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McNair Paper 62, The Revenge of the
Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the next QDR, November 2000 Endnotes
1 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides, A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press, 1996), 352.
2 For the purpose of this study, Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories and
mandates are explicitly considered to be 3 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957). 4 Although the Commission on Roles and Missions identified combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, peace operations, and operations other than war (OOTW) as emerging mission priorities. See Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, by John P. White, Chairman, and members of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 24, 1995), ES-4. 5 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997). See also Bruce W. Bennett et al., "What Are Asymmetric Strategies?" Documented Briefing prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense; delivered to the Quadrennial Defense Review Team, 1997. 6 Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century; Report of the National Defense Panel, by Philip A. Odeen, Chairman, and members of the National Defense Panel (Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, December 1997); and New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 14, 1999). 7 Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1998), and William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999). 8 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, by William J. Clinton (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998), and National Military Strategy of the United States of America, by General Henry H. Shelton (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997). 9 The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) is prepared each year by the Joint Staff as part of the formal strategy development and planning process within the Department of Defense. 10 Cohen, Annual Report to the President, 2. 11 Extracted from an internal briefing for the Joint Staff in June 1998. 12 Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 26. 13 Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 62. 14 This observation was offered by W. Seth Carus of the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University. The examples of Pearl Harbor and Mogadishu, of course, are at the distant poles of the argument. Both will be discussed in this chapter. 15 Some particularly insightful analysis on this subject has been done by Dr. Bruce Bennett of RAND Corporation and is incorporated in his unpublished brief: "Establishing a Baseline for New Force Planning Constructs: Comparing Analysis of QDR 1997." The author received this brief in October 1999. 16 See John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 121-125, and Keith B. Richburg, "In War on Aideed, UN Battled Itself, The Washington Post, December 6, 1993, 1. 17 A good summary of this, while somewhat dated, is Louis Morton, "Japan's Decision for War," in Command Decisions, ed. K. R. Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), 99-124. See also David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), Chapter 13, "The Great Gamble." 18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75. 19 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: 1918-1928, The Aftermath (New York: Scribner's, 1923), 63. See also Michael Pearson, The Sealed Train (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), 64. 20 Pearson, The Sealed Train, 64. 21 This discussion is based on Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999), 188-191, and more generally on Chapters 12 and 13: "Kamikazes, Civilians, and Assessments," and "The Eclipse of Olympic." 22 Ibid., 182. 23 Ibid., 186-187.
24 See George P. Schulz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as
Secretary of State (New York: 25 Rebecca Grant, The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power Made It Work (Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, September 1999), 15. 26 Ibid., 16. 27 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 129-131. 28 Ibid., 268-271. 29 Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), 16. Shock is obtainable on all three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Soviet theory teaches that there are three elements to its practice, beginning with the identification of the elements of the center of gravity: exact points of strength and weakness; deliberate creation of vulnerabilities; and exploitation of these vulnerabilities. In conventional military thinking, in the West this can be caused by a "turning maneuver," or in Soviet doctrine a "turning over," or obkhod. "When such conditions are realized, the opposing system is forced into a situation in which it will lose its abilities both to accomplish its original aim, and to regain its operational equilibrium." 30 Robert Mikesh, Japan's World War II Balloon Bomb Attacks on North America (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1973).
