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McNair Paper 62, The Revenge of the
Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the next QDR, November 2000 Chapter Six Conclusions: The Uneasy Athenians
The idea that weaker states or nonstate actors will attempt to find innovative ways to compensate for their inferiority is the basis for asymmetry. Against Athens, Melos was unable to find a way to compensate for its aggregate inferiority. The lesson of Melian failure has not lost its haunting immediacy in the retelling down through the centuries, and potential enemies of the United States may well see themselves as latter-day Melians, just as we are cast as modern Athenians. Since it will be difficult to challenge the United States directly, our opponents will seek to find our vulnerabilities, and will ruthlessly exploit them. The first task of this paper was to define asymmetry, building upon the existing body of current definitions. A new definition was proposed, one that emphasized the psychological components and disproportionate effects of asymmetric warfare. Expanding on this definition, six recurring themes were identified that gave structure to the working definition. The basic theme was that asymmetric options flourish for the weaker party when there is a disparity of interest between the two antagonists. The target of all asymmetric approaches is the will of the opponent, and this is achieved through the pursuit of psychological effect on the strategic level, regardless of the level of war on which the asymmetric approach is employed. Each of these concepts was illuminated by an historical example, because historical and operational context is vitally important in understanding asymmetric warfare. The second task of this paper was to determine what the asymmetric threats are to the United States and to come to a judgment on what we should concentrate on in defense planning. This required establishing a broad typology of asymmetry. Six threats were identified: nuclear, chemical, biological, information operations, alternative operational concepts, and terrorism. Each of these was examined in depth, across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Following this, the nature of United States conventional military superiority was examined for potential vulnerabilities. The same process was applied to the critical infrastructures that provide basic services in the United States. The integration of asymmetric threats and our potential vulnerabilities enabled the creation of a list of the most serious asymmetric threats to the United States. The establishment of such a set of potential threats gives discipline to the planning process, and allows for the design of appropriate counters. Without this assessment of what is truly threatening, and what is not, it is difficult to craft a coordinated plan. The final task of this paper was to give advice on what we need to do to improve our ability to counter asymmetric approaches. This began by evaluating the current status of existing initiatives and by making some frank judgments about where improvement is needed. The principal criticism of our current approach to the asymmetric threat is that, since we do not have a single accepted concept for how to organize for asymmetric defense, there is little coordination between existing initiatives. A top-down, simple, and clear concept is the starting point, based on three imperatives: minimize our vulnerabilities, accentuate our unique strengths, and prevent disproportionate effect. Based on these three organizing ideas, recommendations were made that would attempt to prevent another Mogadishu and deter another Pearl Harbor. At the beginning of a new millennium, the United States is ubiquitous, and ubiquity brings vulnerability. We will be most effective in this confusing world by realizing that only former great powers have seen the end of asymmetric threats. If we are the Athenians, then we should be uneasy Athenians and remember that, while the Melians eventually succumbed to Athenian power, they did not possess the asymmetric options available to today's potential adversaries. In time, the Athenians, too, passed from the stage because they could not adapt to new strategic challenges. Today sheep graze and children play among the broken walls of Piraeus, the imperial port of once-mighty Athens. |