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McNair Paper 62, The
Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the next QDR, November
2000
An Option of Difficulties--
In 1759, British General James Wolfe, in examining the redoubtable French fortress of Quebec, observed that "war is an option of difficulties." His words ring as true now as then. Nothing is ever easy in war, or in planning for war. Remembering this is a good starting point for the final part of this analysis, because when examining actions we can take to counter asymmetric threats, none will be easy, and we will often have to choose from a range of difficult choices. This chapter begins by outlining what steps are being taken now to reduce the dangers of the asymmetric threats to the United States identified in chapter four. A short summary of existing programs and policies that pertain to each threat will be introduced. Any recommendations for a way ahead must have a sound grounding in current practices. In many of these areas, it will be argued that we can and must do better. It will be proposed that the starting point for improving our responses is the establishment of a broad conceptual model to counter asymmetric threats that will provide a framework for specific responses. Three concepts for dealing with asymmetric threats will be introduced. Linked to each of these three main ideas will be a series of specific policy recommendations that address deficiencies in current approaches. Some of these recommendations encompass a broader arena than the Department of Defense. The chapter will close by looking at the potential programmatic and political costs of implementing these recommendations. Current Initiatives: The State of Play Today In the area of the threat of nuclear or biological attack against the U.S. homeland,116 six principal policy initiatives are active: *Maintenance of a credible policy of not ruling out use of nuclear weapons in response to WMD employment against the U.S. homeland, U.S. forces, or allies *Continuing implementation of PDD62 (Combating Terrorism)117 *Continuing implementation of PDD39 (U.S. Policy on Combating Terrorism)118 *Implementation of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for 1997)119 *Implementation of provisions of PDD63 (Critical Infrastructure Protection)120 *Continuing to conduct tests in advance of a decision on fielding an effective limited national missile defense system capable of high-confidence interception of small numbers of ICBMs. The United States has no capability to defend the homeland against ballistic missile-delivered WMD attack. The success or failure of a ballistic missile attack would depend solely on the technical competency of the attacker. Any asymmetric actor can see the advantages of developing some form of this capability. Of course, a ballistic missile-delivered attack is only one of many options open to an opponent seeking ways to attack the U.S. homeland with WMD. Covert delivery may be more likely.121 A broad variety of initiatives are underway at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent or minimize the effects of a biological or chemical attack. Despite these encouraging developments, many of these initiatives are still immature, funding is inadequate, and much remains to be done in the area of consequence management in terms of training, organizing, and health system enhancements. There is little agreement on who is in charge, and little rationalization of federal, state, and local organizational arrangements. Metrics need to be established to determine investment and training requirements.122 In the area of an information warfare attack against the U.S. homeland, there are two principal active initiatives: *Implementation of the recommendations and provisions contained in the Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection as embodied in PDD63 *Establishment of Joint Task Force on Computer Network Defense (JTFCND).123 The scope of the information warfare problem is now well understood, and within the Department of Defense an aggressive program is underway to remedy known deficiencies. The potential problem is more difficult in the private sector, where myriad opportunities for attack must be balanced against the robustness and diversity of the communications infrastructure itself. The United States remains singularly vulnerable, particularly in the private sector, to potential HEMP attack. The more complex and the more interdependent a system is, the more vulnerable it becomes. In the area of a WMD attack against strategic deployment systems, two initiatives are active: *Conducting tests and moving to field an effective theater ballistic missile defense (TMD) system *Limited tactical decontamination systems at APODs, SPODs, and other organic unit capabilities are being fielded.124 The United States currently has only a very rudimentary and limited theater-level ballistic missile defense system, although extensive investments have been made in both land- and sea-based systems. The decontamination and detection systems now fielded would be stressed to provide coverage for U.S. personnel, and will certainly be inadequate to protect HNS personnel vital to the theater deployment infrastructure. In the area of information warfare (including HEMP) attack against forces in an AOR, limited initiatives are underway. Initiatives in this field are generally related to protection of information systems from cyberattack. Limited actions have been taken against the HEMP threat. This area is a key vulnerability. Significant