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McNair Paper 63, All Possible Wars?
Towards a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001-2025, November
2000
Chapter Five
Consensus Views
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Such a derived consensus does not represent absolute agreement by the majority of sources, nor does it represent complete agreement with the proposition by any one particular source. Rather, it is indicative of a collective wisdom that can provide an appropriate baseline assessment for future choices in American defense policy. As discussed above, there are inherent limitations in utilizing collective views of the future. The derived consensus is not meant to be a prediction. It is meant to be a starting point from which choices on appropriate future strategies, policies, and force structure can be developed. Stating consensus views as single sentence propositions, as in the table above, provides a solid core for follow-on detailed discussions, including the identification of dissenting views. Almost every consensus point has a corresponding dissenting or contrary view. In the process of translating the implications of future assessment into policy recommendations, the contrary views certainly deserve consideration, both as caveats to precipitous policy recommendations and as indicators of potential events against which a prudent strategy may attempt to hedge. The following discussions are structured to identify both the details of the consensus view as well as the arguments of prominent dissenters.87 Threats No Rival Ideology During significant periods in history, ideology has been a driver of conflict. Ideology played obvious, if not dominant roles in the American Revolution, the French revolutionary wars, and totalitarian-led conflicts in Europe.88 The propellant of the Cold War was the ideological struggle between democracy and communism as embodied in the United States and Soviet Union, ending in dramatic victory for the West.89 Ideology as an element of history did not end, though the rivalry between democratic capitalism and communism did, at least for the foreseeable future.90 Vestiges of Soviet-style communism are largely confined to North Korea and Cuba.91 China still claims to be a Marxist-Leninist state, but its philosophical focus appears to be on state power based on nationality and ethnicity rather than ideology.92 Even the current Russian Communist Party refuses to admit a direct link to the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).93 Both the current U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy maintain that "our core values of representative democracy and market economics are embraced in many parts of the world, creating new opportunities to promote peace prosperity and enhanced cooperation among nations."94 Consensus View In this regard, the majority of future security environment studies, both governmental and private, cannot identify other ideologies with global appeal and, thus, cannot foresee a competing ideology before at least 2025.95 The expansion of democratic values appears a byproduct of globalization.96 That does not mean there will not be authoritarian nations that claim to be democracies, when in fact their political structure falls far short.97 However--with the exception of one significant dissenter discussed below--the consensus remains that the future will be one of an evolutionary increase in democratic states.98 The consensus view does, however, include room for the potential for public discouragement and disillusionment in democracy and market capitalism.99 The National Security Strategy for a New Century (October 1998 version) expresses concerns that a slowing pace of economic growth could cause resentment of Western-led globalization and a disillusionment with democratic ideals. The report suggests that "if citizens tire of waiting for democracy and free markets to deliver a better life for them, there is real risk that they will lose confidence in democracy and free markets."100 However, the overall report--which is directed at maintaining Congressional support for the Clinton Administration's foreign policy--is overwhelmingly positive on the expansion of democratic values, given continued American encouragement.101 Contrary View Although not professing to be a direct forecast of the future security environment, Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, like his earlier Foreign Affairs article on the topic, advances the thesis that there are cultural challenges to Western-style democracy.102 Huntington's view is that cultural identity plays a significant role in global politics and that there are natural frictions between the ethnic civilizations of our "multipolar, multicivilizational world." In particular, the Islamic culture could pose the greatest challenge to Americanized democratic liberalism. Islam, with its traditional linkage between religious and political authority, appears to be the sole rival philosophy that can claim to be international and not primarily ethnically-based. In contrast, the other cultures identified by Huntington--Sinic, Hindu, Japanese, Orthodox, Latin American, etc.--appear primarily ethnic in origin and do not necessarily reject democracy as a governing principal. However, this claim for the internationalization of Islam has its limits; Islamic culture primarily dominates those regions of historical Arab or Turkish conquest. Likewise, the dominant face of Islam in international politics is that of the Arab states, whose stature is largely based on their oil reserves, an asset that will eventually be depleted. Also, the lack of a separation of authority between religious leaders and government--which is the primary philosophical challenge to Western-style democracy--is a feature of the Arab world and Iran, but not necessarily a reality in secularized Islamic nations, such as Turkey, Pakistan, or Indonesia (although religious leaders are still influential).103 Thus, the challenge of Islam seems to lie in the potential for its radicalization by the so-called Islamic fundamentalists, or by the rejection of Western culture that Huntington characterizes as the "Islamic Resurgence." This resurgence, epitomized in the slogan "Islam is the solution," accepts modernity and development in an Islamic context and, thus, is an alternative to more radical rejection called for by the fundamentalists.104 Huntington points that "in its political manifestation, Islamic Resurgence bears some resemblance to Marxism, with scriptural texts, a vision of the perfect society, commitment to fundamental change, rejection of the powers that be and the nation state..."105 However, he finds the Protestant Reformation a more useful analogy. And indeed, the Protestant Reformation sowed the seeds of a philosophical change in the theory of governance in Europe. The question is whether the Islamic Resurgence is radicalized to the point of seeking a confrontation with the nonIslamic world. Huntington cites authorities who view the OPEC oil price hike in the 1970s as being the spear-tip of such a confrontation.106
Directly contradicting Huntington's implication on the potential rivalry from Islam is the argument advanced in New World Coming: Supporting Research and Analysis that Islamic culture's adaptability to modernity is the very factor that ensures that such a confrontation will not come about; "Islamic neo-orthodoxy is neither militant nor expressly political in nature...and no Muslim countries beyond Iran, Afghanistan, and Sudan, are likely to develop theocratic governments over the next quarter-century."107 Other Mideast regional specialists tend to agree with this view and conclude that "like their secular counterparts, on most issues many No Rival Coalition In terms of cost-benefit analysis, it is hard to conceive of an overriding motive that could encourage a rival coalition of technologically-advanced states, most of which are democratic, to challenge the United States militarily. The foremost preventatives are shared values and the integration of the world economy. It is a long-standing belief that democracies do not go to war with other democracies, and--depending on how one defines democracy--the evidence appears to support such a belief, although there are detractors.110 Those who view globalization as creating constraints on the independent actions of national governments also find scant evidence for the development of rival military coalitions.111 Thomas Friedman, a reporter for The New York Times who has done the most to popularize the current globalization trend, has semi-facetiously put forward his "golden arches theory of conflict"--that no war has ever been fought between nations that have McDonald's hamburger franchises.112 Whether that will remain true in a world in which McDonald franchises are ubiquitous--with restaurants from Moscow to Beijing--is questionable. Yet, the point is that it remains difficult to perceive the development of anti-U.S. military coalitions in light of current trends. On the other hand, nondemocratic states threatened by the expansion of democratic values might prove more likely candidates for an anti-U.S., or more likely, anti-Western coalition. But the common perception is that the expanding information age is causing nondemocratic states to shrink in number.113 Thus, there would be fewer candidates to form such a coalition. Another factor is the natural tendency of autocratic states--driven by nationalistic ideologies--to be reluctant to ally themselves to other equally powerful states.114 There might be the natural fear that a powerful ally could reap a much greater benefit from an anti-Western coalition, thus precluding one's own rise to greater power.115 However, Brian Sullivan points to the fact that conflict alliances can be built by nations who hold traditional or ideological enmities between each other. "Consider how racist Nazi Germany allied with Japan in World War II, or how the atheistic, Communist Soviet Union allied with democratic, capitalist Britain and the United States in that same conflict."116 Sullivan warns that "future alliances and wars could easily present the same peculiar combinations," although he does not forecast the formation of any particular alliance.117 A question to be asked is whether these alliances would ever form before, rather than during an existing conflict. Yet, Stephen M. Walt, in the same edited volume that contains Sullivan's argument, gives nuanced meaning to the theory of democratic peace: "Indeed democracies may well fight other democracies on occasion, but it seems axiomatic that democracies tend to ally with other democracies far easier than with authoritarian states."118 Consensus View It is accepted that economic and political globalization makes it unlikely that a rival coalition could form to challenge the United States militarily. Various nations may express their displeasure at U.S. foreign policies or the overall specter of American "cultural imperialism," but most would have much to lose and little to gain in an anti-U.S. alliance.119 Based on this consensus, Donald Snow goes farther in postulating that the future "First Tier" of nations--centered around the so-called Group of Seven (G-7) economic powers of the United States, Germany, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada--is evolving toward a common post-industrial society and culture based on "shared commitment to political democracy and market economy and their equally shared commitment to enlarging the sway of those values."120 Snow maintains that "the absence of substantial political or economic disagreement among First Tier states makes it virtually impossible to conceptualize military conflict among them."121 Although other critics may speculate, there have been no serious forecasts that the European Union's interest in developing a unified military force independent from NATO will lead to a potential military confrontation with the United States.122 Supporters of the view that a rival coalition is unlikely point to the fact that the desire of lesser-developed nations to join the "First Tier" mitigates the tendency to fuel anti-Western hostility. Russia has been an honorary member of G-7 since 1997. It is likely that China also seeks a closer association with G-7; indeed, in 1999 it was proposed for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO).123 The closer both nations are economically tied to the West, the consensus view argues, the less likely that an anti-United States coalition will be formed.124 Based on current trends, both Russia and China will seek to continue increasing their world trade during the next twenty-five years.125 Contrary View Strategic Paradigm A of Jacquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney's effort postulates a "loose" rival coalition driven by "an increasingly more assertive China aligned with a much weaker, authoritarian Russia."126 Since this appears as a nonlinear trend from the present security environment, Davis and Sweeney explain that in their construct: "Chinese opposition to the United States is not the result of current trends in Sino-U.S. relations...[but] developed following a series of poor policy choices by both Beijing and Washington that have moved them into a more antagonistic posture than either state had intended."127 The primary postulated event is U.S. action to deter a PRC naval blockade of Taiwan in the 2010 timeframe.128 The Paradigm A scenario also postulates that the current U.S. alliance framework has gradually eroded in the wake of Korean unification, development of the European Military Union (EMU), and nuclear proliferation. They argue that "while to some extent a worst-case scenario, the potential for both Japan and Europe to turn inward and leave the United States alone to face a major challenge from China and other states is plausible and, as a parameter for future planning, must be considered."129 Paradigm A is a scenario rather than a forecast, and the authors conclude that "this paradigm is perhaps the least likely to develop by 2025." However, there have been actions that indicate a desire on the part of the Russian leadership for a symbolic rapprochement with China as a way of countering "global domination by the United States," and particularly U.S. criticism of Russian military actions in the separatist republic of Chechnya.130 Additionally, Russia sought in late 1999 to recharge its diplomatic relations with the so-called rogue states.131 Likewise, there have been suggestions that China would seek to put together alliances that "can defuse hegemonism by the U.S."132 However, most other Asian states view China as their primary potential threat and the United States as a balancing power, so their willingness to join such an alliance is very low.133 In the absence of a competing ideology, the possibility of a China-Russia-led coalition would be the worst-case politico-military scenario for the security of the United States. Thus, it would appear that a critical foreign policy goal of U.S. national security would be the peacetime prevention of a China-Russia military alliance.134 No Global Peer Competitor The issue of the rise of a military peer competitor to the United States suffers from a definitional problem. What exactly is a peer competitor? The QDR 1997 report used the analogy of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, stating that "the security environment between now and 2015 will also be marked with the absence of a 'global peer competitor' able to challenge the United States militarily around the world as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War."135 However, QDR 1997 held out the possibility of the emergence of a "regional great power or global peer competitor," with Russia and China "seen by some as having the potential to be such competitors, though their respective futures are quite uncertain."136 The National Defense Panel of 1997 used the term "hostile peer competitor" in order to describe a future threat against which the United States "should take appropriate policy decisions at that time, including mobilization preparation..."137 The NDP also identifies an ongoing "geopolitical revolution that prompted the collapse of the Soviet Union and that will see the emergence of China as a major regional and global actor."138 The debate on whether China will develop into a military peer competitor in the 2001-2025 time frame is extensive, but inconclusive.139 A significant portion of the confusion is on the lack of a standard definition of the term. To develop a standard definition, one must ask the question: what can the Armed Forces of the United States do that those of other nations cannot? The succinct answer is that the United States is capable of projecting its military power on a global basis in a sustained fashion. It is capable of inserting its forces into any region of the world and sustaining them through its unparalleled logistics capabilities, including airlift, sealift, an extensive series of alliances, and expeditionary forces.140
