McNair Paper 60, April 1999, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives

5.

France and the RMA  

France has the most sophisticated defense industry in Europe.  High-technology development and shaping systems integration are key priorities for French industry and the public sector.  There is wide-scale social acceptance of the legitimacy for the use of military power and of the ability to use that power in a variety of diplomatic settings.            

It would seem that France should be at the forefront of European thinking about the RMA; it has not. There has been resistance to confront the policy implications of an RMA for France akin to the broader reluctance to examine the changes necessary for France and Europe to become more competitive in the global economy.  In addition, the American origin of the RMA rethink has led to reluctance to engage in a broad rethink of how to deal with France's "hegemonic" ally.

But the RMA as part of a broader process of change in the reorientation of France can be identified, and the dynamics of change associated with framing a French approach to the RMA analyzed.  The purpose of this chapter is to do bothCidentify the framework variables affecting the emergence of a French approach to the RMA and then analyze the resultant dynamics of change in French strategic and military policy.  

The relationship of technology to strategy and of the role of France to the rest of the world have been core leitmotifs in recent French thinking and analysis about the future.  As France enters the 21^st century, fundamental debates about the French identity as Europe faces globalization and about the American and Asian challenges are shaping policy reorientations for the French strategic and military communities.        The fundamental restructuring of the French military associated with the professionalization process is a key factor,  shaping the adoption of new technologies and approaches in the next decade.  The emphasis upon interallied missions for the restructured French forces pushes the French in a new direction as well.  Defense industrial restructuring under the twin pressures of American industrial consolidation and the globalization of high technology industries is a key part of the mosaic of a French approach to the RMA.  And driving this change above all is the consolidation of the French economy within a broader Euro zone. 

Procurement choices and technology alliances are significantly affected by the emergence of the Euro zone.  The effort to frame public policy in defense will increasingly be shaped by the interactions among key industrial and military players in the Euro zone. The inclusion of Britain within this zone in the next parliament would only accelerate this process.

France faces three broad choices in meeting the RMA challenge:  

• France can become a key framer of a European RMA.  This would require coming to terms with the requirements of inter-allied military operations on both the European and transatlantic levels. 

• France could selectively adopt certain RMA technologies and cooperate wherever possible with allies in promoting common projects and actions. 

• France could continue to promote the export of legacy systems, to keep its military industrial policy in place, and to emphasize the role of the French military in low-intensity operations.  

The General Political Dynamic  

European politics are undergoing key changes that have important implications for evolving European security policy at the turn of the decade.  Conservatives have been replaced by social democrats in Britain and then France, and now Germany.  The commitment to a European Union that might become a European superstate is undercut, and serious domestic debates are underway over the way ahead for the European Union.  The step-grade evolution of Cold War to post-Cold War security policy among the core European states is being replaced with a genuine Arelook" at the role of defense and security policy within a new social democratic Europe.

Throughout much of the last decade, conservative parties governed France, and the Thatcher revolution dominated British politics.  Chancellor Kohl was a fixture of the conservative landscape in continental Europe.  The agenda that dominated foreign and security policy within Western Europe was shaped by French President Mitterrand and his conservative Prime Ministers, by Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major (with British Foreign Secretaries Hurd and Rifkind playing a prominent role), and by Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, and Defense Minister Ruehe. 

But these key legacy players have disappeared or are weakened in the process of political and economic transition within Western Europe.  Mitterrand is dead; President Chirac is in political limbo; Thatcher is an elder statesman; Major has become a commentator upon cricket; and Kohl has been rejected by German voters.

Inevitably the agenda put together by the conservative parties and elites is in the process of change as a new social democratic Europe emerges as well.  The conservative governments put together a post-Cold War transition package¾  the reform of NATO, the EU, and the state, to preserve key elements of the historical legacy from the past 40 years and seek adaptation for the future.  Conservative governments are subject to pressures for change as adaptations are perceived to fail or the dynamics of transition seem to put key obstacles in the paths of governments which can be eliminated only by the formation of new governments more committed to change with a promise of a fresh approach.

Nagging doubts throughout Europe about the appropriate model of development are resounding to the advantage of social democrats rather than to conservatives.  Indeed, a growing European consensus upon a new European model may well become a new fault line with the United States, with its emphasis upon a liberal globalization model.  

There are significant differences among the various social democratic alternatives emergent within Europe, but at the same time there are some core convergencies that shape an historic transition.  Among the most salient factors might be:  

• A reform of the postwar welfare state but with a continued commitment to a strong buffer from the market

• A priority upon economic and social development over an emphasis upon defense requirements

• A shift in budgetary investments to high-technological industries and the development of Western Europe investments in Central Europe to enhance competitiveness with the United States

• A reform of the European Union to emphasize enlargement and reduced control of the European Commission with less ambitious goals for deepening

• Deepening objectives pursued largely around the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) restructuring (a relatively soft EMU)  that allows the core of Western Europe to institute common structural reforms

• A greater reliance upon European political and security instruments forged in common through EU and the reform of NATO.  

Domestic Preoccupation and the Shift from Neo-Gaullism

The fall of French Prime Minister Alain Juppé and the marginalization of Chirac may have taken with it the neo-Gaullist approach to foreign and security policy. Chirac is committed to an image of France leading a Europe capable of defining its independence in foreign and defense policy via EU and WEU structures.  The way the United States  has been able to operate within the NATO of the past is how Chirac hoped to see EU core states operating through common mechanisms in the future.  A common currency, a common economy, a common defense industry, a common force structure, and a common decisionmaking system would allow an EU system to emerge leading Europe.  This vision is undercut by the continuing economic crisis within Europe and the expansion of EU and NATO.  The expansion of the EU and NATO is not likely to enhance the coherence of the EU as a mechanism leading European States toward common defense and security policies.

