McNair Paper Number 58, Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations, Chapter 4, June 1998
4.
Commonwealth of Independent States
It seems to be almost instinctual to attempt to create a successor organization to a dissolved empire. The English smoothly moved from Empire to the British Commonwealth, the French to Francophone Community, and the Portuguese have recently announced the formation of a Luso League. The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, therefore, can be seen as a reflex action as much as a deep-dyed plan to reestablish Moscow's authority or a far-sighted liberal dream of a new, consensual form of regional relationship.
Certainly prominent military and civilian figures in Moscow, soon to be leaders of the new Russian Federation, were the originators and instigators of the CIS project, and it is reasonable to assume that these individuals and institutions each had different agendas, from empire to commonwealth to personal motives. The last category probably included tactical political calculations by Boris Yelstin in his competition with Gorbachev for Russian leadership. The dissolution of the USSR left Gorbachev with no role or status while conversely transferring to Yelstin, as leader of the new Russian Federation, the governance powers inside Russia hitherto belonging to Gorbachev as chief of state of the USSR. The CIS, then, offered Yeltsin at least a potential formal role in the neighboring countries where Gorbachev had exercised sovereign powers.
The various Russian sponsors of the CIS proposed different and often competing characters for that organization: military, economic, financial, even cultural. None has taken firm shape, although the military has been the most prominent, partially because of a lack of
Map 1
consistency on the part of the Russian Government. A recent development has been the effort, or at least the interest, of some members of the CIS to attempt to leverage their membership to influence Russian behavior and policy. Most successful in this has been Georgian President Shevardnadze who has managed to use the CIS forum to bring pressure on Russia in the spring and summer of 1997 to help end the Sbkhazian secession. Meanwhile, outsiders in Western Europe and the United States have been uncertain how to deal with this Russian regional innovation, but through NATO's Partnership for Peace have pursued a somewhat independent new relationship with many of the members of the CIS. Not unlike the proverbial elephant, therefore, the CIS appears to be a very different creature to different observers such as Russians, other CIS members, the United Nations, and Americans.
From its beginning, the CIS has pursued three major themes: membership, institution building, andCmost ambiguous and yet most important of allCrole seeking. The last item can be encapsulated in the question, "Commonwealth or Empire?" framed by William Odom and Robert Dujarric in the title of their Hudson Institute study. Indeed, Russian policy toward the CIS often has been ambivalent, reflecting the internal debate between the neo-Communist and imperial forces and the liberal reform movement. The leadership of the other countries has been equally ambivalent and changeable, with the old "apparachik" figures anxious to retain as much as possible of the ties and policies of the USSR, while the more nationalist and reform forces seek greater actual independence.
In Moscow, the CIS was viewed as an instrument of Russian policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus, although there was little agreement on the character of the desired relationship- commonwealth or empire or something in between. In Central Asia the old Communist elites still in power wanted to continue with the old command arrangements and limit democratic political expansion, while obtaining a degree of local authority for themselves. Kazakhstan's president was especially forceful in pushing this policy of a strong, highly integrated CIS-"a new Soviet Union with local autonomy"1-but it failed to develop rapidly or institutionally. Elsewhere the CIS "project" was viewed with suspicion but could not be summarily rejected. Out of the complex motives and maneuverings, the idea of regional organizational peacekeeping has emerged as a possible limited type of activity and, because limited, possibly acceptable.
Founding
The CIS was inaugurated when Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed an initial agreement on December 8, 1991, in Minsk, Belarus. This move by the three Slavic states created some unease among the other Former States of the Soviet Union. The five Central Asian states issued a statement almost immediately, on December 13, which commented favorably on the agreement signed and expressed a desire to join as equal founders, given certain modifications and amendments. They called for a summit meeting of the former republics to discuss the issues, which was held in due course in Alma-Ata on December 21, 1991. This meeting enlarged the CIS membership to 11, all designated as High Signatory Parties with equal footing as co-founders. Only four of the FSU republics stayed out: Georgia and the three Baltic states. Georgia later applied (or was coerced) for CIS membership in 1993, but the Baltic states have resolutely remained outside and show no signs of changing their minds.
On January 22, 1993, the Charter of the CIS was formally adopted, initially by only seven states, and entered into force in January 1994. Even prior to that, a Coordinating and Consultative Committee was established at the deputy head of government level. The CIS Minsk "working group" was transformed into a formal secretariat. In September 1993, a council of foreign ministers and a commission on human rights were established. At the time an agreement for a CIS economic union was also signed, but only Turkmenistan and Ukraine signed on initially. Although this was potentially an important step toward institutionalization and consolidation of the CIS, it has not been implemented, and the CIS remains essentially an intergovernmental forum, with little in the way of executive authority or institutions.
Whence the CIS?
Much of the confusion about the true present character or likely future role of the CIS arises from the understandable lack of agreement on the likely future character of the post-USSR Russian Federation itself, although "decentralization and regionalization of power are the predominant trends."2 Whatever it turns out to be, the Russian Federation will be a major power with appropriate interests and concerns. Mr. Paul Goble of Radio Free Europe has outlined what he calls the "trend line of Russian foreign policy," which is based on 10 challenges or issues in current RF foreign policy:
NATO expansion
Former Yugoslavia
China
The "Near Abroad," especially concern for Russian citizens there
Relations with Iran, especially with respect to the Caucasus
Oil prices
Rebuilding the Navy's ability to project force
Arms Control, re-open the existing agreement
Economy
Building of national institutions
Russia, however, can pursue these interests in various ways. Two obvious strategic choices-at opposite ends of the conceptual spectrum-would be one based on cooperation with the West, while another might be focused on resurgence of Russian imperialism in the area of the former Soviet Union. It appears, for the moment at least, that Moscow is attempting to pursue these policies simultaneously. "The new Russian foreign policy wants both membership in the Western club and a privileged role in Eurasia."3 This approach is not surprising, given Russia's urgent need to concentrate on internal matters for the foreseeable future combined with the lack of a national consensus on a wide range of questions, from a definition of Russia itself to agreement on the desirable political and economic models to be adopted.
Membership and Character
The membership question has remained confusing. The three original members were joined by eight others, but in October 1992 Azerbaijan's Parliament refused ratification of the agreement establishing the Commonwealth, and Moldova failed to ratify later in mid-1993. Nevertheless both Azerbaijan and Moldova continued to participate in CIS meetings in one capacity or another. The CIS charter makes a distinction between "founding members" and later adherents, although there does not appear to be any significant difference in the quality of these memberships. The charter also provides for the status of associate members for those who wish to participate only in selected activities, and other states may attend meetings observers if so approved by the Council of the Heads of States. Membership of the CIS finally consisted of 12 countries of the old USSR minus the tree Baltic states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Despite concerns, fears, and objections, Moscow has obtained (by various means) affiliation by all of the former states of the USSR except the Baltics.