Few nations can project power on a global basis. Potential candidates include the United Kingdom and France, both of which are U.S. allies. In the 1980s, Britain demonstrated long range power projection capabilities in the Falklands War. France routinely projects and sustains forces in francophone Africa. The Soviet Union was able to project long-range The National Defense Panel recognized the uniqueness of U.S. power projection capabilities and described it as the "cornerstone of America's continued military preeminence"144 and as a "central element of U.S. defense strategy."145 The NDP also acknowledged that the Nation can currently "project combat power rapidly and virtually unimpeded."146 That statement can be made of no other nation.147 Consensus View If the term peer competitor is defined in terms of equivalency to the Soviet or by the capacity to sustain global power projection, the consensus view is that a peer competitor cannot develop before 2025.148 It is not simply a question of pursuing the development of power projection capabilities. Rather, 25 years appears too short a time to duplicate American logistics and alliance networks, which result from an effort sustained over half a century. In essence, the United States never fully retreated from its postwar occupation of Germany and Japan and attempted to maintain the good will of its wartime allies--with the exception of the Soviet Union and its occupied satellites, which ironically provided the threat to facilitate this task. To duplicate U.S. reach requires much more than developing the technology for long-range strike, such as with ballistic missiles or long-range bombers. Russia still retains a considerable slice of these capabilities, and can threaten the United States with a strategic nuclear strike from both land and sea.149 China has developed its own ballistic missile submarine that could be positioned to strike the United States, and the United Kingdom and France have the capabilities for strategic nuclear strike, as well.150 But as devastating as such a strike could be, it does not constitute sustained power projection. There is no nation that could transport a significant body of forces to the American homeland and attempt an invasion.151 This contrasts with the American ability to invade anywhere.152 Unless the United States made a deliberate decision to forego its power projection capabilities, there appears a very small possibility, if any, that this conventional asymmetry can be overturned by 2025. Thus, there is no potential for a power projection peer competitor.153 Contrary View Since the end of the Cold War, the Office of Net Assessment has maintained an ongoing study of China's changing military strategy and future military capabilities. This China focus has dovetailed with the corresponding Office of Net Assessment study of the issue of a RMA. While there is no agreement that China could develop into a global peer competitor by 2025, the results of a series of Summer Studies suggest that Chinese power projection capabilities could greatly increase through a sustained effort to harness a RMA.154 The most recent study postulates a plausible future in which China is able to project sustained military power throughout the Asian continent, or, at the very least, prevent the projection of U.S. military power anywhere in Asia.155 This would be a China capable of being a regional peer competitor, rather than a global peer.156 However, this regional potential could be expanded by an informal Asian condominium between China and India.157 Additionally, a Russia-China led alliance could pose the possibility of simultaneous conflicts in multiple regions, which would severely tax the ability of American forces to respond. This would be the closest equivalent to a global peer competitor, but it would still lack the power projection capabilities of the current American defense structure.158 Economic Competitors Propelled by the perception of increasing trade competition between the United States and Japan, the 1990s saw a series of publications suggesting the potential for military conflicts based on economic rivalry. In Japan, several prominent figures indicated dissatisfaction with America's 'bullying' of Japan on economic and security matters.159 In the United States, publication of The Coming War With Japan renewed interest in the once-popular view that war was caused by economic competition and that a war between the two strongest economic powers--separated by vastly difference cultures--was almost inevitable.160 There was a near immediate effort by the official foreign policy establishments of both nations to smother such sentiments.161 Although the particular controversy was even more effectively suppressed--for at least the time being--by the Asian economic downturn of the late 1990s, the view of a linkage between economic conflict and war has remained a lingering byproduct. A staple of Marxist theology and post-First World War assessments, the popular appeal of this linkage was echoed in the oft-stated view that the Gulf War was "all about oil." The potential for China to become an economic power, along with the evolving European Union, have also been cited as precursors to politico-military confrontation with the United States.162 Consensus View Despite popular concerns, the intellectual consensus remains that economic competition need not lead to military confrontation, and that it is very unlikely to do so in the 2001-2025 period. The particulars of U.S.-Japanese economic conflict are largely seen as "reconcilable differences" that will not affect security arrangements.163 The prevailing view of the phenomenon of globalization is that such greater economic interconnection decreases, rather than increases, the potential for military conflict.164 However, concerns have been frequently expressed that unequal rates of globalization may create a world of have and have-not states that will lead to regional instabilities. The benefits of a more integrated global economy may not be felt in societies that are unable to absorb or apply rapidly emerging new technologies. As forecast by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century commission: "New technologies will divide the world as well as draw it together."165 Likewise, globalization holds the potential for increasing competition for resources as potential shortages develop in previously accessible energy sources or such essential natural resources as water.166 Nevertheless, the prevailing view remains that, in the long term, the growth of free markets and new technologies solve more problems than they cause.167 Contrary View One diverging view, however, is that of Stratfor.com, the global forecasting and consulting firm located in Austin, Texas. Heavily influenced by Friedman and Lebard, Stratfor.com admits a contrarian belief in the conflictual nature of globalization and global prosperity: The predominant belief is that prosperity tends to stabilize the international system. We disagree. Paradoxically, increased prosperity and integration tends to increase political instability. Prosperity leads to greater economic integration and dependency resulting in greater insecurity by increasing the importance of international economic relationships and therefore increasing the opportunities for friction. This, in turn, leads to greater insecurity.168 Stratfor.com returns to the 1980s theme of increasing potential for U.S.-Japanese economical conflict. "The greater U.S.-Japanese integration, for example, the greater the need on the part of each nation to control the other's behavior.169 The growing use of "political means...to control economic relationships" does not necessarily lead directly to military conflict. However, it sets the stage for such conflicts to eventually develop between the major economic powers. "Prosperity and instability--as we saw from 1900-1914--frequently go hand in hand. Thus, the paradox of the next decade will be that increased global prosperity will lead to increased global instability."170 Like the QDR 1997 report, Stratfor.com sees the actions of the world's greatest political-economic-military power as the prime driver of the international system. The fact that most nations want to be economically more like the United States does not guarantee an increasing harmony of interests. This happy economic picture does not face an equivalently happy political and military picture. That is not to say that this decade will experience a systemic, convulsive war like the Napoleonic Wars, World War I or World War II. Nor will it see a singular systemic confrontation, like the Anglo-French confrontation of the 18th Century or the Cold War. These will happen, but not in this time frame. Rather, the next decade will be a period of increasing disharmony both between nations and within nations. Underneath it all will be a singular political question: how will the international system cope with the growing power of the United States, and what will the United States do with its growing power?171 Regional Military Challengers The threat that regional powers will challenge the U. S. militarily and seek to prevent the United States from projecting power into their regions is universally considered the primary challenge that U.S. foreign and defense policy will face in the first decades of the 21st century. "Regional dangers" is the term used over and over again to describe the potential for "the threat of coercion and large-scale, cross-border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with significant military power."172 Initially, the prime regional threat was thought to be in Northeast Asia: predictable actions (or collapse) of North Korea, the world's last true Stalinist state. The second was, in Southwest Asia, the even more unpredictable actions of an unrepentant Saddam Hussein in Iraq, or--by implication--the simmering hostility of Iran toward its Arabian Gulf neighbors and the West.173 This is the basis for the two MTW force posture adopted by the United States; as previously discussed, these threats are eminently plausible under current conditions.174 However, they do not necessarily represent the most demanding threats of the future in terms of capabilities. Clearly, those nations that have access to a large pool of trainable manpower and can sustain sophisticated defense industries and produce significant quantities of relatively modern weaponry would be the most difficult foes to face. From that perspective, there is clearly a rank order of potential (and current) regional military powers. Within this order, almost every futures assessment identifies Russian and China as having the greatest potential for regional dominance.175 As New World Coming states: "Major powers--Russian and China are two obvious examples--may wish to extend their regional influence by force or the threat of force."176 In terms of strategic weapons systems, Russia remains the most formidable.177 Despite the economic turmoil of its difficult transition to a market economy, it retains considerable technological expertise and industrial capacity for the development of highly sophisticated weapons systems, such as nuclear submarines, fighter aircraft, and tactical rockets and artillery.178 Available manpower has been significantly reduced since the secession of the former Soviet republics; however, continuing conscription can supply a relatively large military force. As is evident from exercises and operations in Chechnya, training of regular units may be very weak.179 However, Russian (former Soviet) doctrine has always emphasized that the use of special forces, and extensive training of small numbers of highly effective personnel is quite supportable.180 Additionally, Russia retains access to a large space launch infrastructure, and is currently the only state capable of mounting a challenge to America's almost complete dominance of the military use of space.181 China is viewed in an analogous position as Russia--a regional power, but under current conditions, not absolutely dominant within its region. Just as expansion of Russian power could be checked by NATO, Chinese expansion could be stymied by a loose alliance of economically strong Asian nations backed by the United States.182 In the past, China has viewed itself as ringed by potential opponents, from Japan to India.183 However, unlike Russia, China is viewed as having considerable economic potential that could fuel an extremely robust military expansion.184 Some sources suggest that China could have the world's largest gross domestic product (GDP) by 2025.185 While other sources view such a forecast as unrealistic, the fact remains that the world's business community views China as a vast future market and emerging economic power, based primarily on its tremendous population. At the same time, China is committed to the rapid absorption of advanced technology, particularly military technology.186 Chinese interest in the debate concerning an information-based RMA has been noted.187 Whether or not Chinese military effectiveness grows at the alarming rate some suggest, it is obvious that China's military potential will grow.188 China also appears to have the greatest likelihood among the current military powers of sparking a regional conflict to achieve its political aims.189 The future of Taiwan is not simply an unresolved irredentist claim, but--in the perspective of the mainland--a continuing challenge to the legitimacy of the Beijing government.190 Even though Beijing has been successful in diplomatically isolating Taiwan and has been recognized in all international forums as the government of China, Communist party cadres will never consider their revolution complete until Taiwan, the last bastion of the Kuomintang, submits to their authority.191 Ironically, formal Taiwanese declaration of independence from the mainland--which would end any pretext of Kuomintang rule under the "one China" policy through the simple recognition of reality--is