Table 2.  Western Europe in transition

       Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has more modest objectives and has in mind a social democratic alternative for France in foreign and security policy.  Working closely with the Labour government in London and with the new German Social Democratic government, Jospin seeks to define a more modest French policy, short on grandeur but strong on pragmatic European cooperation.  The French would promote interdependence in policies with key European states in the service of European development, not the building of an independent defense entity led by France.

Unlike his British counterpart, Prime Minister Jospin has no broadly accepted plan of action for the development of his society and the leadership of his nation.  Jospin was not expected to become Prime Minister.  He leads a coalition government with no consensus upon the agenda for action.  He splits constitutional power with a deeply wounded political opponent, President Jacques Chirac.  

At the same time, Jospin has used his difficult situation to his advantage.  Because he was not expected to win, Jospin carved out a central role for himself in forming the campaign team and then forming a government.  Jospin put his own people into place and has a strong hold over the administration.  The French economy is in the process of recovery.  Jospin and his team committed themselves from the outset to seek fiscal prudence and participation in the projected common European currency.  The political opponents to the right of Jospin are in deep disarray.  The leader of the National Front, Jean Marie Le Pen, is a powerful force, making it difficult for the conservatives to rally together; Chirac is perhaps mortally wounded as the leader of the Gaullists; and there are no popular mainstream conservative political leaders in sight.  Thus, the variables troubling the government are duration and viability.  Will the government fall because of coalition differences?  Will trade unions and other associations challenge the government effectively from the streets? 

The governing crisis in France and deep disputes about the proper direction for economic recovery and social reform hang over any French foreign and security policy.  The current government has little taste for Gaullist grandeur; foreign and security policy is deeply embedded within the effort to reform France and its relationships with Europe.

Prime Minister Jospin sought from the beginning to shape a credible European and foreign policy linked with the economic reconstruction of France.  He rejected pressures to implement his election promises for an extensive jobs program in favor of a credible macroeconomic package shaped by his powerful Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

Jospin made it clear from the beginning of his administration that he was moving in a different direction and pursuing a social democratic policy on defense and foreign policy.  France's influence and power would be linked to those of its European partners as a "normal" state, not as the architect of a Europe fitting into the aspirations of the neo-Gaullists.

The change in African policy came first, when  Jospin announced a change in the disposition of French forces on the continent.  He also sought to form a common policy with Britain and is pursuing a European effort on the continent.  

Jospin announced at the Paris Air Show in June 1997 an end to the Chirac policy on defense industries.  The Prime Minister would limit working with French defense industry to seeking multinational solutions to the rationalization of French defense industry.  This was a reversal from the Chirac perspective, which sought to reform national industries to Europeanize defense.

Inevitably, the question at the core of changes sought in this area is privatization, which is coming in through the back door.¹  Jospin pledged during the campaign to maintain French defense industry as a public sector; in power, Jospin is seeking to reduce French Government involvement to the status of "minority" shares, rather than majority ownership.

Jospin and Strauss-Kahn are seeking to modernize the French economy by mixing lessons throughout Europe, including from Britain, to create a new synthesis that can lead France into the 21^st century.  Only by linking a new domestic model with a broad approach to modernization within Europe can a viable French system be built.  If Jospin succeeds, the new social democratic political movement associated with it could push his conservative political opponents into a corner. 

Jospin was trained as a diplomat; Chirac was formed as a minister for domestic affairs.  Now each has moved to the other's interest.  Jospin is consumed by a passion to reform France as he sees it; Chirac is animated only when he travels abroad and discusses foreign affairs.  Jospin and Chirac make a curious couple indeed!

The Chirac-Jospin tandem represents the third time "cohabitation" has occurred in the Fifth Republic.  The first two were dramatically different.  The 7-year presidential term was almost over when the conservatives won in 1986 and again in 1993; this meant that the 2-year cohabitations of 1986-88 and 1993-95 were prologue to the presidential election.  Now there is the possibility of a 5-year cohabitation with a badly compromised president and an uncertain coalition of strange political bedfellows led by the Prime Minister.   

The Fifth Republic constitution does not clearly delineate powers between the President and the Prime Minister. The constitution was written to support presidential, not parliamentary, government.  Powers are unclearly divided on foreign and security policy between the President and Prime Minister.  Contests of will between the two may decide the interpretation in practice of what each may do. 

Indeed, one of the key things to watch is how Jospin and Chirac manage their dance.  From the outset, Jospin made it clear that he intended to assert his power.  When a French soldier was killed in "frica shortly after he became Prime Minister, Jospin commented and made policy.  Such an action was unprecedented; hitherto only the President in the Fifth Republic had acted in this manner. 

Chirac is so deeply wounded politicallyChaving entered the elections openly on the side of Juppé and personally attacking the socialists as the "party of yesterday"Cthat he has compromised his ability to act as President.  Yet at the time of the 1997 Bastille Day celebration Chirac made a forceful assertion of his authority and broadly attacked the positions of Jospin.  The Prime Minister responded quickly, and in the first cabinet meeting after the 14^th of July put Chirac in his place, reminding him who had the real political power. 

