McNair Paper Number 58, Searching for Partners:  Regional Organizations and Peace Operations, Chapter 3, June 1998

On initial examination, the several regional organizations in Europe, when viewed together, appear to offer the greatest potential among other such entities for the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe. Most have a potential to relieve the U.N. of some of its burdens in dealing with "complex emergencies," in Europe and, conceivably, adjacent regions. A number of reservations must be addressed, however:

• The geographic reach of Europe has proved exceedingly elastic historically. This is evidenced today by the consideration being given within the confines of NATO, the European Union, and the Western European Union to expanded membership to include Eastern and Central European former members of the now defunct Soviet Union.
• Concomitantly, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), dominated by Moscow, has roots both in Europe and Asia. Some of its members are currently seeking special economic and security ties with Western Europe.
• The United States, as the leading member of the Atlantic Alliance, is excluded from membership in the WEU and EU. Nevertheless, the U.S. Government has offered "lip service" to the expressed European desire to fashion a regional defense "identity"-sans U.S. participation.
• None of the existing regional organizations has the ability to handle "complex emergencies" in all their phases. Each must rely on the others for resources, cooperation, and coordination (as exemplified in Bosnia at present).

The inherent fluidity of Europe's geographic boundaries is reflected in the histories of several individual nation-states. Germany has experienced five alterations in its territorial boundaries over the past 200 years, the most recent coming with the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1990. East Germany was not only incorporated by its West German neighbor but, as a result, now forms NATO's new security boundary with Central Europe. Poland's territorial history is comparable, having suffered three partial annexations, foreign occupation, and truncation as a result of the exigencies of World War II. Hungary, former Czechoslovakia, and others reflect similar boundary adjustments and associated "traumas." In brief, geographically Europe is an entity lacking territorial durability and stability. As some scholars observe, Europe is more a state of mind than a clearly defined entity.

NATO itself was certainly not prepared for the pace of change that followed the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. In the fall of 1989, as the Berlin wall was being breached, a survey of over 30 NATO and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) staff officers could find only two who were willing to consider adopting a new NATO strategy in response to the changes underway in Europe. Yet little over a half year later, the NATO heads of state convened in London and directed the Alliance to undertake a "fundamental" revision of NATO strategy and to "build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe" by reaching out to NATO's former adversaries in the East and extending to them "the hand of friendship." To further that end, NATO heads of state invited the members of the then existing Warsaw Pact to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. At its next summit meeting, in Rome in November 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and adopted its new Strategic Concept. From that point, the Alliance has sought to adapt to the rapid pace of political and economic change occurring in the former Soviet Union countries, the Balkans region, and in the Mediterranean basin.

A Plethora of Organizations

The European foreign and defense ministers attending the Maastricht summit announced that the West European Union (WEU), an arm of the EU, would assume the dual commitment of serving as the embodiment of the European defense entity and function as the European pillar within NATO. The WEU had grown out of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, a Western European initiative aimed at preventing a resurgence of military threats. At Maastricht, WEU was endowed with responsibility for "strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." The organization has four membership categories:

At the NATO Summit in 1994, NATO's Heads of State and Government acknowledged the WEU dual role and enhanced its further development by announcing readiness to make NATO's collective assets available. The basis for cooperation would be consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of CFSP goals. In the June 1996 NATO Ministerial Meeting, the participants announced plans to impalement the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in collaboration with the WEU. This approach will permit asset sharing, including command and control arrangements to permit Athe use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU."¹

Despite this collaborative effort, the WEU must clarify how its intends to organize its own integral military system, in particular, the extent to which its proposes to integrate its military planning with the economic imperatives of the EU. There is a convincing case to be made for keeping the two organizations separate and distinct-to wit, it would simplify decisions to admit the Central and East European countries into the EU without there being the need to extend security guarantees to them. On the other hand, given the growing defense planning collaboration between NATO and the WEU, there is some doubt that a country could become a full member of WEU without also achieving comparable status in NATO. Of the WEU's 14 European members, only one, the Republic of Ireland (and then only as one of the observers), is not a member of NATO. For the future, WEU is likely to resemble the purpose and intention of NATO, without America and Canada.

The main pool of military manpower for WEU intervention operations lies in the Eurocorps, which became operational in 1994. The principal components are French and German armored divisions supported by Belgian and Spanish formations. Armored divisions may be useful for imposed cease-fires, much as in 1996 Bosnia, but do not provide the flexibility and rapid response capability when operations occur outside the immediate European theater. The German component is also politically constrained at present given the public disinclination to provide "heavy" combat units for peace operations.