viewed as a greater threat than if Taiwan remains an unconquered part of China.192 In the circumstance of formal independence--or if it appears that Taiwan is unable to put up significant resistance--it is likely that Beijing would act on its stated policy of conducting a military assault on the island.193 Unless the United States were to ignore its history of support for Taiwanese self-determination, and give up the pretext of preventing international aggression, the result would be a regional war.194 Fueling the potential for regional war is the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) view of the United States as their foremost military opponent in the future security environment.195 India, which demographically and technologically is the dominant power of South Asia, has long attempted to reduce U.S. (and other Western) influence in its region.196 However, with the collapse of its client relationship with the Soviet military-industrial complex, India has had to back away from its pseudo-hostility toward American power. Although conflict with Pakistan appears a constant possibility, the situation differs markedly from the Cold War, when the United States supported an anti-Soviet Pakistan.197 A regional war involving the United States and India would be an unlikely occurrence, as there are incentives to warmer relations.198 The European Union (EU), Japan, and Australia could be viewed as regional powers. However, all are American allies--although, as previously noted, there is potential for future economic or even political tensions, particularly with Japan.199 Other potential or de facto regional powers, such as Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, have positive relations with the United States and lack any significant issue of contention that would cause them to challenge the United States militarily.200 Several additional rogue states, such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya, have the potential of becoming military powers in their region, particularly through the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.201 Rogue state scenarios are considered the basis for two MTW planning.202 However, it is also likely that rogue states would seek to use terrorism or other deniable means, rather than confront the United States directly.203 Consensus View It is likely that one or more of the rogue states (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya) may seek to militarily challenge the United States in the near term.204 Such an assessment is based on current hostilities, plans or desire for regional dominance, propensity for aggressive military action, or a pattern of anti-U.S. military activity. In a longer-term view, the potential for conflict with a major regional power may grow, with Russia or China as the most difficult potential military opponents. This assessment is based on the historical experience of the international system, and multipolar and balance of power international politics.205 However, there is no consensus as to which regional power or rogue state is likely to take action at any particular time. As noted, the staying power of the North Korean regime and Saddam Hussein has contradicted previous forecasts of their demise.206 Contrary View Among the sources surveyed, there are no significant arguments that a regional conflict is unlikely before 2025. However, there is a perception that effective United States actions, along with a well-trained and technologically superior military, could deter such conflict. Likewise, astute management of relations with Russia, China, and India may prevent the development of hostilities.207 Other sources argue that hostile states are simply too weak to mount a credible military threat to the overwhelming power of the Armed Forces.208 However, a pessimistic view of the constant potential for regional conflict has settled in, primarily as a result of intellectual disappointment with the short tenure of the euphorically proclaimed "new world order."209 More Failing States The terms failed state and failing state have been increasingly used to describe nations that cannot provide law, order, or basic human necessities to their populations. Such states may be wracked by civil war, tribal divisions, ideological or ethnic hatreds, or other conflicts that prevent the central government from providing internal security or promoting general prosperity. While the internal consequences of such disorder have long been recognized, the external effects within the international environment have not always been considered a security threat to distant, stable nations. However, with growing industrialization, the stability of sources of raw materials and markets became important to the world's major powers, largely precipitating the age of colonialism. Although the colonial age has ended, increasing economic interdependence and the ubiquitous nature of information have ensured that stability of peripheral states remain critical to the core industrial/informational nations.210 Instability in the economic periphery can cause direct effects in the economic core, from energy and resource shortages to monetary flight. This interdependence is forecast to continue. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century highlights, for example, the importance of stability in oil-producing regions: "American dependence on foreign sources of energy will also grow over the next two decades. In the absence of events that alter the price of oil, the stability of the world oil market will continue to depend on an uninterrupted supply of oil from the Persian Gulf, and the location of all key fossil fuel deposits will retain geopolitical significance."211 The QDR 1997 report identifies failed and failing states as potential future security challenges for the United States. As the report states, "failed or failing states may create instability, internal conflict, and humanitarian crises, in some cases within regions in which the United States has vital or important interests."212 Identifying countries ranging "from Albania to Zaire," the report postulates a continuum of results from failed governments that includes the "massive flow of migrants across international borders," and even prompting "aggressive action by neighboring states or even mass killings."213 However, the question of exactly where the United States has vital or important interests fuels the argument that American efforts to restore order in failed states is largely a humanitarian effort that does little to increase U.S. national security. And indeed, U.S. interventions in Somalia and Haiti during the Bush and Clinton administrations were largely justified on humanitarian grounds. Most telling is the precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia following the ambush of U.S. Rangers and the resulting public debate. Presumably, such a precipitous withdrawal would not have occurred if the Clinton administration considered the stability of Somalia a vital, or even important security interest of the United States.214 Likewise, the current political and economic drift of Haiti--even after the restoration of elected government by U.S. military forces--does not seem to have sparked much debate concerning the vital nature of American interests in that unfortunate state.215 Efforts to promote democracy--a significant component of foreign policy in the early Clinton administration--appear to no longer be justified on the basis of increased international security.216 However, there are still compelling arguments for American intervention to stop genocide or massive loss of life.217 Such arguments contributed to the American decision to prompt NATO intervention in Kosovo. But given the nature of democratic politics, such intervention ultimately remains discretionary.218 Consensus View The consensus of the sources appears to mirror the above debate. On the one hand, the future international system is seen as containing an increasing number of failed states, while the effects of the collapse of the Soviet empire, the legacy of colonialism, and increasing globalization all play out. As the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century describes it: "Fragmentation or failure of states will occur, with destabilizing effects on neighboring states."219 Africa and the Middle East are seen as being particularly vulnerable to such destabilization.220 On the other hand, the cumulative effect of the occurrences of failed states is not seen as requiring intervention in order to protect U.S. national security, except in isolated instances.221 In this scenario, the United States retains considerable discretion as to whether it should become militarily involved, even when pushed by reports in news media.222 One of the isolated instances would be the collapse of control by the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang. North Korea, with its population facing starvation and its diplomatic isolation, is categorized by many as already having failed.223 However, the North continues to defy the once prolific forecasts of its imminent demise.224 The most frightening scenario of a total failure in North Korea is that of a destructive, vengeful war against South Korea that could include ballistic missile attacks with chemical or even nuclear weapons.225 America's security relationship with the South and the presence of U.S. military forces would irrefutably place this in the vital interest category.226 Yet, curiously and perhaps reflecting the ambiguity concerning the impact of failed states in the 2000-2025 time-frame, many of the future security environment assessments foresee a unified, perhaps nuclear-capable Korea (led by the South Korean government) as a greater threat to regional security than a collapsing, vengeful, and heavily armed North Korea that is capable of striking U.S. (and Japanese) forces in Japan.227 Like earlier forecasts, Korean unification is seen as a given during the 2000-2025 period.228 Other problematic failing states would include the collapse of a key regional friend or ally.229 However, forecasts on individual states are met with counter-arguments, prompting such key failures to be placed in the wildcard category rather than as part of an anticipated future.230 Contrary View Few if any sources are willing to categorically forecast a future security environment in which significant numbers of failed states do not occur.231 There are, however, optimistic scenarios that are envisioned, even in the case of Africa.232 But even the most optimistic sources include caveats along these lines: "Central to this positive evolution will also be stemming the conflict and instability that has wracked so much of the region for so long."233 While some sources suggest an increase in the desire to actively stem such conflict, others point to an increasing reluctance on the part of most nations to become involved. Additionally, arguments have been made that advocates of intervention underestimate the complexity of involvement, and that such involvement is often counter-productive.234 Unambiguously positive assessments of a future with fewer failing states are largely confined to normative prescriptions masquerading as forecasts.235 More Nonstate Threats The term nonstate threats is used to denote those threats to national security that are not directly planned or organized by a nation-state. Today, foremost among these threats are acts of terrorism other than those sponsored by a rogue state. However, there is a loosely defined spectrum of nonstate threats, increasing in intensity from humanitarian disasters to mass migrations, to piracy, to computer network attack, to organized international crime and drug trafficking, to terrorism with conventional weaponry, to terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The National Defense Panel of 1997 referred to such activities as "transnational threats;" however, the latter term implies that such threats could be subject to multinational control. Indeed, the NDP report states: "Transnational challenges and threats, by definition, reside in more than one country and require a multipartner response."236 This need for a multipartner response creates distinctions between the NDP report, other definitions of transnational threats, and those sources using the term, "nonstate threats." Although nonstate threats may cross boundaries, it is not assumed that a multinational response is the sole means of defense. Additionally, the term "transnational threats" can also be applied to dangers that are generated through nation-state action.237 The subtle difference between the two terms creates a degree of analytical confusion when comparing the recommendations of the NDP to those of the 1997 QDR or other sources. The 1999 version of the National Security Strategy simply states "transnational threats include terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime, and illegal trade in fissile materials and other dangerous substances."238 For the purpose of this study, transnational threats will be viewed as a subset of nonstate threats. The term nonstate can also apply to international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and multinational interest groups. The degree that the activities of such entities are seen as threats to the security of nation-states varies according to philosophical views of the world system. Those holding the belief that an international system dominated by nation-states is the cause of war have long advocated multinational or nonstate solutions. During the 1970s and 1980s, numerous scholarly sources postulated, with varying degrees of support or condemnation, that the international system was soon to be readjusted and that the power of the nation-state would severely decline, with the void filled by international organizations, multinational corporations, and NGOs.239 This was fueled by perennial forecasts/advocacy of an increasingly effective UN organization, world federalism, or other multilateral arrangement for governance that would supercede the sovereignty of individual nation-states.240 To some extent such multilateral arrangements have superceded national sovereignty on a regional basis, the most apparent success being the developing European Union. However, the speed at which such arrangements have emerged has not kept pace with the optimistic forecasts. And for every effort at multilateral institutions that appears to succeed, other institutions fail or become weaker, such as the waning influence of OPEC or the weakness of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in completing peace keeping missions on the African continent.241 At their core, multilateral arrangements are still dependent on the voluntary compliance of member nation-states.242 Alarmist predictions that nonstate actors, issues and threats would overwhelm and break the abilities of most nation-states to deal with them have simply not materialized.243 Nations that have collapsed into anarchy have largely been victims of civil wars, a phenomenon that long precedes the current definition of nonstate threats.244 Many of these civil wars have been fueled or supported by foreign parties, international actors, or other nations. To that extent, nonstate or transnational threats do contribute to such internal collapse, but in ways that have been relatively consistent throughout history.245 Thus, as most of the sources that identify a growth in the number of nonstate threats in the future generally acknowledge, the development of nonstate