31 The concept of a state's "strategic personality" is well articulated in R.
D. Blackwill and A. B. Carter, "The Role of Intelligence," in R. D. Blackwill et al., New Nuclear
Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relation Press, 1993), 217 and
236-237. Although tied to the nuclear issue, the concept has wider 32 For the best general discussion of this, see James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992). 33 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 130-131. 34 Craig R. Whitney, "Anxious French Mutter as U.S. Envoy Tries to Sell Globalization," The New York Times, December 2, 1999, A-12. 35 M. A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf: 1833-1992 (New York: Free Press, 1992), 120. Chapters 6, "Not while this President Serves: The Reagan Administration and the Gulf, 1981-1987," and 7, "The Tanker War, 1987-1988," form the basis for much of this analysis. 36 Ibid., 120-121. 37 Ibid., 130. 38 Ibid., 131. 39 Ibid., 135-136: No mine countermeasures vessels were on hand in the Gulf the day the Bridgeton was struck. 40 The Iraqis launched 88 attacks on ships in 1987 and the Iranians launched 91. Ronald O'Rourke, "The Tanker War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 114 (May 1988): 32. 41 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, 144. 42 Ibid., 147-149, and Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 183-188. 43 From Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment, Occasional Paper of the Center for Counterproliferation Research (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 4. 44 Strategic Assessment 1999, 96. Also, see the dated but still very useful Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, CSIA Studies in International Security #12 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 28. 45 See R. A. Falkenrath et al., America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press and the JFK School of Government, 1999), for a good summary of "who has what," based on a synthesis of unclassified sources. 46 It is my position that this is the far more likely scenario for use. For purposes of organization, though, this has been grouped under the operational level. 47 With one exception: the strategic deployment system has critical nodes that could be degraded through nuclear attack: ports, airfields, marshaling areas, and key bridges and transportation infrastructure. 48 Martin van Creveld, "The Fate of the State," Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 17. 49 Falkenrath, America's Achilles' Heel, 91, 226-227. 50 Ibid., 71. 51 Ibid., 64. 52 Ibid., 19-26.
53 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies
Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1993), 77-81 and throughout for an 54 Ibid., 77-81 and throughout for an excellent discussion. 55 It has been asserted, in particular, that the former Soviet Union viewed contagiousness as a desirable characteristic of biological weapons, and sought to increase the contagiousness of its biological weapons accordingly. 56 Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies, 77. 57 Falkenrath, America's Achilles' Heel, 67. 58 Ibid., 67-68. 59 Ibid., 67. 60 Ibid. 61 See R. J. Larsen and R. P. Kadlec., Biological Warfare: A Post Cold War Threat to America's Strategic Mobility Forces (Pittsburgh, PA: Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1995), 12 and throughout for an excellent discussion of the strategic mobility threat posed by these weapons. 62 Falkenrath, America's Achilles' Heel, 46-59. 63 Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies, 8. 64 Henry H. Shelton, Information Operations: A Strategy for Peace, The Decisive Edge in War (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999). 65 Two recent survey works on the current state of information operations are: Zalmay Khalilzad and John P. White, eds., The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997). 66 For a discussion of the al Firdos bunker, see Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1995), 190. 67 Bob Brewin, "Pentagon Hit by 'World Wide Wait,'" Federal Computer Week, November 15, 1999, 1. 68 Anthony Cave Brown, "C": The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 278. 69 Robert T. Marsh et al., Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures: The Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Washington, D.C.: The President's Commission on Infrastructure Protection, 1997). Hereafter referred to as the Marsh Report. 70 Discussion in this section is largely based on Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1977), Chapters X, "Radar and Radio Effects," and XI, "The Electromagnetic Pulse and its Effects," and S.J. McGrath, "The Electromagnetic Pulse Environment and Its Influence on Tactical Electronic and Communications Equipment," Unpublished thesis for MS in Telecommunications, Naval Postgraduate School, Coronado, CA, March 1992. 71 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 515. 72 Ibid., 518. 73 R. C. Webb et al., "The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis," Defense Electronics, August 1995, 24. See also Martin Libicki, Illuminating Tomorrow's War, McNair Paper 61 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 1999), 14: "The few really good eyes in the U.S. space inventory may be vulnerable to attack." 74 Webb, "The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis," 24. 75 See Andrew Koch, "Interview: Dr. Jay Davis, Director of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 16, 2000, 32: "An EMP attack 'is technically quite simple to do with a relatively crude nuclear weapon,' he adds. 