Nonetheless, the real policy balance between Chirac and Jospin within foreign and defense policy is untested and unknown.  Jospin has stated that he will attend European summits and "significant" international meetings with President Chirac; the President by himself will represent France at other international meetings. 

Jospin has put in place an inner core of key players affecting foreign and defense policy.  The most powerful and significant is his Economics Minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn.  Jospin combined several ministries into a super-ministry for Strauss-Kahn.  Given the centrality of a credible fiscal and European monetary policy, Strauss-Kahn has been the Jospin government's key foreign policy maker to date.

The foreign and defense ministers are also important but play specific roles within the Jospin game plan.  Foreign Minister Vedrine takes care of day-to-day foreign policy and patiently works the relationship between Chirac and Jospin.  Defense Minister Richard was chosen to rein in the defense industrial empire and reduce defense spending while promoting the professionalization of the military.  Both men are very professional and competent and have put excellent staffs in place to play their roles.  

At the same time, Jospin is following the practice of Prime Minister Balladur of creating strong staffs within the Matignon (the Prime Minister's office).  These staffs function as watchdogs for Jospin's interests in the foreign and security arena affecting his core domestic agenda.

President Chirac has reshuffled his Elysée staff.²  His new diplomatic advisor is the former chief of staff of Prime Minister Juppé.  It is not clear though how the Elysée will define its role in relationship to Jospin foreign and defense policy.

There is a considerable disconnect between the foreign and security policy agenda pursued by Chirac under Prime Minister Juppé and that under the Jospin government.  Forecasting French actions is made difficult in part because of this disconnect and uncertainty over whether policy will emerge as a compromise between the two perspectives or whether Jospin will dominate where he chooses to do so.

President Chirac has pursued a neo-Gaullist foreign and security policy.  Although recognizing that the classic Gaullist vision is no longer relevant to the modern world, he has sought to redefine it for the 21^st century.  The main components of his approach are:  

• Reform of the French economy to be more competitive globally

• Reform of the European Union

• The Europeanization of defense through the reform of NATO and the privatization and restructuring of French defense industries;

• Strengthening Europe's relationships with Asia to enhance European competitiveness

• Effectively meeting the U.S. challenge to European culture, society and economy.  

The core tension in the Chirac vision revolved around the ambiguity of economic reform:  Was Chirac seeking to liberalize the French economy and to transform Europe in a similar direction, or was he seeking to adapt Gaullist corporatism to the 21^st century?³   

Chirac's policy toward the United States reflects this tension.  Was the United States the threat or the ally in the transformation of France and of Europe?  Were the reform of NATO and the modernization of European defense and high-technology industries part of a new Atlantic bargain or a European alternative to the old NATO?

Jospin starts with little appetite for the big picture foreign policy so dear to Chirac.  Jospin's focus is upon political viability and an attempt to shape the reform agenda in France for the next generation.  Jospin senses that the weakness on the right provides him with an opportunity to redefine the center of French politics.   If he can do so, the emerging political coalition could well dominate French politics for the rest of his active political life. 

Foreign and security policies need to fit within this overall approach to redefining the political center within France.  Jospin seeks to do so by defining a social democratic vision for a "modern" Europe.  No one is more aware than Jospin that Blair is in a much better position to lead Europe than himself; yet Jospin is seeking to incorporate Blair and the new German government into a broad synthesis of reform.  Among the key elements of the evolving Jospin approach are:⁴   

• A prudent fiscal policy

• A commitment to the Euro

• Support for a strong European central bank but with some consultation with political authorities responsible for designing and implementing budgets

• A reform of the European Union to permit enlargement, but with a strong EMU core within which there is a common approach to economic modernization and social development

• An emphasis upon strengthening relevant multilateral institutions to ensure that Europe has a voice within a trans-Atlantic relationship increasingly dominated by a "hegemonic" America

• An emphasis upon nurturing high-technology industries and organizational reforms that can make Europe more competitive with the United States within the global economy.  

The priority placed on the common European currency and the reduction of public debts meant that there was no money available to sponsor a grandiose French vision of European security.  The need to sell off public assets to pay for entrance into the Euro zone meant that partial privatization would continue, and encouragement of European alliances for industry meant that broad French defense projects were not on the agenda, either.     

The continued commitment to professionalization of the military and the willingness to keep France engaged in a variety of global military commitments-notably in Bosnia and Africa-meant that the Jospin government had continued the reform process.

By April 1998, the Jospin government had conducted a ministrategic review of the Chirac plan.  It made some changes, notably by cutting some procurement programs, which it deemed outside the cost envelope.  In spite of the commitment to entering the Euro and to reducing public expenditures, defense expenditures have been maintained.  The Prime Minister personally and carefully reviewed the results of the strategic reflection of the government on defense and back the MOD against other government departments wishing to reduce defense spending.  

         The French State Crisis and Technology Policy

The political crisis that brought Jospin to power revolves in part around the crisis of the French state as it faces the dynamics of economic change in Europe today.  The strong state, which leads economic and technological change, is being undercut by globalization and the emergence of a different economic model.  The organizational innovations unleashed by the new information systems require less centralized and paternalistic management systems than the French system nurtures.  Colbertism is contradicted by the logic of the new economy.⁵  The result is a growing tension between the neo-Gaullist system of state leadership and industrial policy and the forces for organizational change and innovation associated with Europeanization and globalization.⁶

Gail Edmondson of Business Week characterized the French economy as becoming divided in two as a result of the tension between state and economy:   

Indeed, France's economy has been ripped in two. On one side is a private sector that is mainly lean, profitable, and competitive in world markets. On the other is an inefficient public sector that saps economic growth and wastes vital resources.

