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McNair Paper 62, The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the next QDR, November 2000
What is Asymmetric Warfare?
...victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine: the ability to break the framework which had come to be taken for granted and to make the victory all the more complete by confronting the antagonist with contingencies which he had never considered.3 --Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy This chapter will establish a working definition of asymmetric warfare by examining current definitions, then proposing a variant that will be applied throughout the rest of this study. Five recurring characteristics that are useful in analyzing asymmetric approaches also will be introduced as themes that resonate throughout the rest of the paper, with historical examples to highlight different aspects of both successful and unsuccessful asymmetric approaches. Defining Asymmetry The use of the term asymmetric warfare is new in U.S. Government circles. It does not appear in the 1990 Base Force, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, or any annual Secretarial Report to the congress until 1998.4 In fact, the first mention of the term was in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report.5 Since then, the asymmetric threat industry has been rocketing ahead. The National Defense Panel that shadowed the QDR effort, the 1999 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, and a host of other analyses have since weighed in on its significance.6 The National Defense University, in the 1998 edition of its annual Strategic Assessment, devoted an entire chapter to asymmetric threats, whereas in previous volumes the term had never been mentioned. The term figured large in the Secretary's Report in 1999.7 The concept also made an appearance with the publication of the National Military Strategy in 1997 for the first time, and also in the National Security Strategy.8 The 1999 Joint Strategy Review, an internal analytical study prepared annually for the Chairman, focused on the asymmetric threat.9 The U.S. military's working definition of asymmetric warfare says that "adversaries are likely to attempt to circumvent or undermine U.S. strengths while exploiting its weaknesses, using methods that differ significantly from the usual mode of U.S. operations."10 A recent Joint Staff definition opines that asymmetric warfare consists of "unanticipated or non-traditional approaches to circumvent or undermine an adversary's strengths while exploiting his vulnerabilities through unexpected technologies or innovative means."11 In December 1999, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, the fundamental national security document of the United States, defined asymmetric warfare in this manner: "unconventional approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities."12 The existing definitions, while narrowly accurate, seem insufficient in explaining asymmetry. It will be argued in this chapter that a better definition of asymmetric warfare would be: Leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against American vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining American will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's strategic objectives. The key differences in this proposed definition are the element of disproportionate effect--achieving strategic objectives through application of modest resources-- and the explicit recognition of the importance of the psychological component. These elements are essential to considering how an asymmetric actor can achieve strategic objectives through an operation--even a failed operation--that, from the perspective of the larger power, is only a tactical attack. There is an important caveat to this definition: asymmetric warfare does not equate automatically to an attack on the homeland. Unfortunately, much recent attention in the literature has tended to obscure the fact that asymmetric approaches exist on all levels of war, and forces in the field as well as nations have been seeking them for as long as warfare and diplomacy have been practiced. The attack on the homeland is only the most extreme--and potentially most dangerous--expression of an asymmetric strategic attack. Characteristics: Disparity of Interest Any consideration of asymmetric threats must start with the most basic asymmetry of all: disparity of interest. The matrix below highlights the fact that the greatest incentive for using asymmetric approaches rises from a real or perceived disparity of interest. When a weak adversary has a vital interest that conflicts with the nonvital interest of a strong state, the former has the greatest incentive to use asymmetric approaches. Given the breadth of American security interests, there will be many areas of potential conflict where no vital interest is at stake for the United States, but where a regional actor has vital interests. We should remember that a rich man's small-scale contingency may be a poor man's major theater war. The greatest chance for success for an adversary in such a scenario is when U.S. interest remains relatively low.
