Chapter Six

Divergence and Contradictions




Analysis of the survey sources reveals a number of diverging views on certain aspects of the future security environment. Unlike the points of consensus, there appeared no one dominant view on these particular issues. Rather, there seemed to be opposing schools of thought.

For the purpose of simplification, these alternative assessments of the future are posed in the accompanying table (Diverging Views) as either-or statements. But it must be clearly noted that this depiction is a simplification; there are varying degrees of agreement, and the either-or statements generally represent the alternate ends of this range. Depending on categorization, multiple schools and many variations could be identified. However, to describe every variation would be an involved process, too lengthy for the task of identifying substantial divergences.

It should also be noted that these statements do not necessarily represent a fifty-fifty split between sources. And like the points of consensus, no single source would necessarily agree or disagree with any particular set or combinations of statements. The point is to capture the range of views.

Like the points of consensus, the either-or statements are categorized, this time by nature of conflict (which replaces military technology), threats, and opposing strategies. However, there is much overlap between categories. For example, "future wars will be more brutal" may be an assessment of the future nature of conflict (indiscriminate attacks on civilians), but when applied to external conflict, could also describe an opposing strategy. Its antithesis is a view on how developments in military technology will mitigate such a strategy. It is the juxtaposition between technology and strategy that led to changing the category to nature of conflict.

Nature of Conflict

Two Near-Simultaneous MTWs

A divergence of views on the likelihood of two near-simultaneous MTWs lies partly hidden in the background of most future security environment assessments. Yet, it appears primarily in the form of assumption, rather than analytical argument. There seems to be little effort to prove the validity of either position.

A number of critical assessments--some of which are linked to a recommended strategy or force structure different than the current posture--discount the possibility of two MTWs occurring nearly simultaneously. Preparing for two such overlapping contingencies is dismissed as unsupportable, worst-case thinking. Yet, despite dismissive rhetoric, few detailed logic as to why this could not occur. Taking a cue from the NDP, many analysts find the two-MTW construct inconvenient to their recommendations for transformation, since readiness for the simultaneous scenarios requires considerable expenditure of resources and the maintenance of considerable standing forces. If defense budgets remain at current levels, it is difficult to fund considerable transformation activities while still paying a high bill for readiness and current operations. The NDP report puts the argument plainly:

The Panel views the two-military-theater-of-war construct as a force sizing function and not a strategy. We are concerned that this construct may have become a force-protection mechanism--a means of justifying the current force structure--especially for those searching for the certainties of the Cold war era....The two-theater construct has been a useful mechanism for determining what forces to retain as the Cold War came to a close. To some degree, it remains a useful mechanism today. But, it is fast becoming an inhibitor to reaching the capabilities we will need in the 2010-2020 timeframe.⁴⁰³ [emphasis added]

The NDP report recommends accepting "transitional risk" while moving away from a two-MTW posture. As discussed earlier, the panel discounts the demands of the two traditional theaters of Northeast and Southwest Asia, at least for the near term. Recommendations proposed by the NDP to the Secretary of Defense and Congress are seen as emphasizing long-term security. The implication is that the United States needs to prepare now for future near-peer competitors, although the NDP report does not state so explicitly, positing diffused future capabilities as the threat. However, this appears more a policy recommendation than a forecast. Obviously, Congress may legislate that U.S. forces not prepare for two near-simultaneous conflicts, but Congress cannot legislate that two near-simultaneous major world crises do not occur.

Despite the NDP implications, when assessments of potential regional conflicts are combined, the possibility of crises or conflicts developing near-simultaneously in two or more regions seems quite plausible. Sources point out that there are both historical precedents and strategic logic for a potential regional opponent to make aggressive moves when conflicts arise in other parts of the world. Presumably, the distraction or resource challenges of responding to the first conflict or contingency would make the objectives of an opponent in a second conflict easier to achieve. A patient aggressor could wait until the United States was fully committed to intervention in the first conflict. This would not necessarily require collusion on the part of the two aggressors, although a loose alliance could develop.

To some extent, that is what occurred during World War II. Although Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were nominal allies, at no time did they attempt to coordinate their strategies.⁴⁰⁴ Yet both appear to have assumed that the other would attract the primary attention of the United States.⁴⁰⁵ The Japanese already knew that the attention of the United Kingdom and France was focussed elsewhere; if the United States intended to support them against Hitler, considerable resources would be required. On the other hand, Hitler waited until after the dramatic Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to declare war on the United States It may be mere speculation to suggest that his underlying assumption was that America's forces would focus against the enemy that struck such a direct blow. However, the timing of these actions bare considerable logic in attempting to over-stretch the response of the Armed Forces.⁴⁰⁶

Obviously, dealing militarily with two conflicts in the 2001-2025 time frame would appear a strenuous situation, and there is no guarantee of a swift and overwhelming victory as in Operation Desert Storm. In fact, the reality may be that preparing for two near-simultaneous wars is unaffordable at current levels of defense spending.⁴⁰⁷ Then again, preparing for such conflicts might be considered affordable if one were to accept the fact it would not be on a come-as-you-are basis, that American society would have to accept some economic pain in order to mobilize sufficient resources, or that one theater operation would essentially be a holding action. The point is that two near-simultaneous theater conflicts are not unlikely simply because they are not affordable.⁴⁰⁸ Arguably, it may make them more likely. If history is to be used as evidence, it should again be pointed out that the World War II was, indeed, two near-simultaneous theater wars (or three or four, depending on how military theaters are delineated).