There is general agreement in NATO that the WEU is likely to serve as the primary organization for implementing Europe-only missions outside the NATO "area of responsibility." For major military operations, however, the WEU will require logistics, communications, and intelligence support from NATO. The United States will also be required to provide assistance, given its advanced technological capabilities. NATO=s North Atlantic Council (NAC) will determine what role the organization will play in such missions. The United States, hence, will have a veto right and, in theory, a significant presence in most European decisiomaking where out-of-area operations are under consideration.

The NATO leadership has proceeded cautiously on the question of expanded peacekeeping roles. Change is recorded in the emergence of the Alliance's "Strategic Concept" paper in November 1991. It formed the basis for NATO's defense policies, its operational concepts, and its future planning doctrine. Among the major imperatives was an examination of how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct the Alliance's several missions more efficiently and flexibly, including peacekeeping. The need to adapt, it was recognized, would have to occur against a background of shrinking financial and manpower resources.

The commitments to the United Nations and OSCE have drawn NATO closer to a broader European security environment. Potential crisis regions, their security impact on Alliance members, and routes to these regions are of direct interest to NATO. It was agreed that NATO commitments might well result in NATO participating in operations in a wider geographic theater. Attention is being devoted to peace and stability of countries on the periphery of Europe- particularly given "the build up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including Weapons of Mass Destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the member states of the Alliance."⁴ Among other matters of concern: international terrorism, radical transnational movements, territorial disputes, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and mass migration.

With direct reference to peace support operations (PSO), such operations are expected to be conducted as part of a combined political, economic, diplomatic and military plan. Alliance participation is to be decided by the North Atlantic Council case by case. All military PSO activities are subject to close political control Aat all stages and at all levels."⁵ Military participation in a specific PSO is subject to national decision by member states. There is also an agreed need to assist the participation of non-NATO members, an important consideration as demonstrated in the 1996 IFOR operation in Bosnia.

Although individual NATO nations have been consistent contributors to U.N. observer missions and U.N. troop deployments, as in UNPROFOR in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Somalia, NATO as an institution with its integrated military command first became involved in U.N. peace operations in 1992. Operation Deny Flight, the "no fly zone" enforcement mission over Bosnia-Herzegovina; Operation Sharp Guard, the Adriatic maritime embargo mission; and IFOR, after the 1995 Dayton accords were signed governing the restoration of order in Bosnia, are examples of NATO forces operating under U.N. and OSCE mandate. The actual operations have occurred under the operational control of a major Regional Major Subordinate CommandCAFSOUTH. In addition, NATO resources in the form of a mobile headquarters from Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) were provided to the U.N. Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC) of UNPROFOR up until the latter's termination in 1995.

Doctrine determines what the assigned military forces will do and how, including organization, equipment, training, and rules of engagement. When the mandate and military doctrine are established, a division of labor must then be addressed. It may be derived functionally in terms of conflict prevention (e.g, the former Republic of Yugoslavia of Macedonia), or crisis management (e.g., UNPROFOR in Bosnia), or a combination of both (e.g., contemporary BosniaCIFOR). If crisis management, it may entail traditional peacekeeping (Cyprus) or peace enforcement (Somalia) and may involve a range of civil-military interactions (with NGOs, private societies, and others).

Another area for resolution involves unity of command. Most multinational peace operations almost inevitably experience tensions over national sovereignty and the military principle of unity of command. In both U.N.-directed and U.N.-authorized peace operations where different structures are involved, unity of command is virtually impossible to achieve. Unity of purpose, however, can be achieved and disruptive incidents minimized as long as the mandate and accompanying military doctrine are mutually understood and agreed, and where that understanding and agreement are constantly revalidated if the mission is changed or modified ("mission creep").

NATO and WEU are entering a new era of cooperation and coordination stemming from the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit. The primary focus is on giving form and substance to the "separable but not separate" concept of NATO capabilities linked to efforts to make the European security and defense identity a reality. The CJTF is the principal vehicle that can be used by both NATO and the WEU to provide either organization the capability to pursue out-of-area peace operations. Strategic level issues remain to be resolved, including provision of political guidance to CJTF; creation of policy coordination management mechanisms at the strategic level that can provide advice to the WEU and coordinate with and perform the functions performed by the NATO Military Committee; and creation of a workable theater headquarters mechanism for the WEU to provide the bridge between the strategic level (WEU) and the tactical level (CJTF). For the foreseeable future, however, the WEU organizational structure is likely to remain weak and will not be able to compete with the more sophisticated NATO military and political structures. To be coordinated effectively there will continue to be a need for reciprocity and transparency in terms of the WEU keeping NATO fully informed of WEU planning. A similar need obtains with the OSCE, because there is growing wariness by the Atlantic Council of of being coopted or NATO becoming a "subcontractor" for OSCE ventures.