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Asymmetric approaches can work in three ways within this idea. First, they can deter U.S. entry into crises where there is no U.S. vital interest by threatening disproportionate damage to the United States. Would the loss of Seattle to a ballistic missile attack be a reasonable trade for the unconditional surrender of a hostile Pyongyang government? Absent a vital American interest, such a threat would exercise a powerful sobering effect on U.S. planners. This is probably the most effective illustration of this concept, and also the most likely to have a positive outcome for the weaker state. Second, if a decision has been made to employ U.S. forces in a contingency that nonetheless remains below the level of vital national interest, an asymmetric approach by an adversary that threatens to rapidly cause disproportionate effect may halt U.S. entry, or accelerate a withdrawal. If the perceived U.S. stake is low, and if it becomes apparent that involvement may become very expensive in terms of human and material cost, then a weaker state might calculate that a shocking display of force might cause the United States to recalculate the cost-benefit of engagement. Third, an asymmetric approach may enable regional actors to pursue aggressive strategies indirectly, making it hard to marshal American will to act. Information operations, terrorist attacks, and other unconventional approaches all may tend to make it very difficult to trace sponsorship with the certainty required by the United States for action, ultimately diffusing our response until it may be too late to act effectively. To this end, regional states will work very hard to "manage" their relationship with the United States, while pursuing dual goals of attaining regional objectives and preventing our interference. Does this mean that it is advantageous to be weak? Intriguingly, the Melian Dialogue offers a paradoxical twist for modern times. The final measure between the Melians and the Athenians was the ability of the Athenians to apply unconstrained power against their weaker adversary; this is no longer the case. The nature of international relations, and the approach of free societies to war, limits--properly--our abilities to apply maximum force against potential threats. From this is born an inversion of the Melian Dialogue: At certain levels of engagement, "It is the weak who do what they can, the strong who suffer what they must."13 Nowhere is this more pronounced than in a collision of interests in which the United States has relatively little at stake, while a weaker adversary sees the issue as life or death. As long as the stakes of a conflict stay below the level of vital interest to the United States, the weaker power may be able to manipulate the terms of engagement. It is in this area that the initiative lies with the weaker of the two powers. The risk to the weaker power is that either through miscalculation or intent the issue becomes of vital interest to the United States. It has been said that the archetypal asymmetric actor wants to achieve a "Mogadishu, not a Pearl Harbor."14 If the crossover to U.S. vital interest occurs, the opportunity for effective asymmetric approaches above the tactical level for the weaker party is greatly reduced, and the traditional interpretation of the Melian Dialogue will be reaffirmed.15 When U.S. national will has been mobilized, the strong will prevail. Two examples from history demonstrate the two different outcomes. The first illustrates the successful application of an asymmetric approach in an environment where no U.S. vital national interest was at stake. The second example demonstrates the failure of an asymmetric approach at the strategic level On 3 October 1993, a task force of Delta Force troops and U.S. Army Rangers attempted to capture key aides to Somali warlord Mohammed Aideed. Although the force used helicopters for insertion and was armed with sophisticated weapons, the operation turned sour. Because of the unanticipated loss of a helicopter, the force became trapped in an urban maze that made it difficult to exploit technological advantages, particularly when the foe was willing to expend prodigious numbers of human lives in densely packed assaults. The confidence of an elite and highly capable unit led it into a situation where it became vulnerable to the Somalia National Alliance (SNA), which had studied U.S. tactics, waited patiently for an opportune window of vulnerability, and sprung an impromptu but lethal counterstroke. American casualties numbered 18 killed and 73 wounded, and hundreds of Somalis died. Often overlooked is the fact that the operation was a tactical success: it accomplished its objective. The effect, though, on decisionmakers in the United States was profound, paralleling that of Tet and Beirut. Certainly the Somali warlords who participated in this fight could not have predicted the enormous effect their encounter would have on U.S. policy in Somalia, but they knew good things would flow from U.S. casualties; the ultimate outcome of the battle was an eventual drawdown of U.S. forces in Somalia.16 This is an excellent example of how a tactical event, whatever its outcome on the battlefield, can directly influence national strategy, particularly when