185 plus members of the United Nations, they can sometimes more easily produce consensus (although not always in a timely fashion); their involvement may have greater acceptability by the disputants; and, presumably, they have greater insight to local problems and the root causes of conflict.

Other factors influence the capacity and willingness of member states to undertake complex peace operations and humanitarian missions. The most basic is the disinclination to become embroiled in the internal affairs of others. The failure of member states to meet their international obligations may lead to censure by regional organizations or expulsion (although such cases are rare), but direct intervention in the offending state to correct human rights abuses has generally been felt to be a potential derogation of sovereignty. With the end of the Cold War, nonregional power intervention without Security Council sanction has been much frowned upon. Nevertheless, self-denying boundaries have become somewhat blurred in recent years. Decisions taken by the Security Council on Somalia, Haiti, and other jurisdictional questions suggest a subtle shift in attitudes by some member states. Not all regional organizations accept, however, that violations of "universally" accepted human rights standards, failure to comply with treaty obligations, or the collapse of national institutions provide sufficient cause for forcible intervention by external parties.

Conventional wisdom and recent experience argue that most regional organizations are better suited to play an active role at the low end of the peace operations scaleCpreventive diplomacy, mediation, monitoring and observing, and other traditional forms of peacekeeping. The balance of their strengths and weaknesses suggests as well a potentially useful role in crises dominated by humanitarian concerns. Regional organizations also could serve as legitimizing authorities for specific peace operations, wrestling with the problems of collapsed governments and failed states, and providing expert input when nonregional actors intervene in local conflicts. On the other hand, close proximity to local conflicts and regional politics may undermine the credibility of regional organization involvement in conflict situations. The reputation of the OAS, for example, was tarnished somewhat by its supporting role in the international intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, where the OAS was perceived as functioning as a pliable instrument of U.S. policy. Its lustre was restored in the late 1980s with its participation in the Central American peace process. The CIS suffers somewhat comparable problems associated with Russia's dominant role in that organization. While the two situations of great power preeminence are not entirely comparable, many impartial observers worry that the OAS and CIS could well lose their status as unfettered entities if unduly influenced by Moscow and Washington and perceived as evolving into spheres of influence of either regional "eminence gris."

Third Leg of the Tripod

The 1990-1991 Gulf War produced an avalanche of studies favoring the adoption of ad hoc coalition strategies on the part of the United States to deal with acts of aggression, as exemplified by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Only belatedly was a key lesson learnedCthat timing is critical, i.e., the 6 months available to Washington to deploy American forces and to marshal an array of other national contingents prior to the launching of Desert Storm should not be counted on in future crisis situations. The half-year grace period prior to the launching of Desert Storm proved ample time for diplomats to conduct negotiations for peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi forces while the coalition was being formed, for command and control arrangements to be completed, and for military forces to be deployed into the Persian Gulf region. The effectiveness of the operation was without parallel in modern military annals, but it should be regarded as unique and and not always replicable.

The United Nations leadership adopted, in modified form, some of the lessons learned from Desert Storm. The principal tutorial to emerge was the need to buttress U.N. capabilities to monitor and oversee the plans and operations of the lead nation, including crises of a lesser order of magnitude than that provided by the Gulf experience. (Some U.N. members objected strenuously to the delegation of power accorded to the United States in the Gulf conflict and the limited oversight afforded the Secretary-General and the Security Council.) In part because of member complaints, Boutros-Ghali had called for systematized standby arrangements "by which governments commit themselves to hold ready, at an agreed period of notice, specially trained units for peacekeeping service."³ A special registry has been established and more than 60 member governments have pledged supportCwith serious reservation, however, as to the use and funding for operations. In short, the majority refuses to offer prior consent and reserve the right to respond on a case-by-case basis to future calls for national contingents.

Given this unsatisfactory response, other member governments have called for creation of a standing rapid response force, of varying numerical size and capability, to be made available to the Secretary-General and the Security Council to deal with emerging emergencies. The proposal itself is not new. It is imbedded in Articles 43 through 46 of the U.N. Charter, which was intended originally to provide a pillar for "collective security" under U.N. auspices. Disagreement between Washington and Moscow, however, laid to rest these ambitious plans. As the Cold War unfolded, the veto was a major impediment and can still be used to frustrate Council decisions or their effective implementation, the existence of a standing force notwithstanding.

The performance of the allied coalition in the period preceding and during the Gulf War is instructive. The coalition of 30-plus nations faced formidable obstacles in overcoming national sensitivities. The British, for example, were the only allied nation to have a senior officer participate directly in the actual planning of the campaign, which greatly irritated several other European force commanders and their governments. French forces operated independently under their own national command and control until immediately prior to the onset of hostilities. Control of Arab-Islamic forces fell outside the direct command of General Schwartzkopf; throughout the campaign it remained under the "control" of the Saudi General Staff, a situation that violated the principle of unity of command. Schwartzkopf managed to bridge the gap by insisting on the formation of an informal planning group, the Coalition Coordination, Communication and Integration Cell, to form a common understanding of strategies and operations to be applied at the onset of hostilities. Even then. the Saudi Government insisted that Arab ground forces be used solely for joint operations intended to recover Kuwaiti territory, i.e., Arab ground forces should not be expected to enage enemy forces outside the confines of Kuwait.

The United States, if it is to avoid unilateralist approaches to crisis management, will be confronted in the future with painful policy choices: whether to exercise leadership in coping with "complex emergencies" through the U.N. "system" or regional organizations, or to rely on the formation of ad hoc coalitions. The United States will either assume sole responsibility for coalition formation to cope with complex crises such as Bosnia (an unlikely prospect) or abdicate responsibility for a leadership role and suffer an erosion of its influential position in Europe and elswhere.