It has become common to describe recent NATO actions against Serbia--presumably a smaller-scale contingency--as constituting an MTW's worth of Allied air forces.⁴⁰⁹ If SSCs occur at a near-continuous rate, it is almost inevitable that two or more will occur near-simultaneously, simply based on the law of averages. The United States may not choose to involve itself in more than one SSC, but if it did choose to handle two, the inevitable question is, at what point do they require two MTW's worth of effort?

The two-MTW construct may indeed be designed as a force-sizing tool, and it is certainly not predictive. To become involved in two conflicts would, ultimately, be the choice of the United States. But, many assessments would indicate that near-simultaneous occurrence of two large-scale world crises is quite possible, even if the construct itself is not a recommended policy option. Thus, there remains a divergence in the sources surveyed.

Lethality of Warfare

The question of whether future wars will be characterized by greater brutality and greater civilian casualties or by more discriminate attacks and fewer civilian casualties emerges from debates concerning the existence and effect of an RMA and the importance of information warfare.

At one end is the view that the trend toward a world of warriors--in which much of the youthful population of the less economically-developed world is involved in ethnic, religious, or tribal conflict--naturally creates more brutal forms of warfare, in which the international laws of war are rarely observed.⁴¹⁰ Sources point to the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and Kosovo (along with a myriad of civil wars)--conducted largely by paramilitary terror squads whose primary skills involved the killing of unarmed civilians--as true representations of the future of war.⁴¹¹ Discrimination between combatants and noncombatants is observed arbitrarily, if at all. Victory consists of complete destruction of the lives and property of the enemy.

At the other end is the vision that precision weapons and information warfare, the natural forms of warfare for a growing "third wave" global economy, will make warfare both less likely and less bloody. Kosovo is also used as an illustrative case--this time as an example of how precision bombing, with considerable effort to spare civilian lives and property, was able to win a modern war and reverse ethnic cleansing. Because such precision strikes rely on accurate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the processing of information is a dominant feature of this style of war. Extrapolating from this fact, proponents of information warfare argue that the manipulation of information may, in itself, preclude physical combat in future conflicts.⁴¹² Under perfect conditions, it is argued, the manipulation of information will prevent a populace from going to war by projecting images that indicate the war is unjustified or is already over, or by turning the populace against governments intent on war.⁴¹³

Somewhere in between these views is the argument that future wars will not necessarily be more brutal, but precision strike and information warfare does not presage an era of "immaculate warfare." The U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century, while generally enthusiastic about the precise effects of emerging military technology, expresses this middle ground in its findings:

Despite the proliferation of highly sophisticated and remote means of attack, the essence of war will remain the same. There will be casualties, carnage, and death; it will not be like a video game. What will change is the kinds of actors and the weapons available to them. While some societies will attempt to limit violence and damage, others will seek to maximize them, particularly against those societies with a lower tolerance for casualties.⁴¹⁴

The strongest statements concerning the growing brutality of modern war come from NGOs and relief agencies. Oxfam, in particular, has sketched a future in which the majority of wars--fought primarily, but not exclusively in the developing world--will focus on the civilian as target and will flout the existing laws of war. The end of the Cold War has meant that these wars will not be proxies in the struggle between ideologies, but will be fought over the distribution of resources within or between states. Globalization presumably magnifies the effects of these struggles throughout the international system.

Within these conflicts, the line between soldiery and banditry becomes blurred, and victory consists largely of replacing one unrepresentative and exploitative government with another unrepresentative and exploitative group.⁴¹⁵ Features of this type of warfare include ethnic cleansing, genocide, mass movement of refugees, famine, torture, and rape. In this milieu, the weapons used can range from the primitive to the merely unsophisticated. While armored vehicles, artillery, and shoulder-held anti-air missiles may be used, the dominant platform is the individual warrior--possibly under the age of twelve--and the small arms carried. The use of commercial GPS and cellular phones are useful, but not essential for operations.

The implication is that the sophisticated precision weapons, along with the information systems, that characterize the Armed Forces have relatively little effect against such an enemy.⁴¹⁶ There are simply no enemy systems to spoof, little communication to disrupt, no common picture to manipulate, and no center of gravity to attack (with the potential exception
of the controlling warlord leader--an approach unsuccessfully adopted in Somalia).⁴¹⁷ Thus, it is argued that advanced weaponry cannot prevent ethnic cleansing. The only option is to close with the enemy, a style of warfare that the RMA and information operations have presumably made obsolete.

Another implication is that a considerable investment in RMA-type systems represents overkill. Humanitarian NGOs, which have traditionally argued for the developed nations to spend less on arms and more on aid to developing states, see investments in high tech weaponry as a waste that does little to deal with the real problems of future warfare. If the likelihood of MTW-like cross border aggression is low, as one side argues in the two MTW debate, then it is plausible to suggest that future military systems should be tailored to dealing with a lower-technology threat.⁴¹⁸ A priority would be to tailor military forces so as to be able to intervene early in low-intensity conflicts. Collective wisdom has been that high-tech systems may be useful tools in low-intensity conflict, but that, ultimately, small unit tactics conducted by lightly armed, but well trained personnel are needed to defeat guerrilla-like opponents.⁴¹⁹

Those arguing that RMA systems and information warfare can create a less brutal style of warfare, would counter the above argument with two separate strands of logic. The first is the forecast that new information systems will make even the dirty wars and low intensity conflicts more transparent, so that combatants, but not civilians, can be targeted. At future concept seminars sponsored by U.S. Joint Forces Command, the prospect for developing personnel identification systems--in which the population of whole countries could be tracked and identified on a real-time basis--was discussed.⁴²⁰ Even if this particular proposal might seem unlikely, the general tenet of those seeking to apply the RMA to SSCs and low-intensity conflict is that advanced technologies, such as nonlethal weapons, could be used in situations so as to prevent prolonged brutal civil wars.