It is not completely clear, however, what affiliation or membership means. Different countries pursued different approaches to their obligations and to their participation in decisionmaking in the CIS. The December 30, 1991, Agreement creating the Councils of Heads of State and Heads of Government of the CIS stipulated that decisions in both councils would be reached by consensus. However the agreement also permitted members to abstain in a particular case, with such abstention not to be considered as an obstacle to the adoption of a decision. Individual members therefore possess a veto over any given decision but may also abstain without breaking consensus. These arrangements have been confirmed in later procedural agreements.
This right not to participate (which is similar to the voting process in the United Nations) is widely employed by members of the CIS, who practice a form of selective signing. In fact, only a few of the many CIS agreements have been signed by all member states. Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have formed the hard core of the CIS by signing almost all of the agreements. (Now that Belarus has moved into a much closer bilateral relationship with Russia, it may join this core group.) Most other members have been especially cautious about signing agreements that establish any supranational or permanent executive bodies, although they are more willing to go along with the creation of coordinating bodies in the economic and social areas.
In any case, few of the CIS agreements are legally binding; rather, they are declarations of intention. Where Russia has maintained or reinstated tighter ties (as in Belarus, Georgia, and Azerbaijan), it has done so by manipulating bilateral pressures. Proposals for some form of military integration and economic union have been the most difficult and the most contentious of the core questions that will determine the character, and future role, of the CIS. The experience to date in these two central areas has not been definitive.
Military Relations
Resistance to military integration is particularly strong, and Moscow is having trouble maintaining even limited border troop arrangements in a few countries. In essence, all Russia's partners in the CIS, except for Belarus, are leery of having the Commonwealth turn into a military control mechanism as was the Warsaw Treaty Organization. They accept that they must maintain or reinstitute some economic ties but are attempting to limit the security relationship and demonstrate a viable political independenceCminimizing their ties while maximizing benefits.
While Ukraine has been the most visible in pursuit of Western security arrangements to counterbalance those with Moscow, other CIS countries have pursued similar policies in varying degrees. All have signed their own individual Partnership for Peace agreements; there are no CIS-PfP links. Countries of the CIS participating in the Bosnian adventure are doing so with national units, with no CIS identity or cohesion. Even the bilateral agreements Russia has procured allowing Russian forces to be based in CIS countries (such as Georgia, Armenia, and Tajikistan) permit indigenous personnel to join those units in significant numbers.
A major Russian CIS initiative is the effort to obtain security treaties, but those few signed to date have lacked substance. A major question for all of the members of the CIS is that of successor arrangements for the USSR military structure, beginning with the sharing out of its assets and military equipment. Also, it has been noted that the legacy of the Soviet Union is the heavy involvement of the Russian Federation in the "near abroad," partially through troops stationed there, partially through the recent CIS and bilateral treaties.
Clearly, some senior Russian military officials expected (or at least hoped) that the CIS would provide for a continuation of the complete Soviet military structureCunder Russian leadership. This did not occur, as all the FSUs eventually insisted on the right and need to create their own military. Especially in the military area, many view a comprehensive military arrangement as continuation of Moscow's central authority.
At the Tashkent summit in May 1992, Russia essentially shifted the whole discussion to another plane by introducing a proposal for a collective security treaty for the CIS. By doing so, Moscow came down on one side of an argument that had been central to the question of CIS military policy: whether to follow the old Warsaw Pact (centralized) or the NATO (looser) model. A collective security pact was closer to the NATO model and was based on the existence of national military policies and structures; further, it essentially closed the argument over the character of CIS military arrangements by opting for national forces. However, this agreement is vague in many details and is far from providing for the continuation of an integrated regional military system. Many have expressed reservations and concernsCUkraine thought the treaty was incompatible with other CIS agreements, and Belarus thought it incompatible with its own constitution. Nevertheless, while most have resisted the continuation of Russian central military authority, Moscow has established Russian military presence in several of the CIS member states.
Five CIS summits were held in 1993, with little further progress made with respect to military matters, and attention shifted more toward economic questions. In May, the CIS Council of Defense Ministers abolished the post of commander in chief of CIS Armed Forces and in December eliminated the CIS Armed Forces Command itself. In essence, by the end of 1993 the effort to create a combined CIS military structure had collapsed. Russia itself had reconstituted a national military as had the others. Continued deployment of Russian troops outside the Russian Federation required fig leafs in the form of bilateral agreements or a regional multinational arrangement. Earlier work on the creation of CIS doctrine and authority for peacekeeping deployments was pursued, and the concept paper on the prevention and settlement of conflicts on the territories of the CIS member states referred to above was adopted in early 1996. Therefore, a legal structure for multinational CIS military relations has been created, in case anyone might wish to use it.
Peacekeeping, therefore, might offer Moscow a form of acceptable military cooperation less satisfactory than outright military integration but still somewhat more structured than a collection of bilateral agreements.
Peacekeeping
One major concern of members of this regional organization is that of collective security, although there is a sharp distinction between the attitude of Russia (proactive) and the others (suspicious). While Russian interest initially focused on questions such as the future of the USSR military structure and the protection of borders, war in Nakorno-Korabagh and conflicts in Georgia and Moldova resulted in introduction of "peacekeeping" or "peacemaking" into the collective security agenda at the Kiev CIS Summit in 1992. All CIS members (except Turkmenistan) signed "The Agreement on Military Observer Groups and Collective Peace-Keeping Forces in the CIS." The agreement included many restrictive conditions, similar to U.N. "terms," which called for a request from all parties and a cease-fire in placeCbut still introduced the concept as a possible task for the CIS as a regional organization.
Subsequent agreements were signed, such as "The Protocol on the Status of Military Observer Groups and Collective Peacekeeping Forces" and "The Protocol on Manning, Structure, Logistic Support and Financing of the Military Observer Groups and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States,"
map 2
in May 1992 in Tashkent. Further discussion and elaboration over the succeeding years resulted in a paper, "Concept for the Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts on the Territories of the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States," which was accepted as a resolution of the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS on January 19, 1996. This concept paper lays out arrangements almost identical to those of classic U.N. peacekeeping: consensual operations by voluntary forces financed by special assessment. Particularly significant elements of the concept paper are:
"The member-states of the CIS will strive to strengthen the role of the Commonwealth in the peaceful settlement of conflicts" by joint agreement and action.
Special note was made of the desirability of "heavy participation of the United Nations and the OSCE in efforts to regulate conflicts on the territories of the member-states of the Commonwealth."
Any such activity will be regulated by the U.N. Charter, the Charter, and other documents of the CIS, the generally recognized principals and norms of international law, relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, OSCE documents, and other relevant agreements between member-states of the CIS.
With regard to the settlement of conflicts in the territories of its member-states, the CIS will operate as a regional organization in conformity with Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.