The United Nations and various regional organizations are breaking new ground as they address the variegated problems of the post-Cold War international security environment. No single institution or strategy will suffice in dealing with these problems, in part because each crisis or situation has its own unique properties, and in part because solutions may not be readily at hand. However, several realities will have to be faced in the period immediately ahead. Each of the options available to the United States has its own limitations and drawbacks. Whatever tripod is selected to deal with emergent crises, there must be clear recognition that the application of coercive force has consequences: the notion of neutrality and impartiality will no longer obtain; the use of force may bring order in its wake but does not ensure long-term stability; and perhaps most crucial, use of coercive force constitutes a state of belligerency and thus requires application of accepted rules of war. The latter imperative cannot be ignored or obscured with traditional peacekeeping rhetoric. These are issues that present choices and risks that the United States and regional organizations will ignore at increasing peril to their interests and the "international order."

Two important implications arise from the analysis thus far. First, the ability of the U.S. to forge and manage future coalitions will largely be a function of the external security environment. Although shared values and similar political systems can facilitate formation of ad hoc coalitions, voluntary contributions will be made on the basis of narrow national self-interest. Second, the U.S. ability to play a leading role will depend on our own willingness to make significant financial and military contributions. While there has been much discussion of formation of "vertical coalitions" in which the U.S. provides logistical and technical support while others provide combat manpower, there is little likelihood of acceptance during the initial stages of an enforcement action. On the other hand, as recently demonstrated in Haiti, members of a coalition may be prepared to assume heightened responsibility for maintenance of "law and order" once U.S. forces have disarmed malcontents and unruly elements.

The logic of "vertical escalation" has some merit. The logic reposes in a division of labor; states with different but complementary capabilities can specialize in areas of relative advantage and create a coalition that is stronger than one where there is duplication of effort. This was demonstrated during Desert Storm: the United States provided high-tech weaponry, airpower, intelligence, and most of the land forces, while Egypt and Syria gave the coalition greater legitimacy among other Arab states, and Saudi Arabia provided the territory from which to prepare and launch the assault.

The value and durability of ad hoc coalitions will be determined largely case by case. Some coalitions are likely to have a lengthy shelf-life, particularly where security interests are not directly engaged. Some will not entail U.S. participation or only indirect involvement. The 1997 Italian-led internvention in strife-torm Albania, for humanitarian purposes, may prove instructive in this regard. However, the growing importance of Chapter VII enforcement actions in local disputes involving Security Council authorization for formation of ad hoc coalitions will frequently require some measure of direct U.S. involvement. This requires the United States to maintain an active diplomatic presence as well as robust military power projection capabilities to deal with conflict situations in many geographic regions. It may be possible to create future coalitions "from scratch," but it will be easier for the United States to do so if it is actively engaged with potential partners and if it possesses and is willing to deploy combat capable forces.

While inevitable, and not infrequently worthwhile, the "regionalization" of peacekeeping responsibilities poses some serious questions for the U.S. national security policy community. In some instances, e.g., Africa, regional sponsorship may mean less timely local intervention and limited African resources for settling internal conflicts that threaten to widen. Past failures of ECOWAS in Liberia threatened the stability of neighboring Sierra Leone and others; in Central Africa, the Rwanda and Burundi problems have overflowed the borders of Zaire and could have adverse consequences for Tanzania and Uganda. While the United States can make a contribution in the form of advice and material support for ad hoc African military coalitions, the challenge is to find "coalitions of the willing."⁴ If the OAU is not able to do so, the U.N. Security Council will probably become a hospice for African lost causes, a debilitating prospect at best. Paradoxically, many of the developing countries, fearful of Security Council "interventionism," would prefer to see the Council sidelined or at least far less active. In their view, "regionalization" is a way to constrain Secretariat capabilities for management of peacekeeping operations. The recent reorganization of the peacekeeping "system" urged by the United States and others is to be neither applauded nor ignored in their view.

The ability of the United States to reshape these skeptical attitudes has declined appreciably over the past 2 years. As noted in a 1996 State Department study, Washington's influence with other U.N. members has eroded; members are increasingly reluctant to support U.S. ideas about reform. The United States suffers from a number of disabilities that diminish its capacity to influence the policies of the overwhelming majority of member countries. The two most obvious have been the successful but heavyhanded U.S. effort to deny Boutros-Ghali a second term as Secretary-General despite the support he enjoyed among most members; the second revolves around the refusal of the U.S. Congress to meet U.S. financial obligations, as stipulated under the terms of the U.N. Charter. As of January 1997, the United States was at least $1.0 billion in default on payments to the operating and peacekeeping accounts. According to the State Department study, "The financial crisis has undermined the ability of the United States and the United Nations to carry out some (peacekeeping) reforms . . . given its role in the financial crisis, the United States is not a credible advocate for some financial reforms."⁵

• What limitations should obtain on the third party or regional organization "right" to intervene in internal wars or intrastate conflicts?

• Can regional organizations maintain a neutral or impartial position or should such notions be set aside? If so, what general guidelines should obtain?

• Should humanitarian assistance interventions occur without clearly defined political objectives and precise end states?

• What initiatives should be taken by regional organizations and their members to provide essential crisis management, joint military planning, and standby forces for peace operations?

• If these forces are to be multinational in composition, how should they be organized, trained, and equipped to ensure the highest degree of integration and effective command and control of operations?

An overriding question lies in the difference between the purported advantages and alleged disadvantages of regional organizations in the sphere of peacekeeping in that the former may be largely theoretical while the latter are inherently practicalCand therefore determinate. In other words, with respect to regional organizations, there may be less there than meets the eye. If so, both the United Nations and the United States may find themselves unable to pass on responsibility as much as they want.

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