changes are needed now in existing policy on HEMP protection. Existing standards do not cover all military systems, and even more civilian systems are unprotected. The increasing emphasis on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems for military application only increases the potential danger. Coalition interoperability requirements may also raise additional challenges to system integrity and protection. In the area of biological and chemical attacks against HNS and alliance forces in an AOR (coalition splitting), while U.S. forces possess varying degrees of chemical and biological protection, our potential allies and coalition partners, particularly those outside of NATO, are trained and equipped at a much lower level. Additionally, in a regional war scenario, the civilian populations of potential allies and host nations will be directly vulnerable to this form of attack. In the area of battlespace selection, no clear solution is at hand. The services are pursuing their own visions of how to address this threat. The Army Dismounted Labs and the Marine Corps Urban Warrior series of experiments are dealing directly with these challenging issues. Joint Staff efforts during the last JSR/QDR cycle helped the joint community focus on the problem. Joint doctrine efforts are proceeding. It is still too early to tell how effective the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) initiatives will be in establishing a joint perspective. The challenge for an expanded JFCOM role in experimentation will be to preserve a healthy diversity of approach at the service level, while ensuring interoperability at the joint level. The jury is still out on how effective JFCOM will be in catching up on service efforts and achieving this delicate balance of oversight and nurturing. In the area of non-WMD antiaccess measures, the same initiatives as stated above are active: service initiatives predominate, and there is little joint consensus, though there are signs of growing awareness.125 The recently initiated JFCOM Joint Experimentation Programs may be useful. The Navy is working aggressively to address the mine warfare component of the problem, but much remains to be done. Initiatives in the areas of warrior tactics and wild card threats share common themes: some innovative work is proceeding at the service level, but there is little at the joint level. The Joint Nonlethal Directorate is the principal exception to this. Aside from service-level experimentation, there are few attempts to explore the extent of what is possible. The Marine Corps Ellis Project and the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel are each examining the possibility of technological surprise. More thought needs to be given to studying and "red teaming" foreign military options, such as the translation of Chinese writing on military developments sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment within the Pentagon. Across the board, it seems likely that this effort will benefit from the greater focus and depth that JFCOM experimentation programs will bring, if properly implemented. Summarizing Current Initiatives The programs and policies selected as a starting point are representative, not all-inclusive. There undoubtedly are others that arguably deserve greater emphasis. Even bearing these considerations in mind, establishing an understanding of where our efforts are seems to be the natural starting point for determining where we can do better. Two key observations can be drawn from this policy overview. First, broad disparities in level of effort, interest, and potential effectiveness mark our responses across the threat areas. This is related to the second key observation: no overarching or coherent theme ties all elements of potential asymmetric counter measures together. This lack of a unifying theme follows from the differing definitions of asymmetry that have influenced policies. Improving our responses to the asymmetric threat must begin with adoption of a consistent philosophy of how to deal with asymmetry, based upon a consistent definition. Such a philosophy can be derived clearly and simply from the recurring themes of asymmetric approaches laid out in this study. Doing Better: Beginning with Three Ideas To effectively counter asymmetric threats, our policies need to reflect three interlinked concepts. First, our policies must minimize our vulnerabilities to asymmetric attack by deterring potential attackers and by having the capability to successfully defend against asymmetric attacks against both deployed forces and the homeland, if deterrence fails. Should an asymmetric attack prove successful, we need demonstrated competency in consequence management at home and the operational flexibility to prevail in the face of asymmetric attack for deployed forces. Possession of these capabilities will tend to make asymmetric attacks less attractive to potential adversaries. Second, our policies must accentuate our unique strengths by continuing to pursue transformation objectives that embody the operational expression of Joint Vision 2010 and its successor documents. In doing this, we must avoid overreacting to asymmetric threats. The American way of war, emphasizing speed, shock, and rapid battlespace dominance, is inherently asymmetric itself when compared to the capabilities of most potential opponents. Our way of war works, and we do not need to overcorrect in attempting to anticipate asymmetric approaches. Third, in dealing with asymmetric threats, it will be critical to prevent disproportionate