A second assertion made by some of the high-tech future warfare forecasters is that civil wars are not real wars, and in any event, they are not the sort of wars in which the United States should be involved.⁴²¹ And if we choose to become involved, we should certainly not involve our ground forces. The argument is made that the American people are so casualty-adverse that the U.S. military is now (or should be) confined to "post-heroic warfare."⁴²² Instead of exposing itself to possible casualties by closing with the enemy on the ground, the United States will use stand-off attacks enabled by high-technology to halt potential aggression by systematic destruction of enemy assets, such as armor, trucks, artillery, missile launchers, and air defenses. The objective is to contain the crisis and role back enemy gains at an acceptable cost, without seeming to engage in wanton slaughter.⁴²³

Presumably other developed nations will also adopt this post-heroic style of war, ensuring that any war fought between developed states--in the unlikely case they were not deterred or self-deterred--would indeed be the high-tech affairs envisioned by the less brutal school. Technology (and technical prowess) would be pitted against technology in a manner that could minimize death and destruction.

If the United States cannot avoid becoming involved in a brutal ethnic conflict, and stand-off warfare cannot achieve at least some of our partial aims, the post-heroic solution would be to enlist the cooperation of a friend or ally more willing to risk ground forces in a coalition response to the conflict. Conflicts fought under UN peace-enforcement auspices could rely on the ground forces from such lower-technology nations eager to gain international favor or perhaps compensation for its troops. The role of the United States would be to provide the supporting sea power, air power, lift and ISR capabilities.

A feature of the divergent views on the future brutality of warfare are the differing assumptions on why wars are fought, as well as maintaining a separation between military and civilian involvement in conflict.

The Future of Classical Warfare

The issue of the separation between military personnel and civilians, or combatants and noncombatants, underlies the question of where and how future warfare will take place. Classical warfare is assumed to take place between clearly identified armies in terrain suitable for direct engagements. History--replete with siege warfare, attacks on infrastructure, and massacres of civilian populations--may demonstrate that the ideal is an exception. However, there remains the popular impression that just war is, or at least should be, about defeating the cross-border aggression envisioned in the current MTW scenarios.

Of course, the Armed Forces are used for more than MTWs. Throughout its history, America has called on the military to deal with many contingencies outside formally declared wars. These contingencies have ranged from punitive expeditions to humanitarian interventions. Current wisdom is that the number of such SSCs has greatly increased since the end of the Cold War, along with a greater propensity on the part of American decisionmakers to intervene. Sources also point out
the relatively rarity of American military involvement in major theater warfare against cross-border aggression. From this perspective, Desert Storm is an exception rather than a rule.⁴²⁴ Given the apparent increase in the number and frequency of nonstate threats and the potential for asymmetric operations, it has been suggested that the primacy of the DOD focus on preparing for classic MTWs is a mistake. The threats of the future, according to this view, will be significantly different and will require a different emphasis in preparations.⁴²⁵

One perspective is that future conflicts--particularly those within failed states--will present little opportunity for firepower-intensive warfare. There will be no front lines or rear areas, and in some cases no clearly identifiable enemy force. Rather, there will be an overall atmosphere of chaos in which the primary mission of U.S. forces will be to establish order and quell violence in the most humane way possible. Often referred to as a police function, establishment of order in a chaotic situation without a functioning government or court system is more similar to anti-guerilla operations or wartime occupation duty than policing. But obviously the rules of engagement and the military skills required are different than those of force-on-force combat.

A major proponent of the forecast of future warfare in chaotic environments has been a former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak. During his tenure as commandant (1995-1999), General Krulak sponsored a series of seminars, workshops, and briefings concerning future operations of the Marine Corps, culminating in a briefing he frequently presented entitled "Ne Cras" ("not like yesterday"). Forecasts included the continuing urbanization of the world's population--a driver identified by many other sources--and the continued breakdown of failed states, leading to numerous tribal-like conflicts.⁴²⁶

Calling upon Marine and Army experiences in Somalia and similar contingencies, and adding insights from the then-popular chaos theory, "Ne Cras" and the other briefings postulate a world in which U.S. forces will be predominantly called upon to intervene in the chaotic conditions of the "three-block war," in which the U.S. military has to simultaneously perform three or more disparate, and perhaps contradictory, missions within the confines of three urban blocks.⁴²⁷ As the example goes, on the first block, U.S. forces are conducting a full-scale urban engagement against aggressors or terrorists, on the second block, another part of the force is attempting to maintain a tenuous peace between warring factions, and on the third block, yet another part of the same force is conducting humanitarian operations in support of destitute refugees. The chaos of this ungoverned situation requires forces to make rapid decisions distinguishing threats from nonthreats and combatants from noncombatants, and whether to use force or remain disengaged. The implication is that forces designed for warfighting against a clearly defined cross-border aggressor--presumably trained to destroy targets as they appear--are not appropriately organized or prepared for the chaos of the three-block war.⁴²⁸

As befits a naval service, Marine briefs point to the fact that over seventy percent of the world's urban population are within operating range of a coastline, otherwise known as the littoral region.⁴²⁹ "Chaos in the littorals" is shorthand for future contingencies in such regions.⁴³⁰