France's workforce mirrors its two halves. Many of the country's 14.2 million private-sector employees have adapted to flexible work rules and boosted productivity. . . . Meanwhile, most of the 5.3 million workers in the heavily unionized public sector, from hospitals to utilities, cling to the socialist myth of entitlement. They vociferously support a 10% cut in their workweek with no reduction in pay.

One obstacle to change is France's addiction to a paternalistic government. . . . Government officials hint they will use external pressure stemming from European monetary union to carry out public-sector reforms, including overhauls of the tax and social security systems.  But if Jospin waits for European Union pressure to rethink the French public sector, France's core of outcasts is sure to grow.⁷  

The forces for change in France are driven by the global economy and the reform of Europe.⁸  The portability of capital in the global economy puts enormous pressure upon French macroeconomic policies, as will the shift to the Euro.  The twin pressures are significantly reshaping the French society and economy and with it the technology policy within which an RMA would operate.

A notable example of change in the high-technology sector is telecommunications.  The liberalization of the European market agreed to by the European Union and in the process of being implemented by the European Commission provides a new framework for competition within Europe.  Competition among European firms and their foreign partners and competitors will reshape dramatically the nature of the European telecommunications industry.  No longer will this industry be directed by national entities able to limit choices and technologies available to the public.⁹  

It has been widely recognized in Europe that for competitiveness to be enhanced it is critical for Europe to enter the new information age more rapidly and effectively.  To do so requires the telecommunication system of Europe to be radically overhauled.  The liberalization of the market will be the means by which this occurs, not the guidance of the Colbertist state.  Rather, the French State increasingly will be defining its role interactively with market forces driving change in technological infrastructures in Europe, shaped by global industrial alliances.

The state is part of a network of technological transformation.  It is not the architect of change.  And the emergence of the Euro zone will accelerate this process by which the French state becomes a semisovereign actor shaping its own technology policy.

Nowhere is the shift from Colbertist guidance to market-driven change more evident in the high-technology age than in the French debate about the Internet.  The Minitel symbolizes Colbertist policy.  The French State and its telecoms arm recognized far before any other Western state the promise of the new information technologies;  Minitel was the result.  But the creation of a successful system designed 20 years ago has proven to be an important barrier to change.  The Net has rapidly overtaken Minitel technology and is a metaphor for the processes of globalization in the economy.

The Chirac government mightily resisted the Internet and focused upon the need for the state to protect the French language and culture from the "Anglo-Saxon" invasion.  The Jospin government led by Minister Allegre simply reversed course and in the first few months after taking power embraced the Internet and announced the incorporation of the Minitel within the Net.  "Learn English" was the response of Allegre to those who criticized the influence of the Net on French culture. 

In early 1998 the Jospin government introduced a new information policy, which fully embraces the Internet as the key engine of change.  Rather than the state defining the technological choices, the state is now interacting with global technological forces to define its approach.  The Internet experience is an important metaphor for the broader processes of change associated with the state role in relationship to new technologies.  

As the report introducing the government program dealing with the new information society noted, "Public authorities should not commit themselves to obsolete administrative policies or massive public orders, which are not tailored to deal with changes in information and communications technology. However, it is up to the State to create an environment favorable to the development of these new technologies."¹⁰

The dynamics of change for state policy in high technology are clearly seen in an area closely connected with the new information society and the defense sector:  space policy.  French and European space institutions and companies are under pressure from the United States and other foreign actors to adapt European space to the new telecommunications age.  In turn, the dramatic upsurge in requirements for satellites is leading to changes in the production processes, international alliances, and management approaches to the space industry.  And it is driving change in the space launcher business to provide the vehicles to carry satellites to space.

A key challenge for the French approach to space comes from the dynamics of change in U.S. industry and its approach to global partnerships. The redesign and restructuring of the satellite business are part of broader changes sweeping U.S. industry and society and are inextricably intertwined with the globalization of high- technological industries.  The changing market for the satellite business is shaped by the emergence of a global information society and of global manufacturing industries.

The older relationship between government and industry and the framework for designing and manufacturing satellites is being replaced by a new emphasis upon commercialization of space and the adoption of production-design approaches seen in other manufacturing industries, notably in the automobile and telecom industries.  The radical restructuring of the defense business and of relationships among key global players in aerospace is reshaping the nature of the satellite business as well.¹¹

The satellite industry in the United Sates is in a period of radical change.  At the core of the redesign of the industry are new organizational approaches for the development, manufacturing, financing, and marketing of satellites, as well as a significant alteration in the relationship between the public and private sectors in the design, development, and deployment of satellites. The satellite business is a core driver for 21^st century development, notably for the reinforcement of a global information society with a global production system.  

The shift in the space business associated with the telecommunications and information revolution is pushing governments from the role of sole-source buyers to becoming participants in a space industrial process.  Table 3 provides a brief schematic of the basic dynamics of change anticipated over the next few years.

