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McNair Paper 60, April 1999, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives

Epilogue:

 Reflections on the U.S.-European Military Technology "Gap" 

There is a widely discussed challenge for the Western Alliance¾ working together in the future as military systems are modernized.  It is not encouraging to think about the most successful military alliance in history becoming a collective security system with an increasing inability to mount combined military operations.

This comes at a juncture when Western states recognize a need to work more closely with one another in an effort to enhance European security, including stability in the Mediterranean region.  Persistent differences of opinion and of national approaches complicate an ability of Western states to work with one another, but a new specter of technological dissonance threatens their ability to effect joint operations.  Further, although much discussed, there is surprisingly little analytical work on the problem and, even less so, with regard to practical solutions for closing the military technology gap in the West. 

In part, this is because of the relative "newness" of the problem.  With the end of the Cold War, an Alliance postured to defend itself against a large continental military threat had to shift course.  Indeed, in the early 1990s, many were debating the continued relevance of the Alliance.  Now the Alliance has enlarged with the inclusion of three new states, thus enhancing its relevance to European security.

The question remains, however, of how the Alliance will operate militarily in the future and how the global power in its midst, the United States, will operate with its allies in the years ahead.  This question is particularly underscored as the Alliance reconsiders its strategic mission.  Which military missions are central to the Alliance?  And which tools and approaches are most salient to those missions?  NATO is in the process of trying to answer those questions. Coming to terms with solutions for the military technology gap would seem to be central to the Alliance's future.

But just what is the relationship of the "gap" to greater effectiveness of military coalitions in which Western Europe and the United States would participate?  And how might we most effectively deal with this Agap@ to enhance our ability to work together? 

The U.S. Military in a Time of Change

The driver of change in the Western military system is clearly the United States military and its pursuit of an RMA.  To its credit, the United States is not simply sitting on its legacy military systems but is seeking to recast these systems into a new military force capable of operating with new information and communication technologies.

But there are many debates in the United States about a proper approach to the RMA.  Should there be a modest incremental adaptation of legacy systems to use new information and communication technologies?  Or should there be a much more radical leap forward, in which the old division into air, ground and sea forces is absorbed into an entirely new military system?  Not only is there a broad conceptual debate within the United States about the proper direction of the RMA, but the services are paradoxically seeking to dominate the "joint" force of the future:   

• The Army is shifting to become a high-intensity ground maneuver force directing precision strikes delivered from sea and land. 

• The Navy is shifting from a primary emphasis on its blue-water role to attack from the sea against shore targets and support for operations ashore.

• The Air Force is shifting its attention from classic air power to space dominance and trying to transform itself into the premier C⁴I force for the U.S. joint forces. 

As the United States debates its approach to the RMA and the services struggle to realign and to redefine themselves, the U.S. military has become absorbed with its strategic redesign.  This is occurring precisely at a time when the political leadership of the United States has focused more and more on the requirements for coalition operations within real world military operations.  In other words, a core tension between the strategic redesign of the U.S. military and the requirements of reaching outward to work with allies has become evident.  Clearly one part of the problem of a gap is this tension between internal evolution and external links. 

The RMA Challenge to U.S. Allies

The RMA is an American concept and frames a debate about the restructuring of American military forces in the period of globalization of the American economy.  A core task for regional allies is to seek to understand the scope and character of the American debate and to identify opportunities and risks to themselves in variant patterns of development for the American military in the years ahead.

The RMA rests upon a dramatic restructuring of the American economy.  New technologies are correlated with dramatic changes in organizational structures as the United States shapes a new century.  The restructuring of the American military is occurring in the context of the restructuring of American society and in the context of an expanded global reach for the United States.  It is part of a much broader process of change within the United States and in the relationship of the United States to the world.

For core allies the United States poses a number of challenges simultaneously.  European and Asian allies are struggling to redefine their economic models.  Europeans are entering a new phase of development with the emergence of the Euro zone.  Associated with this change are dramatic efforts to restructure European culture and economies as well.  The enlargement of the European Union comes on top of this and is part of the dynamic process of change.  In Asia, the currency crisis is part of a broader stimulus for change in Japan and less developed Asian economies.  The American economic restructuring is both stimulus and challenge to change in Asia.

The new information society emerging in the United States is reshaping the global reach of American society.  The RMA is part of this broader American assault upon established structures of industrial states driving change.  Coping with the American challenge, globalization, and emergent technologies, framing Asian and European variants of information societies, and redefining security structures to reflect the epochal challenges at home and abroad are formidable pressures upon European and Asian allies.

For the United States as the only global power, military instruments are global in character.  The United States is redesigning its relationships with key industrial allies.  In effect, the United States is trying to set in place a new regional networking strategy.  Broad global military reach is inextricably intertwined with the global forces of economic and cultural change.  For regional partners of the United States, the RMA is part of a much broader challenge of organizational redesign and innovation within their domestic societies and regional frameworks.  For a regional partner operating in a regional network with the United States, the challenge is to design an approach that can cope with American power but at the same time be part of the strategic redesign of its own national and regional agendas. 