The Council of the Heads of States of the CIS is the authority for defining and authorizing of peacekeeping mandates and operations.
Peace enforcement operations (Chapter VII type authority for the use of force) are permitted only when so authorized by the U.N. Security Council.
This convention, interestingly enough, codifies the limited nature of CIS peacekeeping to conflict resolution. None of the CIS states (or, for that matter, Russian states, until the current Bosnia operation) has engaged in any of the humanitarian assistance or complex emergency management activities so characteristic of recent U.N. peacekeeping operations. When humanitarian assistance has been called for, it has been left to U.N. or nongovernmental organizations to conduct, such as the UNHCR in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Nothing in any of the relevant CIS agreements or documents touches on the problem of "failed states" or complex emergencies, and the above discussed "concept" paper clearly prohibits "Chapter VII" type peace enforcement operations unless authorized by the Security Council. Essentially, therefore, the CIS peacekeeping authority is limited to what is generally referred to as "traditional" or consensual peacekeeping under the provisions of Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter.
The CIS, therefore, has adopted criteria and standards whereby it could "provide an international framework for specific interventions by regional actors." However, many observers believe that "oversight arrangements are needed to make the legitimacy of such action conditional on international standards,"4 such as the U.N. Observer Force linked to the CIS peacekeeping operation in the Abkhaz region of Georgia.
The Russians sought formal U.N. recognition (and the financing that would go with it) in 1994, but Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali made it clear during a visit to Moscow that the request would not be met and that U.N. peacekeeping operations would be only those under U.N. control from beginning to end. Moscow continued this effort to obtain international recognition, and in the spring 1996 session of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Russian representative stated that the Russian Federation attached particular importance to the establishment of working relations between the CIS and the United Nations, favoring participation of the United Nations and the OSCE in dispute resolution activities within the CIS, to include peacekeeping operations. He added with some asperity, "So far, unfortunately, we have to note that Russia is still obliged to carry the main burden of moral, political, and financial responsibility for peacekeeping in the CIS States."
In Moscow's eyes, the CIS is an established regional organization of the type covered by Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, and no formal or procedural recognition by the United Nations is needed or even provided for. Former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali) at least appeared to agree; he formally attended and addressed CIS summit conferences.
Russia first attempted to utilize CIS "peacekeeping authority" in mid-July 1993 in Tajikistan. Previous operations, however, were more on the order of bilateral activities, such as the agreements concluded concerning the Trans-Dniester region between Russia and Moldova (1992) and those between Georgia and Russia (several in 1992 and 1993).
Later developments in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan resulted in these countries joining the CIS, the later deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, and an ad hoc peacekeeping force in the South Ossetian region of Georgia. No force obtained the right to wear U.N. blue berets.
Meanwhile, developments in the Dniester River area of Moldova enabled the Russians (who had large army units stationed in the country) to play an active role in local developments. Although the attempt to break off part of the country and have it join Russia failed for the moment, Russia was able to retain a position and role in the country by relabeling its forces as CIS peacekeepers.
Moscow offered another peacekeeping force to assist with the Nakorno-Karabagh conflict, but both parties, especially the Azerbaijan Government, strongly prefer either a CSCE or U.N. force. Nevertheless, Moscow will probably continue to attempt to consider peacekeeping operations as a policy option in the geographic area of the former USSR. While many will continue to harbor suspicions about Russian intentions in doing so, the reality remains that inter- and intrastate conflicts in the area, present and future, will require attention.
Regardless of their internationally recognized status, or lack thereof, four Russian-sponsored "peacekeeping forces" were, and still are, deployed, in Tajikistan, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Moldova.
Tajikistan
Russian troops in Tajikistan (both army and Border Troops) had been actively engaged in the civil war in Tajikistan when 23 Russian Border Troops were killed on July 13, 1993. Moscow notified the U.N. Security Council that it would assist Tajikistan and appointed Foreign minister Kozyrev as "special representative" to coordinate all Russian operations there. Kozyrev addressed the U.N. General Assembly in September and proclaimed a special peacekeeping role for Russia in the CIS and asked that Russian peacekeeping forces be given the status of U.N. peacekeepers.
To bolster this request, Russia obtained promises of support from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan and launched a diplomatic campaign to obtain U.N. sanction. The diplomatic effort failed, and the United Nations declined to grant the Russian request, but the effort signaled a Russian policy of claiming a special role for peacekeeping under CIS cover. This was actually Russia's second attempt to place a "peacekeeping" force in Tajikistan. The first operation had been authorized by the CIS in January 1993 in an attempt to stabilize the political environment in Tajikistan. Although deployed, it consisted only of Russian troops and had little success, if only because a cease-fire agreement was never achieved.
The second and more ambitious operation produced the Coalition Peacekeeping Forces (KMS), which numbered approximately 25,000 troops (the vast majority Russian) under the command of a Russian general. (The command and control arrangements, however, appear somewhat ambiguous, as the KMS commander does not appear to have clear cut authority over Russian units, much less those from other CIS states.) The mandate of the KMS is also more ambitious, representing a full-scale intervention under the authority of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, which smacks more of peace making than peacekeeping. Some have described it as turning Tajikistan into a de facto Russian-CIS (actually Russian-Uzbeck, in the opinion of some) protectorate.
The KMS remains deployed in Tajikistan, mostly as backup to the border troops on the southern border with Iran although one major unit is deployed in the Tajik capital where it performs the function of propping up the government. Both within the context of the KMS context and with the help of the United Nations,a series of cease-fire accords have been negotiated, and each in turn failed. In essence, the KMS has become a regional coalition operating in support of the Tajikistan Government.
Although approached by the participants to play a peacekeeping role, the Security Council has declined to do so, limiting U.N. involvement to the authorization in December 1994 of an observer force (UNMOT-U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan) with an authorized strength of 84, including local civilian staff. In this connection, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy. Both the Special Envoy and UNMOT were authorized to pursue the usual mediation, cease-fire agreement monitoring, and humanitarian assistance tasks, and were specifically instructed to maintain close liaison with the "Collective Peace-keeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Tajikistan" as well as with the Mission of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and local forces.
This effort began to unravel in late 1996, when the Tajik opposition several times routed superior but clearly unmotivated government forces in the narrow middle section of Tajikistan that connects the western and eastern parts of the country. Continuing discussions among the various parties produced another peace agreement in late June 1997, but did not, at least immediately, result in any noticeable increase in civil accord. In fact, the alignment of forces among Tajiks became more complicated, with various government forces apparently aligned against the Government. In early August, Russian officials (speaking for the CIS FORCE) and opposition leaders announced they would remain neutral in these intragovernment squabble. Concurrently, Russia continues to pursue an active bilateral policy, reaching across the border into Afghanistan in an effort to frustrate the anti-Russian Tajik rebels.
