Chapter Four

Assumptions on National Strategy




If the value of an assessment of the future security environment is based on its facility for being updated, the obvious starting point for a new consensus assessment is a validation or refutation of the current wisdom as incorporated into the standing defense policy and military strategy.

The current U.S. military strategy of "shape, respond, and prepare now" was codified primarily through the mechanism of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that concluded in May 1997. Although QDR 1997 was popularly perceived as a resource analysis leading to optimal force structure for a downsizing, resource-constrained Department of Defense, considerable effort was made to develop a strategic approach to the current and anticipated security environment--albeit, an approach considered, in the words of Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, "fiscally responsible" and based on the premise that "barring a major crisis, national defense spending is likely to remain relatively constant in the future."⁷²

The report of QDR 1997 contains a three-page section describing the review's planning assumptions concerning the present and future global security environment. The assumptions were derived primarily from intelligence estimates, including the original limited use publication of the National Intelligence Council study that would be later released as Global Trends 2010.⁷³ Of note is that the 1997 version of the National Security Strategy, also released in May, appears to be based on an earlier set of estimates than Global Trends 2010, and does not incorporate the same language as the QDR. In contrast, the 1998 version--released in October 1998--references the "priority military challenges identified in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review," and adopts significant segments of the exact language of the QDR report.

The Environment to 2015

As summarized in the tables below, QDR 1997 attempted to balance a view of the current environment with limited forecasts to the year 2015. The tables utilize the first two categories described in chapter one: threats and nature of probable conflicts (and anticipated military mission areas). As noted, because the QDR report's future security environment discussion is derived from other sources, it makes no effort to directly identify drivers (third category)--with one significant exception: the role and posture of the United States. The QDR report assumes that the actions of the world's sole superpower remain the most significant driver of international security relations. This is an inherently logical assumption, since, as the saying goes, when the elephant rolls over, the other creatures lying next to her have to move. The QDR report makes this driver clear in the form of a concluding caveat:

Finally, it is important to note that this projection of the security environment rests on two fundamental assumptions: that the United States will remain politically and militarily engaged in the world over the next 15 to 20 years, and that it will maintain military superiority over current and potential rivals. If the United states were to withdraw from its international commitments, relinquish its diplomatic leadership, or relinquish its military superiority, the world would become an even more dangerous place, and the threats to the United States, our allies, friends, and interests would be even more severe.⁷⁴

Regional Dangers

As defined by QDR 1997, the world that the United States faces to the year 2015 is one that presents little or no prospect for war on a global scale, but retains a high propensity for regional crises. Many of these crises will not involve conflict between nations but, instead, constitute conflicts within nations, or situations in which the governmental authority of a particular state has broken down. The latter case, that of failed states, may result from--or correspondingly cause--civil wars, military coups, refugee migrations, or other humanitarian disasters. The events are seen as destabilizing to other nations in the particular region, or to the global international system as a whole. Reflecting overall Clinton administration policy, there is a presumption that, in most cases, such crises ultimately constitute a threat to U.S. national security and will require some degree of American involvement or intervention. From this view, the primary objective of U.S. military power is to provide for international stability so that the political evolutions begun by collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War--the growth of democracy, free markets, and economic integration--can continue to create a more peaceful world.

As previously pointed out, although the actions of the United States are not causes or drivers of these individual regional crises, U.S. actions become the significant driver in restoring the regions to stability. This creates an analytical quandary in that the actions of the United States are forever changing the forecasts for regions in which crises may occur. The quandary is subtly acknowledged in the opening statement by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen to the QDR report in which he admits that "we cannot expect to comprehend fully or predict the challenges that might emerge from the world beyond the time lines covered in normal defense planning and budget."⁷⁸ Since the normal defense planning and budget is done on a biennial basis with budget forecasts no longer than five years, this statement would seem to contradict the future security environment assessment effort found in the QDR, which extends to 2015.
However, it is more likely that the statement by Secretary Cohen is meant to imply a difference between generalized challenges, such as failing states and regional crises, than the occurrence of any specific conflict.

Hedging on Two MTWs

There are, however, two specific regional dangers identified by the QDR 1997 report that entail force greater than that expected to be applied to a SSC. Both are potential threats that pre-date the post-post-Cold War world: the threat of North Korean attack on South Korea, and threats to the stability of the Arabian Gulf region from either Iran or Iraq. In both cases, the United States has considerable military force stationed in the region and a network of alliances and friendships to provide for regional support of American actions. Both are recognized by QDR 1997 as "significant" and "foremost" threats, respectively, and provide the logic for a two-MTW policy. And neither threat has since been resolved.

Unlike the QDR 1997 assessment, many of the other assessments have discounted the potential of major theater war in those particular regions, contributing to a view that the two-MTW approach is strategically and fiscally obsolete. In commenting on the work of the QDR, the National Defense Panel gave scant attention to the two near-simultaneous MTW potential. An invasion by North Korea, in particular, is seen as an issue of the past. "We envision a reconciled, if not a unified, Korean peninsula," states the NDP, focusing their concern on Japanese and Chinese reaction to inevitable Korean unification.⁷⁹ In effect, the QDR global security environment (along with the parent analysis, Global Trends 2010) appears the sole holdout to the growing view that a peaceful reconciliation of North and South Korea would occur in the very near future.