no U.S. vital interest is at stake. The second example illustrates the danger of miscalculation. An asymmetric approach that may even be tactically effective can draw the strategic ire of a stronger power by miscalculation. A clear example of this is the Japanese decision in 1941 to initiate hostilities against the United States. The ultimate aim of Japanese strategy was to expand to the south in order to gain unfettered access to oil and other vital natural resources. The American presence in the Philippines was a potent threat on the flank of any such advance, and Japanese strategists concluded that eventually the United States would enter the war against them--it was only a question of when. Given this belief, it seemed reasonable to conduct not only a series of attacks on U.S. forces in the Philippines, but also a spoiling attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet, forward-based at Pearl Harbor. Japanese planners calculated that by removing the primary U.S. offensive weapon from play at the very beginning of hostilities, they would gain breathing room for the establishment of a defense in depth. Even after losses were made good, U.S. forces would have to operate at great distances from home bases when attacking the Japanese Empire. The strategic goal was to induce war weariness in the United States. Viewed in this manner, the Japanese strategy was for a limited war, fought with limited means, and with a limited objective. Unfortunately for Japan, the attack on Pearl Harbor, while rich with precedent from Japanese military history, had a strategic effect opposite that desired. If Japan had hoped to fight a limited war, Pearl Harbor ensured that the United States would fight a war of unlimited means for what became a virtually unlimited objective: the unconditional surrender of Japan. This well illustrates the open-ended nature of asymmetries: limited tactical successes can ultimately bring massive strategic failure. Pearl Harbor was the key element in the entry of the United States into World War II. The price of miscalculation proved very high for the Japanese.17 These two examples highlight the fact that when there is no U.S. vital interest at stake, innovative asymmetric approaches can potentially shape U.S. national will. The danger, as the Japanese learned, is that there can be a fine--and moving--line between the vital and nonvital interests. Targeting the Will of the Opponent Asymmetric approaches can achieve powerful effect through manipulation of the psychological element. Aimed directly at the will of the opponent, they can compensate for materiel or other deficiencies. While the method of the approach may be tactical, the psychological effect is sought at the strategic level. This is a key distinguishing feature of asymmetry--the continual focus on strategic effect, enabled by reliance on the psychological component of the approach selected. In functional terms, the target becomes the mind of the opponent, in particular the will of the antagonist. It is a reaffirmation of the Clausewitzian principle that "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."18 Three examples from history illustrate this point. The first, from World War I, is that of Lenin and the sealed train. The Russian Czar had abdicated the Romanov Throne in March 1917, but the Germans still faced a two-front war as the Kerensky government attempted to do its part to keep pressure on the Germans. To the Great German General Staff, the endurance of Russia in the face of staggering defeats was a significant problem. In an attempt to kick-start the squabbling revolutionaries who circled around the Provisional Government in Petrograd and destabilize the Russian government, the Germans decided to inject a deadly, ruthless, and totally committed communist revolutionary into the body politic of Russia. The revolutionary was Lenin, who, in Winston Churchill's immortal words, was transported "like a plague bacillus from Switzerland into Russia."19 Lenin, of course, was devoted to the overthrow of all noncommunist governments, so this action shows clearly how desperate the Germans were. Their bold action paid off in the short term. Lenin energized the communists, and the Bolsheviks seized power from the Provisional Government in the October 1917 revolution and eventually left the war. The Germans achieved their short-term goal: "the greatest possible degree of chaos in Russia."20 The long-term effect of this injection of ideas was to change the course of world history; ultimately it rebounded upon the Germans in the form of a powerful Soviet Union. There is no clearer case in modern history of the power of an idea used as a weapon. Had the Germans not brought Lenin home from exile, it is unlikely that the Bolsheviks would have seized power as they did, and the course of history would have been different. A second example of an attempt to operate directly against an opponent's will in the face of serious material and operational mismatches was the Japanese concept for the defense of the home islands in 1945, in the face of an expected Allied invasion. After the fall of Okinawa, Japanese Imperial Headquarters began work on the plans for the defense of the home islands from amphibious attack. They