Georgia (Abkhazia)
Relations between the minority Abkhaz and the majority ethnic Georgians, tense for decades, erupted in 1992 in the aftermath of the breakup of the USSR, when the local Abkhaz authorities attempted to separate from the newly independent Georgia. Russian involvement in the Abkhaz attempt is widely assumed and played a role in bringing Georgia into the CIS. Meanwhile a de facto division of Georgia had occurred and a cease-fire was agreed to. The CIS operation was initiated in June 1994 and consisted of 3,000 troops, mostly Russian with minor Tajik participation. Its mandate is focused on maintaining the demilitarized zone along the Abkhaz-Georgian "border."
However, the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia is not alone; it shares the field with UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia), a Special Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General, individual U.N. specialized agencies and programs, and a resident mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although the United Nations declined Russia's request that the CIS force in Georgia be granted U.N. status, the Security Council resolution mandating UNOMIG does specifically mention the CIS peacekeepers and thereby link them to U.N. efforts. However, the multinational effort in Georgia-Abkhazia has been noted for its lack of cohesion and integration among the various players.
Little progress was made throughout 1995 and the first half of 1996, but the political situation appeared to improve when Georgian President Shevardnadze won the November 1995 election, thereby significantly strengthening his efforts to stabilize the country, and the Abkhaz leader announced a new position accepting the principle of a "Federate Union" (undefined). In addition, several changes were introduced to improve the integration and effectiveness of the overall operation in early 1996, and the mandates of both forces were extended.
These developments enhanced the peacekeeping and regional organization credentials of the CIS. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov himself chaired meetings in February 1996 between the disputants in Moscow, although without any particular success. Later in the year, the Georgian Government began to make public noises about the possibility of it asking Russia to withdraw the force, unless it could produce acceptable results quickly.
Diplomatic and political activity in 1997 did result, however, in some direct contact between the Abkhaz and Georgian leaders and a joint statement in August 1997, in which both pledged to refrain from the use of force. Russian President Yelstin stated that if these talks moved forward and produced a political settlement, he would propose a phased withdrawal of the now 1,600 Russian/CIS peacekeepers now deployed on the current cease-fire line.
Georgia (South Ossetia)
The South Ossetian conflict is similar to the Abkhazian in that it involves a minority ethnic group in a newly independent country, but differs in that the group in question shares its ethnicity with kin across the border in Russia (North Ossetia). Open tension between the Ossetians and the Georgians developed in 1989 and after as the new Georgian Government instituted a Georgian language program as well as other Georgian nationalist initiatives. Increasing tensions resulted in South Ossetian local government declaring its independence, which the Georgian Government rejected, and abolishing South Ossetia's previous autonomous status. The conflict escalated, and by mid-1991 there were interethnic war with blockades, hostage-taking, and artillery attacks. Georgian President Gamsakhurdia fled and was replaced by Edward Shevardnadze, but the conflict continued and Russia increased its involvement, finally organizing a meeting in June 1992 near the Russian city of Sochi, which produced a cease-fire agreement and the organization and deployment of a joint peacekeeping force.
The South Ossetian mission is not a CIS operation but the first attempt by Moscow at a what has been described as a local coalition model. The force of approximately 1,500 is composed of troops from both sides of the conflict as well as Russia (both Russian Federation and "local" troops from North Ossetia). As the largest contributor as well as political patron, Russia dominates and leads the force.
The force's mandate was originally to separate the warring sides by creating a buffer zone between South Ossetia and Georgia. By mid-1993 the operation appears to have expanded into a more general policing and monitoring activity throughout South Ossetia, as the South Ossetian government does not appear to have been able to establish anything serious in the way of local police administration. Little progress has been made in resolving the conflict since then, although the Georgians and the South Ossetians signed an accord in June 1996, mediated by Russia and the OSCE, that carried forward the cease-fire and called for action on the outstanding issues. Meanwhile, the peacekeeping force, somewhat reduced as Russia deals with other demands for troops, continues to function in its dual monitoring and policing role.
Moldova
The peacekeeping operation in Moldova is also an ad hoc arrangement: a bilateral agreement between Moldova and Russia, not CIS authorized. It is designed to separate regional factions along the Dniester River; half is composed of Russian troops and the rest comprises Moldovan and Dniester battalions.
Although billed as a peacekeeping operation, the force more clearly represents a direct Russian involvement in the internal affairs of a former Soviet republic. The conflict arise from the efforts of the east bank region of the Dniester River to secede from Moldova, an especially strong impulse following the collapse of the USSR and Moldovan independence. The conflict is political rather than ethnic and was exacerbated by the role of the Russian 14th Army, which was based in the region and which actively supported the Dniester forces. Negotiations among Moldovan, Russian, and Dniesteran authorities resulted in a cease-fire agreement in July 1992 in Moscow.
In what Kevin O'Prey calls "Moscow's local coalition model for mediation and peacekeeping,"5 the Russian and Moldovan presidents agreed to act as joint guarantors of peace and authorized a peacekeeping force. In the event only Russia was willing to contribute peacekeepers to the Moldovan mission, other CIS and some East European states had offered to send peacekeepers but backed out and called for the use of OSCE mechanisms. However, when the OSCE in July 1992 refused the Moldovan Government's request for a OSCE peacekeeping force, Chisinau finally accepted a Russian proposal for a tripartite (Russian, Dniester, Moldovan) force to be labeled as CIS peacekeeping force. The peacekeepers, about 4,000 strong, were deployed in July and August 1992 in a buffer zone separating Moldovan and Dniester forces. In addition, the OSCE sent a resident observer mission.
Although there has been no outbreak of large-scale hostilities since the operation has begun, there have been persistent charges that the force has not been impartial; that it has consistently favored the Dniester side. A treaty for withdrawal of the force was negotiated in early 1996 but has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma. However, Moscow has actually withdrawn a significant portion of its contribution to the peacekeeping force over the past 2 years, arguing that some of their functions could be assumed by its 14th Army units stationed in the area, thereby further diluting the neutral character of the peacekeeping force.
Cohesion
The passion for their new-found independence by most of the former members of the USSR is obviously why there has been little progress in new institution building and the evolution of common policy (and the consequent continued parallel growth of Russian bilateral policies in the area). In reality, the CIS was created largely in an ad hoc manner, without a unifying concept of coherent structure. Most of the agreements concluded have been reached though a process of compromise that has attempted to meet Moscows bottom line of preventing a further disintegration of inherited relations, while enabling the other members to pursue varying degrees of independent national political life. The key word or concept is "reintegration," but there is little agreement of what that means. Increasingly it appears to mean a mixture of economic and military ties, varying from country to country.
However, by late 1993, the CIS took on new life with the accession of Georgia and Azerbaijan (even though their new membership was less than fully voluntary). Each of the three Caucasian states discovered that, for different reasons, it could not retain full independence from the Russian Federation.
