Peacekeeping in Asia

Institute for National Strategic Studies

McNair Paper Number 58, Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations, Chapter 6, June 1998

Peacekeeping in Asia

The countries of Asia are undergoing enormous changes, economic as well as political. The Cold War framework that influenced so much of the world's political development is gone and not yet replaced by a new structure. This is true of Asia, even though the Cold War, at its height, was not the sole determinant of Asian developments. What it did determine was how the United States and the Soviet Union approached the region as well as the manner in which they interacted with China. The end of the Cold War has removed this particular influence but not the influence of these major global powers, at least of the United States. It has also exposed more openly the region's own economic and political-security issues, its own personality rooted in its own economic dynamism, differential growth rates, and still unsettled political character.

In this context the countries of the region have entered into a complex discussion of collective security, the central element of which is to define what that term means for the Asia-Pacific region. As in so many areas, the end of the Cold War requires some new thinking. It is true that the central security role played by the United States continues, but the fluidity of the post-Cold War environment implies that the existing triangular relationship among the United States, China, and Japan (and one can add Russia occasionally) and their roles in the region may evolve. With this consideration in mind, member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) launched the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a consultative process by which they hope to engage other countries in the regionCand most especially the four "outside" majorsCin a dialogue on security concerns. Although formally defined as a consultative forum, not an operational organization, ARF has launched several very limited and modest efforts of multilateral cooperation and has included in its dialogue various questions relating to peace operations.

One characteristic of the Asia-Pacific region is that it is the only geographic region without a "universal" regional political organization. "Although Pacific Asia is now a world force, its institutions for cooperation and coordination are in their infancy," as Richard Baker puts it.¹ The regional political dynamic is very fluid, and the end of the Cold War has only strengthened the anticolonial commitment to the independent nation-state. The nation-state continues to be the beneficiary of anticolonial emotions, the focus of the new allegiances of these rapidly industrializing countries, and the funnel through which much of the benefits of this industrialization is distributed. Even separatist movements in the region pay tribute to the nation-state idea as they attempt to create their own. The widespread Asian resistance, at least among government elites, to Western ideas of human rights (seen as attempts at external interference into their internal affairs) is at least partially due to this commitment to this now sacrosanct idea of national sovereignty.

Although the Cold War generally inhibited regional development, concerns over developments in Vietnam and Cambodia contributed to the growth of ASEAN. The first effort toward an indigenous regional effort divorced from the tensions of the Cold War was the establishment in 1967 of ASEAN, founded by Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines and later joined by Brunei and then Vietnam. The dramatic economic growth (at least partially fueled by the economic and commercial opportunities offered by the Vietnam War) led to efforts to establish economic cooperation, but they did not produce any significant results until 1989, with the first meeting of the Asian-Pacific Economic Council (APEC). APEC was created as an economic process for extending that dialogue to important "external" economic powers. Then, in 1993, ASEAN initiated the idea of a regional security dialogue, and in 1994 ARF held its first meeting in Bangkok.

ASEAN was created as a limited economic organization, albeit one with a hidden political agenda. Although it has developed quite impressively, with Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar about to enter, a definite effort was and continues to be made to prevent infringements of sovereignty in the economic sphere from spreading to other domains, notably political. The ASEAN countries-some of them relatively new as independent states, but all marked by the colonial era-remain focused on norms such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in domestic affairs. As a result, the support among regional governments for international institutions is limited, except, of course, for the United Nations, which is seen as nonthreatening for a number of reasons, including the prominent role of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The general preference remains for some form of coordination well short of collective action while avoiding turning their organization into a pure debating society like the European Parliament. These attitudes have led to the enunciation of what is called the "Asian Way"-a commitment to its own diplomatic style of musyawarah and mufakat, or consultation and consensus. That means the organization does not take stands on issues that exceed the comfort levels of all its members. Achieving this requires a delicate balancing act, described in one official publication as not moving "too fast for those who want to go slow, and not too slow for those who want to go fast." The resulting consensus politics may be used to smooth over, obviate, and even occasionally resolve interstate disputes and conflicts among its members, but its two primary functions are to ensure the primacy of national governments and to prevent interference in their internal affairs, especially by governments external to the area.