threats to the national-state systems appears as an evolutionary, rather than an exponential rise.246 Nation-states are as vulnerable as the choices they make--such as for greater commercial dependence on the Internet or for wider ranging free trade agreements--require or permit them to be.247 As a commercial phenomenon, globalization has tied the economies of advanced states tighter together, but such ties are not historically irreversible, and it is unclear what the effects of a major downturn in the global economy might be on the process of globalization itself. Individually, some states will choose greater degrees of autarky than others, cutting their vulnerability to certain nonstate threats. For example, states that erect significant physical barriers to immigration will be less vulnerable to the effects of mass migrations than those that do not. Likewise, the growth of nonstate actors will likely continue, but does not necessarily threaten the independent powers or national security of nation-states.248 To some extent, the increasingly public roles of NGOs are recognized as matters of convenience; they are performing missions or functions that states do not choose to do, or can save resources by allowing someone else to do them. Humanitarian NGOs are the most notable in carrying out missions that provide for the public good, but that no one state is responsible or can necessarily afford. At the same time, many humanitarian NGOs are becoming increasing dependent on governmental funding for their activities, an issue that is being debated within the traditionally independent NGO community.249 This reinforces the arguments that NGOs function as surrogates rather than supplants. Even the most aggressive issue-oriented NGOs have found limits to their ability to challenge national sovereignty.250 On issues in which popular opinion is at odds with governmental policy, it is recognized that NGOs can galvanize opinion to change national policies, or even affect international policies by promoting a degree of discomfort for a certain state. A prime example is the Greenpeace-led campaign to change Japanese and Russian policy toward whaling. However, when a Greenpeace chapter attempted to prevent the U.S. Navy from conducting an underwater test launching of submarine launched ballistic missiles by positioning a vessel in the launch area, they were rammed, towed, and arrested without a flutter in popular opinion.251 Likewise, Greenpeace opposition to the deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm caused such a significant loss in contributions in the United States that a number of local chapters quickly backed away from that position. In such cases, considered matters of national security, governmental power was in no way diminished. Internet interest groups are another form of NGO that has been identified by some sources as having the potential to reduce the loyalty of individuals toward national identity. As the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century finds: "New technologies will divide the world as well as draw it together."252 Their finding suggests the development of a "cyber-class of people" consisting of educated elites with "greater mobility and emigration."253 However, the existence of such sub-cultures is not without precedent, and does not necessarily presage the development of an increasing array of alternative loyalties. As New World Coming concedes, an anti-technology backlash is conceivable.254 It is also conceivable that members of the new cyber-class may be more competitive than cooperative. Psychologists have suggested that the anonymity of Internet users can lead to an increase of anti-social behavior.255 Critics of economic globalization have pointed out that the Internet may allow more corporations the opportunity to avoid taxation by transferring operations to those nations with more favorable tax laws.256 To some extent this can be seen as a nonstate threat to security. However, it is likely that advanced states will find a host of legal remedies to prevent significant effects. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century has identified the evolutionary nature of nonstate threats through the juxtaposition of two of their findings. The growth of nonstate and transnational threats is acknowledged by the observation that: "All borders will be more porous; some will bend and some will break." But at the same time, the resilience of the nation-state in retaining its role as primary international actor is recognized by the finding that: "The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but will endure."257 Consensus View The consensus of the sources is that nonstate threats will increase in number and intensity in the future. However, this anticipated increase parallels vulnerabilities that are by-products of the evolutionary process of globalization. There is not enough evidence to suggest that states cannot take measures to reduce their vulnerability, if they so choose. Logically, the technologies that fuel globalization, and presumably are the heart of increasing vulnerability, should be able to solve as many nonstate problems as they create. Other nonstate threats such as terrorism and international crime may seem more potent due to the advantages modern technologies may bring to the perpetrator. However, the same or other modern technologies can be used to strengthen defenses. The wave of increasing nonstate threats will likely be closely followed by a wave of technologies to defeat them. But it must be admitted that this does not solve the near-term problems of terrorism, particularly if terrorist groups come in possession of WMD.258 An occurrence of this nature is such an obvious legal and security threat that most sources assume increased levels of vigilance and effort by law enforcement agencies and the armed forces are needed to deter, defend against, and react to such threats.259 The consensus view is not sanguine about the near-term potential for terrorist incidents. Yet, the level of current and future vulnerability of societies to terrorism is still hotly debated.260 Similarly, the majority of sources view the influence of NGOs as increasingly important, though only indirect affecting international security. The treaties and understandings they have traditionally fostered and supported cannot guarantee security without voluntary enforcement by sovereign powers. Efforts to ban the use of land mines, like previous efforts to ban the use of submarines or poisonous gas, ultimately rely on the self interest of supporting states. The consensus remains that, although NGOs may become more ubiquitous, their power will not supplant that of nation-states in the 2001-2025 timeframe. Contrary View There are no sources that are willing to maintain that nonstate threats will not increase in the 2001-2025 time frame. However, some sources do view the rise of these threats as exponential in nature, and they indicate more alarm than the consensus view might imply. Of particular concern is the possibility of terrorism with WMD, also known as "catastrophic terrorism."261 However, since terrorist attacks can be part of an overall military attack by a hostile state, this threat straddles the line from nonstate threats to asymmetrical attacks, which are the subject of another consensus point.262 It is assumed that development of WMD or information warfare would be easier for a nation-state and its physical infrastructure and resources than it would be for a nonstate terrorist group.263 Military Technology Diffusion of Technology The category of advanced military technology is rather broad and constitutes a spectrum of technologies or innovative uses of technology developed during the last few decades. This spectrum, arrayed in terms of the destructiveness of the products of advanced technology, ranges from emerging biological weaponry and other weapons of mass destruction, to new forms of nonlethal weapons including information operations using mass media.264 Because of the dynamism of technological development, "advanced" remains a relative term. Yet, in discussing military capabilities, it is possible to identify technologies within the reach of only a few of the world's armed forces. Initially, the resulting advanced weapons are often produced in small quantities because of difficulty in manufacture. However, they may later proliferate as technology advances and cheaper techniques are developed. Currently, such advanced weaponry includes highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, fourth-generation aircraft (complex surveillance, detection, tracking and targeting equipment), surface-to-air missiles, nuclear powered submarines, and numerous other relatively high-cost systems. Some of these systems can be readily purchased from the manufacturers, although most nations place export controls on their front-line weapons. However, a cash-strapped Russia has recently sold advanced weapons systems that it would not transfer during the Cold War, such as the SS-N-22 Sunburn (Russian: Moskit) anti-ship missile.265 Advanced weapons are sometimes sold illegally. Other dual-use (military and commercial) technology has been legally transferred under the guise of commercial contract. The controversy generated by the sale of U.S. computing and satellite launch technology to China, which the Chinese are reputed to have used in enhancing their ballistic missile lethality and accuracy, is but a recent example.266 Development (and to some extent, use) of advanced military systems requires a mastery of diverse technologies, from missile and satellite guidance to high-energy power sources. However, much of the underlying scientific knowledge can be obtained from readily available open-source literature. Most states have at least a small indigenous intellectual infrastructure capable of translating scientific advances into technical applications. More importantly, the university systems of the advanced nations are generally open to students of all nationalities, allowing the diffusion of scientific and engineering knowledge throughout the world. Thus, nations seeking to apply older, available technology to new military system generally have or can gradually obtain an indigenous knowledge base from which to proceed. This indigenous base can be extended by the hiring of foreign scientists, technologists or engineers. Hence, the frequently expressed concern about the post-Soviet collapse hiring of Russian technologists by rogue states.267 When an indigenous or hired knowledge base is applied to the improvement or upgrade of weapons systems already available on the world market, the results can be the development of an advanced system that outclasses other regional militaries. Both North Korea and Iraq, along with other states, were able to extend the range of ballistic missiles originally sold to them by the Soviet Union. This indigenous capability, with its relatively low cost, is a factor in the assessment that ballistic missiles (and cruise missiles) will be "weapons of choice" in the 2001-2025 timeframe.268 Both India and Pakistan were able to translate their civilian nuclear power capability, by means of secret programs and, possibly, outside assistance, into nuclear weapons. There is the significant potential that less technologically advanced nations can convert commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) into military capabilities through use of unique or unexpected applications, a process for which Paul Bracken has coined the term "sidewise technology."269 In addition, considerable military electronic technology has become commercialized. A primary example is the Global Positioning System (GPS), an aid to navigation that was used extensively by the United States and the allied coalition in the Persian Gulf War, but was unavailable to the Iraqis.270 GPS is now commercially available, although not necessarily with military standards of precision. However, these standards could be reverse-engineered. Consensus View The consensus of the sources is that advanced military technology will continue to become more diffuse through sales, modification of dual-use systems, and indigenous weapons development programs. Although international export control regimes may exist for certain types of advanced weapons, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), these agreements appear to be as easily circumvented as enforced. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century points out that Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and India have all effectively foiled the MTCR.271 Thus far, control regimes appear to have slowed potential nuclear weapons development by rogue states. However, Iraq--a nation that suffered such a crushing military defeat--continues to play cat-and-mouse games with the international inspectors mandated by the peace treaty. Evidence indicates that there are other covert proliferation efforts. At the same time, the scientific knowledge that forms the basis for many military technologies flows freely.272 To some extent, it is inherent in the freedom of information in modern democracies. But it becomes even more difficult in a more globalized and Internet-linked international environment to keep genies in their bottles. That does not mean that nations will not attempt to control their technological secrets, particularly precise details in the manufacture of advanced weapons. But it does mean that knowledge can be focussed so as to replicate these secrets. Such focusing requires considerable financial resources, which is why not every nation can replicate every technology. But it is possible that certain nations, particularly rogue states, might choose to focus their resources on a particular technology, thereby being able to duplicate or supercede the most advanced systems of the advanced states in that particular niche.273 Contrary View Although there are sources that endorse greater efforts to negotiate and strengthen weapons control regimes, none argue that military technology will not continue to become more diffuse in the 2001-2025 period. In fact, it is the alarm at which military technologies are spreading that prompts the more urgent calls for international controls. Under current circumstance, proliferation of advanced systems appears to be but a matter of time and resources. Commercially Available Intelligence Information is the prime necessity for military operations with high-technology weapons. The precision attacks demonstrated in the Gulf War could only be achieved by real-time, targeting-quality information gathered by a sophisticated network of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors. In the case of the United States, this capability is largely a byproduct of the national technical means (NTM) developed during the Cold War to detect nuclear attack or significant conventional force movement by the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War allowed the United States to reorient portions of the global NTM network and combine it with operational and tactical military ISR systems in order to provide combat forces with a more complete view of potential battle spaces. NTM still remain a prime element of U.S. nuclear deterrence, its application has broadened to the point that separation between strategic and tactical information has begun to dissolve. At the same time, corresponding Russian global ISR capabilities have generally eroded, allowing the United States to develop an unprecedented information advantage