Not surprisingly, apart from the Russian Federation each member of the CIS is attempting to pursue a membership policy that brings it some advantages (e.g., Russian support for Armenia in Nakorno-Karabagh), while limiting Russian influence. Russia's intentions, as noted above, are not fully transparent, or maybe just not yet fully developed. Everyone, including Russia, has a separate agenda. Reuters6 classified the member states of the CIS as follows with respect to their views on the institutionalization of the CIS:
Integration enthusiasts: Russia, Belarus. The two Slav neighbors signed an accord in April 1996 creating a "Community" with some supranational bodies and a timetable for the creation of a common market and monetary union by 1997, and joint transport and energy systems. They are to coordinate their defense an foreign policies but insist each will maintain its individual sovereignty.
Pro-integration but suspicious of outright union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. These two have joined Russia and Belarus in a pact with less integrated structures promoting economic integration and a customs union within the broader CIS framework. However, there are no supranational bodies envisaged.
Less interested in integration but dependent on Russia: Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. All four belong to a collective security system within the CIS dominated by Russia. Georgia depends on Russia to keep separatists in check; Armenia sees Russia as a protector against its Muslim neighbors; Tajikistan has 25,000 Russian troops to fight Moslem rebels; and Uzbekistan has few resources and little ability to resist Russian pressures. Although members of the NATO Partnership for Peace (except Tajikistan), they have refrained to date from holding joint exercises with Western countries.
Hostile to integration: Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Moldova. None is active in CIS activities; Ukraine and Turkmenistan have not even signed the CIS charter. Ukraine leads the resistance. This group is less dependent on Russia. Turkmenistan has gas and Azerbaijan has oil. Neither Azerbaijan nor Moldova has agreed to hoist Russian bases or forces, and Turkmenistan has proclaimed itself Central Asian's first neutral state.
Totally opposed: The Baltic States. These three led the drive to leave the USSR, inspiring nationalists elsewhere. All three have refused to joint the CIS and have declared their intention to join NATO and the European Union.
The View from Moscow
The Russian Federation is caught between conflicting pressures and memories: trying to reconstruct a post-Communist viable society and government, while also attempting to sort out its relations with the outside world. Lack of consensus on this fundamental question is reflected in the lack of coherent policy in a number of areas, including the purpose and future of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a Moscow creation.
In the foreign policy area, Moscow has shifted from a world view to a focus on its "frontier," now largely composed of former constituent parts of the USSR. Many Russians, of course, want to bring these "neighbors" of what they call the "Near Abroad" back into the fold but are facing questions of how to do so and then how to define the new relationship. The other successor states of the USSR naturally view Moscow's interest in reintegration with mixed interest and suspicion, as do many Western observers.
A major instrument for official Russian Federation policy on this question appears to be the CIS. Moscow is touting this organization as a natural development, based on history, common interest, and mutual consent, designed to provide for a reintegration of many of the successor states of the USSR into a more or less coherent regional space. Two aspects to this policy merit close watching: first, the degree of success in reintegrating the region; second, the character of the institutional result. For the United States and Western Europe, the final judgment, according to U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Republic Thomas Pickering, will depend upon:
The degree of mutual consent by which the process is pursued
The degree of mutual advantage shared by the participants, especially the smaller nations
The degree to which the CIS permits political, economic, and social interaction with outsiders (such as the the United States and the European Union).7
The CIS, apparently conceived by Moscow in the hectic days of 1991 to be the successor institution to the USSR, failed to take form in any meaningful way in its first few years. Moscow attempted to give it new life in 1993, beginning with operations in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Since then, under Foreign Minister Primakov, Russian official interest in the reintegration of the successor states of the USSR has solidified into a policy of seeking influence rather than reinstating rule. Russian diplomats now present, to who ever will listen, a formal description of the CIS as both a process and an institution for the reintegration of the former states of the Soviet Union into a new politico-economic-social space. They claim that even without the institution the process is actually underway and will lead sooner or later to a more or less reintegrated regional entity based on the following realities:
Economic: the USSR was an integrated economy built on the organizing principle of no "duplication" of economic activities; few if any of the successor states are yet able to pursue an independent economic life.
Security: the USSR had centralized military institutions, and the CIS countries are now forced to build their own institutions from scratch and at enormous cost. Thecomplex border situation (between the Russian Federation and CIS members; between the CIS members and the external world; and from there back again into Russia itself) makes that task even more difficult.
Common heritage: History exists, and there is a vast common heritage of language, customs, bureaucratic cultures, and memories (e.g., of the Great Patriotic War).
The border questions are particularly pressing. The internal borders within the former USSR were rather casual affairs, and all the infrastructure of border protection and control was placed on the external borders of the USSR. The breakup of the USSR has left the Russian Federation essentially without clearly demarcated borders with many of its new neighbors, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The political problems connected with obtaining clearly marked borders, e.g., between Russia and Georgia, are reportedly vexing.
Russian policy thinkers have formulated the idea of the "Near Abroad," a contiguous area consisting of former republics of the USSR for which the Russian Federation claims special responsibility and in which it claims special authority. Some Russians, including President Yelstin in an election speech, go so far as to claim the right to use military force to protect ethnic Russians living in the Near Abroad. While Yeltsin may only have been engaging in electioneering rhetoric in 1996, other Russian candidates clearly meant to claim that right. Needless to say, the whole concept of the Near Abroad raises eyebrows, at minimum, in those countries so designated.
At the same time, the transformation of former USSR border regions (under Moscow's control as states of the centralized USSR) into independent states leaves Russia without an external geographic security buffer. In attempting to deal with this disturbing nakedness, Moscow has pressed for bilateral agreements that permit the deployment of Russian border troops (which include a large number of recruits from the host countries) manning Georgia and Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran. However, even a satisfactory arrangement with respect to purely security matters will not alleviate Russian concerns arising from an essentially wide-open movement of goods and peoples across these borders, given the weak or even nonexistent capability of these newly independent countries to control their borders. As long as these conditions exist, Russian concerns about smuggling, arms transfers, crime, and terrorism will continue.
In sum, Russian officials argue that existing "objective" factors lead to some form of reintegration, which they insist is not a cover for re-establishment of the imperial relationship of the USSR. The issue surfaced in Russian internal politics in March 1996, when the Communist-dominated State Duma passed a resolution declaring invalid the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. Boris Yelstin turned this action of the Duma against the Communists in the electoral campaign by making the case that he was more able to bring about some form of reintegration of the former republics than were the Communists, in the form of a consensual CIS. He obtained the support of most of the leaders of the other former Soviet republics for his position. Nevertheless, clear policy on the future of the CIS is absent, and pending the achievment of any consensus, the Government of the Russian Federation under President Yelstin's leadership appears to be pursusing a procedural policy whereby the CIS is kept busy with meetings, conferences, and resolutions without much concern for their relevance, pending the day when a policy consensus will enable the organization to take on more substance.