correctly anticipated that the initial Allied attack would fall on Kyushu, southernmost of the home islands and accepted this battle as the decisive one for the defense of the homeland.21 By this time in the war, Japanese planners had a clear understanding of the overwhelming power of American air support. Their plan of defense, known as Ketsu-Go, featured the mobilization of the entire Japanese nation in support of the defense of the homeland. Their intent was to defeat U.S. firepower and maneuver superiority by defending not on the beaches but inland and by avoiding the movement of reserve forces that would become vulnerable to U.S. airpower. By forcing continual close battles and preventing the full application of U.S. firepower, they hoped to cause enough U.S. casualties to weaken civilian morale. The goal was never outright defeat of U.S. forces (except among extremists); instead, it was a rational calculation that, by causing enough casualties in the fight for Kyushu, they might avert the invasion of Honshu. A third and related example is the adoption of kamikaze tactics by the Japanese. This was an asymmetric approach that was never fully solved by the United States Navy. Functionally, kamikazes were the antecedents of today's cruise missiles. They were cheap, numerous, and lethal. Off Okinawa and in the Philippines, the U.S. Navy was exposed to the threat. The Japanese inflicted 3,389 fatalities, achieving a ratio of 1.78 Americans killed for each kamikaze sortie.22 This tactic would only become more effective as U.S. forces closed on the Japanese home islands. The U.S. plan to lessen kamikaze attacks was based on attacking Japanese airbases, early warning, effective fighter interception, and point defense. It has been estimated that the Japanese would have been able to generate as many as 7,500 kamikaze sorties off Kyushu that might have destroyed as much as a third of the invasion fleet.23 These three examples demonstrate the value--and difficulty--of undertaking operations against the national will of an opponent. The example of Lenin and the sealed train has many parallels to information operations today. The examples of the Japanese plan for the defense of their home islands are more conventional illustrations, but all three examples take aim at the will of their foe, rather than its fielded forces. Attaining Strategic Effect on All Levels of War Asymmetric approaches have been applied on all levels of war, but the most effective asymmetric approaches seek to attain strategic effect regardless of the level on which they are applied. It follows that there may be a definitional blurring between the level of the action and the level of the effect, and for the asymmetric actor, the goal is to produce effect on the highest possible level. The strategic level encompasses, in the broadest sense, actions taken to accomplish national-level security and foreign policy objectives. Within the context of asymmetric warfare, these are actions that typically promise the greatest "bang for the buck" for any adversary, since they are designed to influence the basic outcome of a conflict. Actions on the tactical and operational level may yield strategic outcomes, the ideal objective of any asymmetric approach. A classic example of a favorable strategic outcome deriving from a tactical action is the Beirut Bombing of 1983: The truck-bomb attack on Battalion Landing Team 1/8 in October 1983 ranks as one of the most successful attacks in modern history. It was both tactically brilliant and politically fruitful at the strategic level, since it led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1984.24 This episode captures so many of the attributes of a successful asymmetric approach that it could be held up as the "essence of asymmetry." Tactical and strategic surprise were achieved, and the cost to the attacker (probably Syria) was minuscule compared to the blow to American will. This tactical event ultimately had a vastly disproportionate strategic effect, while preventing the United States from responding with overwhelming conventional superiority by obscuring "ownership" of the attack. The operational level includes actions against theater-level forces and the strategic deployment infrastructure. Of narrower scope than strategic asymmetries, they are regional in focus. A good example of this is the employment of Serbian air defense during Operation Allied Force in March-June 1999. During this operation, frequently the Serbian "air defense system simply did not 'come up' to challenge NATO strikes."25 Most emitters stayed off. This prevented North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO) air forces from achieving the requisite level of suppression of air defenses, forcing NATO pilots to operate at higher than optimum altitudes when bombing. As General John P. Jumper, Commander U.S. Air Forces Europe, remarked: "We learned from this war that it is a different ball game when SAMs don't come up to fight--everything that we do is based on the bad guy's willingness to engage."26 This tactic was, in effect, analogous to Tirpitz' "risk fleet" strategy before World War I, when the very existence of a capability, despite being vastly weaker than its stronger opponent, influenced British