ARF was created in 1994 by the ASEAN countries as a means and process for engaging the major external powers (especially the United States, China, Russia, and Japan) in a security dialogue. While the Russian Federation does not raise the concerns of the old USSR, and China remains the great question, the United States is clearly the strongest single military power in the Pacific-and the future of the American commitment in the area is at least open to discussion. Most Asia-Pacific governments desire that the United States continue its security role but at the same time are strengthening their own defense capabilities. Meanwhile, everyone watches China to "see what it will be like when it grows up,"² as one knowledgeable observer puts it. It is too early to tell if a new security configuration will emerge in the next few years, and if it does whether it will be dominated by one or more powers, reflect a balance of powers, or incorporate some kind of collective security arrangement.

Consultation and consensus currently rule ARF, now in its fourth year and potentially ASEAN's most important spinoff. The forum is by design informal and gradualist. It does not have a permanent secretariat, and decisions are made without official votes, as is customary with ASEAN. As a result, no country wants to participate in an ARF meeting without at least trying to appear conciliatory. Hence China helped temper tensions over the disputed Spratly Islands by offering for the first time to negotiate its claims in the context of accepted international norms. At the same time, Beijing promised to publish more information about its defense budget. Such moves conform with the forum's stress on building confidence among members before moving on to other stages of crisis management. Consensus is the norm as well as the process, and the fact that many of the potentially serious problems (for instance, Korea) are not in ARF's in-basket enables its members to use this period of relative noncrisis to create new habits and new relationships.

The organization and procedures of ARF are carefully designed to ensure that ASEAN's members remain the directing core. Despite its elaborate membership structureCConsultative Members, Sectoral and Dialogue Partners, and ObserversCattendees participate as simple members except for the guarantee that an ASEAN member will occupy the chair (at least through the first 7 years). The "ASEAN Way" was thereby extended formally into the security area. ASEAN and ARF are primarily forums or venues, intergovernmental bodies for dialogue and consensus building. ASEAN has evolved certain executive organizations, but ARF is still in an embryonic state organizationally.

Several so-called "Track II" efforts (where academic and policy analysts discuss and review regional confidence-building measures, environmental issues, etc.), such as CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) and NEACD (Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue) have been created. They fit nicely into ASEAN/ARF's consultative ambiance and provide an even less formal process for discussing issues without the danger of setting precedents or creating commitments.

Security Questions

The removal of the Cold War "overlay" in Asia uncovered the local dynamics underneath. ASEAN created ARF in 1994 to deal with the major external (that is, outside of Southeast Asia, not outside of the Pacific Rim area) powers on security questions. Although most have recently become robust economies, most Asian governments are relatively new and tentative political systems. The expected latest three members (Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos) have been characterized by The Economist as the "awkward" squad in recognition of their economic and political weakness compared to their neighbors.³ Internal dissension and conflicts can easily spill over into neighboring countries, although no serious security problems are perceived to exist at the moment in the South East Asia area. The real danger area is seen as North Asia, especially Korea. Although potential problems exist in South East Asia, for instance in the South China sea with its conflicting territorial claims, by and large political stability and economic growth have put the area in the best shape it has been in decades, if not generations. One pre-ARF situation did create concern and lead to collective action. Although ASEAN's members turned to the United Nations to run the Cambodian affair, it was nevertheless seen as a high moment for ASEAN political action.