'If you look at the effects of that on our communications and telecommunications systems, and if you look at the more problematic effect of EMP from a high-altitude burst over US forces or over part of the USA, it becomes an attractive equalizer for a less sophisticated military opponent or even a terrorist.'" 76 Glasstone and Dolan, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 520-532. 77 Norman Friedman, "Russians Offer EMP Counter," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 123 (August 1997): 91-92. 78 See Bruce D. Nordwell, "EMP, High-Powered Microwaves Pose New EW Threat to Aircraft," Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 26, 1998, 68. 79 Webb, "The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis," 21. 80 Testimony of Mr. Gil I. Klinger (Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space) to the House National Security Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, July 16, 1997, Y4.SE2/1 A:997-98/18, 5. 81 Testimony of Dr. Lowell Wood (Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, CA) to the House National Security Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, July 16, 1997, Y4.SE2/1 A:997-98/18, 5. 82 Ibid. 83 Quoted in Daniel Verton, "Army Battles Irrelevancy," Federal Computer Week, November 15, 1999, 10. 84 Sha Lin, "Two Senior Colonels and No-Limit War," Beijing Zhongguo Qingnian Bao in Chinese, June 28, 1999, 5 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation). 85 See Charles J. Dunlap, "21st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Landpower in the 21st Century: Preparing for Conflict (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1998), 83-93, for a good analysis of this. 86 For a broad sampling of Chinese thinking in this area, see Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000), and Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997). 87 See also Fred Kennedy et al., "A Failure of Vision," Airpower Journal (Summer 1998): 84-94. 88 P. D. Feaver, and C. Gelpi, "How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer," The Washington Post, November 7, 1999, B-3, which describes the results of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) Casualty Aversion Survey, conducted during the period September 1998 through June 1999. 89 This term was used in a brief the author received at Headquarters, Task Force Eagle, 1st Cavalry Division, Tuzla, Bosnia, January 1999. 90 Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982), 1. 91 Clausewitz, On War, 77. 92 See Libicki, Illuminating Tomorrow's War, 47-50 for a thoughtful discussion of this problem. 93 See Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" Foreign Affairs 78, no. 5 (September/October 1999): 30, for an analysis of the effect of China's nuclear force on U.S. strategic calculations. 94 See Edward N. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996): 33-44, for a presentation of this view. 95 For example, Benjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties: Public Opinion and U.S. Military Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), finds that U.S. casualties might actually increase the will of the American people to pursue victory instead of withdrawal. 96 Robert W. Chandler, Tomorrow's War, Today's Decisions (McLean, VA: AMCODA Press, 1996). See also Greg Weaver and D. J. Glaes, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass Destruction Undermine U.S. Strategy for Projecting Military Power (Mclean, VA: AMCODA Press, undated). Also in this camp is Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999). 97 Robert H. Scales, Jr., "The Indirect Approach: How U.S. Military Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Urban Warfare," in Future Warfare (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999), 173-185. 98 See Allen Hammond, Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998), 72-74, for a discussion of the urbanization of the world. 99 Air power theorist John Warden argues that it may be possible to exercise crowd control in an urban environment with "a combination of AC-130s and helicopters in the air equipped with searchlights, loudspeakers, rubber bullets, entangling chemical nets, and other paraphernalia." See John Warden, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," in Karl P. Magyar et al., eds., Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Concerns (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1994), 330. 100 Paul K. Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., in "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," in Landpower in the 21st Century: Preparing for Conflict (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1998), 3-12, make the point that "In an uncertain world, we dare not base force requirements on preconceived assumptions about whom we might fight in the next century or how." 101 And this generated the March 1942 attack on Lubeck, an unimportant north German coastal town of little strategic significance. See the Royal Air Force's Official History, by Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, vol. I, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961), 392. The incident "showed the extent...to which a town might become a target mainly because it was operationally vulnerable." See also Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New York: Dial Press, 1979), 147-148. 102 Also known to some as a "regional near-peer" adversary or competitor. 103 Clarke's Third Law, from Arthur C. Clarke, Profiles of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 21. 