McNair Paper 60, April 1999, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives

5.

France and the RMA  

France has the most sophisticated defense industry in Europe.  High-technology development and shaping systems integration are key priorities for French industry and the public sector.  There is wide-scale social acceptance of the legitimacy for the use of military power and of the ability to use that power in a variety of diplomatic settings.            

It would seem that France should be at the forefront of European thinking about the RMA; it has not. There has been resistance to confront the policy implications of an RMA for France akin to the broader reluctance to examine the changes necessary for France and Europe to become more competitive in the global economy.  In addition, the American origin of the RMA rethink has led to reluctance to engage in a broad rethink of how to deal with France's "hegemonic" ally.

But the RMA as part of a broader process of change in the reorientation of France can be identified, and the dynamics of change associated with framing a French approach to the RMA analyzed.  The purpose of this chapter is to do bothCidentify the framework variables affecting the emergence of a French approach to the RMA and then analyze the resultant dynamics of change in French strategic and military policy.  

The relationship of technology to strategy and of the role of France to the rest of the world have been core leitmotifs in recent French thinking and analysis about the future.  As France enters the 21st century, fundamental debates about the French identity as Europe faces globalization and about the American and Asian challenges are shaping policy reorientations for the French strategic and military communities.        The fundamental restructuring of the French military associated with the professionalization process is a key factor,  shaping the adoption of new technologies and approaches in the next decade.  The emphasis upon interallied missions for the restructured French forces pushes the French in a new direction as well.  Defense industrial restructuring under the twin pressures of American industrial consolidation and the globalization of high technology industries is a key part of the mosaic of a French approach to the RMA.  And driving this change above all is the consolidation of the French economy within a broader Euro zone. 

Procurement choices and technology alliances are significantly affected by the emergence of the Euro zone.  The effort to frame public policy in defense will increasingly be shaped by the interactions among key industrial and military players in the Euro zone. The inclusion of Britain within this zone in the next parliament would only accelerate this process.

France faces three broad choices in meeting the RMA challenge:  

The General Political Dynamic  

European politics are undergoing key changes that have important implications for evolving European security policy at the turn of the decade.  Conservatives have been replaced by social democrats in Britain and then France, and now Germany.  The commitment to a European Union that might become a European superstate is undercut, and serious domestic debates are underway over the way ahead for the European Union.  The step-grade evolution of Cold War to post-Cold War security policy among the core European states is being replaced with a genuine Arelook" at the role of defense and security policy within a new social democratic Europe.

Throughout much of the last decade, conservative parties governed France, and the Thatcher revolution dominated British politics.  Chancellor Kohl was a fixture of the conservative landscape in continental Europe.  The agenda that dominated foreign and security policy within Western Europe was shaped by French President Mitterrand and his conservative Prime Ministers, by Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major (with British Foreign Secretaries Hurd and Rifkind playing a prominent role), and by Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, and Defense Minister Ruehe. 

But these key legacy players have disappeared or are weakened in the process of political and economic transition within Western Europe.  Mitterrand is dead; President Chirac is in political limbo; Thatcher is an elder statesman; Major has become a commentator upon cricket; and Kohl has been rejected by German voters.

Inevitably the agenda put together by the conservative parties and elites is in the process of change as a new social democratic Europe emerges as well.  The conservative governments put together a post-Cold War transition package¾  the reform of NATO, the EU, and the state, to preserve key elements of the historical legacy from the past 40 years and seek adaptation for the future.  Conservative governments are subject to pressures for change as adaptations are perceived to fail or the dynamics of transition seem to put key obstacles in the paths of governments which can be eliminated only by the formation of new governments more committed to change with a promise of a fresh approach.

Nagging doubts throughout Europe about the appropriate model of development are resounding to the advantage of social democrats rather than to conservatives.  Indeed, a growing European consensus upon a new European model may well become a new fault line with the United States, with its emphasis upon a liberal globalization model.  