Bosnia has proved a particularly unfortunate test case for collaboration between the military arm of NATO and the United Nations "system." The introduction of NATO into the Bosnian crisis occurred in 1993, at the height of the genocidal activities of Serb and Croatian forces. The arrangement came in the form a subcontractC NATO air and naval capabilities were to be placed at the disposal of U.N. officials in place in Bosnia and Croatia. Representatives from the two organizations had divergent approaches to the military requirements at hand: NATO official doctrine, predicated on anticipated conflict with Warsaw Treaty forces in the four preceding decades, emphasized the importance of "overriding force" to neutralize adversaries as expeditiously as possible. The U.N. leadership on the ground, military and civilian, adhered to a different doctrineCminimal use of force, largely in a self-protection mode, on the assumption that parties to a conflict were prepared to honor cease-fire agreements.

The request reached the headquarters of the U.N. military commander, General Bertrand de Lapresle, who was located in Zaghreb. He opposed the request on the grounds that an air strike of major magnitude would constitute a "provocation," one that could well jeopardize UNPROFOR units elsewhere and undermine the U.N. mission in Bosnia. The U.N. local civilian authority, Special Representative Yasushi Akashi, agreed and concluded that only a symbolic military action would be justified. Akashi ordered the destruction of an obsolete Serb tank located in an "arms exclusion zone" located outside Sarajevo, the gesture intending to serve the dual goals of "deterrence" and "retaliation." Serb forces were given a 20-minute warning of the scheduled air strike, which involved the dispatch of five aircraft from Italy to destroy the abandoned tank. Thus the U.N. reputation for impartiality remained intact.

NATO commanders were outraged, however. The air strike was hardly punitive, would not dissuade the Serbs from further violations, and had placed at jeopardy the lives of five airmen as a result of the advanced warning given. NATO defense ministers shortly thereafter forwarded a formal complaint to Boutros-Ghali and urged the adoption of firmer military measures in the future. A NATO team sent to Secretariat Headquarters in New York urged the adoption of more robust rules of engagement, but returned largely empty handed. The differences proved irreconcilable, and the six U.N. declared "safe zones" were to remain hostages to ill fortune, as history would soon demonstrate.

Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged from the demise of the Yugoslav federation with weak credentials for international recognition as a workable nation-state. It had no historical record as a political entity separate from its neighbors and capable of assuming international obligations and duties associated with independent status. Indeed, with the implosion of the Yugoslav federation, Serbian "leaders" were required in 1992 to fashion political and constitutional bonds for a state whose population had little sense of nationhood. It was populated by Southern Slavs speaking a common language but divided into three major national groups: 43.7 percent Muslims; 31.4 percent Serbs; and 17.3 percent Croats. An additional 5.5 percent were designated "Yugoslavs," essentially the offspring of mixed marriages. By 1992, state institutions were beginning to disintegrate, and each group began to seek security in its own community.

A number of peace plans were introduced by U.N., European, and U.S. diplomats throughout 1992-93, all reflecting a desire to avoid the use of military force to end the strife. Each peace plan was summarily rejected by one or another of the contending parties. Based on the notion of ethnicity, each of the peace plans reflected progressive acknowledgment of partition as a logical outcomeCand the geographical reduction of Sarajevo to a small principality. The most noteworthy effort was jointly launched by the United Nations and the soon-to-be renamed European Community. Former Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance represented the United Nations; former U.K. Foreign Secretary Lord Owen did the honors for the European Union. The Vance-Owen peace plan of 1993 was rejected by Serb "leaders" in Bosnia. The U.S. Government also opposed the plan, provoking widening strains in the Atlantic Alliance. However, the United States generated no acceptable approach of its own and was perceived in much of Europe as vacillating and increasingly contradictory.

The United Nations, with U.S. endorsement, had begun to organize an humanitarian relief effort in 1992, including formation of the multinational UNPROFOR. This force received as its initial mandate provision of emergency supplies to Sarajevo and surrounding areas, included the opening of a land corridor for unfettered delivery of aid. In August 1992, Security Council Resolution 770 enjoined UNPROFOR to use "all measures necessary" to deliver humanitarian assistance. However, the Council refused to recognize that the situation in Bosnia was a civil war in which the parties involved were loathe to accept "impartiality." If anything, relief goods and supplies were viewed as items to be controlled and embargoed should circumstances require. Hence, protection of Sarajevo and the provision of humanitarian assistance could be vouchsafed only by the use of overriding forceCsuch force was also required to protect other U.N. designated "safe areas." UNPROFOR, however, was ill equipped to meet such requirements.