Finally, as a short-term expedient, Moscow is attempting to use the CIS as a mechanism for dealing with local conflicts in the neighboring former states of the Soviet Union that now belong to the CIS. Conflicts in Tajikistan and Georgia resulted in the introduction of the concept of peacekeeping into the CIS agenda, followed by an agreement among several of the CIS members to create CIS "peace maintenance forces." These are currently deployed in Georgia and Moldova, and Moscow has indicated interest in further CIS peacekeeping operations in the region. As explained by the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Sergey Lavrov, "The emergence of conflicts on political and ethnic grounds in the newly independent states in the territory of the former Soviet Union poses a serious threat to the security and stability of those states and Russia, . . . as well as to regional and international peace in general" and therefore "defined as an international organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the CIS is already making its contribution to peacekeeping in Commonwealth territory."8
The View from Transcaucasia
The Transcaucasia region constitutes a complex geopolitical matrix- a version of three-dimensional chess that illustrates again the validity of General de Gaulle's comment about geography making politics. At one level there is the intricate, intimate, and occasionally conflict-ridden relationship among the peoples of Caucasus region: primarily the secessionist movements of the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians of Georgia, the Armenians of Nakorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan, and the peoples of the Russian Federation across the border in the Transcaucasus (most notably the Czechens). At another level there is the interplay between Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (and their various peoples) and the surrounding layer of major regional powers-Russia, Turkey, and IranCwho were all once suzerains in the Caucacus and might wish to be so again.
The novelty of Caucasian independence is matched by the passion for trying to keep it, but the fragility of the newly independent economies and institutions combined with geographic isolation poses problems. For instance, with no substantive progress to date in the political talks on the issue related to Nagorno-Karabakh and to Abkhazia, the future of more than one million refugees and internally displaced persons continues to be uncertain. Out of this number, more than 900,000 people (250,000 in Armenia, 405,000 in Azerbaijan, and 250,000 in Georgia) are receiving international humanitarian assistance. This combination of fragile governments, internal and intrastate conflict, and economic deterioration following the collapse of the USSR is an obvious arena for regional peacekeeping initiatives.
Armenia
The Armenian Government is focused on four foreign policy issues:
The future of Nakorno-Karabagh and relations with Azerbaijan
Establishing relations with its other neighbors, especially Turkey, but also with Georgia and Iran
How to break out of economic as well as political isolation
The character of the CIS and Armenia's role in it.
Yerevan joined the CIS at its inception, seeing in it both an opportunity and a danger. It offers the prospect of an acceptable relationship with Russia, which Armenia needs for security reasons- to maintain Russian sympathy in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and, in the longer run, to counter the "Turkish Threat." The Nagorno-Karabagh question is particularly important for the current Armenian Government, which wants to concentrate on nation-building tasks but is caught between a more militant diaspora political movement (the Dashnak party) and the Nakorno-Karabagh regime. This conflict raises all sorts of internal and international problems for the Armenian Government, which finds itself isolated both economically and politically.
Moscow's continued sympathy and potential for assistance in resolving these problems is important for Yerevan. Yerevan has therefore signed a number of Moscow proposed agreements in the CIS context and has even had to accept the stationing of Russian troops. (Relations between Armenian forces and Russian forces reportedly remain close, in a version of an "old boy network" if not officially, and includes, according to Azerbaijani claims, significant transfer of weapons and other materiel.) Moscow has also offered to sponsor a CIS peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabagh. While Yerevan does not wish to offend Moscow or discourage it playing a constructive (pro-Armenian) role in the conflict, it must be cautious about the implications of a truly neutral CIS involvement and, like Azerbaijan, will want to see the shape of the agreement before it agrees to the deployment of a peacekeeping force. (The inviolability of national borders is a traditional preoccupation of newly independent states.)
Azerbaijan
Azerabaijan's problems are equally daunting. It resisted joining the CIS until late 1993, when continued internal instability (some say Russian fomented) and defeat in the war in Nakorno-Karabagh produced economic as well as political chaos. Azarbaijan is opposed to the concept of reintegration among the former states of the USSR (if only because of the conflict over the future ownership and disposition of Caspain Sea petroleum), but joined the CIS under Russian pressure and with the Russian promise that in doing so it could it obtain Russian assistance in resolving the Nakorno-Karabagh problem. Baku remains bitter about what is believes is Russian support (including provision of military supplies) for Armenia and nervous about Russian attempts to remain a major player in the Caspian Sea petroleum developments.
In the event Azerbaijani membership in the CIS has not produced any noticeable or significant change in Russian policy with respect to the Nakorno-Karabagh situation, and Azerbaijani participation in the CIS has been accordingly less than enthusiastic. They have refused to sign most of the agreements, especially those relating to security and the deployment of "CIS" border troops in Azerbaijani territory.
Specifically Baku has resisted Russian suggestions for a CIS peacekeeping force in Nakorno-Karabagh, absent a negotiated agreement, and attempted to pre-empt this proposal by turning to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whose so-called "Minsk Group" has been serving a negotiating forum for the Karabahk problem. The Azerbaijan Government has also attempted to foster Western ties by proposing participation in the Partnership for Peace, raising the idea of NATO peacekeeping during a presidential visit to Brussels in April 1996.
Georgia
Georgia was essentially dragooned into the CIS in 1994 following an initial period of postindependence instability, which most observers believe was fostered by Russia or by individual Russian officials operating independently.
Georgia would prefer to avoid a too tight security embrace by Russia but finds itself in need of Russian assistance in a number of areas, apart from the obvious economic and transportation ties. The CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia is completely Russian, and Moscow must obviously be a party to any solution of the Abkhaz secession. Russia continues to play the role of mediator in the South Ossetian problem, most recently during the latest accord signed by the two parties in May 1996. And Russia maintains troops in Georgia in three different and distinct categories: border troops on the Turkish border, a regular garrison remaining from Soviet days, and the CIS peacekeeping force. Georgia hopes somehow to cut itself into Azerbaijani's oil future, and this also may require Russian support. In other words, while Tsiblisi may see Moscow as part if not the sole source of most of its problems, it also sees the Russian Federation as a necessary participant in the solution of those very same problems.