The key point here can be put simply: the space business represents a strategic shift in the role of the state and the nature of public policy in a key high technology sector.  The French institutions are seeking to adapt themselves to these new conditions, and their adaptation processes are symptomatic of a much broader redesign of the public sector and industry to operate in the high-technology sector within the global economy.  In turn, these adaptations will put in place the framework within which the French approach to an RMA will emerge and not the other way around.  This is a major shift in the way France has done business.  Clearly the state and its functionaries would like to lead or to design the processes of technological change based upon which military force structures would be built.  Rather, the state will live off of an interactive process with industry and its core industrial partners in shaping "French" choices.  

        Strategic Rethinking and Processes of Change

The process of reform of the French military since the Gulf War has gone through three broad phases.  The first phase was a re-examination of the French military in light of the experience of the Gulf War.  This culminated in the judgments about the need for change in the 1994 White Paper.  This paper was produced by Prime Minister Balladur's government and was seen as prologue to the decisions to be taken by the next President.

      The second phase was the formulation of the military policy of the newly elected President.  Chirac emphasized professionalization of the military and the inclusion of the military within NATO as the twin pillars of change.   

The third or current phase has emerged from the defeat of the Juppé government and the inability to negotiate a return to the  integrated military structure of NATO.  The Jospin government continues basic changes initiated by Chirac with regard to professionalization but with limited means and no commitment to re-enter the NATO military structure.

Table 3.  Dynamics of change in the space business and the role of the state  

  The White Paper  

The military reform sketched out in the White Paper was ambitious.  To meet those ambitions, a large defense budget would be maintained, and France would frame a European military policy to be built upon French ambitions for change.  There was a strategic concept for change and an expectation of the prospects of finding the means to implement a new policy.

For the Balladur administration, which wrote the White Paper, there was a clear emphasis upon the new context within which French conventional forces were to operate.  The administration made it clear that the enhancement of the mobility of French forces and their ability to operate in multilateral settings were the core objectives for rethinking the role of conventional forces:  

A true conversion must gradually be carried out in the role of conventional weapons. . . . conventional facilities will henceforth be defined first of all by their aptitude as such to contribute, if necessary by force, to the prevention, limitation or settlement of regional crises or conflicts that do not involve the risk of extreme escalation.  If this latter case presents itself, these very facilities will resume their traditional function in the deterrence maneuver, by giving concrete expression to our will to defend our vital interests and by enabling us to test the determination and the facilities of the potential aggressor.¹²  

The White Paper goes on to underscore the new role for conventional forces within French strategy and the need to modernize those forces in order to play their proper role:  

Apart from their specific operational capabilities, which would have to be examined, the aptitude of the forces to intervene in distant places will depend on their availability, their organization and the nature of the resources to bring into play in the theater of operations. . . . The organization of the forces must be such as to make it possible to split them up into elementary cells which may be reassembled on demand, into coherent groups having all the capabilities of command, action, support and assistance required for the intervention.  The principle of modularity will be the condition for the efficiency of the entire organization.¹³

The emphasis upon modularity and flexibility with the reliance upon small maneuver units was a key emphasis within the White Paper and could form an important motif for a French variant of the RMA.

Also emphasized in the White Paper was jointness, notably with regard to forming General Staff integration for command and control and intelligence functions.  In fact, greater integration of service planning within the framework of the General Staff has been a hallmark of military reform from 1994 onward.¹⁴ 

The Balladur administration was not ready to confront the NATO question directly.  Rather, the role of a new French command element within the new combined joint task forces for NATO was emphasized.  The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the new interarmy command structure were to form key elements of the strategy for change emphasized by the Balladur administration.¹⁵

A French parliamentary report reviewing the White Paper underscored that the reforms required the "creation of a "projectable" interarmy theater command structure, which could draw together the elements necessary to conduct the operations of French forces while operating within a coalition.  Thus, this "etat-major" must be multinational in character.¹⁶  

The Chirac Initiatives

Chirac inherited the changes initiated by the Balladur government  and added two further twists.  Above all, he ended the draft and pushed France toward the era of the professional army.¹⁷  He also aimed to put this professional army within a reformed military structure of NATO.  The two seemed to go naturally with one another-the new professional army would focus upon power projection missions and new approaches to mobility and operations, and the new NATO military structure would provide a framework within which joint operations could develop.¹⁸ 

As Defense Minister Millon said in front the National Assembly in March 1996, the core principle of the reform was "the creation of forces capable of rapid organization, able to be projected very quickly, with the elements of command experienced in inter-allied cooperation and based on the principle of reinforcing the European identity of defense within a renovated Atlantic Alliance."¹⁹  

The first proved more doable and durable than the second.  The French military was deeply reluctant to see the end of the mixed conscript and professional army, but Chirac envisaged the shift to professionalism as necessary in order to operate in the new military setting of peacekeeping and mobility.  The need to develop greater inter-army coordination and cooperation as well as to operate within multilateral settings also seemed to call for a professional force.

Unfortunately, the NATO inclusion effort fell short.  If the French military was included in the reform of NATO's military structures then there would be clearly legitimized access points for an interallied learning curve for the reformed French forces.  Without this framework, adaptations would have to be made in a more ad hoc fashion characteristic of past French relations with its Anglo-Saxon allies.

But the evolving British relationship with France formed an important counterpoint for the French military reform process.  Indeed, the British military was identified as the model against which the French would measure themselves.  The joint experience in Bosnia was an important stimulus to a deepened relationship as well.  And the establishment of a French-British airmobile brigade was to form a touchstone for Chirac's efforts to link military reform with a new approach toward allies.