Internal affairs must be a major preoccupation for these governments, with a concomitant concern for international norms such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in domestic affairs. With this attitude, support for international institutions will be cautious: relatively high for the nonthreatening United Nations and more suspicious of those with a hint of supranational norm-setting (human rights) or governance. The key security question is how to deal with China when "it grows up." Regional interaction with Japan and Russia are important questions but slightly less pressing. The United States is and will remain a major player but it is not a consistent hegemon, and there are concerns by some that there could be a gap between a withdrawing United States and the failure to develop replacement powers or organizations. Anxiety over this matter was allayed by the firm U.S. Government response to China's probing of the Taiwan Government in 1996. U.S.-Japanese security arrangements were reaffirmed by the "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security," issued in April 1996 by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, which was followed by the "Interim Report on the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation," issued in June 1997.

Dramatic economic progress in the area has been the primary contributor to the growing legitimacy of the governments of the region. Development and economic growth remain government priorities, if only for this political reason. The financial and economic problems faced by Thailand in mid-1997, and by extension its regional partners, obviously created a strain but should be manageable, at least in political terms.

The importance of economic development in national priorities, development founded on outward oriented economy policies, provides a somewhat contradictory theme for these governments. The policy problem for Asian countries was how to involve the outside powers (especially China) in these concerns (both political and economic) while retaining some measure of control. APEC and other Track II arrangements were efforts to do so in the economic sphere. Although ASEAN and APEC were, and are, essentially economic cooperative arrangements, they have had implications in the politico-security area, if only as examples.

The five original members of ASEAN (ranging in political styles from monarchy through various forms of authoritarianism's and democracies) have not been at war despite numerous territorial conflicts and other tensions since the founding of the organization. While these tensions and potential trouble spots continue, the norm of nonuse of force to resolve disputes amongst them has gained increasing acceptance, a trend attributed at least partially by many observers to the beneficent and calming effect of a habit of dialogue and collegiality developed over 30 years in the corridors of ASEAN. (Obviously, growing economic interdependence supports and, in a sense, "funds" this process.) However, the political, not to mention economic, character of the newest candidates (Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) will obviously create problems. The ASEAN claim that it has discovered a different, more effective, more "Asian" way of resolving political problems will be severely tested by these new members. Events in Cambodia in mid-1997 and the ongoing internal tensions in Myanmar may be only the beginning of the rest of ASEAN's collegial style.

APEC has persistently expanded its approach into a wider area, beyond its own limited ASEAN membership. APEC summit meetings and regular meetings of officials and businessmen provide further opportunities for accommodating diverse interests. This process in APEC duplicates that which occurred in ASEAN, where contacts and channels pursued over a period of time helped create a sense of common interests to balance against special national interests. This development in the economic area could stimulate similar efforts in the security sphere. In Asia, trade and economic arrangements such as the Pacific Area Free Trade and Development (PAFTAD) and the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) preceded various security conferences and meetings such as the Kuala Lumpur Asia-Pacific Roundtable and the Conference on Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Area. ARF followed APEC. Interaction between the two spheres is normal and therefore likely to continue.

In the security area, ASEAN has also provided private "corridors" where its members could quietly discuss and attempt to ameliorate regional problems and manage relationships in the region. For instance, Philippine-Indonesian tensions have been moderated over the years by formal and informal contacts in the ASEAN context. This is a form of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution at the low end of the peacekeeping scale. ASEAN members played an important role in the Cambodian situation, by supporting the anti-Khmer Rouge resistance movement (a political decision) and then turning to the United Nations (an operational decision). They did so, however, not by raising the ASEAN 'flag' but by coordinating and agreeing informally within the ASEAN context.

ARF was the initiative to accomplish the same in the security area but with the participation of other Pacific powers. ASEAN views ARF as a forum for dialogue and consensus building. It is not viewed as an executive body or agent of the intergovernmental process, or as a precursor to any form of collective security agency, like NATO. Both ASEAN and ARF operate as problem-management processes, not problem solvers. Their objective is to avoid confrontation when no solution exists. Specifically, ARF is an expansion of the "Asian Way" political process employed within ASEAN to moderate interstate political as well as economic disputes. As noted previously, political developments in Cambodia and Myanmar may pose severe challenge to the "Asian Way."