Spurred by the potential use of chemical or biological weapons in urban areas, a slightly different perspective can be termed "panic in the city." Proponents of this view are concerned that asymmetric or terrorist attacks could create similar chaotic conditions within the U.S. homeland.⁴³¹ The U.S. military would not simply have to stabilize chaotic conditions overseas, but would be expected to do the same at home. While many emerging strategy alternatives call for increased military involvement in homeland security, most assume that the military would merely play a support role to civil authorities, providing resources that may not be readily available in the civil sector. In contrast, those who view panic as the new weapon envision homeland security as the preliminary, even primary, mission of the Armed Forces. The implication is that civilians simply cannot face the physical or psychological aspects of the chemical and biological threats, and both precautions and responses should be military functions. Once the perception of homeland sanctuary is broken by an asymmetric attack, the American population would panic and flee toward areas of perceived safety, while demanding that their elected officials cease whatever foreign activities might have provoked such an attack.

In order to prevent such a scenario, sources argue, the military needs to refocus its efforts away from the less likely case--a classical military response to cross border aggression--and toward the more direct and more likely threats of asymmetric attacks against the homeland and the use of panic as a weapon of the globalized future.⁴³²

In contrast, a significant number of sources view MTWs as the most likely form of warfare in which the United States would become involved, and job one for its military. From this perspective, America's large-scale warfighting capability is the primary deterrent of both chaos and asymmetric attack. Unlike the "Ne Cras" view, future war may indeed be "not like yesterday," but it need not involve urban warfare under the conditions postulated by three-block war. This is a perspective that would support the development of some capability for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), but would consider it but one among a number of key military missions--and certainly not the primary.⁴³³ Likewise it would view involvement in chaotic conditions as a more discretionary situation than responding to a classical attack on an ally or regional pivot. Supporting friends and allies is viewed as a vital interest; intervening in chaos elsewhere is not. There is also a lingering implication that reversing cross-border aggression, which would presumably require more combatant forces, is a more demanding task than quelling tribal warfare in smaller-scale contingencies.

Panic in the city would also appear a less likely form of war than MTWs. For one thing, the United States does not have hostile states on its borders, and attacks on the U.S. homeland would either continue to prove difficult in the 2001-2025 period, or could be defended against by classical means, such as a dedicated national missile defense (NMD).⁴³⁴ A second point would be that the American people historically have not exhibited much panic, so panic attacks are not a likely form of warfare. A third point is that the deterrent effect of classical warfighting capability makes asymmetric attack less likely. Though attempts at asymmetric warfare should be expected, these are best defended against by classical defensive means at home, combined with an overwhelming offensive in the opponent's home region.

The divergence of opinion on whether future warfare will primarily take the form of chaos in the littorals and panic in the city, or will mostly resemble the expected forms of MTW, appears to be related more to preferred prioritization of threats than to any conclusive forecast of wars to come. But there is evidence on both sides of the issue.

Militarization of Space

The question of the so-called militarization of space is particularly contentious. Space-based intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) are critical to U.S. military operations and gave such an informational and command and control advantage during Operation Desert Storm, that some have called the Gulf War "the first space war."⁴³⁵ To a considerable degree, the United States has become dependent on space based assets to provide information and command connectivity to military forces in both wartime and peacetime. However, there are great distinctions between the military use of space, a war from space, and a war in space.⁴³⁶ Every future assessment predicts increasing use of space assets by the military, but there are wide differences on whether war from or in space could occur in the timeframe to 2025.⁴³⁷

A number of sources are very certain of the potential for a force-on-force space war. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century's "Major Themes and Implications" states explicitly: "Space will become a critical and competitive military environment....weapons will likely be put in space. Space will also become permanently manned."⁴³⁸

This finding supports the view expressed by the commander-in-chief, U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACE), one of the joint unified commands that control U.S. combatant forces, who envisions the development of "emerging space forces missions" including "...defensive and offensive counterspace, and if directed by the NCA, a force application capability" (i.e., space-based kinetic or energy weapons) [emphasis in the original].⁴³⁹ The implication is the inevitable development of space as a theater of combat because of the military and commercial value of satellite assets.⁴⁴⁰ The CINCSPACE long range plan maintains: "It's difficult to project how much additional investment or how many satellites will be in service in 2020, the target time frame of our plan, but there is little doubt of the answer. SPACECOM will be called upon to conduct space operations to protect U.S. investment and commercial assets, in addition to securing our other national interests in space."⁴⁴¹ [emphasis in original] This is portrayed as a response to the fact that: "In 2020, if not sooner, adversaries will essentially share the high ground of space with the United States and its allies."⁴⁴² [emphasis in original] This forecast had also appeared in statements by previous SPACECOM commanders.⁴⁴³

An opposing viewpoint is the forecast that militarization of space is not likely to occur before 2025. This reasoning projects a continuing U.S. advantage in military space systems based on previous investment and infrastructure development. From this posture, "the United States is in a good position to win any ensuing arms race."⁴⁴⁴ Even with increasing investment, it would be difficult for most nations--with the possible exception of Russia, which retains some of its previous space launch infrastructure--to produce, launch, and control indigenous military space systems. Those nations with sufficient technical capabilities are generally allies of the United States.⁴⁴⁵ Although the use of commercial space assets by potential opponents is possible, and, as previously discussed, likely before hostilities, commercial systems do not possess offensive or defensive characteristics suitable for combat. Currently, commercial systems are not electromagnetic pulse (EMP) hardened, making them vulnerable to the long-range effects of exoatmospheric nuclear bursts.⁴⁴⁶