planning. In much the same manner, NATO could not afford to ignore the potential resident in the withheld capability. While the Serbs ultimately did not succeed in defeating the NATO air campaign, this approach did significantly reduce its effectiveness. The Serbs were unable to gain strategic effect from this action, and it must be considered a partially effective asymmetric approach. On the tactical level, asymmetric operations are undertaken against fielded forces, the enabling structures that allow them to operate, and through selection and manipulation of the battlespace. By their very nature, tactical asymmetries often promise the least overall "bang for the buck," even though they may embody remarkable technological or tactical concepts. A clear example of this is Japan's use of the torpedo in World War II. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) placed great emphasis on the torpedo in the years following the Russo-Japanese War, even though torpedoes performed poorly in that war. The IJN always saw itself fighting from a position of numerical and perhaps big-gun inferiority against potential enemies, and the use of torpedoes at night and in conditions of limited visibility was intended to be a counter.27 Interestingly, early torpedoes continued to underperform. It wasn't until the eve of World War II, almost four decades after the birth of the torpedo concept in the Japanese Navy, that the IJN finally developed, in the form of the Type 93 oxygen torpedo, the ultimate torpedo of World War II.28 This is an excellent example of an organization seeking an innovative way to overcome a perceived deficiency of numbers and firepower by emphasizing a technological counter, yet still applied within an overall symmetric construct of warfighting. It was a very successful asymmetric approach, particularly since it was kept secret from Japan's potential enemies until it had been extensively employed in combat during World War II. Despite significant tactical advantages that accrued from their advanced torpedo technology and doctrine, the Japanese were not able to translate the tactical advantages rendered by the torpedo into strategic results. The Importance of Effectiveness Determining effectiveness is critical in evaluating asymmetric approaches. What works and what doesn't work? Effective asymmetric approaches tend to have several common characteristics. From the perspective of the target, they are unexpected actions, and the most effective response may be counterintuitive. The intuitive response may worsen the situation. A good analogy is combined arms warfare; ideally, a force on the receiving end of a combined arms attack will be forced to expose more of its force to another perhaps more damaging form of attack while attempting to compensate for the most visible threat. When executed, effective asymmetric approaches create shock effects within the defender's command system that make it impossible for the defender to attain his original goal, "in practical terms a consequential state of a fighting system which can no longer accomplish its aims...which derives from physical and psychological factors alike."29 Perhaps most importantly, effective asymmetric operations cause a disproportionate amount of damage to the target for the investment in resources, time, and money by the attacker. Ideally, this effect is felt at the strategic level, regardless of the level at which the operation is carried out. The importance of effectiveness is illustrated by an asymmetric approach that, while technically elegant and full of promise, failed utterly to gain traction: the Japanese balloon attacks on the United States during World War II. Beginning in November 1944, the Japanese army conducted a highly sophisticated and sustained countervalue attack on the continental United States by floating large hydrogen gas balloons from launching bases in northern Honshu across the Pacific Ocean in the jet stream. These balloons typically carried several small incendiary and fragmentation bombs. The Japanese intent was to foment panic and instability by setting fire to the huge forest tracts in the Pacific Northwest. Over 9,300 balloons were launched between November 1944 and early April 1945. Of these, as many as 1,000 reached the continental United States, of which approximately 285 were either recovered or destroyed. Balloons landed as far east as Iowa, and as far south as Texas, although most landings occurred in the Pacific Northwest. Army Air Force and civil defense planners in the United States rapidly recognized the nature of this threat and clamped a rigid security blackout on all aspects of the balloon attack. This proved vital in denying the Japanese information they could have used to refine their approach and perhaps make their balloons more lethal. On 5 May 1945, six people on a Sunday school outing were killed as they examined a crashed balloon near Bly, Oregon. They were the only casualties caused by this sequence of attacks. There is no evidence of fires started as a result of this effort.30 This was an ineffective asymmetric approach: the defender was never seriously threatened, and the effective information denial by the United States made it impossible for the Japanese to adjust their