104 Science fiction classic by Frank Herbert, Dune (New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 1984), 409. 105 A good discussion of the arguments surrounding the "transportation plan" is found in W. W. Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower's Decision of March 25, 1944 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981). For the al Firdos bunker, see Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf, 190-192. 106 The best general discussion of this is D. S. Alberts, J. J. Garstka, and F. P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2d ed. revised (Washington, D.C.: DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999), 87-114, but also throughout. 107 There are a number of sharp critiques of JV 2010. Two worth noting are Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Assessment," and F. G. Hoffman, "Joint Vision 2010--A Marine Perspective," both in Joint Force Quarterly 17 (Autumn/Winter 1997-1998): 47-49 and 32-38, respectively. 108 Noting the significant exceptions of Pearl Harbor and the Alaskan islands in World War II. 109 The data in this table, and many of the underpinnings of arguments developed in this section, are derived from the previously cited Marsh Report. 110 Paul F. Herman, "Asymmetric Warfare: Sizing the Threat," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 6, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 180. This excellent article deals clearly with the conceptual underpinnings of asymmetric warfare. 111 A good summary of this can be found in Brad C. Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation," International Security (Summer 1993): 158, "In the United States, proliferation is likely to sharpen the debate about vital versus peripheral national interests, undermine the political support for military intervention, or even long term engagement, increase U.S. vulnerability to coercive diplomacy by regional actors, and narrow the room for maneuver in [the] international environment." 112 E. Anders Eriksson, "Viewpoint: Information Warfare: Hype or Reality?" The Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 1999): 57-64. 113 Libicki, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors, 11-13. 114 Based on Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 78: "One gram of dried anthrax spores contains more than 1011 particles; since the lethal dose by inhalation in monkeys is between 103 and 104 spores, a gram of anthrax theoretically contains some 10 million lethal doses." 115 Webb et al., "The Commercial and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis," 22-24. 116 The threat of a chemical attack against the homeland, although a different threat, is assumed as a "lesser included" consideration for purposes of analysis here. 117 PDD-62, signed on May 22, 1998, expands and more clearly focuses PDD-39, and "creates a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century. It reinforces the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs from apprehension and prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the heart of America's economy." Additionally, PDD-62 established the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism within the National Security Council. This information is taken from the White House, "Fact Sheet on Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62," May 22, 1998. 118 PDD-39, signed on June 21, 1995, establishes broad measures to combat terrorism through reducing vulnerabilities, deterring, and responding, to include NBC consequence management. The thrust of this PDD is against terrorist attack on the homeland using WMD. Taken from PDD-39: U.S. Policy on Combating Terrorism (unclassified abstract), Chapter Report, 09/26/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Appendix 1. 119 The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program was designed to increase training of potential first responders to WMD terrorist incidents within the United States. By the end of 1998, 40 U.S. cities had received training, with training ongoing in an additional 80. As part of this program, each designated city receives $300,000 from DOD for personal protection, decontamination, and detection equipment. The Public Health Service will assist in the establishment of Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams in each of the cities, at a cost of approximately $350,000 per city for equipment and pharmaceuticals. This information is taken from The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons Resource Page, "United States response to CBW terrorism and domestic preparedness" (http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/domestic.htm). 120 PDD-63, signed on May 22, 1998, was based on many of the recommendations of the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection as given in the Marsh Report, and called for these key steps to be taken: --Improved interagency coordination for critical infrastructure protection --Definition of the roles and responsibilities of U.S. agencies in fighting terrorism --Establishment of departmental Chief Information Officers (CIOs) within the Federal Government, with responsibilities for information assurance --Designation of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism as the governmental officer responsible for implementation of the provisions of PDD-63 --Improvements in capabilities for protecting the national information structure, the most important of which is the creation of a National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in the FBI --Promotion of partnerships with industry and other private players to enhance computer security --Study plans for minimizing damage and recovering rapidly from attacks on vital infrastructure. See White Paper: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63, May 22, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998). 