In spite of the decision to professionalize the Army and to reconsider the French relationship with the NATO military system, neither President Chirac nor the Juppé government could break free of the entangling web of Gaullism.  Notably, the government was unable to shift from legacy military systems to new ones.

In his reformulation of French defense policy, one critic of the Chirac approach, François Heisbourg, had underscored the need to shift funding from high-cost legacy systems to those that would lead to a breakthrough toward the future.²⁰ Heisbourg also identified the core problem of choice in trying to move toward a new military system. His core principle for French reform is simply put: "To play the maximum role within a coalition for the best cost."²¹  He then went on to identify a core set of "advantages" the French should build upon in nurturing reform.  

• The ability to organize intervention forces quickly and effectively

• The long historical knowledge and experience of French forces in a number of regions critical to peace and security in the future

• The ability to work with limited resources in local settings with local populations

• The technological capacity to develop new observation and information systems with other Europeans

• The close working relationship between the navy and the air force in joint power projection and the ability to project organic forces.  

Neither Chirac nor Juppé made a decisive breakthrough against legacy systems nor promoted key choices in shaping the direction for the development of the new professional military system.  Additionally, the approach toward reconciliation with NATO was not well defined.  The opportunity to work with the proposal to turn Deputy SACEUR into a real planning and training cell for European operations could have provided an opportunity to blend new technologies with new military structures and, in turn, with new relationships with allies.  Other conservatives have underscored the opportunity posed for France in using a deepened role for Deputy SACEUR and the creation of new planning tools to move European operations forward into the new century.²²  

The Military in Transition

The defeat of Juppé's government meant an end to the Chirac experimentation.  The new Jospin government has continued the professionalization effort but put on hold any new relationship with NATO.

The priority placed on the common European currency and the reduction of public debts left no money available to sponsor a grandiose French vision of European security.  The need to sell off public assets to pay for entrance into the Euro zone meant that partial privatization would continue, and encouragement of European alliances for industry knocked broad French defense projects off the agenda.

The continued commitment to professionalization of the military and the willingness to keep France engaged in a variety of global military commitments¾  notably in Bosnia and Africa¾  indicates that the Jospin government will continue the reform process.  Even though no strategic breakthrough on NATO or European security policy is in the offing, the processes of change are moving forward.

A small example of how continued reform mixes new technologies for the military with global commercial standards and reliance upon NATO military standards in generating that technology is the French Air Force's acquisition of new logistics software.  In an article published in Air and Cosmos in February 1998, the continuing process of reform is revealed:  

The air force has just put into service a new management system called "Sigma" (Information System for "ir Materiel Management), which was inaugurated on 30 January by Major General Gerard Resnier.

In fact, the management of air force parts has been computerized for more than 30 years. During that time, new software modules that execute increasingly complex functions have been superimposed on the original system, to the point that the functionality of the overall system was heavily encumbered; for example, the central system was only updated twice a week. That made it difficult to assure coherent management of diverse stockpiles, considering that 95 percent of orders received are filled the same day.

The Sigma project was designed, therefore, to harmonize and speed up performance of the functions previously performed by these various software modules. . . . It was necessary to write some 5.4 million lines of code and create an Oracle database, which, with a capacity of 42 gigabytes, is the largest in France, perhaps, the largest in all of Europe.  General Jacques Deroche, director of materiel, whose Sigma project is finally seeing the light of day, is justly proud of his "child."²³  

Reforming the Military: Impact on the RMA

In spite of the difficulties of transition, a number of core changes are evident in the process of reforming the military, which have an important impact upon a French variant of the RMA.  

• The professionalization of the military will allow it to experiment more effectively with new technologies than could a conscript army.

• The end of a number of traditional missions and much greater emphasis upon interdependence with allies will accelerate cross-national learning cycles.

• The use of new communication technologies in the Army is leading to change.  Already, the French have the most digitized Army in Europe, and they have used the new technologies effectively in Bosnia.²⁴

• Budgetary reductions will lead to greater reliance upon common resources in a number of areas for the services- logistics, command and control, and civilian technologies, in a shift away from the use of proprietary military systems.  Such changes provide a scope for further acceleration of reform.

• The French military, in common with most other European militaries, is suspicious of centralizing impulses coming from new technologies and seeks to use technologies to reinforce the power of decentralized military leadership in line with their historical practices.

• The introduction of some new technologies¾  UAVs, longer range strike missiles, and greater reliance upon precision strike-will intensify the competition between traditional platforms and new approaches.

• The ongoing commitment of French leaders to use military forces in peacekeeping and operations other than war-indeed, the significant French experience with such¾  provides an interest in new technologies such as nonlethal weapons.²⁵  

In short, the professionalization project in front of the military and the emphasis upon greater interdependence with allies provide the benchmark from which greater focus upon an RMA can proceed. The much greater attention being provided to social change and the construction of the Euro zone overshadows military issues.  For now it simply crowds out the ability to pay attention to a significant and comprehensive reform of the military and its associated industries.  Nonetheless, macroeconomic and social change within France and Europe do provide the framework within which the changes in the military sector associated with professionalization and inter-dependence will unfold.

Critical Issues for a French RMA

Several key issues could drive a French RMA.  Put in other terms, which questions need to be dealt with in order to have or to accelerate a French RMA or French participation within an interallied RMA?