effect. This is the heart of asymmetric advantage, and it must be countered at all levels of war, although preventing the upward migration of tactical and operational effect to the strategic level is the most important component of this approach. These three ideas all support what must become a basic understanding of the Department of Defense in dealing with asymmetric issues. For the United States, disparity of interest with a broad range of potential opponents is an enduring reality. As long as we remain a global power with many strategic interests, some interests will always be less important than others. It is the DOD operational task in dealing with the issue of asymmetric warfare to ensure that United States foreign policy options are not artificially circumscribed or compressed by state or nonstate actors who, by threat or action, seek to impose a disproportionately high price on our engagement in an issue when it is inimical to their interests. Policy Recommendations A number of specific actions are recommended to implement this objective. In order to maintain coherence, the recommendations are grouped under the three organizing ideas: minimizing vulnerabilities, accentuating our unique strengths, and preventing disproportionate effect. Some of these recommendations will require broader action from departments and agencies across the Federal Government, as well as state and local governments. When a proposed action falls partially or wholly outside the Department of Defense, this is noted. There is significant overlap between the recommendations, and most will have positive effect under more than one organizing idea. Thus, these recommendations are not prioritized, nor are they listed in a proposed order of adoption. Specific Actions to Minimize Vulnerabilities We must act to reduce the direct threat of strategic attack against the American homeland. This requires the earliest possible deployment of an effective limited national missile defense system (NMD) capable of high-confidence interception of small numbers of ICBMs. This recommendation acts against the threat of direct attack on the United States homeland with ballistic missile-delivered WMD. It is understood that such a defense will only limit one potential avenue of attack for an aggressor, who may still choose to employ a myriad of covert means to attack the United States with WMD. It is also understood that deploying a ballistic missile system should only be part of a comprehensive approach to strategic defense. A comprehensive approach to this problem must also embrace a broad range of counterproliferation initiatives, an explicit deterrence strategy, and a variety of activities designed to prevent or minimize the possibility (and consequences--see recommendations that follow) of a covert attack. Despite the fact that a ballistic missile defense system will only provide coverage against one of several attack options, it is still recommended, principally because it will complicate a potential attacker's problem by removing one offensive alternative.126 The operative word in the statement of the problem is "threat." Defensive systems of this nature act explicitly to reduce a component of the potential threat, thus expanding the choices for future NCA when confronted with an opponent armed with WMD-equipped missiles. We must also act to reduce the threat of direct or covert WMD attack on the homeland by demonstrating a capability for consequence management. This requires the expansion of the Nunn-Lugar "first responder" training from its current level of 120 cities to at least 240 cities as soon as possible. Larger cities may need larger teams, and perhaps more than one or two. A number of key supporting actions are recommended in concert with this proposal: *The existing system for regional stockpiling of medical equipment and medicines, which is controlled by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), should be expanded, based on updates from the intelligence community. This system should include methods for inventory control with "global visibility." The DOD should be tasked to develop contingency plans for rapid movement and concentration of these resources. *Significant improvements have been made in the level of epidemiological monitoring within the United States; these efforts, also under the direction of the CDC, should be continued. This will be helpful in more rapidly detecting a covert biological or chemical attack. We need to continuously reevaluate the basis for our planning. Current efforts have been criticized as being too rooted in the threat of "what people think terrorists could do, not on what they have done in the past or what they are able to do given considerable technical difficulties of procurement, production, and delivery."127 This can lead to programmatic decisions that are too focused on "worst case planning, which may skew governmental focus away from the types of attacks that are more likely to occur."128 All of our programs need a healthy sense of balance: there are too many scare scenarios out there now. This tension between worst case planning and a broader-based approach must be observed at all times. It isn't a bad thing, because it tends to cast a skeptical eye on the more outrageous possibilities. While the bioterrorism of The Cobra Event may make for chilling reading, in Oklahoma City a "conventional" attack was the deadliest terrorist incident ever on American soil. In the long term, Department of Defense support for local and state agencies for consequence management (CM) should