In other words, an American RMA will not be replicated by any particular regional ally of the United States, but will be part of the new face toward the future of organizational innovation in broader social, economic, and military structures. Hence, the technology gap is an organizational gap and globalization response gap as well. 

             The Impact of Legacy Systems on the Gap

When the Cold War ended, the Europeans and Americans instantly experienced a power projection gap and a relevance gap.  For 40 years, the Europeans had been oriented toward the defense of Germany against a large continental military threat.  The United States was not a continental European power and needed air and naval forces to project power to Asia and Europe to support its interests and its allies.

The United States as a naval power had a large global navy.  The U.S. Air Force had been built around the need to stop the Soviet Army in its tracks to allow reinforcement of U.S. ground forces by sea in the even of war. 

European forces were built around the large and efficient German Army.  The European allies of Germany sought in various ways to block Soviet projected lines of attack on Germany and the southern and northern flanks.  For this, one did not need power projection forces or a blue-water navy.  Countries that possessed power projection forces, notably France and Britain, did so largely as a legacy of earlier overseas operations in support of empire.  But in a constrained resource environment, the competition between central front defense and other missions was always a drain on European military budgets.

Without any RMA, there would be a gap flowing from the different nature of European and American legacy systems.  Added to this challenge are the adaptations for each of the key Western European militaries posed by the end of the Cold War:   

• The West German Army is becoming a military force for a United Germany. 

• France is shifting from a conscript to a professional force with a new focus upon power projection. 

• The United Kingdom is undergoing a fundamental strategic defense review in which conclusions reached in early reviews (e.g., the Nott review, which emphasized a significant reduction in the surface navy) are being modified for the new strategic situation.   

The strategic redesign of Western European militaries is occurring in the context of profound economic, cultural, and political change.  A new Europe is being built, the Euro is being launched, and the redesign of the European economic model to meet the globalization challenge is being pursued.  Reform of the military is simply one objective among various contending priorities for a European reconstruction and renewal. 

            A European Approach to Military Redesign

The rebuilding of the European economies is a more important challenge than the rapid reconstruction of the military instrument.  The military instrument can be rebuilt as part of the overall effort to redesign a high technology society within a new European model of development.

Meeting these challenges requires putting in place a new architecture for military industrial development, procurement, and force structure design.  To create such an architecture requires an organizational revolution on both sides of the Atlantic or the bridging of an organizational gap between the military and civilian sectors and between the U.S. and European militaries.  Each side of the Atlantic will need to build connectivity among its forces and pay much closer attention to the timing and phasing considerations of the other side in framing joint projects. 

The Architectural Gap

The United States could pursue its joint force-driven RMA but end up with few real allies.  Alternatively, the United States could seek to put together an architecture in which it might seek overall full-spectrum dominance but within an architecture where plug-and-play allies can develop specialized capabilities and packages of forces to achieve significant dominance in regional situations.  An architecture that can take into account both the global needs of the United States and the regional needs of Allies is critical to shaping a force structure plan for coalition operations.  Put in other terms, how can a U.S. RMA designed for global forces mesh with a European RMA designed to meet regional requirements? 

The Organizational Gap

Each side of the Atlantic has its own organizational gap problem.  Nonetheless, developing the connectivity needed for communication and information systems required for joint and coalition forces is a key interactive challenge.  It is not simply a requirement that the Europeans adopt American solutions to information and communication connectivity processes after the U.S. joint forces have picked their best option.  Crumbs from the table are not how a European RMA would develop.  Rather, the European Union is moving east and with it European Union standards for data and telecommunications systems.  European and American commercial firms will figure out how to make these different standards work together, and perhaps the military ought to pay some attention to such solutions.  Interoperability for coalition forces is not simply buying American equipment and catching up to the Americans. 

The Strategic Partnership Gap

In high-technology industries, global strategic partnerships are key elements driving development and growth.  It is not hard to believe that similar partnerships in defense industries need to follow this trend.  Forging real strategic partnerships, with systems integrators on both sides of the Atlantic, will be a key part of any interallied RMA.

As noted in the December 1997 National Defense Panel Report, there is a real need to "investigate new avenues for interoperability, including closer links between U.S. and overseas defense companies." 

The Timing and Phasing Gap

The core allies of the United States capable of participating in an interallied RMA¾  Europe and Japan¾  are undergoing fundamental transformations in response to the globalization challenge.  U.S. leadership in framing a realistic architecture for the development of an interallied RMA over the next 20 years would be a real contribution to transatlantic relationships.  The United States seems too willing to push short-term programs at the expense of developing architecture. 

At the same time, a Europe that becomes preoccupied with its domestic development and forgets its military and security responsibilities will not be an ally at all.  The RMA could be used as a venue for technological change not only within the military sector, but also as a way to connect the renovation of the military instrument to the redesign of a new high-technology Europe.   

Summary