International treaties governing space activities are another potential inhibitor of space-based weapons.⁴⁴⁷ A broad interpretation of the 1967 international "Treaty on the Principles of the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" and the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems treaty would appear to preclude the deployment of offensive weapons in space. However, a narrower interpretation is that these treaties ban only orbiting nuclear or other WMD in space, and systems designed to shoot down Russian ICBMs. Many types of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons would not normally be considered WMD, nor would space-to-ground energy or kinetic kill weapons not designed for an ABM role fall easily into the WMD category. In the narrow interpretation, there is but minimal treaty restriction on space weaponry.⁴⁴⁸ Whether or not the current treaties will remain in force, or more extensive treaties will be negotiated, is difficult to forecast.⁴⁴⁹ Proponents of arms control point to the lasting affects of most treaty prohibitions; skeptics resonate with the oft-cited quote by French president Charles DeGaulle that "treaties last while they last."⁴⁵⁰

Skeptics of treaty prohibitions tend to share the inevitability view of the introduction of space weaponry in the 2001-2025 timeframe. As former Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall argued: "We have a lot of history that tells us that warfare migrates where it can--that nations engaged in conflict do what they can, wherever they must. At a very tender age, aviation went from a peaceful sport, to a supporting function, very analogous to what we do today in space--to a combat arm. Our space forces may well follow that same path."⁴⁵¹ A similar argument is made by Major General Robert Dickman, USAF, who was the DOD space architect in 1997: "To hope that there will never be conflict in space is to ignore the past."⁴⁵²

Threats

Military Competitor

As discussed earlier, the development of a global military near-peer competitor to the United States before 2025 is unlikely. However, that forecast does not quell the debate on whether such a near peer is inevitable in the long term. Sources that view a near peer as inevitable base their argument on historical example; every aging leader is eventually challenged by younger, growing competitors. To ignore this is also to ignore the past. Even the Roman Empire fell.⁴⁵³ In terms of the academic study of international relations, there appears always a struggle among states to become the hegemon that dominates the international system.⁴⁵⁴ The struggle for hegemonic control can vary from long-term wars between empires or alliances or political imperialism, to economic competition or cultural imperialism. There are major diversions in the contending schools as to whether political, economic, or cultural dominance represents true hegemonic control. But even scholars who question the morality of hegemonic control--and in particular the position of the United States as the current hegemonic power--appear to believe that such a struggle is the natural order between states. Hence, the desire or expectation for some other political entity to replace the nation-state as the dominant form of international actor. This desire for or expectation--or opposition to and fear--of the increasing role of nonstate actors, including such nonstate threats as terrorist movements, is reflected in the discussion of the consensus point on the increase in nonstate threats.

If the struggle for hegemonic control is the natural order of the international system, it would also be natural that those responsible for the security of the United States--including its freedom, institutions, population, and prosperity--would prepare for such a struggle. Having achieved victory in a Cold War that took the form of an ideological struggle, it is said that the United States is now enjoying a strategic pause in which it can plan and position itself for survival and success in any future hostilities. The concept of strategic pause reflects an acceptance of the inevitability of future hostilities resulting from challenges of dissatisfied states that seek to overturn the stability of the current international order. While there may be a continuous debate as to which preparations are most appropriate--and how the outbreak of hostilities can be deterred in the near term--there seems to be agreement among many that a dissatisfied state could eventually build itself into a military near peer to the United States sometime after 2025.

The belief in the inevitability of a near peer is also reflective of the consensus point that "advanced military technology will become more diffuse." To be a near-peer competitor, the opposing state would presumably need to be able to utilize military technology on a par with the United States. It could be possible to develop different technologies, perhaps using "sidewise" methods, that could temporarily neutralize American technological dominance. However, even that would require some familiarity with the nature of current technological developments. Such would likely occur under conditions of high technological diffusion. As military technology becomes more diffuse, it appears inevitable that any American advantage in military technology would gradually shrink, creating de facto near-peer competitors.

There is, however, an alternative view on the inevitability of military near-peer competition. In this view, it is not the natural order for near-peer challengers to occur, but, rather, the actions of the leading power that causes such a competition.⁴⁵⁵ Supporters of this view range from those who see a competitive international system as an anomaly of the capitalist world, to those who view gradual world democratization as eventually leading to a world free from major war--under the premise that democracies do not fight democracies. Others subscribe to the belief that near-peer competition is not inevitable as an unspoken corollary to their idea that a leading power can take actions that prevent such a competition from occurring. To some extent, such a view underlies the premises of a proposal by Ashton Carter and William J. Perry for a "preventive defense."⁴⁵⁶

The question of the inevitability of a near-peer competitor after 2025 is not merely an academic question. It ties directly to the choice of a future defense policy. If an inevitable conflict with a near-peer competitor is expected after 2025, it would behoove the United States to take distinct steps to develop a defense policy and force structure that would retain a measure of military superiority sufficient to dissuade, deter, or--if necessary--defeat a potential near-peer opponent.⁴⁵⁷ Choices could include whether or not to forego near-term modernization in order to focus resources on the science, technology, and experimentation that would shape military force structure in the years beyond 2025. This might require a deliberate policy of avoiding military involvement in most failing states in order to preserve resources to prepare for the direct threat of a hostile near-peer competitor. Future military systems would be optimized for near-peer conflict, which might include a significant level of information and space warfare, at the expense of systems optimized for near-term intervention against nonstate threats, many of which might be resolved by other states.