over possible antagonists. Although NATO ISR is nominally independent--and other U.S. friends and allies have developed their own, albeit limited, ISR systems--the reality is that these systems either rely on support from U.S. ISR or are unable to provide a real time picture beyond their own immediate regions, or are focused solely on potentially opposing strategic nuclear forces (such as those of Russia or China). In the near term, real time global information suitable for military targeting is primarily an American commodity.274 The availability and quality of commercial satellite imagery, however, continues to increase. SPOT Image Corporation, for example, can provide digital imagery of 10-meter resolution for much of the world.275 Although this information is rarely real time, due to the expense of permanent satellite coverage, the use of commercial information for military planning before the start of hostilities makes perfect sense. If the number of commercial remote sensing and digital imagery satellites increase as predicted, the cost of their products should logically decrease, putting them within the range of even nonstate actors.276 The U.S government has actively encouraged remote sensing commercialization as a cost effective method of providing non-real time military information.277 But it is also possible that an increased number of dedicated satellites could provide real time imagery for customers other than the U.S. military.278 Militarily important imagery could also be covertly obtained by weather and environmental monitoring satellites. Yet, satellite imagery is but one portion of the U.S military ISR effort, a network that includes land-based radars, manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and intelligence gathering by submarine and other platforms. Although the great increases in computing power makes the fusion of multiple source information faster and more affordable, it would be difficult for a potential opponent to develop an ISR network of the scope of the U.S. effort. Admittedly, an opponent would not necessarily need a system for global reconnaissance, and might opt for one focussed on the immediate region. But a regional system would not be effective in detecting and tracking U.S. forces before their entry into the region, thus, allowing the United States a capacity for surprise. Use of commercial systems monitoring North America or other regions might eliminate this capabilities gap. The issues of when real-time imagery will become commercially available, and whether commercial interests would continue to sell imagery to a rogue state or other nation at war against the United States or American allies, are contentious. Even if real-time imagery were available, the commercial interests involved would likely be Western-led corporations with greater ties to the United States and allies than any other states. Under such circumstances, it would be natural for these corporations to cut off information to states conducting a war against the United States. However, critics have argued that we cannot assume that multinational corporations would retain a sense of national loyalty, and they might find the trade in wartime imagery particularly lucrative. Consensus View
Given the current trends in space launch and commercialization, the consensus is that operational intelligence--primarily satellite imagery--will become more and more commercially available. The potential for such a market is growing. The U.S. Commission on National Yet, reflecting the consensus view, the commission forecasts that the United States "will, however, maintain a preponderant edge, using its technical systems to produce timely and usable information."280 The infrastructure necessary is simply too difficult to create except through the obvious expenditure of considerable resources. At the same time, the consensus view concerning militarily-significant commercial information is that it would be available to a potential aggressor until the commencement of hostilities, but would be voluntarily or covertly shut down upon the initial attack.281 It is hard to conceive of a circumstance where even the most independent of multinational corporations would care to jeopardize future contracts with the United States or American allies. Actions by the IRS or by civil lawsuit round out the less forceful end of potential incentives. But the fact that operational intelligence would not remain available during conflict may be of little consolation, since the information obtained during pre-hostilities would be sufficient to target fixed sites, such as land bases, in advance. The use of WMD might also make the need for real-time targeting information moot. Contrary View None of the sources surveyed suggested that operational intelligence will not become commercially available in the 2001-2025 timeframe. Opposition to the consensus view revolved around two points: (1) that satellite information is largely irrelevant to the most likely threats the United States military will face--Third World anarchy and tribal warriors, and (2) that a cutoff of commercial imagery during hostilities cannot be presumed.282 U.S. Lead in RMA The concept of an ongoing RMA dominates the work of the Office of Net Assessment and propels advocates to make wide-ranging proposals for the transformation of U.S. military forces.283 But the debate over what exactly constitutes an RMA still ongoing, and there are numerous skeptical voices.284 Yet, there are a number of advances in military technology that are frequently cited as evidence that an RMA is underway, and even skeptics concede that these advances have had a tremendous effect on warfighting. Advances in information processing and command and control are cited most frequently, with digitalization of the battlefield and more availability of real-time information at the command level being the expected results. When this advanced information processing capability--referred to as battle management--is combined with advanced sensors, particularly space-based sensors, command and control of military forces are significantly enhanced. Some proponents claim that new ISR technology and battle management systems have dispelled the fog of war that has previously prevented the commander from having a thoroughly accurate picture of the battlefield.285 Another class of systems frequently linked to the RMA is precision weapons. The significant increase in accuracy of cruise missiles and air-launched ordnance has indeed increased the lethality of modern striking power, in turn, reducing the number of platforms and weapons required to achieve a desired effect. This was quite evident from the earliest stages of Operation Desert Storm. At the same time, advances in stealth technology have made strike platforms more survivable against air defense systems. Combining precision strike and stealth, along with the continuing development of stand-off systems (weapons that can be fired from beyond the reach of the defender) creates an exponential increase in the ability of modern platforms to strike previously difficult targets with great accuracy. The advances in ISR and battle management allow for greater detection of these targets, and efficient processing of information from sensor to shooter. Other technological advances, from biological weapons to highly miniaturized weapons, or nanosystems, are also taken as indicators of an RMA.286 These new technologies are frequently seen as pushing modern warfare away from the bloody killing fields of ground combat.287 Critics of the RMA concede that the importance of the advances in military technology have greatly increased the striking power of modern militaries. However, they argue that such advances have not changed the fundamentals of warfare, and that victory ultimately requires closing with the enemy and occupying territories or destroying centers of gravity.288 Even the U.S. Commission of National Security/21st Century, which provides general support for the argument than an RMA is underway, acknowledges that "the essence of war will not change...[and will include] casualties, carnage and death; it will not be like a video game."289 Whatever the particulars of the RMA, it would seem natural for militaries to increase their capabilities vis-à-vis potential opponents through mastery of emerging technology. There are historical examples of the rejection of advanced military technology, the abandonment of musketry by the Japanese Shogunate being one such case. Arms control agreements are also direct or indirect inhibitors of the advancement of some military technologies. However, the history of warfare--like the overall history of humankind--reflects a thirst for technological advancement. Potential opponents seek to gain advantages over each other, and qualitative technological advancement generally appears to be the most effective method. If, in fact, the U.S. military is in the midst of an RMA that is making the weaponry of potential opponents obsolete, it seems logical that these potential opponents would seek to grasp the fruit of the revolution and seek to find areas in which they can exploit new technologies to counter U.S. advantages. But pursuing an RMA requires resources. Most, if not all, potential opponents of the United States and its allies cannot afford to devote the level of financial resources that the world's largest gross national product (GNP) can provide.290 Either they must attempt to uniquely capitalize on technological information made available to them, or must concentrate their resources on a technological niche in which they can gain at least a temporary advantage.291 Both attempts hold some potential for providing temporary advantages. COTS equipment now dominates digitalization. Such systems can be purchased even by countries that lack a sophisticated technological infrastructure. Through "sidewise" innovation, it would be possible for less technologically-advanced states to develop unexpected weapons. Likewise, it is possible to outspend the United States or other advanced nations in a particular area of military technology, particularly if developments in that area do not appear promising to the United States. Advanced, long-range cruise missiles are now seen as systems that provide the United States with a considerable military advantage. Often forgotten is that the United States largely abandoned cruise missile technology in the early 1960s, in order to pursue more promising advances in ballistic missiles.292 Even while seeking to match or surpass the United States in ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union attempted to exploit the advantages provided by their continued cruise missile development in the 1960s and 1970s.293 For a while, they did hold a lead in the category of anti-ship missiles. However, it would seem very difficult for potential opponents to challenge the overall technological lead of the United States and its allies.294 Arguably, the one significant past attempt resulted in bankruptcy for the potential opponent. Part of the reason is the commercial push present in the advanced countries that encourages across-the-board development in technology.295 Although the results of research and development (R&D) can be spread through globalization, the United States maintains the largest technological infrastructure as well as the higher education system that trains most of the world's advanced technologists. Increasing amounts of commercial computer code may be written in India and other less overall technologically-advanced nations, but it is largely at the direction (or at least economic sufferance) of Silicon Valley. Even U.S. allies, whose scientific skills match those of the United States, find it difficult to keep up with America's in fielding high-technology military systems.296 Consensus View Potential opponents may pursue the RMA through the development of advanced weaponry, but--barring an economic disaster in the West--they cannot surpass the overall U.S. lead in advanced military technologies in the 2001-2025 timeframe. Certain niche technologies, such as advances in chemical and biological warfare or the development of nanosystsem weapons--which would be easier to transport and deploy in space or on earth--could provide a temporary technological lead in specific areas.297 Developing a niche, such as in WMD, could literally provide a state with limited resources more bang for the buck, but it would be unlikely that such a specific development would make the entire U.S. arsenal obsolete, or completely paralyze national level decisionmaking. At the same time, the overall U.S. technological lead would likely facilitate the development of defenses against these advantages, or at least methods of mitigating the threat.298 Contrary View While conceding America's current overall lead in military technology, several sources point to alarming trends. From their perspective, the United States is not producing enough American engineers and scientists to maintain the knowledge capital to retain the overall technological lead.299 Worse, from this perspective, the American university system is educating technologists loyal to potential opponents.300 Eventually other states could take technological leadership. Other sources argue that the United States is not taking the RMA seriously and, therefore, is squandering our technological lead.301 In this view, the Department of Defense continues to spend money on legacy systems, but, at the same time, underfunds both basic and advanced R&D, and experimentation.302 This combination gives opponents an opportunity to leapfrog over the capabilities of our formidable arsenal and make our overall technological superiority moot.303 Technological Surprise Following on the consensus view concerning America's overall lead in commercial and military technology is the perception that it is unlikely that a technological surprise--a completely unexpected invention or discovery--could occur in a way to give military superiority to a potential opponent. In a sense, this is a refutation of the belief that the ongoing evolution (or revolution) in military technology could be leapfrogged. However, this point of consensus is more narrowly focussed on the general nature of technological development, rather than on the potential to capitalize on new discoveries. An unanticipated technological surprise is, by definition, unforeseeable, so its future occurrence cannot be completely dismissed. However, there is such a myriad of public forecasts concerning every conceivable category of science and technology that the truly unanticipated seems to be crowded out. Predictions from "our future as post-modern cyborgs" to "the future of God," would seem to leave little room for developments that are not being examined or, at least, contemplated.304 Advocates for scenario-based planning recommend seeking out the thoughts of "remarkable people," some of them on the fringes of society, for incorporation in futures analysis.305 Science fiction is also advocated by some as a source for the examination of unanticipated developments.306 It would seem that an unanticipated technological development would be much rarer than anticipated developments that never come to fruition. Nevertheless, it is possible that the prodding of development in a niche of technology could provide a rather startling product. But, again, the tremendous commercial push of the advanced economies, and the technological infrastructure and knowledge capital of the United States and