There are significant differences among the various social democratic alternatives emergent within Europe, but at the same time there are some core convergencies that shape an historic transition.  Among the most salient factors might be:  

Domestic Preoccupation and the Shift from Neo-Gaullism

The fall of French Prime Minister Alain Juppé and the marginalization of Chirac may have taken with it the neo-Gaullist approach to foreign and security policy. Chirac is committed to an image of France leading a Europe capable of defining its independence in foreign and defense policy via EU and WEU structures.  The way the United States  has been able to operate within the NATO of the past is how Chirac hoped to see EU core states operating through common mechanisms in the future.  A common currency, a common economy, a common defense industry, a common force structure, and a common decisionmaking system would allow an EU system to emerge leading Europe.  This vision is undercut by the continuing economic crisis within Europe and the expansion of EU and NATO.  The expansion of the EU and NATO is not likely to enhance the coherence of the EU as a mechanism leading European States toward common defense and security policies.

Table 2.  Western Europe in transition

 

 

Key Dimension of Legacy

 

 

 

New Priority

 

The welfare state

 

Creation of more competitive system; new European model; a competitive but mixed system

 

National defense as a necessity to deal with threats from the east

 

Defense as a residual requirement for national and European development

 

EU development via Maastricht Compromise

 

EMU as focus of deepening; shift from the EU as a Western European system to becoming a multinational European system via gradual enlargement

 

Priority upon transatlantic relations balanced with intra-European requirements

 

Investments in economic development and use of new geopolitical situation within Europe to meet the American (and Asian) economic and cultural challenge

 

National defense industry and forces as core requirements 

 

Greater emphasis upon European contributions via reformed NATO and/or via ESDI

       Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has more modest objectives and has in mind a social democratic alternative for France in foreign and security policy.  Working closely with the Labour government in London and with the new German Social Democratic government, Jospin seeks to define a more modest French policy, short on grandeur but strong on pragmatic European cooperation.  The French would promote interdependence in policies with key European states in the service of European development, not the building of an independent defense entity led by France.

Unlike his British counterpart, Prime Minister Jospin has no broadly accepted plan of action for the development of his society and the leadership of his nation.  Jospin was not expected to become Prime Minister.  He leads a coalition government with no consensus upon the agenda for action.  He splits constitutional power with a deeply wounded political opponent, President Jacques Chirac.  

At the same time, Jospin has used his difficult situation to his advantage.  Because he was not expected to win, Jospin carved out a central role for himself in forming the campaign team and then forming a government.  Jospin put his own people into place and has a strong hold over the administration.  The French economy is in the process of recovery.  Jospin and his team committed themselves from the outset to seek fiscal prudence and participation in the projected common European currency.  The political opponents to the right of Jospin are in deep disarray.  The leader of the National Front, Jean Marie Le Pen, is a powerful force, making it difficult for the conservatives to rally together; Chirac is perhaps mortally wounded as the leader of the Gaullists; and there are no popular mainstream conservative political leaders in sight.  Thus, the variables troubling the government are duration and viability.  Will the government fall because of coalition differences?  Will trade unions and other associations challenge the government effectively from the streets? 

The governing crisis in France and deep disputes about the proper direction for economic recovery and social reform hang over any French foreign and security policy.  The current government has little taste for Gaullist grandeur; foreign and security policy is deeply embedded within the effort to reform France and its relationships with Europe.

Prime Minister Jospin sought from the beginning to shape a credible European and foreign policy linked with the economic reconstruction of France.  He rejected pressures to implement his election promises for an extensive jobs program in favor of a credible macroeconomic package shaped by his powerful Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

Jospin made it clear from the beginning of his administration that he was moving in a different direction and pursuing a social democratic policy on defense and foreign policy.  France's influence and power would be linked to those of its European partners as a "normal" state, not as the architect of a Europe fitting into the aspirations of the neo-Gaullists.

The change in African policy came first, when  Jospin announced a change in the disposition of French forces on the continent.  He also sought to form a common policy with Britain and is pursuing a European effort on the continent.  

Jospin announced at the Paris Air Show in June 1997 an end to the Chirac policy on defense industries.  The Prime Minister would limit working with French defense industry to seeking multinational solutions to the rationalization of French defense industry.  This was a reversal from the Chirac perspective, which sought to reform national industries to Europeanize defense.