However, if actual or proposed military preparations of the hegemon propel other states to seek parity, it may be in the interest of the United States to break the cycle of increasing military expenditures in order to prevent the development of a near peer. Specific policies could be adopted--along the lines of preventive defense--that seek to co-opt or manage a potential near peer by allowing a degree of American vulnerability in order preserve the current balance, which appears in favor of the United States.⁴⁵⁸ Part of this logic parallels the action-reaction paradigm that underlay Cold War-era arms control theory. By foregoing the choice of maintaining or increasing the current massive level of military superiority, the United States might be able to channel more resources into failed state and humanitarian intervention, thereby preventing the development of more dissatisfied states. Proponents also point to increasing globalization as creating the sort of economic interdependence that would dissuade hostility among world powers. Such a view implies that the primary role of U.S. defense policy would be to prevent the outbreak of major conflict until such time as globalization and interdependence would lead to a more peaceful world. The force structure selected under such a policy could be vastly different than that designed to prepare for a military near peer.

Between the inevitability and the preparation-as-cause views are a range of perspectives that seek varying degrees of hedging against the rise of a military near peer and its prevention through military policy and diplomacy.

Defense of Overseas Bases

The reach of opponents into space, along with the adoption of other techniques of antiaccess or area-denial warfare would have a damaging impact on the overseas bases upon which America's current power projection forces appear to be dependent. If the 2001-2025 period is indeed one in which potential opponents strengthen their anti-access capabilities, then the threat to overseas bases would appear to increase. This forecast is commonly accepted.⁴⁵⁹ However, there is a debate among the sources as to whether the nature of the future security environment will conspire with the laws of physics and the diffusion of technology to make an overwhelming threat to fixed land bases permanent.

In the eyes of the bases-will-be-indefensible school, defensive measures simply cannot keep up with the offensive threat that places fixed military forces at grave risk.⁴⁶⁰ In this perspective, the action-reaction phenomenon of military technological development naturally favors offensive systems. This is similar to the argument against NMD that such defenses can always be penetrated by massive attacks or fooled by decoys, and even if one missile, presumably armed with nuclear warheads, were to penetrate the defense, the resulting destruction would be massive. Hence, a defensive system is quite pointless. Even some sources favorable to the development of NMD consider overseas bases nearly impossible to defend.⁴⁶¹ For one thing, they are closer to potential aggressors and can be targeted by short- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles, both of which are easier to develop than the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could threaten the homeland of the United States. In that sense, defending against an ICBM attack on the continental United States could be easier than defending a fixed base in or near a region of conflict. Such overseas bases could be attacked with WMD by other means of delivery, such as cruise missiles, attack aircraft, or artillery shells.

At the same time, political vulnerabilities may make overseas bases, particularly those within the sovereign territory of a host nation, much more difficult to defend. The host nation may seek to placate a potential aggressor by insisting that defenses be kept to a minimum in order to maintain the current strategic balance. If the base relies on the movement of mobile defense into the theater, such as the arrival of Patriot missile batteries, it is vulnerable to preemptive attack or coercion. The host nation may decide not to let the United States use its base facilities, lest such permission provoke an attack by a regional aggressor.

Because of the continuing development and proliferation of commercial imagery and satellite navigational aids, fixed bases appear to be increasingly easy to target with more precise weapons. The targeting solution for a fixed position--which would rely primarily on the simple input of latitude and longitude into a guidance system--is so many orders of magnitude easier than attempting to attack moving targets that fixed bases would appear to be the most cost-effective targets in any conflict.

Interpretation of all of these factors lead some sources to argue that it will be nearly impossible for the United States to successfully defend overseas bases in the 2001-2025 period from any significant regional threat.⁴⁶² This has considerable implications for American defense policies and the expenditure of defense resources. If, as the studies of the Office of Net Assessment suggest, the threat to fixed positions will only continue to increase, despite U.S. efforts to develop theater ballistic missile defenses (TBMD), then, logically, resources should be channeled to long-range or stand-off weapons and platforms that do not rely on overseas bases. A concurrent reduction in such systems as short-range tactical aviation and logistics-heavy ground units would also be logical. Sea-based and space-to-ground weaponry might also prove more desirable as replacements. The power projection forces of the United States--capabilities which mark the U.S. monopoly on global military power--would have to be reshaped to eliminate any dependence on theater-based logistics, such as the need for land-based pre-positioned equipment. All this would make mounting a power projection campaign considerably more difficult.

It may be a reaction to the implications for American power projection that cause other sources to insist that overseas bases could be successfully defended in the 2001-2025 time-frame. To admit the growing vulnerability could cause undesirable revolutionary changes in the allocation of defense resources. However, the bases-can-be-defended view also argues that emerging military technologies can make defenses against WMD more effective. Weapon technology is not necessarily biased toward the offensive. While force protection may be difficult, it may not pose a greater difficulty than that facing the aggressor in his efforts to stage a coordinated attack. The continuing and natural lead of America and its allies in emerging military technology, as identified in consensus points noted above, cause some to conclude that defenses can match offenses, particularly when backed by the eventual triumph of qualitatively (and possibly quantitatively) superior U.S. power projection.⁴⁶³ Likewise, the regional use of WMD may be deterred by the vast U.S. nuclear arsenal, use of which might be provoked by significant casualties of U.S. military personnel or host nation civilians.