Above all, there is the need to fit the military reform project within the overall restructuring of French society and within the French approach to the European project.  If the military reform effort seems simply to be an echo of past efforts for glory or "adaptation" to a post-Cold War environment, there will not be adequate political or economic support for a significant redesign of the military.  Rather, the need for Europe to have a modern military instrument and-a key role for France¾  in shaping such an instrument can become key leitmotifs for change.

But for this to happen the French have to give up the pretension of a Colbertist French state replicating itself on the European level.  No European military industrial policy will be put in place that will protect French industry.  No European command structure will be put in place that does not come to terms with the Americans. 

If the French recognize the need to modernize the military instrument on a European level, they must also accept three things¾  the centrality of the marketplace in shaping the infrastructure for military technology; the primacy of an influence strategy whereby France crafts a European power projection strategy with due regard for the priority which the British and Germans place upon the Americans; and the shaping of a new approach to European procurement, whereby governments set priorities based on power projection and let the marketplace generate the technological choices.  

A core requirement for moving ahead on a French RMA will be an ability to frame the strategic goals for power projection.  Simply building tools for power projection will not lead to the level of economic and political support within a France in the throes of economic transition sufficient to support the French military.  Rather, a much clearer focus for French efforts is necessary.  Building power projection tools for operating in the Mediterranean with the British, Italians, and Spanish is such a clear focus, but here the main technology is naval and would require accepting the central role of the United States.  This is why the misguided effort by Chirac to have a debate about the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) has been so counterproductive for French strategy.

In addition to France's Mediterranean vocation, working with Germany to shape abilities to protect the Baltics might form a solid basis for the French ground and air forces to merge their plans and operations with a reformed German military.  Indeed, a French effort to do so could be extremely useful in shaping an ability to reform its military with modest power projection capacity.

Three broad technological projects could form a basis for RMA efforts: information technology and information warfare, precision-strike integration, and enhanced capability to use space-based systems and expand battlefield awareness.  

Information Technology and Information Warfare

Here the broad reconstruction of European infrastructures to enter the new information society would form the basis for the redesign of military communication and information systems and spur managerial reforms.  Legitimacy for the redesign of military information systems and the new approach to battlefield awareness would be gained from acting within the mainstream of information innovation.  European Union efforts to build macrostructures could form a key input to the strategic redesign of communication and information systems for the military.  The challenge of dealing with information or a cyberwar Europewide would become a new mission for European militaries.²⁷  Such a mission could be used in the effort to carry out strategic redesign.  

Precision Strike  

French industry has been innovative and international in scope in framing its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and missiles capabilities.  The BAE-Matra-DASA relationship in missiles has been a key success in shaping a global competitor to Hughes-Raytheon.  But precision strike, the use of UAVs, and space-based technology to guide UAVs have been developed without a strategic concept.  Also, the legacy systems take the lion's share of resources and starve out the ability to focus more effectively on precision-strike and battlefield-management systems.  This could end.  Indeed, the presence of European capability in two key domains of the RMA¾  precision-strike and battlefield-awareness technology¾  forms a basis from which new concepts and approaches could be formed.

But to do so requires organizational change whereby European militaries work more effectively with one another and with the United States to create a variety of force projection capabilities.  The United States is capable of simultaneous power projection at high levels of lethality; Europeans will be capable of sequential power projection at mid-levels of lethality.  If the French wish to participate in an RMA, they can seek to focus upon the European project solely or seek to do this in conjunction with a broader interaction with the Americans.  Isolated programs can provide for enhanced technological capabilities for French forces, but they require organizational innovation and strategic direction to mesh new capabilities with the renovation of forces and the emergence of new power projection capabilities.  

Space-Based Systems and Battlefield Awareness

The use of space-based systems to provide capabilities for the military¾  communications, reconnaissance, and battlefield manage-ment¾  could form a test of the dynamics of change in a French approach to the RMA. The French have insisted upon independent systems (both national and European).  Unfortunately, neither the money nor the will to do so has been evident within either France or Europe.  Further, the dynamics of change in the space business discussed earlier argues against a purely French or European solution to French and European military requirements.  

The revolution in the space business is having dramatic effects upon European industry and the public policy supporting space.  The challenge to pursue strategic partnering globally requires European firms to shape alliances with American and Asian firms.  The shift in space activity from a larger government-sponsored domain to one shaped decisively by commercial requirements has placed major question marks over European public policy in support of space.  All key institutions involved in shaping public policy in Europe¾  the French Space Agency (CNES), Arianespace, European Space Agency (ESA), and German and Italian Space Agencies¾  are rethinking their approaches.²⁸

U.S. developments have always been critical to the shaping of European approaches.  Indeed, the relationship between NASA and the European space public policy organizations is vital in shaping European space policy.  There has never been a significant military relationship between European and American space to rival the role of NASA within European civilian space.  CNES was even set up along the NASA model. 

The U.S. market has provided the key for the success of one key player in European space, Arianespace.  The majority of Arianespace's revenue has come from U.S. clients.  The special relationship between Arianespace and Hughes has been essential for the development of Arianespace's dominant position in the launcher market today, a position sure to be challenged by new developments and entrants.

Most significantly, the changing nature of the space business is creating a key challenge for the organizational adaptation of European space.  The emergence of new space conglomerates around Boeing and Lockheed Martin means that the fragmentation of the European space business is increasingly anachronistic. Indeed, it is an open question whether a purely European consolidation of aerospace and defense will emerge to meet the American challenge.  Rather, the strategic partnering being driven by the telecommunications and satellite business may alter dramatically the relationship between Europe and the United States in the space business.