It is unlikely that ARF will expand in some manner to become a form of regional "governance," even in the limited form claimed by some other regional organizations. First of all there are too many overlapping concerns, involving overlapping regions and powers. (The claim of the United States and Russia, for instance, to be Asian countries may be true, but ignores that they are also the nation-state equivalent of cosmopolitan individuals and private corporations with serious out-of-area interests.) The tension between the ASEAN desire to retain control over the course of events in Asia and the need for accommodation of the external "Great Powers" will certainly inhibit ARF institutionalization. This tension between insecure regimes and external pressures and influence will continue for the foreseeable future. Finally the rapid expansion of ARF, now with 21 members, "exacerbates the forum's tendency towards process rather than substance."⁴

However, in that form, ARF, along with numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements and relationships, is a process rather than a specific organizational project that throws a "spider's web" over the Gullivers of major powers. Whether it might yet develop into a more concrete project or organization is a matter for the future, but at the moment its members resist even a formal relationship in U.N. Charter Chapter VIII terms with the United Nations.

Peace Operations

Individual South East Asian states have been very active in international peacekeeping, often participating in U.N. "traditional" peacekeeping operations. The Cambodia operation was of that genre, although much more ambitious and located in the Asian region. Both individually and collectively as ASEAN, the countries of Southeast Asia have been interested in peacekeeping in their region, but mostly as an informal process at the low end of the peacekeeping scale: preventive diplomacy and informal mediation. The corridors of ASEAN meetings have proven to be an excellent venue for these type of activities.

ARF itself has carefully avoided all implications that it might become an organization for the authorization and mounting of peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless it has begun to inch into the general subject area, beginning with a seminar on "Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities for the ARF," held March 7-9, 1995, in Brunei. At the seminar there was wide-ranging discussion of options to strengthen the capacities of the United Nations in peacekeeping. The focus was substantially on those ideas with relevance to the ARF. Participants emphasized support for the U.N. peacekeeping efforts illustrated by the growing numbers of ARF members contributing to peacekeeping operations. Discussion also focused on the role for regional groupings as called for by the then U.N. Secretary General in his "Agenda for Peace." There was a strong sense that peacekeeping should be viewed as part of a continuum involving preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace making, and peace building (with no clear cut demarcations noted). A number of participants felt that more attention should be paid to preventive diplomacy. While noting that there was clearly a substantive role for ARF members and the ARF as a grouping to support the United Nations, the general sense was that an excessive focus on "regionalization" might detract from effective U.N. operations. It was also pointed out that the ARF is a fledgling forum, and premature demands should not be made upon it now.

At ARF's first Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on the subject, held in Kuala Lumpur on April 1-3, 1996, a statement was released that noted, "The participants were of the view that the discussion on the subject of peacekeeping within the ARF context promoted greater understanding in the Asia-Pacific region." The meeting was organized around three main presentations: the "Current Status on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," "Training for Peace Support Operations," and "Stand-by Arrangements." However, several delegates told outside observers that as peacekeeping is really a U.N. matter and ARF members' views are very diverse, only abstract proposals were discussed, such as the importance of training peacekeepers based on U.N. standards and the possibility of the ARF being involved in U.N. standby arrangements.

The ISM on peacekeeping was followed by a Senior Officials Meeting in Indonesia on May 10-11, 1996, which decided to continue the intersessional process on peacekeeping for another year. This was somewhat of a surprise, as the original proposal for ARF consideration of peacekeeping was limited to 1 year, and most observers had thought that the ISM had pretty much exhausted the interest of ARF members in the subject. The Senior Officials Meeting also agreed to schedule intersessional meetings on demining and "training the trainers." All these considerations and proposals were reviewed at the Third ARF, held in Jakarta on July 23, 1996. Specifically noting that "the ARF should expand carefully and cautiously," the Chairman summarized the participating ministers' acceptance of the proposals of the ISM on Peacekeeping Operations by stating that ARF participants should:

Work together more closely both within the ARF context and in the United Nations as part of the ongoing dialogue on U.N. peacekeeping operations

Promote greater sharing of peacekeeping experience and expertise among themselves through, inter alia, training courses, developing a roster of trainers, sharing national training programs and facilities, contributing to financing of such training, and fostering cooperation among national peacekeeping training centers

Support a U.N. peacekeeping capacity, working closely with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), through loan of military and civilian personnel and other bilateral support arrangements and specifically by taking part in Standby Arrangements to facilitate the planning and deployment of U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The Third ARF also agreed that the ISM on Peacekeeping Operations, co-chaired by Canada and Malaysia, would continue its activities for another year to coordinate the implementation of these various recommendations, including the convening of a regional "Train the Trainers" workshop in Kuala Lumpur (as well as a course on demining to be hosted by New Zealand).

Later in 1996, ARF focused on another aspect of peace operations, preventive diplomacy, in a meeting in Paris at the so-called Track II level (government officials meet in their private capacities with nongovernment specialists for what are billed as free-flowing discussions). At previous ARF-sponsored meetings of this type, preventive diplomacy was broadly defined as "action aimed at preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between and within states, or preventing them from escalating into armed confrontation."⁵ This definition fits comfortably into the range of peace operations enunciated by then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his "Agenda for Peace" and his subsequent efforts to engage regional organizations in a closer collaborative relationship with the U.N. in peace operations.

This initiative is another, albeit modest, move by ARF toward a more active collective security role. In 1995 the then ARF chairman stressed the Forum's focus on confidence-building measures but noted that preventive diplomacy would be a "natural follow-on." The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out ways to proceed with preventive diplomacy and notes the possibility of developing a set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes. All these events are still well situated in the dialogue or discussion mode, but it is interesting that these events indicate at least a willingness to consider an active preventive diplomacy role for ARF in the future.

Meanwhile, ASEAN's members prefer to turn to the United Nations if a peacekeeping operation is deemed necessary in the region (e.g., Cambodia). Actually, there have been few other situations that called for action. Papua New-Guinea was an unusual and perhaps Athe precedent setting case, with Australia leading an ad hoc regional peacekeeping coalition under at least informal approval from its regional neighbors. A 400-strong South Pacific Regional "peacekeeping force" was organized ad hoc by several countries of the area when the conflict on the island of Bougainville escalated in the early 1990s and resulted in a temporarily successful negotiation. The force was deployed in October 1994 to ensure the safety of the Arawa Peace Conference participants (a version of the classic peacekeeping observer force function). It was composed of troops from Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu plus naval units, support, logistical, and command arrangements from Australia and New Zealand. However, the conference was a nonstarter, and the operation was not pursued.

What is the likelihood of other conflicts in the region that might call for regional peacekeeping efforts? Probably small, East Timor and the Spratlys notwithstanding. Asian countries are firmly, even doctrinally, opposed to interference in internal affairs, and there is a general feeling of lack of need as well as lack of interest. Some of the conflicts are too big or explosive for peacekeeping (Korea and Taiwan), but Cambodia could return and who knows what will be Burma's future?

As for the Spratlys, China would probably prefer to negotiate separately with each of the claimants, but this approach would be unlikely to settle all the conflicting claims. Indonesia has sought to broker a peaceful settlement, but to date the claimants have been unable to resolve their differences. An overall settlement might be possible by establishing a multilateral regional regime guaranteeing freedom of navigation to ships of all nations and access to gas resources according to an agreed upon apportionment formula, but such an approach can obviously not be forced on any of the claimants, especially China. (China rejects any formal organization which includes Taiwan.) However, now that Vietnam has become a member of ASEAN, the ASEAN claimants may find it easier to reach some reasonable settlement. Even if such a proposal were rejected by China and Taiwan, it would at least serve to produce an agreement among the ASEAN claimants and thereby reduce tension among them. Nevertheless, the very process of organization and meetings is shaping policies and programs in certain areas, such as search and rescue (not really peacekeeping but collective action nonetheless), humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping activities such as preventive diplomacy. In these subjects, at least a problem definition stage is underway. However, with respect to these subjects, the orientation is well within Chapter II rules (peacekeeping) and far short of any thought of Chapter VIII operations (peace enforcement).