friends and allies would point to the product being developed first or quickly replicated in the West. A resurgently hostile Russia could conceivably reconstitute its military technology infrastructure to pursue technological surprise, and other states might do likewise in niches. But even during the technological race at the height of the Cold War, breakthroughs had relatively short half-lives as the contestants sought to counter offensive advantages with defensive, or other offensive developments. It is more likely that a contestant simply cannot afford to compete than be surprised by developments of which it was unaware. Consensus View A consensus of sources examined indicates that a truly unanticipated development in military technology is unlikely in the 2001-2025 period. But if such were to occur, the consensus view holds that it would most likely be the product of Western or advanced-state development--a nation not hostile to the United States. If a technological surprise were to occur in a hostile state, it is likely that it could be quickly replicated somewhere in the West. Infrastructure, knowledge base, and commercial incentive appear to be the drivers of new, surprising technologies. These are indeed centered in the democratic capitalist states.307 Contrary View The sources surveyed do not suggest the likelihood of a technological surprise. But among those assessments of the future security environment that identify potential wildcards, a major technological surprise was listed as an occurrence of potential concern.308 Khalilzad and Lesser identify it as a specific event to hedge against, proposing that "the Department of Defense can and should take steps to avoid future catastrophic technological surprise."309 Their study, reflecting its funding source, suggests that "the U.S. Air Force in particular might consider developing a technology warning system" that would enable it to flag both evolutionary and revolutionary advances of particular salience."310 Arguably, such is the overall goal of DOD R&D efforts. Placing technological surprise in the context of other wildcards, the RAND study also suggests that the "military could assemble a small, joint, planning cell responsible for sketching the basic outline of possible responses to unexpected challenges."311 Although other authorities might concur with this suggestion, their wildcard focus is primarily on political events.312 Proponents of the concept of RMA routinely express concern over the military effect of a technological leapfrog over U.S. capabilities. From their perspective, an unanticipated technological development can be considered a subset of the potential for strategic military surprise. Yet, the majority of specialized studies in strategic and operational surprise again identify political factors, rather than technology as the driver of potential Pearl Harbors.313 Opposing Strategies Control of the Seas and Air Even if America does have a propensity for being operationally surprised, it often emerges from the event militarily stronger. Such is indeed the legacy of the Pearl Harbor attack of 1941, and its effect remains apparent in U.S. sea and air dominance. The current overwhelming naval strength of the United States is as much a product of the World War II as the Cold War, for it was during war in the Pacific that the art of war at sea reached peak intensity.314 The conceptual and doctrinal basis for modern naval warfare--defense in depth, combined undersea-sea-air-land operations (and now space)--were largely perfected through this trial of combat. What has happened over the past fifty years is a continuing evolution of naval technology that has vastly increased the reach of naval forces onto land. The collapse of the Soviet Navy through the dissolution of the Soviet Union has allowed U.S. naval forces to shift to a landward focus because there is no longer a fleet capable of challenging the United States in the open oceans.315 This situation, the lack of opposing fleet, allows for the use of naval power in a direct and joint fashion against the littoral battle space and targets deep ashore. When combined with the overwhelming size of our transoceanic Navy, such naval dominance is self-reinforcing.316 Attempting to protect land targets from naval strike reduces the resources of a potential opponent available for building an ocean-going fleet. The size and strength of the current U.S. fleet--as well as that of the fleet mapped out in the future defense program--makes the construction of the few vessels affordable to an opponent appear militarily ineffectual. A quick assessment of comparative strength in ocean-going fleets as of March 2000 is evident in the table below.317 Of note is the fact that the majority of fleets capable of global operations are long-term U.S. allies. Richard Danzig has argued that the quantity and quality dominance of U.S. naval forces has a dissuasive effect on potential opponents.318 They are dissuaded from investing resources in naval construction because of the difficulty of ever catching up with America's maritime investment. Operationally, dissuasion also influences their calculus of the outcome of challenging the U.S. dominance in the open-ocean. Such effort would appear futile.
Likewise, the evolution of U.S. air power has traveled an historical course to overall air dominance. Roots of this dominance grow from the World War II experience, in which both strategic and tactical uses of air power were vital elements of victory. The early era of the nuclear age was largely a competition in the design and construction of increasingly more capable air platforms (including missiles). While Russian construction of new generation aircraft has continued beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union, the result of the collapse of the Soviet armed forces is a vast quantity, quality, and operational lead for U.S. air power.319 The rapid achievement of absolute air supremacy in Operation Desert Storm was an unprecedented feat in combat involving modern military forces. As difficult as it would be to defeat U.S. air power in regions where basing is available for it to operate from, it would seem impossible to challenge American land-based and sea-based forces in the long-range fashion that was envisioned during the Cold War. Although the table below indicates the relative sizes of world air forces, it does not quite capture the significant qualitative advantage that U.S. air power currently enjoys.
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As with maritime forces, the scope of American air power may have a dissuasive effect on direct competition. That is not to say that potential opponents will not attempt to challenge U.S. air power within their region. Certainly, it appears that such is probable. But challenging U.S. air power on a global basis would seem impossible absent the combined air power of a coalition of opposing states. Potential opponents interested in increasing their military power would likely direct resources to weapons that could negate American advantages within their own regions, developing missile and other WMD-capable platforms to target the supporting infrastructure that U.S. naval and air forces would use in the event of a regional conflict. This would constitute an indirect or asymmetric challenge to American sea and air dominance, rather than a direct force-on-force challenge.320 "The world's commons"--the sea and air spaces that are international and not legally subject to any state--would appear likely to remain both accessible to and dominated by U.S. military power. |
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However, forecasts of continuing U.S. sea and air dominance assume that the United States will seek to maintain the relative size advantage it has today and will continue to modernize its naval and air forces at a pace that keeps it abreast of critical technological developments.321 Consensus View The consensus of sources is that the size and operational experience of the Navy and Air Force make it nearly impossible for potential opponents to mount a serious challenge in the waters and air space over the world's oceans.322 This is likely to continue until 2025. Even if potential opponents do not remain dissuaded from direct competition against these American strengths, it would take at least 20 years for any competitor to build to the numbers and sophistication of the U.S. naval and air fleets. That is not to say that an opponent would not seek to contest U.S. sea and air control in their own region, or even undertake force-on-force engagements outside their region. However, the investment needed to challenge the United States on a global basis in areas where the United States has long maintained operational advantages is staggering. The investment in shipbuilding and aircraft construction may be a less difficult challenge than achieving the training and experience required to conduct extensive maritime and aerospace operations. It is likely that certain competitors will seek to build or purchase fourth-generation platforms and the most modern ocean-going warships, but in relatively small numbers.323 These could be used to dominate regional opponents. If they are used in combat operations directly against the U.S. naval and air fleets, it is likely they would operate as a high-tech guerrilla force, attacking areas of perceived weakness until they were destroyed or securely hidden from U.S. response. Victories against individual U.S. platforms could be significant morale factors in the opponent's will to fight, not unlike the effect of individual ship engagements on the United States in the War of 1812. However, U.S. ISR capabilities would likely curtail such operations in relatively short order. Contrary View No source suggests that the U.S. naval and air fleets could be decisively defeated, and particularly not within the global commons in the 2001-2025 period. However, concerns are frequently expressed that the United States could become complacent with its current margin of superiority and elect not to replace aging systems with more technologically advanced first line platforms. Over the long term, the cumulative effect of a procurement holiday might make the bulk of U.S. naval and air forces obsolete.324 To some extent, that is the logic of the proponents in recent debates over acquisition of the F-22.325 The concept of block obsolescence for legacy systems also appears in the arguments of proponents of transformation. That advanced capabilities--along with better training, spirit, and morale--can beat size is a fact of military history. And, indeed, complacent powers often are defeated. However, the technological push of the U.S. private sector appears to be a considerable influence in encouraging military modernization. It is often pointed out that the U.S. military is no longer the driving force in scientific R&D that it was before the explosion in information technology. If, indeed, warfare of the future will be primarily focussed on information, the commanding lead in platform numbers seems of even greater significance, rather than less.326 Critics of American complacency also point to the continuing development of high tech weaponry for export by technologically-advanced nations. Russia, with its economic woes, has considerable incentive to continue production of advanced systems for foreign sale.327 This includes platforms as well as systems, as is evidenced by the recent Russian sale of an aircraft carrier to India and four Sovremenny-class destroyers (armed with SS-N-22 antiship cruise missiles) to China.328 Navies and air forces are trappings desired by nations that view themselves as emerging great powers. This produces an arms race dynamic, at least to some degree, as other states seek to protect themselves from the threat of military force from these emerging powers.329 The result may not be a challenge to American naval and air dominance by any one state; but it could allow for a powerful force if a military coalition of hostile states developed. Historically, this was a concern of Great Britain in the era in which the Royal Navy dominated the seas, resulting in their attempt to maintain a two-power standard in naval forces. Arguably, the United States has an effective two-power standard force. However, critics argue that it will be unaffordable to keep such an advantage throughout the 2001-2025 period. If so, the overwhelming American advantage in sea and air forces will gradually dissipate during this period. Additionally, there are sources that argue that general American dominance of sea and air is largely irrelevant in dealing with the more likely future threats of terrorism, chemical, biological and information warfare, and failing states, as well as against the prepared antiaccess or area-denial strategies of regional opponents.330 Antiaccess/Area-Denial Strategies The concept of antiaccess or area-denial strategies for use against American power projection capabilities has been a focal point of research in the Office of Net Assessment since at least the mid-1990s.331 The genesis of the concept lies in a series of anti-Navy studies designed to examine the capabilities of post-Cold War militaries to prevent the Navy from operating with impunity off their immediate coastlines.332 These studies were viewed not only as a means to test the ability of the Navy to carry out its ...From the Sea strategic vision, but also reflected the reality that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were no potentially hostile blue-water navies capable of engaging the Navy at sea. According to this construct, if there were to be threats to U.S. naval operations, they would come from weapons systems designed to deny American passage through maritime choke points or the ability of the Navy to conduct operations near land.333 Such weapons, seen by both the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of Net Assessment as proliferating throughout the world, include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, diesel-electric submarines, sophisticated naval mines, and fast patrol craft.334 In the logic of the antiaccess approach, a potential opponent would not seek to engage the Navy at sea, where the United States holds absolute dominance. Rather, it would seek to prevent U.S. maritime forces from entering their littoral waters by massive attrition attacks by the proliferated asymmetric weapons.335 However, the anti-Navy core of these studies was soon expanded to include all U.S. overseas presence and power projection forces. As previously noted, sustained long-range power projection is both a unique strength of U.S. military forces and a requirement for an activist foreign policy and forward defense. The Office of Net Assessment work on the RMA and studies of ballistic missile proliferation led to an intellectual linkage between the proliferation of military technologies--particularly the production of indigenous ballistic missiles--and the desire of potential opponents to blunt U.S. capabilities of projecting power into their regions. The implicit assumption is that ballistic missile attack--particularly with WMD--provides the fastest and cheapest method of area denial.336 The obvious first step in such an area-denial effort would be to neutralize any existing lodgment of U.S. forces in the region. This would entail destroying U.S. forward presence forces while simultaneously attacking the regional infrastructure that would allow for the flow of follow-on power