McNair Paper 59, Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age, Chapter 3, , Notes, May 1998
Notes
1. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997; and, Joint Vision 2010, 1997.2. A series of RAND studies in recent years, exploring very large numbers of operational scenarios, shows that U.S. forces should prevail easily against today's rogues provided the forces have at least modest warning time, can gain access to the theater, and can count on local allied support. (See for example: Paul Davis et al., Access Constraints and Persian Gulf Contingencies: Potential Problems and Measures to Mitigate Them, 1997). This concern about warning time, access, and local support
—e.g., if there is a threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction—is contributing to U.S. interest in networking and streamlining forces, as well as developing better stand-off capabilities.3. James Stavardis, "The Second Revolution," Joint Force Quarterly 15 (Spring 1997): 8-13.
4. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
5. Any discussion of adaptive planning and complex adaptive systems should acknowledge the roles of RAND and the Santa Fe Institute in pioneering the applied and theoretical work on this new way of thinking about and planning for change and the future.
6. Brian Arthur remarks to the Highlands Group, Santa Fe Institute, December 3-4, 1995.
7. Emphasis on "environment shaping" in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review suggests confidence that the United States can affect and not simply react to international developments.
8. Samuel B. Gardiner and Daniel Fox, Understanding Revolutions in Military Affairs (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).
9. Richard H. Ullman, Strong States, Strong Hopes: Guidelines for Post-Cold War United States Foreign Policy and the Role of Foreign Assistance (Washington: The Aspen Institute, 1997).