approach. These attacks were unexpected, and for a while they created confusion in the United States (among those who knew about them). On the other hand, they could not provide the disproportionate results that are critical for an effective asymmetric attack, particularly in a situation of total war, when the United States had all the advantages of a fully mobilized economy and the willing assistance of the media in controlling the story. The Threat-Response Dynamic Our own actions and strategic choices will drive the nature of the asymmetric threat. As we refine operational practices, potential adversaries will look to find ways to counter. This process of action-reaction is inescapable. Responses by potential adversaries will come from two broad currents: their specific operational and historical-military heritage and outlook, and their reaction to the nature of the perceived threat from the United States. Cultural Considerations Nations develop strategic personalities over time that can be a useful tool in divining their approach to asymmetric warfare.31 How has the state traditionally defended itself? Is there a legacy of asymmetric warfare? If the state achieves the capability for weapons of mass destruction, will its outlook be coercive or deterrent oriented? What countries are its potential adversaries, and what is its relationship to the United States? Answers to these questions spring from the culture of the nation and provide revealing clues in looking for potential adversary approaches to asymmetric warfare. By way of example, the oft-cited German approach to war that proved so effective in 194041 had less to do with a search for asymmetric approaches to their potential foes than it did with the affirmation of long-standing core competencies of the Prussian and subsequently the German Army. These included a strong preference for the flanking attack, superior officer training at all levels, and the institutionalization of mission-oriented tactics that encouraged small-unit initiative.32 IJN fascination with torpedo tactics, already discussed, is another example. While the use of the torpedo was clearly a response to a perceived tactical disadvantage in quantity and size of big guns, the use of these tactics also harkened back to ancient tendencies in Japanese warfare--the use of small groups of warriors fighting semi-independently against "the heart of the enemy."33 Reaction to the Perceived U.S. Threat This is a particularly difficult challenge for Americans, who often find it hard to see things from the perspective of foreign cultures. We would do well to remember that other nations well understand the ultimate fate of the Melians at the hands of the Athenian Empire. To some, Americans are the embodiment of a modern Athenian Empire. Rumblings from friends in Europe about the United States as a "hyperpower" reflect a growing concern about a unipolar world order.34 However, the fact that others react to what we do also provides opportunities to influence this eternal circle of action-reaction to our advantage. The choices we make, the emphasis we place on certain programs while de-emphasizing others, can all have a cumulative effect in determining the reactions of others. A Final Example: The Gulf Tanker War The recurring themes that have been raised in this chapter can be applied to a recent example. Throughout most of the decade of the 1980s, Iran and Iraq waged a merciless war that managed to incorporate most of the horrors of 20th century industrial warfare: the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons, "city-busting" attacks with both manned aircraft and SCUD missiles, and naval warfare in the form of attacks on merchant vessels plying the narrow channels of the Persian Gulf. In February and March 1986, the Iranians appeared to gain the upper hand in the bloody struggle, as their forces finally captured the Fao Peninsula.35 Growing more desperate, the Iraqis stepped up their attacks on Iranian tankers. This created several problems for the Iranians. It was not possible to reply in kind against Iraq. The Iraqis possessed an insignificant navy, and their oil moved through pipelines into Turkey, or was transshipped from the Gulf States of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in neutral bottoms. Imports followed the same trail in reverse: to neutral ports in the Gulf (predominantly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) and then via transshipment to Iraq.36 In seeking a way to strike back at the Iraqis, the Iranians were faced with three options: attack the pipelines in Turkey, attack neutral ships carrying war material to Kuwaiti or Saudi ports, or strike tankers carrying Iraqi oil out of the Gulf. All three choices were problematic. The Iranians chose the third option: to attack tankers "in burden" exiting the Gulf from states that were supportive of Iraq. Functionally, this meant attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi ships, and it formed the core of an asymmetric approach that would be eventually expressed not only strategically--in the choice of the target--but tactically--in the manner of the attack. Iran had some unique advantages. The Iranian Navy, while greatly weakened from the revolution of 1979, was