come primarily from the Reserve Components, and over time elements of the Army National Guard should be restructured to reflect this.129 This can be accomplished by dual-missioning in the short term; ultimately, however, the requirement for WMD response and consequence management in the continental United States should evolve into a primary mission for the Army National Guard. This is a natural choice because of the long affiliation which the Army National Guard has had with local governmental structures and its ultimate responsibility for the defense of the United States. When in a state supporting role, the Guard is exempt from the provisions of posse comitatus (18 USC 1385), which prohibit Federal military forces from performing law enforcement duties.130 Restructuring should be oriented toward enhancing and broadening the extant capability to assist in routine and contingency planning for CM activities and in incident response. Incident response would include C4 infrastructure support, augmentation of physical security, emergency mobile medical assets, NBC reconnaissance, and mass evacuation operations if required.131 The capability to deploy from the United States for some of these forces will become of lower priority. Eventually, first call on designated elements of the National Guard force structure should be linked to requirements for WMD (and other) consequence management within the United States, and only secondarily any requirement to deploy on short notice in support of theater contingency plans. This will require a huge change in thinking on the part of the Guard--it will need to reorient inward as a first priority. There will be resistance to this idea, and it may be argued that such a reorientation of a significant portion of the National Guard will dissuade enlistments, particularly among potential soldiers who seek service in combat and combat support forces. While not minimizing this recruiting challenge, there is an obvious attraction of recruiting for forces that could make a concrete difference in six hours in a national emergency, rather than perhaps in 120 days in a "second major theater war (MTW)" CINC operations plan. Under this proposal, the highest priority for the National Guard would be pre-attack, attack management, and post-attack consequence management within our borders. The National Guard would still retain the ability to support limited rotational deployments overseas in support of the active component, and would still have a "strategic reserve" mission, although it would no longer be explicitly linked to short-term regional warfighting operations plans. The restructuring of the Guard would be designed to increase the current numbers of low-density, high-demand units critical to consequence management: chemical, medical, military police, and other combat service support capabilities.132
The first step toward this end would be a detailed analysis of Specific Actions to Accentuate Unique Strengths We need to take immediate steps at the interagency level to improve our strategic intelligence posture that monitors the global environment and actively scouts for potential asymmetric approaches that might threaten us. This effort must go beyond our traditional adversaries and examine new and innovative threats that may arise. "Wild cards" will emerge, and the earlier that we can sense them, the more effective our response will be. In many cases, the knowledge that we are looking and listening will present a potential deterrent effect in and of itself. This will require substantial retooling of our technological base for information collection as it listens to a world that is both increasingly encrypted and less dependent upon broadcast signal.133 The qualitative edge that the United States enjoyed for so long in electronic monitoring has evaporated, and we may never be able to fully recover it. The expanded use of human intelligence will only begin to fill this void.134 A key element of intelligence gathering is ensuring it is ultimately disseminated to those who need it, both within the United States and among our allies. This is typically the greatest weakness of any intelligence program. Part of this practice of expanded dissemination must be the continuous process of sharing the latest available information on and counters to potential asymmetric threats with allies and likely coalition partners. We need to take steps to assure that we will have continued access to those areas where we may be called upon to deploy in order to deter, and, if necessary, to fight and win. Specific components of this are: *Field effective theater ballistic missile defense systems, both upper and lower tier, that will provide high-confidence coverage of arrival airfields and ports, their associated assembly areas, airbases, critical host nation support infrastructure, and both U.S. and allied land- and seabased forces.135 The current approach to testing and deployment appears to be broadly on track. *Through military-to-military contacts with allies and potential coalition partners, ensure a common competency in NBC protection is established and maintained, and that procedures are established and rehearsed as integral parts of CINC plans for combined measures to be taken in the event of NBC attack. This should include the common provision of a single standard of prophylaxis across a combined force. *Continue to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures and the associated equipment necessary to ensure continued access for amphibious, air-delivered, and air forces in environments