Inevitably, the question at the core of changes sought in this area is privatization, which is coming in through the back door.1  Jospin pledged during the campaign to maintain French defense industry as a public sector; in power, Jospin is seeking to reduce French Government involvement to the status of "minority" shares, rather than majority ownership.

Jospin and Strauss-Kahn are seeking to modernize the French economy by mixing lessons throughout Europe, including from Britain, to create a new synthesis that can lead France into the 21st century.  Only by linking a new domestic model with a broad approach to modernization within Europe can a viable French system be built.  If Jospin succeeds, the new social democratic political movement associated with it could push his conservative political opponents into a corner. 

Jospin was trained as a diplomat; Chirac was formed as a minister for domestic affairs.  Now each has moved to the other's interest.  Jospin is consumed by a passion to reform France as he sees it; Chirac is animated only when he travels abroad and discusses foreign affairs.  Jospin and Chirac make a curious couple indeed!

The Chirac-Jospin tandem represents the third time "cohabitation" has occurred in the Fifth Republic.  The first two were dramatically different.  The 7-year presidential term was almost over when the conservatives won in 1986 and again in 1993; this meant that the 2-year cohabitations of 1986-88 and 1993-95 were prologue to the presidential election.  Now there is the possibility of a 5-year cohabitation with a badly compromised president and an uncertain coalition of strange political bedfellows led by the Prime Minister.   

The Fifth Republic constitution does not clearly delineate powers between the President and the Prime Minister. The constitution was written to support presidential, not parliamentary, government.  Powers are unclearly divided on foreign and security policy between the President and Prime Minister.  Contests of will between the two may decide the interpretation in practice of what each may do. 

Indeed, one of the key things to watch is how Jospin and Chirac manage their dance.  From the outset, Jospin made it clear that he intended to assert his power.  When a French soldier was killed in "frica shortly after he became Prime Minister, Jospin commented and made policy.  Such an action was unprecedented; hitherto only the President in the Fifth Republic had acted in this manner. 

Chirac is so deeply wounded politicallyChaving entered the elections openly on the side of Juppé and personally attacking the socialists as the "party of yesterday"Cthat he has compromised his ability to act as President.  Yet at the time of the 1997 Bastille Day celebration Chirac made a forceful assertion of his authority and broadly attacked the positions of Jospin.  The Prime Minister responded quickly, and in the first cabinet meeting after the 14th of July put Chirac in his place, reminding him who had the real political power. 

Nonetheless, the real policy balance between Chirac and Jospin within foreign and defense policy is untested and unknown.  Jospin has stated that he will attend European summits and "significant" international meetings with President Chirac; the President by himself will represent France at other international meetings. 

Jospin has put in place an inner core of key players affecting foreign and defense policy.  The most powerful and significant is his Economics Minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn.  Jospin combined several ministries into a super-ministry for Strauss-Kahn.  Given the centrality of a credible fiscal and European monetary policy, Strauss-Kahn has been the Jospin government's key foreign policy maker to date.

The foreign and defense ministers are also important but play specific roles within the Jospin game plan.  Foreign Minister Vedrine takes care of day-to-day foreign policy and patiently works the relationship between Chirac and Jospin.  Defense Minister Richard was chosen to rein in the defense industrial empire and reduce defense spending while promoting the professionalization of the military.  Both men are very professional and competent and have put excellent staffs in place to play their roles.  

At the same time, Jospin is following the practice of Prime Minister Balladur of creating strong staffs within the Matignon (the Prime Minister's office).  These staffs function as watchdogs for Jospin's interests in the foreign and security arena affecting his core domestic agenda.

President Chirac has reshuffled his Elysée staff.2  His new diplomatic advisor is the former chief of staff of Prime Minister Juppé.  It is not clear though how the Elysée will define its role in relationship to Jospin foreign and defense policy.

There is a considerable disconnect between the foreign and security policy agenda pursued by Chirac under Prime Minister Juppé and that under the Jospin government.  Forecasting French actions is made difficult in part because of this disconnect and uncertainty over whether policy will emerge as a compromise between the two perspectives or whether Jospin will dominate where he chooses to do so.