still the most powerful indigenous navy in the Gulf. Geography also helped. The long coastline of Iran gave ample opportunity to attack the shipping channel that ran the length of the Gulf and the natural chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz and its approaches in the Gulf of Oman. Because of the bottom contour in the Gulf, the main shipping channel ran in the north, closer to Iran. Iran had mines, surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and a number of small surface combatants with which to execute this strategy. The Iranians also were well acquainted with the potential of mine warfare. In 1973, during a joint exercise with the United States, a senior Iranian officer noted the "vulnerability of the Persian Gulf to guerilla mine warfare."37 Additionally, the Iranians presumably registered the response of the United States and its allies to the 1984 mining of the Red Sea, during which 19 ships struck mines. The Iranians may have drawn three conclusions from this. First, it was very difficult to determine who laid the mines. Eventually, strong circumstantial evidence implicated Libya, but there was no "smoking gun." Second, the mines were very effective in reducing traffic in the Red Sea, even though no ships were sunk. This damaged the Egyptian economy, a goal of Libya. Third, the United States took no immediate retaliatory action against Libya. There were, however, contradictory and less reassuring lessons as well. The United States and its allies removed the mines in an international effort, and, eventually, the incident "hardened the Reagan administration's stance toward Libya, leading ultimately to the April 1986 air strikes."38 In late 1986, the Iranians began to attack shipping in the Gulf. In 1986, 10 tankers were attacked. In 1987, the number of ships attacked rose to 91. There was nothing the Iraqis could do to stop these attacks, and the Gulf States themselves lacked both the means and the will to take defensive measures. Initially, the Iranian approach seemed to pay dividends, but in December 1986 the Kuwaitis requested information about reflagging their vessels under U.S. colors. Eventually, the United States agreed to reflag a number of Kuwaiti tankers and to provide convoy protection for them and other vessels transiting the Gulf. The Iranians had little desire to provoke the United States. Despite their inflammatory rhetoric, they pursued a campaign that was designed to hurt Iraq and Iraq's supporters while minimizing the possibility of superpower intervention. The U.S. Navy adopted an operational concept built around "deterrence, intelligence, surveillance, presence, retaliation, and, last, MCM [mine countermeasures]."39 The initial emphasis was on presence and deterrence. It did not work. Sometime in the early summer of 1987, the Iranians decided to begin execution of a mine campaign in international waters, although they fastidiously avoided attacking combatant vessels with either their SSMs or small craft. There were dangers for Iran in raising the stakes. Mines, while slightly more difficult to trace to their sponsor, also held the danger of striking a U.S. warship or even a Soviet vessel. On 24 July a reflagged tanker, the Bridgeton, struck a mine in international waters while under escort of the U.S. Navy (in fact, Bridgeton was the first vessel to transit under protection--hardly an auspicious omen). The American response was swift. Additional forces were deployed to the Gulf, including MCMs that had not been deployed initially. Over time, the U.S. Navy and its allies were able to establish a strong and credible presence throughout the Gulf. The operational environment was daunting for U.S. forces: during this period, Iraq continued to aggressively prosecute an antishipping war against Iran, with the tacit approval of the United States. Iraqi attacks on Iran-bound vessels (and, occasionally, by accident on U.S. warships, namely the Stark and the Chandler) were as frequent as Iranian attacks.40 This low level of engagement continued throughout 1987. The Iranians employed mines as their best bet to reduce tanker traffic and other shipments to Iraq. At the same time, Iraq continued to use airpower to strike Iranian vessels. The U.S. Navy and its allies provided escorts for ships en route to the Gulf States--effectively supporting Iraq. In September 1987, the Iranians were caught red-handed laying mines, which largely removed any veil of deniability for them. Events came to a head in the early spring of 1988, when the Iraqis began a bombardment of Teheran with SCUD missiles, while concurrently retaking the Fao Peninsula, assisted by the use of chemical weapons. On 14 April, Iran's run of good luck with mines ended when the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine. The ship was saved by superior seamanship, but the U.S. response was powerful. On 18 April 1988, in Operation Praying Mantis, two Iranian oil platforms, a frigate, and several fast attack craft were destroyed. The rules of engagement were extended to enable allied forces to render aid to any friendly or neutral nonbelligerent outside the declared war zone. Because of the geography of the Gulf, Iraqi attacks tended to occur within the declared war zone, while Iranian