across the spectrum of engagement--from benign to forcible entry. For air forces, this translates into a continual refinement and improvement of the ability to destroy or degrade enemy air defenses, particularly against a foe who chooses to employ his weapons in innovative and nontraditional ways. As Major General Bruce Carlson, USAF, has noted, "The SEAD [suppression of enemy air defenses] capability that we've built in the U.S. Air Force is a little bit dependent on the enemy fully utilizing his assets--if they're not emitting, then you're not suppressing very much."136 Functionally, this means we need to have a "destruction" (DEAD) capability as well as a "suppression" (SEAD) capability. It also means that we need to continue to explore the technical and tactical feasibility of extreme long-range air operations, for circumstances when the threat will require distant basing. For ground forces, the principal requirement will be the ability to conduct forcible entry operations and subsequent logistical sustainment in extremely austere environments, potentially with an extended "across the beach" or limited airhead flow of supplies for lengthy periods. The Marine Corps MV22 and AAAV amphibian vehicle will provide the capabilities for extended-range forcible entry from across the horizon to objectives well inland, bypassing potentially defended beaches. The top-to-bottom reassessment of Army organization will yield a force that is both lighter and significantly more deployable than the current one. Aside from parachute infantry and air assault forces, how this force will integrate into forcible entry operations remains to be fully resolved, in terms of equipment, doctrine, and structure. For naval forces, the ability to defeat the mine, cruise missile, small fast attack craft, and coastal submarine threat, and to ensure safe passage for amphibious, surface fire support, and follow-on logistics ships will be paramount.137 Since 1950, 18 U.S. Navy ships have been damaged or sunk. Mines were responsible for 14 of these. In addition to loss of life, the cost to the nation has been many millions of dollars. The aggregate cost of the mines that caused this damage has been estimated at $11,500. Mines remain the principal threat to both warfighting and sustainment vessels, and the program of eight antimine "assigned systems" (one submarine-launched, one surface combatant-launched, and six helicopter-launched) will be critical in correcting this long-term deficiency. All joint forces must be prepared to conduct operations for extended periods of time in hazardous chemical and biological environments, and overcome this challenge through protective measures on the ground, in the air, and at sea. In concert with industry, we need to undertake to ensure that all future military and specific civil communications and satellite systems emphasize radiation-tolerant microelectronics. This would include all satellites launched by the United States, not just military-specific systems. It is not fiscally feasible to harden all, or perhaps even military, satellites against direct (i.e., kinetic or directed energy) attack, but satellite systems can have higher levels of environmental protection designed to counter such tactics as the "pumping" of the Van Allen belt. It has been estimated that, for total programmatic costs of between 1 and 5 percent, this goal can be obtained.138 At the same time, a selective retrofitting of critical U.S. theater and tactical level communications systems needs to be undertaken, with a goal of providing adequate HEMP protection for those systems. This cost will be significantly higher, reflecting the difficulty and greater expense of modifying existing systems, instead of designing protection into the system from the beginning. This could cost as much as 10 percent of each program. For this reason, this decision needs to be based on a careful study of the backbone systems necessary to execute JV 2010 in the face of HEMP attack. Any attempt to rejuvenate the declining radiation-tolerant microelectronics industry will require a significant government-defense industry partnership, which will have to also make it financially attractive for nonmilitary satellites to incorporate hardening principles into their design. This will not be cheap, since hardening requires both new electronics and additional weight--both are premium in a system that will be launched into space. While the interagency process for dealing with the consequences of mass catastrophic terrorism in the United States has been refined and improved with the establishment of a central coordinator within the White House, particular emphasis needs to be placed on the nature of the support DOD will provide in such an event from an interagency perspective. This is particularly important regarding the utilization of low-density, high-demand units and equipment in the Guard, Reserve, and Active Components, units such as chemical decontamination units and medical support elements that might be needed for simultaneous contingencies outside of the United States. This will require DOD to come to a clear and explicit understanding of how it will support the civilian government when faced with a catastrophic attack on the United States. It seems only reasonable to expect that the time of greatest danger for an attack on the continental United States might be during a significant international crisis in which many of our forces are deployed abroad. In this instance, worst-case planning is prudent. The Department of Defense should begin this process