President Chirac has pursued a neo-Gaullist foreign and security policy.  Although recognizing that the classic Gaullist vision is no longer relevant to the modern world, he has sought to redefine it for the 21st century.  The main components of his approach are:  

The core tension in the Chirac vision revolved around the ambiguity of economic reform:  Was Chirac seeking to liberalize the French economy and to transform Europe in a similar direction, or was he seeking to adapt Gaullist corporatism to the 21st century?3   

Chirac's policy toward the United States reflects this tension.  Was the United States the threat or the ally in the transformation of France and of Europe?  Were the reform of NATO and the modernization of European defense and high-technology industries part of a new Atlantic bargain or a European alternative to the old NATO?

Jospin starts with little appetite for the big picture foreign policy so dear to Chirac.  Jospin's focus is upon political viability and an attempt to shape the reform agenda in France for the next generation.  Jospin senses that the weakness on the right provides him with an opportunity to redefine the center of French politics.   If he can do so, the emerging political coalition could well dominate French politics for the rest of his active political life. 

Foreign and security policies need to fit within this overall approach to redefining the political center within France.  Jospin seeks to do so by defining a social democratic vision for a "modern" Europe.  No one is more aware than Jospin that Blair is in a much better position to lead Europe than himself; yet Jospin is seeking to incorporate Blair and the new German government into a broad synthesis of reform.  Among the key elements of the evolving Jospin approach are:4   

The priority placed on the common European currency and the reduction of public debts meant that there was no money available to sponsor a grandiose French vision of European security.  The need to sell off public assets to pay for entrance into the Euro zone meant that partial privatization would continue, and encouragement of European alliances for industry meant that broad French defense projects were not on the agenda, either.     

The continued commitment to professionalization of the military and the willingness to keep France engaged in a variety of global military commitments-notably in Bosnia and Africa-meant that the Jospin government had continued the reform process.

By April 1998, the Jospin government had conducted a ministrategic review of the Chirac plan.  It made some changes, notably by cutting some procurement programs, which it deemed outside the cost envelope.  In spite of the commitment to entering the Euro and to reducing public expenditures, defense expenditures have been maintained.  The Prime Minister personally and carefully reviewed the results of the strategic reflection of the government on defense and back the MOD against other government departments wishing to reduce defense spending.  

         The French State Crisis and Technology Policy

The political crisis that brought Jospin to power revolves in part around the crisis of the French state as it faces the dynamics of economic change in Europe today.  The strong state, which leads economic and technological change, is being undercut by globalization and the emergence of a different economic model.  The organizational innovations unleashed by the new information systems require less centralized and paternalistic management systems than the French system nurtures.  Colbertism is contradicted by the logic of the new economy.5  The result is a growing tension between the neo-Gaullist system of state leadership and industrial policy and the forces for organizational change and innovation associated with Europeanization and globalization.6

Gail Edmondson of Business Week characterized the French economy as becoming divided in two as a result of the tension between state and economy:   

Indeed, France's economy has been ripped in two. On one side is a private sector that is mainly lean, profitable, and competitive in world markets. On the other is an inefficient public sector that saps economic growth and wastes vital resources.

France's workforce mirrors its two halves. Many of the country's 14.2 million private-sector employees have adapted to flexible work rules and boosted productivity. . . . Meanwhile, most of the 5.3 million workers in the heavily unionized public sector, from hospitals to utilities, cling to the socialist myth of entitlement. They vociferously support a 10% cut in their workweek with no reduction in pay.

One obstacle to change is France's addiction to a paternalistic government. . . . Government officials hint they will use external pressure stemming from European monetary union to carry out public-sector reforms, including overhauls of the tax and social security systems.  But if Jospin waits for European Union pressure to rethink the French public sector, France's core of outcasts is sure to grow.7  

The forces for change in France are driven by the global economy and the reform of Europe.8  The portability of capital in the global economy puts enormous pressure upon French macroeconomic policies, as will the shift to the Euro.  The twin pressures are significantly reshaping the French society and economy and with it the technology policy within which an RMA would operate.