With the situation in growing deterioration, NATO was invited to provide backup for UNPROFOR. Togther with the European Community, naval forces were dispatched to the Adriatic to enforce U.N. declared embargoes, and a no-fly zone was declared for northern BosniaCall ostensibly to enforce U.N. "all necessary means" resolutions. Decisions on the means to be applied would be determined by the U.N. Secretary-General's representative in the region, Mr. Akashi, and the U.N. military commander. Their assigned priorities were maintenance of "impartiality" in the conflict, protection of UNPROFOR units, and delivery of humanitarian aid to the "safe areas." NATO could initiate no military action without prior U.N. approval. Thus, a joint "turnkey" or parallel management arrangement had to be fashioned, one clearly at odds with the traditional NATO doctrine of unity of command.

Serious disagreements were to develop under this turnkey arrangement and crippled both organizations. For the Secretary-General and U.N. field representatives, mission survival was the primary imperative. Therefore, UNPROFOR was to remain lightly armed and unthreatening. Its numbers were too limited, given the geomorphology of Bosnia, and therefore stretched too thin to conduct major military operations to protect "safe areas." For example, the "weapons exclusion zone" around Sarajevo could not be enforced with available ground forces. Indeed, the Serb units were ensconced atop the surrounding hills with ample fields of fire for artillery and tank units. When UNPROFOR did unleash compliance efforts (primarily at U.S. urging), dozens of U.N. personnel were apprehended by the Serb forces, disarmed, and subjected to public humiliation. The U.N. leadership concluded that it could not enforce any peace accord but could only hope to monitor such accords and feed where possible displaced populations.

NATO would have been well advised to proceed with greater caution. As one former U.N. assistant secretary observed in fall 1994, A The institution of the Secretary-General is inherently inappropriate to manage the use of force. . . . By involving itself in decisions on the use of force, the institution of the Secretary-General compromises the impartiality critical to its capacity as a negotiator."⁷ Nevertheless, NATO had wittingly delegated decisionmaking authority to an institution conditioned not to manage the use of force under Chapter VII mandate.

The abject failure of the United Nations, NATO, and other parties to deal effectively with the widening Bosnia crisis was undermining their credibility and demanded reexamination of existing strategies. Their moral standing had been shredded as Serb forces slaughtered unarmed Muslims after the fall of the Srebrenica "safe area," bombed the enclave of Tuzla, and took several hundred U.N. Blue Helmets hostage in reprisal for limited NATO air attacks (again at U.S. urging). To stiffen resistance to ongoing Serb attacks, Presidents Chirac and Clinton received approval for transfer of overall military command authority to NATO forces, thus ending the dual turnkey approach, and called for the creation of a 10,000 man Rapid Reaction Force (heavily armed). At the same time, UNPROFOR units were concentrated in defensible areas, which required their removal from much of eastern Bosnia, and thus leaving remaining "safe areas" in the east to Serb control.

By summer 1995, the balance of local power was beginning to shift unfavorably against Serb interests. At a conference held in London, NATO was authorized to launch "massive" air attacks in the event of future Serb depredations. In August, Croatian forces took the offensive in the Krajina salient, defeating Serbian units, while Bosniac commanders launched separate campaigns. The United States, rhetorically and otherwise, supported both efforts, as did the majority of Western European governments. The Rubicon was being crossed and, quite obviously, UNPROFOR could not expect to return to its traditional doctrines and roles. Nor could the threatened use of overriding force by its adversaries be blinked away by Belgrade and local Serb chieftains.

The IFOR effort has been evaluated by NATO officials and Secretary of Defense Perry as "successful." The evaluation has been tendered in terms of criteria that are narrowly based. IFOR managed to complete its perceived mission with few combat-related casualties. Its various national contingents gained valuable chain of command, intelligence/information collection, and related field experience. For Russian officers and those participating Partner for Peace members, a growing awareness of areas for collaboration and NATO's peacekeeping potential helped to reduce suspicions and mistrust. For the United States, the "exercise" sensitized unit commanders to complex subtleties of enforcement operations under constrained rules of engagement. In addition, experience gained in the area of C³ operations, especially for ad hoc coalition partners, could prove of great value in the future.