Other sources argue that overseas bases can be defended by sea-based or space-based systems. Naval TBMD systems might prove especially valuable in defending littoral bases, since their mobility makes them a more difficult target.⁴⁶⁴ If shorter-range ballistic missiles can be destroyed in the launch or boost phase by space systems positioned overhead, the ballistic missile threat to overseas bases may be reduced. There is the potential for continuing development of such sea-based and space-based systems in the 2001-2025 period.

Additionally, there is the argument that vulnerability of land bases actually works to the advantage of the United States. If an attack on overseas-based U.S. forces occurs, it is likely that the United States would be reinforced in its determination to pursue the end-state of a regime change. This perception could deter a regional aggressor from launching such a strike. Also, the vulnerability of the host nation's territory to an aggressor might provoke the host nation to seek greater, rather than lesser military cooperation with the United States. As previously discussed, certain sources also argue than any host nation that could be coerced to restrict U.S. access to bases threatened by the regional aggressor's WMD is simply not an ally worth defending.

Opposing Strategies

Legacy Systems and Antiaccess Strategies

The debate on the defensibility of overseas bases has a parallel concerning the continuing effectiveness of power projection forces. Supported by the same data concerning the growing development of antiaccess systems and strategies, a number of sources suggest that the power projection forces of the United States, as currently constituted, will have increasing difficulty in penetrating antiaccess defenses in the 2001-2025 period. This would appear an evolutionary effect of the diffusion of advanced military technology, but with a reversal of the offenses-will-lead-defenses argument. There seems a bit of irony in the fact that the same sources that argue that overseas bases cannot be effectively defended also argue that offensive platforms will have great difficulty in penetrating antiaccess systems. However, their premise is that overseas bases are critical to the lodgement and sustainment of U.S. power projection forces entering a contested region. The vulnerability of overseas bases, therefore, is but the initial aspect of growing strength of antiaccess strategies directed toward prevention of U.S. intervention in a regional conflict.

The proponents of this view, however, do not necessarily see these developments as an evolutionary challenge to which the United States can modify and adapt its current forces. Rather they see this as a revolutionary development that is enabled, in part, on foreign adaptation to the RMA. Several of these sources disagree that the United States will retain the overall lead in technology. But even sources that see an overall U.S. lead, argue that temporary advantages in niche technologies may allow regional powers to strengthen their antiaccess networks. Strengthening antiaccess systems would appear quite logical as a reaction to the Gulf War lesson that the only way to defeat the United States is by keeping its forces from entering the region. In any event, the proponents argue that relying on current systems--as superior as they may be in direct combat--will eventually doom the U.S. ability to project its power.⁴⁶⁵ Continuing to spend resources on maintaining and upgrading current military systems and platforms--somewhat disparagingly called "legacy systems"--is seen as a sure path to military impotence. This position could lead to radical changes in the U.S. defense posture, some of which are advocated by the transformation school. Indeed, the perception of the growing strength of antiaccess strategies is a major impetus to the calls for defense transformation.

In contrast, there remains a body of literature that characterizes antiaccess strategies as natural aspects of war that require incremental improvements in American power projection forces, but are not a revolutionary development requiring radical change. As previously discussed, the modern version of antiaccess efforts can be seen as attempting to conduct the traditional mission of coastal defense using higher technology weapons. This view argues that current developments, particularly in theater missile defense and stand-off and precision weapons, allow U.S. power projection capabilities to keep pace with antiaccess systems.⁴⁶⁶ The Army vision of a "strategically responsive" force that is less dependent on heavy equipment and multiple air- and sea-lifts contributes to the perception that U.S. power projection forces may become even more effective in the 2001-2025 period.⁴⁶⁷

Conceptually, antiaccess strategies rely heavily on ISR assets in order to target approaching forces and coordinate defense efforts. ISR can be a weak link if not hardened against attack. Space-based assets, especially commercial imagery, could be particularly vulnerable to American counter-measures. Thus, there is a growing argument that blinding an antiaccess opponent by initially attacking and destroying ISR assets could quickly make the area-denial effort ineffectual and allow for the effective use of many of the so-called legacy systems in the U.S. inventory.

A divergence of views on the penetrability of antiaccess defenses in the 2001-2025 period underlies a divergence of defense policy recommendations, particularly concerning the pace of transformation.

Nuclear Deterrence

Throughout the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was considered the ultimate defense of both the homeland of the United States and the integrity of NATO. This perception was based on a self-fulfilling pattern of logic that considered both the United States (and the NATO alliance in general) and the Soviet Union to be rational actors who did not want to see their respective societies destroyed in a spasmodic nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence was a focal piece of international diplomacy and, in large measure, defined the limits within which choices on American defense policy could be made.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and significant reduction of the immediate nuclear threat to the American homeland (and, therefore, Russian homeland as well), many of the assumptions concerning the workings of nuclear deterrence would seem open to challenge. Recognizing that it had more to lose in a tactical nuclear exchange, the United States had already begun a phase-out of much of its tactical nuclear inventory in the mid-1980s, particularly in naval weapons.⁴⁶⁸ To some, these developments have brought into question the future effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent and the validity of the whole concept of nuclear deterrence. Who was the U.S. nuclear arsenal to be directed against? Given a world in which nuclear arsenals will continue to be reduced, what exactly would prompt a liberal democracy to retaliate with nuclear weapons? And if the potential opponents were rogue states with less rational decisionmakers what exactly would nuclear weapons deter?