A notable example of change in the high-technology sector is telecommunications.  The liberalization of the European market agreed to by the European Union and in the process of being implemented by the European Commission provides a new framework for competition within Europe.  Competition among European firms and their foreign partners and competitors will reshape dramatically the nature of the European telecommunications industry.  No longer will this industry be directed by national entities able to limit choices and technologies available to the public.9  

It has been widely recognized in Europe that for competitiveness to be enhanced it is critical for Europe to enter the new information age more rapidly and effectively.  To do so requires the telecommunication system of Europe to be radically overhauled.  The liberalization of the market will be the means by which this occurs, not the guidance of the Colbertist state.  Rather, the French State increasingly will be defining its role interactively with market forces driving change in technological infrastructures in Europe, shaped by global industrial alliances.

The state is part of a network of technological transformation.  It is not the architect of change.  And the emergence of the Euro zone will accelerate this process by which the French state becomes a semisovereign actor shaping its own technology policy.

Nowhere is the shift from Colbertist guidance to market-driven change more evident in the high-technology age than in the French debate about the Internet.  The Minitel symbolizes Colbertist policy.  The French State and its telecoms arm recognized far before any other Western state the promise of the new information technologies;  Minitel was the result.  But the creation of a successful system designed 20 years ago has proven to be an important barrier to change.  The Net has rapidly overtaken Minitel technology and is a metaphor for the processes of globalization in the economy.

The Chirac government mightily resisted the Internet and focused upon the need for the state to protect the French language and culture from the "Anglo-Saxon" invasion.  The Jospin government led by Minister Allegre simply reversed course and in the first few months after taking power embraced the Internet and announced the incorporation of the Minitel within the Net.  "Learn English" was the response of Allegre to those who criticized the influence of the Net on French culture. 

In early 1998 the Jospin government introduced a new information policy, which fully embraces the Internet as the key engine of change.  Rather than the state defining the technological choices, the state is now interacting with global technological forces to define its approach.  The Internet experience is an important metaphor for the broader processes of change associated with the state role in relationship to new technologies.  

As the report introducing the government program dealing with the new information society noted, "Public authorities should not commit themselves to obsolete administrative policies or massive public orders, which are not tailored to deal with changes in information and communications technology. However, it is up to the State to create an environment favorable to the development of these new technologies."10

The dynamics of change for state policy in high technology are clearly seen in an area closely connected with the new information society and the defense sector:  space policy.  French and European space institutions and companies are under pressure from the United States and other foreign actors to adapt European space to the new telecommunications age.  In turn, the dramatic upsurge in requirements for satellites is leading to changes in the production processes, international alliances, and management approaches to the space industry.  And it is driving change in the space launcher business to provide the vehicles to carry satellites to space.

A key challenge for the French approach to space comes from the dynamics of change in U.S. industry and its approach to global partnerships. The redesign and restructuring of the satellite business are part of broader changes sweeping U.S. industry and society and are inextricably intertwined with the globalization of high- technological industries.  The changing market for the satellite business is shaped by the emergence of a global information society and of global manufacturing industries.

The older relationship between government and industry and the framework for designing and manufacturing satellites is being replaced by a new emphasis upon commercialization of space and the adoption of production-design approaches seen in other manufacturing industries, notably in the automobile and telecom industries.  The radical restructuring of the defense business and of relationships among key global players in aerospace is reshaping the nature of the satellite business as well.11

The satellite industry in the United Sates is in a period of radical change.  At the core of the redesign of the industry are new organizational approaches for the development, manufacturing, financing, and marketing of satellites, as well as a significant alteration in the relationship between the public and private sectors in the design, development, and deployment of satellites. The satellite business is a core driver for 21st century development, notably for the reinforcement of a global information society with a global production system.  

The shift in the space business associated with the telecommunications and information revolution is pushing governments from the role of sole-source buyers to becoming participants in a space industrial process.  Table 3 provides a brief schematic of the basic dynamics of change anticipated over the next few years.