      There are two key industrial constellations within Europe in the satellite business. The first is built around Matra-Marconi Space, and the other is built around ALCATEL.  The Germans, Italians and the Spanish have clustered relationships around these two cores.   

Matra-Marconi space was formed as an Anglo-French joint venture of Matra and GEC-Marconi.  But recently, the German firm DASA has joined this effort.  And in fall 1997 Matra-Marconi joined with Motorola in the development of the Celestri satellite system, thereby shifting its balance of interests from a largely European to a broader transatlantic partnership.  Later this shifted to the broad Alliance around Teledesic. 

The partial privatization of Thomson CSF has involved the formation of a new satellite company in conjunction with Aerospatiale and Alcatel.  The ground station segment of Thomson CSF, the satellite bus manufacturing and systems integration capacity of Aerospatiale, and the satellite communications capacity of Alcatel has been merged into a new satellite company, a company that instantly becomes the major competitor to Matra-Marconi space.

It is clear that the anticipated competition with the new satellite company was a major reason Matra-Marconi sought the Motorola deal.  To ensure that the new satellite company will be viable, the French Government will almost certainly need to reward it with scarce government contracts.  Reading the tea leaves, Matra-Marconi saw the need to get a jump on the ability of the new company to work commercially within the new global market.

At the same time, Aerospatiale, recognizing the challenge of the new market place and its enhanced working relationship with Alcatel, has broadened its participation in SkyBridge, the "European" response to Teledesic and Celestri but with strong participation with Loral.  So even within this Franco-French company, a major relationship with a U.S. firm is an important component of its emergent space strategy.

European space programs are almost completely civilian in character.  The shifting basis of industrial alliances and the dynamic changes in the global space business will therefore have a dramatic impact upon European space programs.  It is extremely costly to build low-volume specialized military satellite programs within a largely commercial space effort.  In addition, the overall thrust of European militaries have been focused upon continental land, air, and sea defense against the Soviet threat for more than 40 years, within which specialized military satellite capabilities were provided by the United States.   

The economic crisis within Western Europe and the challenge of building a new Europe with the former Warsaw Pact states are proving to be far more significant priorities than is the restructuring of national security policy.  Also, the inability to build common European procurement policies means that European space policy is a patchwork of national interests cobbled into a common effort.  This common effort is increasingly more market driven than strategically designed.  The budgetary crisis affecting European states has further crippled any effort to create a macro-European policy that provides European satellites for European militaries.

Nonetheless, the strategic redesign of the militaries in key Western European states emphasizes the need for force mobility and regional power projection.  The mid- to long-term interest in building satellite capacity to support a regional European power projection policy is certainly there, but it is competing against more pressing short-term interests.

The French have been the only state with a clear strategic vision with regard to space and with a clear desire to have an independent military capacity.  The deepening economic crisis within France has called into question the ability of the French to meet even their own objectives.  And the election of the social democratic government of Jospin and its powerful Minister of Research Allegre, who deals with space, has lead to much less interest in a great power policy in space.  Allegre has emphasized the need to restructure French space agencies and to push the commercial side of space at the expense of manned and military space.  As the head of military space in France said,  "There is no money in the budget for new military satellites."  

The French are caught in a procurement bind.  They decided in 1986 under Prime Minister Chirac to augment their ability to fight in the central front, and new tanks, new combat aircraft, and assorted equipment were ordered.  The end of the Cold War did not lead to a quick restructuring of priorities.  Now when the need to redirect procurement policy is evident, the economic crisis makes it difficult to eliminate the jobs associated with legacy systems.  Also, the Jospin government is not terribly interested in national security policy and will not invest its energy in the strategic redirection of military policy.    French military space ambitions have had to be reduced dramatically.  Helios 2 has been dropped from the German budget, and the French are lengthening the budgetary timeline for their national version.  Their military satellite (Horus) has been eliminated from the French budget as well.

The competition between Matra-Marconi and the new satellite consortia organized around Aerospatiale-Alcatel-Thomson will also shape French choices.  There is no way that Europe can support these two companies on their own; they will survive only by operating globally with American and Asian partners.  This requirement will reshape the industrial base serving French and European space policy.

The space policy business is being dramatically restructured to meet the demands of the telecommunications market.  In meeting these needs, new design and production techniques are being introduced into the satellite business; the dramatic upsurge in launch demand is leading to changes in launch enterprises as well. The acquisition of military systems within space will increasingly draw off of the opportunities generated by commercial space concerns. 

The Europeans are deeply affected by the changes in the space business.  The need to interact with American firms shaping new policy choices is leading to change in Europe.  The current economic crisis and the preparation for the common currency have made it difficult to provide state budgetary support for a dramatic shift in military or space policy.  But the impact of an inability to forge a direct challenge to U.S. leadership in military space, coupled with the decisive impact of American firms upon European industry, will leave in its wake a restructured infrastructure for European space policy.  As money becomes available to fund new forces in the decade ahead and to design a role for space systems to play a role within new force structures, there will be a significant opportunity to use the new industrial restructuring to weave a new military space policy between Europe and the United States.                                                

                          Alternative Outcomes  

Three broad outcomes are possible for the French as they face the RMA.  These outcomes vary in terms of how far the RMA becomes the organizing principle and how salient joint and interallied operations become as organizing principles for the restructuring of French forces.