Nevertheless, developments in 1996 indicate that President Shevernadze and his Government believe the time is ripe for a reappraisal of relations with Moscow, relations essentially forced on Tsbilis in the early, chaotic days of Georgian independence. In early September, Georgia and Uzebistan signed a bilateral military agreement, outside of the CIS context, and a military training agreement with Germany, and a military cooperation agreement with Turkey. Throughout 1996, Shevardnadze and the Georgia Parliament publicly criticized the CIS peacekeeping effort and Russian policy for freezing the situation in Abkhazia, thereby protecting the Abkhaz rebels and warned that if the situation did not improve, Georgia would terminate the CIS peacekeeping mandate. In response, Moscow suspended its military assistance program to Georgia, an action it reversed at the late October CIS defense ministers meeting; Moscow also agreed to the "joint" appointment of the new commander of the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia. In other words, Shevardnadze is attempting to use the CIS and the Russian-Georgian military relationship as instruments to encourage Russia to serve Georgian interests as well as its own.
The View from Central Asia
The Central Asian members of the CISCKazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Krygyzstan, and TajikistanCall share geographic proximity, ethnic, and cultural affinities and a Russian/Soviet experience. On the other hand, there is considerable disparity in size, population, resources, and internal political situations. Even their Russian experience varied, as well as the economic consequences of the collapse of the USSR. Finally, of course, the ambitions and rivalries of their individual leaders play a role in their attitudes and policies toward regional and international issues.
As noted earlier, Central Asian attitudes toward reintegration of the former Soviet space and the CIS vary considerably. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan favor both; Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are less interested but very dependent in different ways on Russia; and Turkmenistan is flatly opposed. The subregional view of CIS peacekeeping is equally skeptical, as evidenced by the clear preference for U.N. involvement in CIS peacekeeping operations. lt is interesting to note that Uzbekistan has, like Russia, found the concept of CIS peacekeeping of some use in pursuing its own foreign policy objectives in Tajikstan.
In the past few years, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan have made serious efforts to cooperate among themselves in economic and fiscal matters as well as in defense and security matters. However, in spring 1996 they agreed to create a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion to be earmarked for U.N. sponsored operations and scheduled joint exercises in 1997 as part of NATO's PfP program. Tajikstan was not invited to participate in this program, presumably because of its civil strife, and Turkmenistan declined to join, citing its general neutral status (an excuse it uses to avoid participating in CIS military activities). All these attitudes reflect the fundamental skepticism about Russia.
Future developments will depend to a great deal on the evolution of the CIS as a multinational regional organization. In that context, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries may well reach consensus on a core agenda. They seek both to secure their countries' secular orientation and to deny Moscow an opportunity to reestablish regional hegemony under the guise of combating "Islamic fundamentalism."
Tajikistan is unique in Central Asia as the "beneficiary" of a peacekeeping operation. Although cautious and skeptical about Russian plans for reintegration of the countries of the area, the Government of Tajikstan is so dependent on Moscow merely to remain in power that its views are muted at best. The anti-Russian rebels are very real, but the Government has no choice except to go along with Russian activities and policies. Tajikistan is therefore caught between Russia's aim to ensure that other powers do not step in to fill the power vacuum left by the USSR and the other newly independent states of Central Asia. Among these countries, the one with the strongest cards to play is Uzbekistan, which has influence in sizable areas of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, a large if obsolete military arsenal, and links with Afghan leaders.
The Views of the Other FSUs
Ukraine is the most significant member of the CIS after Russia. While not exactly a challenger for leadership, Ukraine is interested in limiting Russian influence. It also has its own fish to fry, notably the ongoing argument with Moscow over the division of the Black Sea fleet and naval bases. In an effort to reduce Russia's role as the primary source of military and technical assistance, Ukraine concluded bilateral security cooperation agreements in 1996 with Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan.
A regular meeting of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, held October 29, 1996, in Dushanbe, provided a clear view of the attitude of most CIS members toward any aggressive CIS peacekeeping. The meeting marked an inauspicious debut for Russian Defense Minister General Igor Rodionov as chair of the CIS defense agency, as a number of Russian proposals were rejected.
Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan failed to attend the meeting, while Ukraine was there only as an observer and limited its participation to issues affecting its own interests. A majority of the delegations in attendance rejected Moscow's proposal to appoint General Mikhail Kolesnikov as head of the CIS Military Cooperation Staff, arguing that his predecessor had also been Russian and that the post must not be monopolized by Russia. The Ukrainian delegation's head, Deputy Defense Minister General Ivan Bizhan, stated that Ukraine will participate only in U.N. or OSCE "peacekeeping" operations and not those under CIS.
The situation in Afghanistan and on the Tajik-Afghan border was a major topic. Some unspecified countries (very probably the Central Asian) endorsed a proposal to prolong the mandate of "CIS peacekeeping" forces in Tajikistan. Some (again unspecified) ministers supported the formation of "regional and subregional security systems" in fulfillment of the draft CIS collective security concept. Tajik president Imomali Rahmonov, together with the Russian delegation, urged approval of that proposal. There was no word on the agenda item regarding the mandate of Russian "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia and the appointment of a new commander of that force, a point of controversy between Russia and Georgia. The meeting ended after a half-day, instead of the day-and-a-half originally scheduled. The rejection of Kolesnikov leaves the CIS Military Cooperation Staff headless as its former chief, General Viktor Samsonov, was named recently to Kolesnikov's former post as head of Russia's General Staff.
Moldova is another "beneficiary" of Russian bilateral peacekeeping and therefore not in a position to have much of a view of the concept in a theoretical sense. Most observers agree that peacekeeping as practiced in Moldova has had little of the neutral character usually required but has been more in the nature of Russian intervention. In recent months, the Government of Moldova has felt emboldened (or desperate enough) to complain publicly about Russian failure to comply with certain elements of the 1994 agreement, notably the withdrawal of Russian troops. Given Moldova's resistance to Moscow's call for reintegration of the former republics of the USSR and its own experience with "peacekeeping," it is reasonable to assume that the CIS would have to have a much firmer and demonstrated multinational and consensual character before Moldova would look very favorably on an active CIS peacekeeping role in the region.
Belarus is in the unique position of appearing to want more integration with Russia than Russia is willing to give. Moscow sees Belarus as the catalyst for integration in the CIS, as well as a traditional part of the motherland wishing to return home, but is leery about the very significant economic costs involved.
Conclusions
The problems the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) faces in obtaining recognition as a true regional organization begin with its Russian origin and character; it is seen by too many as a facade for Moscow's true imperial intentions. Without greater acceptability, its ability to perform regional peacekeeping functions will remain limited.