by ensuring that all theater contingency plans are thoroughly coordinated through the Joint Staff and potential dual claims (between theater CINCs and homeland defense) on low-density, high-demand assets and stored equipment and supplies unique to catastrophic management are deconflicted and prioritized. Associated risks should be assessed and articulated, and this deconfliction, prioritization, and risk assessment should be understood at the interagency level. We should be red teaming our own capabilities so that we have an accurate net assessment of our strengths and weaknesses. This is an effort that is important enough to have both protection and continuity, and it needs to be located outside the intelligence community, although it must have strong ties to it. For such an organization to have credibility, it must possess not only analytic capabilities, but also operational respectability--it must be staffed with operators as well as analysts. It must also have access, and access means high-level sponsorship. There is a need for this concept at every level of the Department of Defense: the services, the Joint Staff, and in the combatant commands. On the Joint Staff such an organization would be charged with review of plans and operational concepts from an adversarial, intelligence-based, and operationally validated perspective as well as other taskings from the Chairman. In time, parallel organizations might prove useful within each regional and functional combatant command. The services have strong vested interests in looking ahead at alternative futures, and in continually refining their Title X (USC) responsibilities. Specific Actions to Prevent Disproportionate Effect Last, it has been argued throughout this analysis that the ultimate goal of any asymmetric approach is to seek strategic effect against the will of the opponent. This can be achieved through deterrence or coercion, or--once battle is joined--through such approaches as warrior tactics and battlespace selection. While every action recommended to this point will tend to contribute to the reduction of this effect, the most important step that can be taken in this regard is to explain clearly to the American people the purpose of an operation. While it has become conventional wisdom in some circles that the people of the United States will not accept even minimal casualties in military operations far from home, the truth is actually more complex. In fact, it seems likely that if the goals and objectives of American involvement in operations abroad are clearly and explicitly explained, support at home will be both broad and deep. What does this mean? Telling the American people what we are doing when their fighting men and women are in harm's way, and why they are there will be ever more important in a world in which the hierarchy of information is flattening. Other advocates, perhaps unfriendly to our interests, will also be telling their side of the story. We must take advantage of every opportunity made possible by our vast information system of systems to explain what we are doing, and we must do it better than our potential opponents. An Option of Difficulties? This chapter answers the question posed at the beginning of this paper: what can we do to counter asymmetric threats? The proposals outlined above argue for both the continuation and refinement of existing programs, and in some cases for the adoption of new ones. Some have obvious benefits, but will require presidential decision (i.e., the deployment of a NMD), because of the larger political and diplomatic consequences. Some will require the breaking of long-held paradigms (i.e., the role of the National Guard). These will be difficult choices. The recommendations having the greatest fiscal impact involve the fielding of both national and theater ballistic missile systems. While significant sums have been spent and are now currently programmed, a decision to deploy a NMD will require significant future commitment of resources. Of lesser but still significant fiscal impact is the recommendation to improve and protect our information architecture from HEMP, and a potential restructuring of the Army National Guard for consequence management. The single recommendation having the greatest potential domestic political volatility is the recommendation to re-tool elements of the Army National Guard to better face the domestic consequence management threat, and to shift away from its current emphasis on large-scale deployments from the United States in support of theater war plans. The objective of these recommendations is to gain the best relative competitive advantage for our nation at the least cost--in human life and national treasure--in a strategic environment in which our interest in any given engagement may not be as great as our adversary's. In preparing for this environment, it is important that we do not design our responses so narrowly that we become prisoners of our own actions. For that reason, these recommendations have sought to fulfill a basic responsibility of civil government--the protection of its citizens and their property--without becoming fixated on the defense of the United States homeland as the beginning and end of the asymmetric threat. Such an approach would entail passivity, and passivity is not in the American character. The dual objectives of protecting our citizens at home while advancing American interests abroad form the most effective possible response to asymmetric threats. We must do both. These recommendations will help us do them better. |