The key point here can be put simply: the space business represents a strategic shift in the role of the state and the nature of public policy in a key high technology sector.  The French institutions are seeking to adapt themselves to these new conditions, and their adaptation processes are symptomatic of a much broader redesign of the public sector and industry to operate in the high-technology sector within the global economy.  In turn, these adaptations will put in place the framework within which the French approach to an RMA will emerge and not the other way around.  This is a major shift in the way France has done business.  Clearly the state and its functionaries would like to lead or to design the processes of technological change based upon which military force structures would be built.  Rather, the state will live off of an interactive process with industry and its core industrial partners in shaping "French" choices.  

        Strategic Rethinking and Processes of Change

The process of reform of the French military since the Gulf War has gone through three broad phases.  The first phase was a re-examination of the French military in light of the experience of the Gulf War.  This culminated in the judgments about the need for change in the 1994 White Paper.  This paper was produced by Prime Minister Balladur's government and was seen as prologue to the decisions to be taken by the next President.

      The second phase was the formulation of the military policy of the newly elected President.  Chirac emphasized professionalization of the military and the inclusion of the military within NATO as the twin pillars of change.   

The third or current phase has emerged from the defeat of the Juppé government and the inability to negotiate a return to the  integrated military structure of NATO.  The Jospin government continues basic changes initiated by Chirac with regard to professionalization but with limited means and no commitment to re-enter the NATO military structure.

Table 3.  Dynamics of change in the space business and the role of the state  

 

 

Key Factors

 

 

 

1996

 

 

2005

 

 

2010

 

Dominant industrial force

 

Aerospace

 

Mixed aerospace and telecoms alliances building the global information society

 

Information content providers supply the global information system with continuing development of the infrastructure as key challenge

 

Role of governments

 

Hegemonic or dominant as proprietary client

 

Anchor or dominant client for the development of the industry with mixed public-private system

 

Governments as key client among several or first among equals seeking alliances with key players to exercise leverage

 

Role of national requirements

 

Defense and state requirements dominate

 

Regional alliances and declining role of purely national requirements and of the role of the state

 

Civilian and global requirements for global information society dominate

 

Key business model

 

Defense industry (strong links with government and control over proprietary national standards)

 

IBM or MCI (data or transmission infrastructure company with global presence)

 

Sun Micro-Systems or HP (Global Network Organization)

  The White Paper  

The military reform sketched out in the White Paper was ambitious.  To meet those ambitions, a large defense budget would be maintained, and France would frame a European military policy to be built upon French ambitions for change.  There was a strategic concept for change and an expectation of the prospects of finding the means to implement a new policy.

For the Balladur administration, which wrote the White Paper, there was a clear emphasis upon the new context within which French conventional forces were to operate.  The administration made it clear that the enhancement of the mobility of French forces and their ability to operate in multilateral settings were the core objectives for rethinking the role of conventional forces:  

A true conversion must gradually be carried out in the role of conventional weapons. . . . conventional facilities will henceforth be defined first of all by their aptitude as such to contribute, if necessary by force, to the prevention, limitation or settlement of regional crises or conflicts that do not involve the risk of extreme escalation.  If this latter case presents itself, these very facilities will resume their traditional function in the deterrence maneuver, by giving concrete expression to our will to defend our vital interests and by enabling us to test the determination and the facilities of the potential aggressor.12  

The White Paper goes on to underscore the new role for conventional forces within French strategy and the need to modernize those forces in order to play their proper role:  

Apart from their specific operational capabilities, which would have to be examined, the aptitude of the forces to intervene in distant places will depend on their availability, their organization and the nature of the resources to bring into play in the theater of operations. . . . The organization of the forces must be such as to make it possible to split them up into elementary cells which may be reassembled on demand, into coherent groups having all the capabilities of command, action, support and assistance required for the intervention.  The principle of modularity will be the condition for the efficiency of the entire organization.13

The emphasis upon modularity and flexibility with the reliance upon small maneuver units was a key emphasis within the White Paper and could form an important motif for a French variant of the RMA.

Also emphasized in the White Paper was jointness, notably with regard to forming General Staff integration for command and control and intelligence functions.  In fact, greater integration of service planning within the framework of the General Staff has been a hallmark of military reform from 1994 onward.