121 See the testimony of J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, in John Donnelly, "Intelligence Officials: Missiles Attack on U.S. 'Unlikely,'" Defense Week, February 14, 1. The testimony of Mr. Roy and other officials before the Senate Intelligence Committee indicated that they consider covert means of attack more likely than a direct missile attack. 122 See James S. Gilmore et al., First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C., December 15, 1999). 123 JTF-CND was established December 4, 1998, with responsibility for defense of DOD networks and computer systems. 124 Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, before U.S. Senate, Committee on Veteran's Affairs, March 17, 1998: "Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DoD's Plans to Protect U.S. Forces" (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-83), p. 2. According to Mr. Gebicke, "there are deficiencies in doctrine, policy, equipment, and training for the defense of critical ports and airfields." 125 For example, see unattributed, "Navy Mine Warfare Official Warns Judgment Day is Coming," Inside the Navy, November 22, 1999, 7. As cited herein, the Navy's mine warfare program has $5 billion budgeted against it across the future years defense plan, but at least one of the seven mine-clearing systems is being slipped. Dale Gerry, Navy Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mine and Undersea Warfare, is concerned about the Navy's ability to meet the goal of outfitting one carrier battle group with organic mine countermeasures by 2005. 126 Two differing perspectives on this issue can be found in (for the affirmative) Henry A. Kissinger, "The Next President's First Obligation," The Washington Post, February 9, 2000, 21, and (for the negative) George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright, "National Missile Defense: An Indefensible System," Foreign Policy (Winter 1999-2000): 120-131. 127 John Parachini, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, "U.S. Government Spending to Combat Terrorism: Chart and Analysis" (http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/ternarr.html). 128 Ibid., 2. 129 See the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, Study Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1999). 130 This builds on recommendations in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Reserve Component Study completed in 1999, and the 1999 Report to the National Guard Bureau Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Study (Washington, D.C.: Science Applications International Corporation, February 1999). 131 OSD, Reserve Component Study, C-1, 2. The 1999 Report to the National Guard Bureau Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Study, 4, identified 141 potential support roles for the National Guard, and then refined them to "47 mission consistent potential National Guard WMD response support roles." 132 Here is an example of how such a restructuring might be accomplished, based on Annex C, "Missioning RC units for CM and critical infrastructure physical security," in the Reserve Component Study cited above. Beginning by assuming that a surge chemical decontamination capability is needed for every major metropolitan area in the United States with over 200,000 people, then the requirement will be for 76 organizations with this capability. If the unit of measure is a chemical company, then a requirement would exist for 76 chemical companies. There are 42 chemical companies in the Reserve Components, of which 9 are in the National Guard and 33 in the Army reserve. All are currently tasked under existing regional warplans. For these reasons, dual-missioning existing companies is not feasible. Developing 76 chemical companies including procurement of equipment and personnel retraining would cost in the neighborhood of $200 million. 133 See Seymour Hersh, "The Intelligence Gap," The New Yorker, December 6, 1999, 58-67, for a discussion of the challenges facing the National Security Agency. For example, "the North Koreans...have bought encrypted phones from Europe, high-speed switching gear from Britain, and up-to-date dialing service from America--a system the NSA cannot readily read." A U.S. "intelligence official" went on to say that "All their military stuff went off ether into fiber--from high frequency radio transmission to fiber-optic cable lines." Fiber-optic cable is both capable of carrying much more traffic than any radio transmission, and cannot be readily read by external monitoring systems. See also Douglas Farah, "New Drug Smugglers Hold Tech Advantage," The Washington Post, November 15, 1999, 1., which outlines some of the encryption techniques readily available to well-funded transnational criminal organizations. 134 Falkenrath, America's Achilles' Heel, 282-286, makes some of these recommendations in Chapter 5, "Recommendations: An Agenda for the American Government." 135 In the TMD arena, the Army's PAC-3 and the Navy Area Defense systems are already budgeted. 136 Quoted in John A. Tirpak, "Dealing With Air Defenses," Air Force Magazine, November 1999, 26.
137 Unattributed, "Navy Mine Warfare Official Warns 'Judgment Day' Is Coming,'"
Inside the Navy, 138 Joseph C. Anselmo, "U.S. Seen More Vulnerable to Electromagnetic Attack," Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 28, 1997, 67.
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