projection forces. The Office of Net Assessment has used ballistic missile development as an indicator of a potential opponent's capacity to carry out this first step. Another step would be to attack the ports and airfields of embarkation of forces in the continental United States. However, that is generally beyond the anticipated conventional capabilities of most regional powers.337 Arguably, a strike against the U.S. homeland would strengthen U.S. resolve to prosecute the conflict rather than discourage the effort--the Pearl Harbor effect.338 Because of range limitation and the uncertain psychological effect, it is likely that the regional opponent would focus on closing access through regional straits of choke points, rather than expending limited resources on a CONUS attack. However, the use of terrorism, information warfare, or other asymmetric means remains a distinct possibility. And, as previously discussed, ample evidence exists that a number of rogue states seek to develop extended range ballistic missiles. These antiaccess efforts are most evident in use of relatively low-cost maritime forces in blocking the attempts of U.S. and allied navies to re-enter the region. Antiaccess maritime platforms would include quiet diesel submarines, sea mines, cruise-missile carrying patrol boats and light combatants, and other fast attack craft, as well as land-based aviation and cruise missiles. With regional land bases destroyed and maritime access denied, the potential regional opponent would effectively extend its defenses out to the entry points of its region. The United States would find itself in the position of having to undertake costly forcible-entry operations. This would be the modern equivalent of the D-Day invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe, but with both sides having access to high-tech weaponry.339 Even in this war of attrition, it is likely that the United States would eventually breech the antiaccess defenses, particularly through the use of stand-off weapons stationed outside the region or in CONUS. However, the real goal of an antiaccess strategy is to convince the United States and/or its allies or coalition partners that the cost of penetration is simply too high.340 Hostilities could thereby be ended via a diplomatic agreement that granted the regional power its wartime objectives. Such an agreement would be encouraged by international organizations that traditionally advocate negotiated peace. Enhancing the desirability of the antiaccess strategy for regional powers are the perceived lessons of the Persian Gulf War. While it was a crushing victory for the coalition forces, critics point out that it took six months for the United States and its partners to build a logistical "iron mountain" in the theater. Iraq had no capacity to counter this build-up nor prevent American entry into the Gulf. If Iraq could have blocked the Straits of Hormuz or shut down the supporting ports and airfields in Saudi Arabia, the argument goes, it is unlikely that the coalition could have retaken Kuwait, or could have done so only at high cost in casualties. Because of their massive and often lingering effects, weapons of mass destruction could have given Iraq the capability of denying U.S. access, through the destruction of Saudi ports and airfields, as well as any forces entering the narrow confines of the Gulf, or through the mere threat of use, which might have caused the Saudis to withdraw permission for the stationing of U.S. forces on their soil.341 The perception that other nations have noted these lessons is reinforced by an apocryphal report that a former chief of staff of the armed forces of India, General K. Sundarji identified weapons of mass destruction as an integral ingredient of any "keep America out" strategy. According to the report, Sundarji said: "One principal lesson of the Gulf War is that, if a state intends to fight the United States, it should avoid doing so until and unless it possesses nuclear weapons."342 Although it is possible to develop and antiaccess strategy through conventional means alone, it is well evident that the possession of weapons of mass destruction makes any such strategy more potent. The ability to threaten targets outside the region, or even in the continental United States, increases this potency. However, as discussed previously, long-range targeting is a more difficult problem than targeting within the region. Consensus View The consensus of sources surveyed is that an antiaccess or area denial is the most likely campaign plan for an opponent of the United States to adopt, and thus the likely strategic U.S. power projection forces would face in a major theater war. This conclusion is based not only on the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other suitable weapons, but on the underlying logic of the strategy itself. The Greek attempt to prevent an invasion by the numerically superior Persian force at the pass of Thermopylae in 480 BC, and the subsequent Greek concentration on the destruction of the Persian fleet, is but the first recorded example of an antiaccess style strategy.343 The Greek city-states perceived that they could not defeat the Persian land army if it were free to forage the Hellenic interior and attack the city-states one by one. Militarily inferior states have attempted similar anti-invasion strategies throughout history, Hitler's Festung Europa being a more recent unsuccessful attempt. Armed with the means of carrying it out, the antiaccess strategy remains a historically-proven means of making the costs of intervention too high for the more powerful state to bear.344 The proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD and the perceived willingness of rogue states to use such weapons make antiaccess an even more likely strategy for a regional aggressor to adopt.345 Contrary View None of the sources surveyed maintain that the antiaccess approach is an unlikely strategy for a potential opponent to adopt in order to prevent the United States from intervening to stop regional cross-border aggression. If such a major theater war were to occur, an antiaccess strategy would appear the best--perhaps only--method to blunt U.S. power projection strength. However, a number of sources see the occurrence of cross border aggression and major theater war as much less likely than the chaos of failed states and internal civil strife. These sources would not necessarily agree that U.S. military forces should focus their efforts on developing the tactics and weapons systems to break potential antiaccess strategies. Among the sources that accept antiaccess strategies as the most likely methods of conflict adopted by regional aggressors, there are differing perceptions concerning the ability of such aggressors to carry out regional closure in the 2001-2025 time frame.346 In contrast to the forecasts of the Office of Net Assessment, several sources suggest that, before 2025, most potential opponents will be unable to use ballistic missiles effectively against moving targets, allowing U.S. air and naval forces opportunities to attack the weak points of an antiaccess campaign.347 Other sources suggest that the ability of rogue states to coerce potential American allies into denying U.S. access to their territory has been overstated.348 WMD in Large-Scale Combat One of the most controversial consensus statements is that large-scale combat in the future is likely to include weapons of mass destruction. This controversy is not rooted in assessments, but in the popular reaction to "thinking the unthinkable." For over the fifty years of the Cold War, nuclear weapons were perceived as qualitatively different than conventional weapons and were designated as elements of strategic deterrence and weapons of last resort. The concept that nuclear weapons, along with other weapons of mass destruction, could be used in conventional military operations was considered dangerous and destabilizing, at least by American decision-makers and military planners.349 However, there is a growing awareness of the efforts of many states to obtain the components of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery. The extensive efforts of the UN weapons inspectors in Iraq following the Gulf War were based on the perception that Iraq continued to actively seek to build a WMD arsenal. Recent testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan gives testimony to the fact that the nuclear nonproliferation regime has not completely eliminated the desire of emerging regional powers to possess a nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the general disregard of the international law of conflict by the rogue states implies that future use of WMD may not be inhibited by the norms of Cold War behavior. Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its war against Iran may be the best documented case of WMD use, but there is evidence of other rogue states using such weapons in internal conflicts.350 Terrorist groups also appear interested in purchasing or developing WMD. Preventing Osama Bin Laden from obtaining chemical or biological weapons was one of the U.S. Government's justifications for the Tomahawk strike on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998.351 Combining the desires of certain states for WMD arsenals, the rate of proliferation, and a seemingly growing disregard of the laws of armed conflict with the lessons aggressors can draw from the Gulf War provides a portrait of the potential integration of WMD into classical military operations.352 Most sources assume that proliferation will continue in 2001-2025. Many of the international control regimes seeking to prevent the spread of WMD are expected to break down, or at least be consistently ignored by states unhappy with the international status quo. As discussed previously, underlying technologies, particularly dual use systems such as nuclear reactors that could generate power or enrich uranium, are becoming available to potential aggressors and provide cover for weapons development. Humanitarian NGOs persistently report that the law of war appears to be devolving, with scant distinction made between attacking military forces and civilian noncombatants. The sum of these developments points to the likelihood that tyrannical regimes facing potential removal by outside forces would use WMD in combat. Consensus View The majority of sources surveyed view the likelihood of use of WMD during large-scale conflict in the 2001-2025 period as being quite high. The consensus is that chemical or biological weapons use would be more likely than nuclear war, but many sources view WMD use as the primary future threat to American security. Disagreement remains as to whether such weapons would be used in the initial stages of a major theater war, particularly in an antiaccess scenario, or whether even the most desperate of opponents would reserve WMD use for the prevention of regime change in case their aggression was successfully opposed. But there seems to be agreement that, in the case of certain rogue states, if weapons of mass destruction were available, they would be used for survival of tyrannical regimes. Since the United States possesses the ability to project power into warring regions with apparent success, it is natural for U.S. forces to be a primary potential target for WMD. The warning not to fight the United States without possession of nuclear weapons is advice on how to neutralize the power projection advantage, whether by deterrence, coercion, or employment. Although the U.S.-led coalition chose not to force the removal of the Hussein regime in Iraq and did not send forces toward Baghdad, there is a wide perception that the whole element of choice would be taken away in a similar future scenario if WMD use is threatened.353 In such a scenario, potential aggressors could maintain a sanctuary of their own territory. In the antiaccess scenario, WMD use could create a de facto sanctuary of the whole region. The potential of WMD in the hands of terrorist groups has already been discussed, and is considered a more frightening situation by many sources. Terrorist attacks, like state attacks in conventional conflicts, could obviously be directed against civilian populations as well as military forces. Arguably, the civilian populace--if it can be reached--is a softer target than military forces that would be more likely to possess personal protective gear. The perception that this soft target would be more attractive to potential opponents than an attack on U.S. military forces is the prime concern of sources focused on identifying the growing vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to WMD. Contrary View Although conceding the likelihood that potential opponents would seek to leverage the possession of WMD as a counter to U.S. actions, there is also a perception that use in conflict can be deterred.354 Obviously, the United States retains a most formidable nuclear arsenal. Given current arsenals, a nuclear exchange between the United States and a state other than Russia would be a horrendous, unmitigated disaster. But it would not destroy American society. Contrariwise, the large American arsenal could literally lay waste to most rogue states, removing all instruments of power. While nuclear arsenals are forecast to increase in the 2001-2025 period, the rate of increase does not suggest that more than a handful of states, perhaps no more than two or three--or potentially none, if the United States developed an effective national missile defense--could threaten mutual destruction. Because chemical and biological weapons are routinely categorized along with nuclear weapons as WMD, there is, by definition, ambiguity as to whether chemical or biological use would naturally provoke nuclear use. From this perspective, it is possible that the use of WMD against forces in large-scale armed conflict with the United States would be deterred by the American WMD arsenal, which consists solely of nuclear weapons. Sources that view chemical and biological weapons as the significant threats of the 2001-2025 period do not necessarily dispute the deterrent effect of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, or even the deterrent effect of conventional power projection forces. Rather, they argue that it is possible to use WMD on American soil or against U.S. forces in a manner than could render their source unidentifiable.355 If it appeared that WMD use constituted a terrorist attack, state opponents might successfully attack the United States without legitimate retribution.356 Or a state could use seemingly unsponsored terrorist groups as proxies in a WMD attack designed to paralyze American response to regional aggression. Other sources argue that technology (and the American psyche) renders such attacks ultimately attributable, mitigating the attractiveness of such a reckless course of action. Sources that see WMD as a potential combat threat do recognize that the United States has and continues to develop means of force and theater protection.357 Several are willing to suggest the increase in the ability of U.S. forces to engage in counter-proliferation or counter-WMD action, such as the "Scud hunt" of the Gulf War, greatly reduces the possibility of WMD during conflict.358 An additional deterrent might be U.S. theater ballistic missile defenses. If positioned before the outbreak of conflict, such defense might act as a deterrent to WMD use in the initial stages, or perhaps the entire conflict.