attacks occurred outside the zone.41 The turn of fortunes in the ground war, coupled with the disastrous events at sea, forced Iran to reevaluate its policies. It had attempted to apply an asymmetric approach to the task of hurting Iraq's economy, while rheostatically controlling the likelihood of an encounter with the U.S. Navy. The principal weapon was mine warfare. While Iran did some limited damage to Iraq's war economy, ultimately the war of the tankers was a failure for Iran. It exemplifies the open-ended and unpredictable nature of asymmetric approaches. The instrument proved too blunt, and eventually a U.S. warship was struck. Iran was not prepared to risk war with the United States, even when the USS Vincennes mistakenly shot down Iran Air flight 655 on 3 July 1988, with heavy loss of life. Surprisingly, the shootdown of the flight may have provided the catalyst to end the Iran-Iraq war. Iran was too exhausted to continue and, in mid-July, accepted the terms of a UN cease-fire.42 What can this case study teach us? First, the Iranians understood that they had some advantages in confronting the United States only so long as they were able to maintain an asymmetry of interest. They consciously made decisions in this light, refraining from taking escalatory actions that they judged would be viewed as inflammatory by the United States. Ultimately, they were unable to prosecute this strategy, but the failure lay in execution rather than the concept itself, which sought to minimize the possibility of a conflict with the United States. Second, the Iranian use of mines and other forms of unconventional naval warfare sought disproportionate effect at low risk and cost. They were able to achieve this at times, but ultimately they were unable to execute this component of their strategy. This reflects an Iranian misreading of the effects of mine warfare and access denial strategies upon the United States, since these were the issues that provoked an enlarged United States presence in the Gulf--exactly the opposite of what the Iranians desired. It is important to note that, in the final analysis, the Iranians were the losers in this struggle, and their defeat was a strategic disaster of the first magnitude for them. The tactics and technologies they applied were unable to carry the load of a dual strategy that sought to strike at the Iraqis while minimizing United States (and its allies) presence in the Gulf. This is a particularly important case study for yet another reason: it may foreshadow future adversary asymmetric approaches, both in terms of strategy and technology. The Iranians chose a relatively low-risk and deniable approach, and they implemented it with what they hoped were cheap, nonattributable tactics using a relatively low technology weapon--mines. The overall strategy had some merit, and its failure does not mean that we will not see some variant of it again. Finally, it's worth noting that a number of escalatory options against the United States and its allies were never executed by the Iranians. Their attempt to manage the conflict with the United States and its allies in the Gulf while fighting a total war with Iraq demonstrates considerable strategic sophistication. It is likely that dual-track approaches of this nature will recur. Conclusions This chapter has sought to define asymmetry by examining the current definitions, and then to refine existing thinking by explicitly proposing the concept of disproportionate effect as the desired outcome of an asymmetric approach. Five recurring features of asymmetry have been identified and are useful in understanding asymmetry: *Disparity of interest is a key factor in assessing an adversary's incentive to adopt asymmetric approaches. *The will of the opponent is the ultimate target, and understanding this is fundamental to understanding asymmetric warfare. *Asymmetric approaches operate on all three levels of war, but seek strategic effect. *Effectiveness is important in evaluating asymmetric approaches (they don't always work). *A dynamic process of threat and response is an inescapable factor in any analysis of asymmetry. The examples that attend each of these themes demonstrate that asymmetric approaches are not new to the strategic landscape. They also demonstrate that innovative and exotic thinking can produce dramatic benefits for the weaker power in a confrontation. What gives immediacy to the study of asymmetry is the realization that new weapons and capabilities are creating new vulnerabilities. Many of these new weapons have characteristics that are ideal for use in an asymmetric approach. The idea of disproportionate effect is particularly compelling as a jumping-off point for chapter two. In evaluating the historical development of asymmetric approaches, the most ominous conclusion is that the potential destructiveness of these asymmetric approaches has increased dramatically in the latter half of the 20th century. The confluence of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons with actors who are searching for cheap and innovative ways to address strategic imbalances makes the possibility of catastrophic outcomes far greater than at any time in the past.
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