But here again we are discussing preventive diplomacy, multilateral consultation, and mediation, not the authorization and deployment of peacekeeping missions. As the third ARF made clear, its ASEAN members at least have not accepted any responsibility for mounting regional peacekeeping operations. Instead, they are focusing on preventive diplomacy and informal consultations as roles for themselves as an organization, and fostering participating by their members in U.N. activities (training, financing, standby arrangements, etc.). Peacekeeping for ASEAN and ARF is not an active project, but rather a hook for dialogue.

However, more active future activity is not foreclosed. It is worthwhile to note that ARF is showing persistent interest in the subject of search-and-rescue coordination and cooperation. An ISM on that subject has also been established that proposes a fairly extensive program of sharing training, expertise, facilities, cross-posting of personnel, and joint exercises. These subjects were probably selected as they are politically neutral and noncontroversial, and yet can move a little further down the road toward regional operations.

Neither ASEAN nor ARF showed any interest in the field of disaster relief until 1996. However, the third ARF authorized the convening of an ISM on the subject and will presumably consider its proposals at the next ARF. Disaster relief required by purely natural catastrophe, of course, is a benign and nonpolitical activity. However, the demand for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance arising from local or regional conflicts has become a major element of contemporary crisis and conflict management. In fact, the importance of nonmilitary humanitarian assistance has become the distinguishing character of so-called second generation peacekeeping. ARF movement in this area, if any occurs, could be a significant addition to peacekeeping capability of the organization.

When the subject of peacekeeping in the global context is raisedCthat of U.N. peacekeeping operationsCAsians appear to be very comfortable and are very supportive of U.N. peacekeeping when peacekeeping appears called for. Four ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) have participated or are currently participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and two of those operations were in ASEAN's immediate geographic area (West New Guinea and Cambodia). After all, U.N. operations essentially require consensus in New York, which provides ASEAN's members with an active role. They tend to view the United Nations as the global 911 number.

A Work in Progress?

Clearly, ASEAN contributes to political security in the Asia-Pacific region, if only as a corollary to its focus on regional economic development. However, actual and potential conflicts exist, and regional economic development can lead to further tensions as well as tighter links among countries. Southeast Asia is growing politically as well as economically, and population growth as well the adhesion of new countries will increase ASEAN's role on the world scene, if that expansion is managed successfully. Economic growth is not shared at the same level, and the three expected new members are both politically and economically much less developed. Their membership is bound to create some tension.

Nevertheless, these countries have historically worried about the actual or potential dominance from the powers from China and Japan (and the USSR in the Cold War period). They therefore both seek and appreciate the balancing presence of the United States, although neither Myanmar nor Cambodia is likely to focus on this beneficial aspect of relations with the United States for the foreseeable future.

How far ARF can go as a security instrument is a subject for continual discussion. For instance, there is little institutionalized contact among defense establishments at the policy level , although there is an elaborate process of contact at the operational or military level, much of it fostered by the United States through its Pacific Command. U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry launched a trial balloon in early 1996 when he proposed a meeting of defense ministers from the 44 nations in the Asia-Pacific area. It was apparently conceived of as a useful complement to the ARF process and would symbolize the evolving security equation in the post-Cold War period while highlighting U.S. leadership. Although the proposal was not made in the context of ARF, such a meeting would clearly engage the ASEAN initiated process, especially if it were to lead to an effort at institutionalization of the contacts and cooperation implied. It was not clear whether the initiative was intended to spark a process or an institutionalized forum. A process of institutionalization in this area would either have to be absorbed within ARF or compete with it.