It has also been suggested that a U.S. declaratory counter-proliferation policy of pursuing regime change in the event of WMD use, or threats of use, would have also have considerable deterrent effect. If the likely end result of any WMD-laden confrontation with the United States or ally would be the decapitation of the aggressor, rogue states might reconsider any potential tactical advantages of WMD use. In any event, if a potential user of WMD perceives that it has more to lose in the long run, the attractiveness of WMD employment in combat appears Homeland Vulnerability The perception that the U.S. homeland will become increasingly vulnerable in the 2001-2025 timeframe can be traced to the National Defense Panel report of 1997. It has subsequently become an almost universal forecast by defense analysts. The NDP argued that: "Threats to the United States have been magnified by the proliferation of, and the means to produce and deliver, weapons of mass destruction."361 However, the NDP also linked its call for homeland defense to an increase in other state and nonstate threats, such as terrorism, information warfare, attacks on critical infrastructure, and transnational threats. This typology, along with the perception that greater efforts are needed to combat such increasing threats, has been incorporated into the National Military Strategy, National Security Strategy, Presidential Decision Directives, and other planning documents.362 In 1999, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century echoed the prevailing perception that "America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us."363 Their forecast goes as far as to suggest that in event of a future conflict, "Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers."364 From the perspective of recent history, the perception that the American populace is in increasing danger may appear counter-intuitive.365 During the Cold War, literally thousands of nuclear warheads were targeted on the American homeland. Some argued that alert procedures put a massive nuclear attack on a hair-trigger basis. With the end of the Cold War and the agreed de-alerting of nuclear forces, along with reductions in overall U.S. and Russia nuclear arsenals, it would appear that the American populace is much less directly vulnerable than they have been in at least thirty years.366 However, proponents of the increasing vulnerability view point to the balance of terror that made a nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union irrational. Rogue states, they argue, are less likely to be deterred from making asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland in the event of a conflict.367 Indeed, asymmetric attacks may be the most useful--perhaps only--military tool in the hands of potential opponents.368 Additionally, acceptance of the forecast that nonstate threats are increasing leads naturally to the belief that such threats, along with the proliferation of WMD, increase the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland. The days in which the broad expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean were assumed to provide sanctuary seem long gone.369 Consensus View Despite some skepticism that the U.S. homeland is more vulnerable than it was during the Cold War, the consensus remains that the U.S. homeland will become more vulnerable to new threats, particularly chemical and biological weapons in the hands or rogue states and terrorist groups.370 The ability to transport such weapons in small packages and devices that can be easily smuggled is often cited as a contributing factor. In addition, it is obvious that rogue regimes, such as in North Korea, are attempting to develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental U.S. Although these intercontinental missiles probably would be optimized for nuclear attack, those states cut off from possessing fissile material would likely opt for chemical or biological warheads. Realization that the United States forward defense posture allows for but limited defense of the U.S. coastline and airspace has increased among individuals who had ignored this concern during the Cold War.371 At the same time, the Internet and the ubiquitous nature of computer control seem to have made America's infrastructure more vulnerable to nonexplosive attack, such as information warfare. Although computer network defenses are possible, they bear both a financial and social cost. However, the consensus position differs from more alarming forecasts on questions of the degree of future vulnerability. While the rhetoric of many homeland defense advocates would suggest an exponential, almost insurmountable rise in new threats, the majority view is that such threats are evolutionary, rather than exponential. As use of the Internet continues to penetrate society, vulnerability to disruption increases. However, this is to be anticipated, and, as more users become dependent, it is more likely they will demand redundant and protected systems. Likewise, globalization may cause a rise in transnational or nonstate threats, such as massive migrations. However, by providing a worldwide increase in employment, the benefits of globalization may mitigate such threats to the homeland. Meanwhile, the United States appears to be taking initial steps to deal with the catastrophic terrorism and infrastructure attack, potentially matching the threat increases of the 2001-2025 time frame. From this perspective, measured responses match the measured increase in anticipated vulnerability.372 Contrary View Few sources argue that there is not a myriad of emerging threats. However, contrary positions exist on both sides of the argument concerning the degree of vulnerability in 2001-2025. Sources suggesting that we are essentially less vulnerable today, and will remain so, argue that American society can absorb such isolated attacks, and that, because such attacks are not militarily significant, they are relatively unlikely. Supporting this view is the belief that potential opponents recognize the Pearl Harbor effect and are reluctant to sponsor a catastrophic attack that would arouse a significant response by a militarily-superior United States.373 Advocates of national missile defenses postulate that, with such defenses, America would become less vulnerable to nuclear weapons in the future, potentially making such weapons obsolete. Others would argue that the American populace has always been considerably vulnerable, particularly during the 1970-1989 period, but refused to recognize that fact. On the other hand, several sources suggest that the developmental rate of future threats--fueled primarily by the malicious use of new technologies--is indeed increasing at an exponential rate. From this perspective, increasing homeland vulnerability is inevitable, particularly if active defenses, interagency cooperation efforts, redundancy, and reconstitution do not receive substantial funding increases within the U.S. defense budget. Information Warfare At least two distinct facets characterize information warfare.374 The first is the use of various measures to attack the information technology (IT) systems on which a military opponent may depend.375 The systems under attack may be providing ISR or command and control capabilities necessary for the conduct of modern, high-technology warfare. But the attack could also be an asymmetric strike on the civilian infrastructure of the opponent's homeland. Concern for the IT infrastructure of the U.S. homeland is based on the expectation of a continuing explosion in computer technologies and communication systems, and of a growing increase in the influence of mass media.376 In particular, the Internet is seen as creating--along with its obvious scientific and commercial advantages--new vulnerabilities to the U.S. economy.377 In addition to the indirect vulnerabilities caused by the disruption of corporate business, concern focuses on the potential for direct attacks on computer-controlled public utilities, such as water facilities and the power grid. In recognition of this potential, the U.S. Government adopted Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63, which set in place responsibilities and interagency procedures for protecting critical infrastructure and "the national information structure" that provides for the flow of control information.378 The second facet of information warfare is the control and manipulation of the information available to the civilian populace of an opposing state.379 This modern use of propaganda has obvious historical parallels and is a natural aspect of interstate conflict. However, there is a perception that the ubiquitous nature of modern news media has made control of information--when it can be achieved--more effective in changing popular attitudes.380 Likewise, it is perceived that continuing growth in information technology also increases the value of information control and manipulation.381 Dependent on information to run society, the populace is less likely to be able to discern real from manipulated information, and, at the same time, can bring more immediate pressure to change U.S. Government policy.382 To some extent, this public relations war would have a less lethal and more indirect effect on the populace than computer infrastructure attack. However, as seen in the Vietnam War experience, it may have a more direct effect on the willingness to prosecute a war.383 With recent efforts, the U.S. Government has taken strides in computer network defense (CND) and critical infrastructure protection, but in the face of an emerging and somewhat indistinct threat, defense necessarily lags offense.384 An aspect of concern to some is the potential anonymity of attack and the possible use of information warfare by nonstate actors, particularly terrorist groups. The mechanism of the Internet is such that both hackers and terrorists could use multiple paths of entry to disguise their identities and intentions.385 Although it is possible to trace these paths to a source, such efforts take time and resources.386 The question remains as to whether a hostile state could mask an information attack to such an extent that the United States would be unable to determine the source and take timely defensive or retaliatory actions.387 The fact that American society is so open to information (via Internet and more traditional media) does allow exposure of its populace and infrastructure to information warfare.388 On the other hand, the fact that it is open allows for exposure to multiple sources of information, which makes it difficult for the message of a hostile attack to remain unchallenged. While it is relatively easy for an opponent to disrupt the normal sources of information, it would seem very difficult for them to monopolize all sources. In the vernacular of the Internet, it is possible to clobber an account with spam, but it is harder to convince the recipient that it is more than annoying junk mail. Metaphorically, it is difficult to convince anyone that spam is filet mignon, unless they have never tasted filet mignon. This is not necessarily true of closed societies, where control of a single source of information may, in fact, provide an information monopoly. In a real sense, America's vulnerability to information is also a strength.389
In classical military terms, the use of information is an attempt to lift the fog of war that envelops the battlefield. Commanders have always tried to acquire accurate information; what is different is that modern IT appears to provide a greater opportunity to clear away the fog than ever before. Thus, it is natural for U.S. forces to strive for information dominance |