There is an accompanying downside to any objective evaluation of IFOR. IFOR interpreted its mandate in narrow operational terms and did little to diminish tensions and disagreements amongst the ethnic communities. These were largely set aside for future validation, as well as the growing doubt within some NATO circles about the efficaciousness of using military power over an abbreviated period of time to secure satisfactory political outcomes. Equally important, there is greater appreciation regarding obstacles to be overcome in divergent international bureaucratic cultures where customs and procedures are at variance with those of other organizations. Effective "lock step" is much desired but difficult to attain. Not to be ignored, any evaluation of IFOR effectiveness has been the reconciliation of the conflicted agendas of local parties in the civil war.

Any assessment of IFOR performance must take into account its role and impact on NATO expansion plans. Attention should be accorded NATO and CIS peacekeeping operational zones as potential spheres of influence. Where the interests of NATO members are not at risk, the inclination will be to accept CIS "zones of influence," the exceptions being the grey geographic areas of Eastern and Central Europe. Barring membership in NATO, countries in these two areas are likely to become marshlands of uncertain security status, much like Bosnia, where the NATO-CIS relationship may evolve into either collaboration to secure peaceful resolution or one of open competition.

Bosnia will also likely prove a significant testing ground for European peacekeeping staying power, as well as a litmus test as to the capacity of Moscow, Washington, and Brussels to reach agreement on common purposes and goals. Bosnia will also test the ability of European organizations, notably CSCE and EU, to provide the diplomatic and economic resources and skills to bring Bosnia into the "community of European nations." The challenge for EU is heightened by the fact that member states view foreign policy as an extension of national self-interest. Constituent EU members of the WEU have little desire to project force while subordinating this interest, particularly if it involves risking their soldiers' lives to a common policy dictated by others. With the WEU treaty up for possible renegotiation in 1998, members have an obligation for "mutual defense," which is difficult for traditional neutrals such as Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland to accept unconditionally. The Economist recently underscored the EU/WEU dilemma:

NATO, however, will almost certainly prove the primary organization in shaping the future of Europe in terms of peacekeeping roles and missions. NATO confronts several challenges within the organization and from neighborhoods once considered threatening. The alliance has proved enduring despite many internal disagreements over the past 30 years. However, "victory" is not an unmixed blessing. The organization today has an increasing number of critics who question its continued utility given the changed regional security environment, which many NATO members concede is not longer "threatening." In the words of Secretary Albright, the clear imperative is to fashion a "new NATO" or else face the risk of being considered an "ossified institution."

The "new" NATO contemplated is one prepared to extend membership to selected countries east of the Elbe that fully meet NATO standards in the military, economic, and political realms. The organization has in recent years established two entities to facilitate cooperation and joint military exercises with former Warsaw Treaty Organization members-the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partner for Peace program (PfP)Cas well as to engage in joint military planning and exchanges of military information.

NATO has been adapting its military structures and procedure since July 1990, when the allies declared, "The Alliance's integrated for structure . . . will change fundamentally." A major facet of change has been the increased European representation on higher staffs and in senior billets. In addition, since WEU moved to Brussels in January 1993 to undertake its new roles of strengthening the European pillar of NATO, NATO has taken significant steps to empower WEU with real military assets to accomplish its tasks. WEU and NATO meet quarterly in joint Council sessions, their secretaries-general meet often to discuss matters of common interest, and the WEU Secretary-General is invited to North Atlantic Council ministerial meetings.

Implicit in NATO's expanded ties is its future roles and missions. In particular, NATO must address the extent to which it is prepared to undertake "out of area" actions, that is, areas that do not fall within the traditional alliance operational zone. Members of the alliance have supported operations in Bosnia and adjacent areas, as authorized by the United Nations and the OSCE. Alliance leaders have made clear that they are prepared to consider future missions, but have yet to provide clear guidelines for planning purposes on which geographic zones constitute "areas of interest" in which NATO would be prepared to deploy forces.

A further consideration is the future of NATO relations with the OSCE, particularly problems to be surmounted at the strategic level on the use of military force. During the UNPROFOR phase of the Bosnia peace operation, confusion arose not only over chain of command considerations but conceptual preconceptions. The notion of mixing U.N.-directed "peacekeepers" with NATO "peace enforcers" in the same tactical context and theater of operations proved unsound, conceptually and practically. For NATO, the issue remains on the table with respect to future peace operations. What did emerge in Bosnia was the clear understanding that use of coercive military force by an organization inevitably makes that organization a co-belligerent in the eyes of other belligerents, and where certain nations provide units for both peace enforcement and peacekeeping, the belligerent who is under attack may be unwilling to distinguish between the two.

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Last Update:  October 1, 2002