Given the long-standing aversion in Asia to formalizing multilateral defense contacts, ARF notwithstanding, Secretary Perry's proposal did not strike fire. (Also, he made it in the APEC context, which presumably raised other concerns.) The Southeast Asians share a cultural ethos of consensus, if only because of their shared interest in national governance and their shared abhorrence of external interference in their internal affairs. Also, they share a perspective of realism and pragmatism with respect to feasible political developments. That is, they neither want nor believe in possible robust regional political organization. Obviously, their concern over the inevitable prominent if not dominant role of China in a regional body reinforces this perspective. Bringing China into a consensus-type organization is obviously quite different from bringing it into a more cohesive institution.

Discussion over the future character of ARF has included some thought of moving ARF toward a more formal, structured character with some executive responsibilities in the security area, but there appears to be little real interest in this approach among ASEAN members. OthersCnotably in the American, Canadian, and Australian GovernmentsChave shown periodic interest (if generally only speculative and informal) in institutionalizing ARF as a regional security organization. Secretary Perry's proposal may seen as one manifestation of this interest. However, given the reluctance of Asian governments to seriously consider this approach, the prospects are not high for any move in this direction, and any such proposals are now obviously low on the priority list. As a result, and as a deliberate policy, the U.S. Government has adopted a passive role toward ASEAN's potential in this area, eschewing any temptation to pushing institutionalization. On the other hand, there is a persistent Western interest (possibly arising from cultural preferences for institutionalization) in moving ARF down the road toward a more active regional role in collective security and conflict resolution.

Even in this context, ARF obviously contributes to regional cooperative security but within very definite limits. If nothing else, Chinese reluctance to see a regional security organization take form provides a major break on ASEAN development in this direction. But, "Beijing still seems reluctant to use the multilateral forum to settle sovereignty disputes in the South China sea."⁶ Two major differences in perspective separate ARF from further movements toward a more concrete role:

Whether ARF should become a player in "out of area" situations, e.g., North Asia

Whether potential "in area" situations (e.g., the Spratlys) are imminent enough to require action now.

ASEAN's members are generally reluctant about the first question and doubtful (given Chinese attitudes) about the second. Therefore, they see no need for ARF to attempt to substitute the United States, or for the triangular relations among the United States, China, and Japan, even if they could figure out how to do it. Nevertheless, ARF can contribute to the stability of that relationship, if only marginally, and as a supplement for bilateral arrangements.

A subtheme of the collective security perspective is that of regional peacekeeping-whether or not ASEAN, presumably working through ARF-might wish to create a regional peacekeeping capability (peacekeeping as usually understood in terms of traditional U.N. Charter Chapter VI consensual operations in support of a cease-fire agreement). Here as well, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region do not show much interest, even though several of them are enthusiastic supporters of and participants in U.N. peacekeeping operations. In the Southeast Asia region, the above-mentioned aversion to formalizing multilateral defense contacts is combined with the general reluctance to create robust multilateral political organizations.

In addition, there is the always dominant consideration that major actors in the area are in fact "outsiders." Creation of a "local" conflict resolution capability implies an invitation to these outsiders, some form of formal participation by them in the area. While the roles of China, Japan, and the United States in the area are realities, the members of ASEAN are attempting to direct them through the ARF process, which is consultative, not executive.

However, actual and potential local conflicts do exist in the area. The present attitude of the area's governments appears to deal with these problems, when forced to, by an ascending process of bilateral contacts, informal consultation, and discussion in ASEAN's corridors, ad hoc local peacekeeping arrangements (such as Bougainville), and then if necessary a call to the United Nations. In this context the focus on confidence-building measures, the tentative initiative toward an ARF preventive diplomacy process, practical cooperation on demining and search and rescue, and ongoing discussion on various aspects of peacekeeping operations combine to hint at a potentially more active ARF in the general area of peace operations.

Last Update: October 1, 2002