Although many observers will agree that the new Russian Federation is made up of disparate tendencies, and that not all Russians or Russian leaders wish to renew Russia's traditional imperial vocation, Moscow's propensity for political interference and general mischief making,9 as exemplified in the concept of the Near Abroad, remains and cannot be ignored. This bent is exacerbated by the transitional stage of politics and policy making in the Russian Federation. Without a consensus on the character of the post-USSR Russian Federation, individual Russians (military and civilian) find opportunities for entrepreneurial politics. "Despite its claims to the contrary, the military engages in politics, resists reform, seeks to preserve the military-industrial complex, . . . and generally poses a considerate threat to the future of Russian democracy and the tranquillity of its neighbors."10
In addition there is the question of what Paul Goble calls capability: the difference between what Moscow might want and what Moscow can obtain.11 He notes that Moscow probably wants to recover the Ukraine and the three Baltic states but can't, and probably does not want to take back Belarus and the Central Asian states even though it probably could. However, there is the perspective, outlined by former U.S. Ambasador to Russia Jack F. Matlock, that Russia needs good relations with its neighbors as much as they and may be coming to understand that. The tragic conflict in Chechnya has shown that Russia's frontier region is volatile at best and that great dangers lie ahead for Russia if it continues to stir up conflicts and ethnic animositites in the region beyond its borders. Ambassador Matlock points out that Georgian President Shervardnadze has shrewdly pressured Moscow, through clever manipulation of the CIS forum and the Russian-Georgian military relationship, to play a more constructive role in the Abkhazia situation by using its influence on the secessionists.12
All these swirling currents can be seen in the four so-called peacekeeping operations currently underway in the territories of the member states of the CIS and the one proposed but not yet accepted. Of these four, two can be reasonably called peacekeeping operations in the sense usually meant, using criteria derived by the U.N. tradition and experience. In Georgia, both the Abkhazian and South Ossetian operations, despite suspicious beginnings and ambiguous objectives, now appear to be functioning within generally accepted guidelines for Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. However, in Tajikistan the Russian (with Uzbekistan support) operation, under the guise of peacekeeping, is clearly functioning as an external support for a local government facing a rebel challenge. A similar situation obtains in Moldova, where the exclusively Russian peacekeeping force is providing external support for a breakaway movement.
The present state and future possibilities for CIS-authorized and CIS-sponsored peacekeeping in the CIS region can be studied in the unfolding Nagorno-Karabagh situation. The existence of the CIS and the fact that both contestants are members would appear to offer an almost textbook opportunity for regional organization conflict resolution and peacekeeping. In this situation, the role of a major outside player (especially one also a member of the relevant regional organization) could well be constructive. In fact, Russia has offered to assist with mediation and to provide a peacekeeping force, an offer the Azerbaijan Government has firmly rejected, at least for the moment. Russia's bone fides are just not acceptable, certainly to Baku and probably not without some direct negotiation, to the Armenians of Nakorno-Karabagh. And without acceptance of Russia's credentials, the role of the CIS as a peacekeeper remains doubtful, given Russia's dominant role in the CIS.
However, it should be noted that the recent CIS-approved "Convention on Peacekeeping" lays down the criteria for such a role. The Convention was clearly motivated by concern, if not fear, of additional Russian attempts (following Moldova and Tajikistan) to appropriate the peacekeeping label for unilateral, hegemonistic activities. The Convention is an obvious effort to set limits to Russian activity but also creates positive criteria for truly consensual, regional multilateralism. The problem will be to create CIS legitimacy and credibility. One interesting approach has reportedly been floatedC to bring in the United States and possibly others to participate with Russia as joint mediators and possibly peacekeepers in the Nakorno-Karabagh situation. While such a suggestion might well be unwelcome in Moscow (and in Washington, for different reasons), it could offer a way to unblock the Nagorno-Karabagh situation while pushing the CIS toward a more transparent and credible regional organization.
The CIS was clearly seen as an artificial formation in its early days, but in 1993 its Russian proponents initiated a more sophisticated presentation that focuses on the effort to reintegrate former Soviet republics on a more consensual basis. As part of that approach, Moscow is also attempting to present the CIS as the regional peacekeeping organization of choice, seeking recognition as a U.N. Chapter VIII regional organization, similar to the OAS. However, regardless of Russian intentions, trustworthy or not, the CIS faces the additional problem that the vast majority of its members is still shaky as independent nation-states. If it is difficult to make bricks without straw, then it is equally difficult to create a multinational organization without viable nations as members.
One practical aspect of this problem is that CIS peacekeeping is too dependent on Russian resources. This is the problem with those operations currently underway and gives too much scope to Russian tendency (not an unusual characteristic of the sovereign nation-state) to pursue its own interests rather than to act neutrally.
In the Transcaucasus region, Armenia and Georgia may be tempted by the general concept of a regional organization but have reservations about specifics. Azerbaijan is even more hesitant, anticipating its own petroleum-financed golden age. The same is true in Central Asia, except possibly for Tajikistan, where the Government's life depends upon support from Moscow. Belarus is a panting suitor for Russian favors, while Moldova is a "victim" or target; successful evolution of the CIS is not a pertinent concern at this time for the Government of Moldova. Ukraine is the major "competitor" for influence within the CIS, but obvious limitations make it more of a "spoiler" trying to keep Moscow honest than a real competitor.
Each of these members of the CIS has its own internal conflicts and transition problems, but all share suspicions of Moscow's real intentions combined with varying degrees of dependency on Russia. Nevertheless, each CIS capital recognizes, at least in principle, its own need for some form of regional cooperation. This need includes a mechanism and process for conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The CIS region is rife with interstate and intrastate conflicts, some ethnic, others more political. The problem of ethnic Russians living in all of the former republics of the USSR can easily create new conflicts. However, all the former Soviet Union members continue to express much greater confidence in external organizations like the United Nations (the CIS and the Economic Commision for Europe signed a memorandum on economic standards and norms in April 1997), the OSCE, and NATO (eight of them, including Russia, are active in the Partnership for Peace program).
The prospects for regional peacekeeping by the CIS constitute a subset of attitudes toward the broader questions of the future of the CIS as a reintegrating and/or collective security organization. From its beginning, it has been dogged by suspicion and skepticism. Its Russian sponsors have alternated between fostering it as a military union, a currency union, and an economic union, sometimes concurrently and competitively and without significant success.
Yet the CIS may be one of those institutions that, if it did not exist, would have to be created, especially in light of developments in the rest of Europe. At least for the immediate future, the expansion of Western Europe's institutions will stop short of the former borders of the USSR. This leaves 14 countries at loose ends in the post-Cold War world that need to create a new and viable relationship with Russia as well as find an independent role in the wider world. In addition there is the question of the evolution of a post-Cold War Russia. There is an ongoing internal Russian debate between proponents of a "big Russia" and those who wish for a "small Russia." In other words, geography and mass dictate that Russia will be a major power, if not the major power, in Halford J. Mackinder's World Island, but the answer to the question of what kind of hegemon is still open to discussion. The creation of a robust regional organization with the Russian Federation as primes inter pares is a possible palatable alternative to the dangers of a "great Russia" on the one hand, and the destabilizing frustration of a "small Russia" on the other. Whether the United States and others can assist in this development is an open question, but use of the international and multinational peacekeeping process, under UN patronage and mentorship , may offer one low-cost, low-risk option.
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