McNair Paper Number 58, Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations, Chapter 7, June 1998
7.
Range of Organizations Available
It is commonplace to observe that the United Nations has reached its limit in enforcement in the maintenance of international peace and security. (It still offers potential in terms of the formation of international norms-of a "Global Code of Ethics"-but that is a different subject.) The organization does not possess the instruments needed for enforcement implementation, and its ability to operate under a committee approach based on "consensualism" impedes its capacity to meet crises expeditiously. The unfolding 1996 breakdowns in Central Africa affecting Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire and the feckless performance of the United States, France, and African "leaders" underscore the point.
Therefore, the search for additional support or for substitutes will continue, specifically for regional organizations. In some circumstances, the United States will even encourage the formation of new such entities, as underscored in April 1996, when then Secretary of Defense William Perry proposed a series of steps that might be taken by Balkan nation defense establishments to enhance their capability to conduct joint peacekeeping operations in their region. He urged their participation in "every NATO-organized peacekeeping exercise in the region" to develop habits of military cooperation, thus raising a question in the minds of some observers if the security boundaries of NATO were becoming too elastic.
However, a wide range of regional organizations with primarily security mandates already exists. Some of these organizations have overlapping mandates, and they have differing relationships with the United Nations. A number have formal observer status in the General Assembly, while NATO has a liaison relationship with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Almost all have had some involvement in peace operations (see the appendix, annex 1), and/or in an actual working relationship with the U.N. in at least one situation offering a threat to international peace and security (see appendix, annex 2).
Table 3. Regional and subregional organizations
Africa
The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Economic Community of Central African States (ECOCAS)
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Americas
The Organization of American States (OAS)
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS)
Asia
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Europe and North Atlantic
European Union (EU)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Western European Union (WEU)
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Middle East
Arab League (AL)
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)
Arab Maghreb UnionCNorth Africa (UMA)
With the exception of NATO and possibly CIS, most of these organizations possess limited experience in organizing multinational forces to deal with "complex emergencies." A number of obstacles would have to be overcome if effective peace operations were to be organized. An agreed command and control arrangement structure would be essential, as well as common training and indoctrination, a capable logistics management system, agreed operational procedures and rules of engagement, common equipage, and appropriate links to civilian authority. In addition, mission mandates would have to be precisely worded and within the capability of forces deployed to execute. Finally, financial support for field operations would have to be assured, including appropriate recompense for serving military and civilian personnel in the field.
One question that will require special attention relates to the level at which integration of command for multinational forces should occur. The distinction in military parlance between command and operational control may be useful. Command applies to such matters as overall direction, discipline, morale, and logistics. These responsibilities are by tradition met by participating member states. Operational control is of a different order of responsibility, involving tactical decisions in the field undertaken by the area commander, his staff, and subordinate commands. The extent to which member states are prepared to surrender control of their forces to a foreign commander has proved a vexing issue.
An additional area that requires close examination involves missions and roles. In "complex emergencies," the distinctions drawn between purely military or security enhancing operations and those entailing civilian support functions frequently prove illusory. Conventional wisdom surrounding "mission creep" provides no meaningful guidelines for forces assigned to the field, especially since civilian components of the operation depend heavily on the maintenance of a secure environment in which to function. Overlapping assigned missions and roles are shown in table 4.
As was demonstrated in Bosnia, disagreements may emerge between civilian-led and military components involved in operations generated in part by differing cultural and bureaucratic perspectives, difficulties in generating timely financial support among government agencies and NGOs, different "lag times" in initiating field operations, and incompatible staffing arrangements. In addition, strategies adopted for "existing" operations may differ quite markedly. Missions and roles also have to be tailored to actual conditions in the area of operation, with unanticipated local crises threatening to disrupt planning and timetables. These crises require innovative handling and occasional readjustments in assigned missions and roles. The degree of flexibility required is currently being tested in Bosnia (chapter three).
Table 4. Roles and missions for multinational forces to deter unwanted behavior
Provide Early Warning
Deter infiltration, aggression
Maintain territorial integrity, political independence
Compel Prescribed Behavior
Create safe havens, weapons free zones
Disarm, demobilize local forces
Deny combatants freedom of movement
Remove "rogue" leaders
Locate, detain war criminals
Conduct punitive strikes
Enforce economic, arms embargo
Secure withdrawal of foreign forces, advisors, mercenaries, paramilitaries
Liberate seized territory
Restore government, provide security
Dismantle, destroy arms inventories and production facilities
Humanitarian Relief
Protect relief operations
Provide emergency relief from manmade disasters (medical, shelter, water, etc.)
Conduct relief operations (convoys, air drops, etc.)
Noncoercive Support
Establish buffer zones between combatants
Monitor cease-fire; investigate violations
Patrol borders
Supervise prisoner exchanges
Monitor disengagement, withdrawal of forces
Clear mine fields
Provide security for elections
Assist in restoring law and order
Support rebuilding of infrastructure
Recent trends suggest that international organizations are building constituencies of their own. The primary vehicles are NGOs and private voluntary organizations, which are establishing direct connections to the world's citizens. If this assessment is valid, new tensions are likely to arise among these private entities and regional organizations, as well as with the United Nations. The former often have agendas at odds with established state authority and the agendas of regional organizations. While the regional organizations and the United Nations have the capacity to provide the adhesive necessary to ameliorate tensions that are emerging, they have yet to devise successful strategies that tie together the national institutions of failing states with the plans and actions of the multiple players increasingly involved in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. The United States is well positioned to encourage efforts to integrate and coordinate the programs and activities of institutions and agencies concerned with the two fields of endeavor.
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