Since 1997, North Korean development of intermediate range ballistic missiles has renewed concerns of potential conflict, although this has not necessarily been reflected in the general trend of futures assessments. The RAND Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century points out that, even after such multiple crises as the fatal 1976 DMZ tree-cutting incident, the 1983 Rangoon bombing that killed 17 high-ranking South Korean officials, and the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear development scare, no direct military clashes occurred between North and South Korea.⁸⁰ Presumably this would indicate the improbability of cross-border invasion during future incidents. However, the staying power of the North Korean regime is itself a caveat to placing any certitude on futures analysis.⁸¹ By all conceivable trends, such as economic decline, marginal agricultural production, and limited access to world resources, North Korea should have already failed.⁸² With this in mind, numerous sources assume an impending reduction in the 36,000 U.S. military personnel currently stationed in the Korean peninsula.⁸³ The NDP recognized that "the risks in Korea remain high," but its report argues that the "challenge in the theater is unique" and not necessarily a strategic justification for the two-MTW construct.⁸⁴

Likewise, the NDP report argues that "our current forces...with the support of allies, should be capable of dealing with Iraq, which still poses a serious threat to the region and appears intent on acquiring an offensive WMD capability."⁸⁵ But having also mentioned Iran as a potential MTW threat in the Southwest Asia region, the NDP report makes no assessment of U.S. capabilities to deal with Iranian capabilities, which are considerably different from and more robust than Iraqi capabilities.

The issue of whether two near-simultaneous MTWs are likely remains a focus of U.S. defense planning. The key point to be made here is that, as an official Department of Defense review, QDR 1997 was required to take a cautious approach on the future resolution of crises. From this perspective, the future security environment of the QDR is more comprehensive in its timeframe (to 2010) than the competing NDP version.

Critiquing QDR 1997

It is the QDR's effort at comprehensiveness that strengthens its position as a natural starting point for comparative analysis. But does it actually encompass a long-range view of American security interests?

As discussed, QDR 1997 used intelligence estimates as its methodological approach. But whether estimates can remain valid for 13 years is questionable. It is also unclear whether alternative-futures work had much influence on its assessment. In contrast, the NDP engaged in alternative scenario development, although, like QDR 1997, it is difficult to discern the impact of the recommendations of the final report.

There is also no discussion of the effects of wild cards on defense strategy in the QDR 1997 report. While that is not a significant criticism in itself--many of the wild cards discussed by futurists would be considered outlandish in a formal governmental assessment--it does suggest that QDR 1997 had no mechanism for incorporating hedging strategies other than two MTWs in developing its study. This is illustrated by the fact that there is no discussion of the use of intensive military force beyond the canonical MTWs of Korea and Southwest Asia. Although the estimate of the lack of a near-peer competitor seems valid, the possibility of a regional competitor more robust than Iraq or North Korea does not seem to have been considered. If security policy is meant as survival insurance, the lack of plans for hedging against a more powerful opponent would be a flaw. Neither Iraq nor North Korea posed a direct threat to the survival of the United States in 1997, nor do they today. But there could be other regional competitors that do, and a conflict involving them could easily require military forces beyond those designed for the canonical cases.⁸⁶

The QDR 1997 report admits the potential for a near-peer competitor beyond the 2010 time frame but sidesteps a discussion of whether the two-MTW force would require modification if unexpected development of a near peer occurred. Obviously, this concern is a prime motivator for the NDP call for "transformation," although at the expense of a two-MTW capability. Again, this points to the issue of incorporating hedging strategies against the unexpected.

Another area that would merit greater concern would be the combat employment of WMD. Although the QDR report expresses concern on WMD proliferation, it sidesteps the discussion of whether the future battlefield will be one of extensive WMD use. The characteristic would be of considerable concern in developing an appropriate future force structure.

Although the QDR 1997 global security environment emphasizes nonstate threats to "Americans at home," the extent of this threat is not clearly defined. If, in fact, the intensity of such threats is anticipated to be high, it would seem logical that significant changes in U.S. force structure might be needed. Such changes are not suggested in the overall report.

Recommendations

In assessing the future security environment, the QDR 1997 appears to do an excellent job in avoiding constraints imposed by fiscal concerns. Conceptual support for the potential for two overlapping MTWs is but one example. However, there are several improvements that could be incorporated into future reviews.

First, the exclusive use of the estimate methodology should give way to a more inclusive blending of estimates, forecasts, and scenarios. The use of estimates only limits the long-term effectiveness of the review. If it is expected that a QDR will be conducted every four years, then it would appear that there is no harm in relying on short-term, yet more sharply defined estimates. However, this would not provide any means of incorporating the reviews into a more comprehensive, long-term plan. The image is of climbing a ladder of which only the next few rungs can be seen. The destination still appears unclear. In terms of the procurement of new defense systems, a process that can extend out to almost twenty years, the short-term view provides little input on the anticipated environment in which the system will be used. This adds to the impression that the Defense Department remains chained to preparing for the last war. Likewise, the life span of major weapons systems may be thirty years or more. Is a short-term estimate the best assessment on which to base the procurement of thirty-plus year systems?

Secondly, a mechanism for incorporating hedging strategies would appear critical if the future security environment is to allow for unexpected events. As part of this mechanism, discussion of the effects of wild cards would also improve comprehensiveness.

Finally, a greater degree of integration is needed in incorporating the implications of the anticipated future security environment with overall defense decisionmaking. This can only be done if upcoming defense reviews avoid isolating the assessment of the future security environment as a preliminary discussion, confined to a small introductory portion of the report. Instead, recommendations should be tied directly to the anticipated future. If the anticipated future is one of WMD use on the battlefield, procuring nonprotected systems would seem hard to justify. Likewise, WMD defenses would seem to be a greater priority.

Of course, as the Yiddish proverb says, if we don't know where we are going, any road will get us there. The first step is to ascertain where the likely roads to the future go.




Table of Contents  |  Chapter Five  |  Endnotes