Sources are split in their assessment of the importance of nuclear weapons and the validity of traditional nuclear deterrence in the 2001-2015 period. On the one hand are those who see nuclear weapons as less effective in deterring war.⁴⁶⁹ On the other are those sources who concede that nuclear weapons may have a different role than they had at the height of the Cold War, but that they remain the ultimate deterrent with considerable effect on the actions of even rogue states.⁴⁷⁰

The argument that nuclear weapons will no longer be significant elements of military strategy brings together some strange bedfellows.⁴⁷¹ Many who state a moral opposition to nuclear weapons have translated their desires into forecasts of a globalized world in which nuclear deterrence no longer makes sense. With greater economic interdependence, this argument runs, even the so-called rogue states will be reconciled to the international order, renouncing or reducing their overt or covert nuclear arsenals. The major nuclear powers of the United States and Russia will continue to reduce their own arsenals to very low numbers, and China will be forced by world opinion to follow suit. By 2025, according to this vision, nuclear weapons will be all but outlawed.

Sources that view future conflict as consisting primarily of brutal civil wars in undeveloped states--and Western intervention to prevent suffering and injustice--simply see no utility in nuclear weapons. Since nuclear weapons cannot solve any of the real issues of conflict and appear to have no obvious deterrent effect on the outbreak of such ethnic wars, nuclear deterrence will play a much smaller role in conflict. While nuclear weapons may not be completely abolished, they will remain in the far background along with the potential for major interstate war.

From a considerably different perspective, some suggest that the RMA has simply passed nuclear weapons by. If information operations will be the dominant form of conflict in an Internetted world, the use of nuclear weapons would seem merely suicidal. Nuclear effects, such as EMP, hold the potential of destroying much of the technical access to information on which both war and international society are dependent. Again, there would seem to be no utility in nuclear warfighting, so nuclear deterrence is confined to a background role.

Others who focus on the potential for RMA advances to make national missile defenses effective argue that a defense-dominant world will eventually lead to the abolition of nuclear arsenals. Indeed, this was a stated objective of President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In this vision, the reliance on nuclear deterrence as ultimate protection gives way to the reliance on active defense during the 2001-2025 period.

Additionally, some sources argue that nuclear deterrence simply has little effect on irrational rogue regimes and terrorist groups, the two threats that are most likely to attempt asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland.

In opposition to this composition of views stand those sources that view nuclear weapons as retaining considerable deterrent effect, even on rogue regimes. Since, it is argued, active defenses can never be one hundred-percent effective, the potential for nuclear destruction will remain.⁴⁷² Nuclear deterrence, therefore, retains a considerable role in protecting the homeland from weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁷³

A few sources suggest that a world in which there are more nuclear powers is a world in which interstate conflict is much less likely.⁴⁷⁴ Peace would thereby be even more dependent on nuclear deterrence than it is today. The dominance of the United States, and the relative quiescence of Russia in the realm of nuclear weapons, currently make the world safe for conventional war and increases the value of conventional over nuclear deterrence. However, such a condition may not last, as other states follow the lead of India and Pakistan in demonstrating nuclear capability. This change would again make nuclear deterrence the centerpiece of defense policy.

Other sources would argue that rogue regimes are much more rational than popularly portrayed. Although their objectives are widely divergent from the goals of liberal democracies, rogue regimes approach these objectives through a train of logical decisions. Since they have no desire to be decapitated, rogue regimes would remain cautious in provoking a disproportionate response from the United States, an idea that is further developed below. America's nuclear deterrence is what keeps such rogue regimes--or states of concern--"in the box."

Finally, sources suggest that the inherent logic of nuclear deterrence continues to be intellectually robust and retains considerable impact on international decisionmaking. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear deterrence may have ceased to be a front page news story, but it remains about as important to American security, no matter the inventory levels of the Russian and American nuclear arsenals.

Divergence of views on the importance of nuclear deterrence in 2001-2025 would seem to presage a debate on that portion of future American defense policy.

Conventional Force versus Nonstate Threats

Sources that focus intensely on the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. homeland and on the potential for asymmetric attack tend to doubt the ability of conventional military force to deter such attacks. Although there is not necessarily a direct correlation with specific views on the validity of nuclear deterrence, many of these sources tend to downplay the role of nuclear weapons and assume that potential opponents would concentrate on developing chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction, rather than expend resources on developing an extensive nuclear arsenal. Biological weapons, in particular, are frequently assumed to be immune to deterrence by conventional military forces--and possibly by nuclear weapons as well.⁴⁷⁵ The logic is that opponents who would be so irrational or immoral as to use biological weapons (particularly against civilian populations) would not easily be swayed by the threat of extensive damage to their own people.⁴⁷⁶ More importantly, terrorist groups--having no state or population to protect--do not necessarily present the vulnerabilities of a traditional military opponent. If there is an inherent difficulty in determining the perpetrators of a biological attack, there may be no apparent target for conventional (or nuclear) forces to attack.

An opposing viewpoint is that there are always vulnerabilities than can be attacked--even for terrorist groups.⁴⁷⁷ Presumably, terrorists act for causes that have overt elements. For example, Al Fatah terrorists demanded an independent Palestinian state, and the Irish Republican Army claimed to fight for greater political power for Catholics in Northern Ireland. For many years, Israel and the United Kingdom utilized conventional military and police power, as well as special operations units, to attack the terrorists directly. These actions were successful in preventing these movements from gaining power until they adopted peaceful means. States less respectful of international law and morality have used less discriminate means of denying terrorists their objectives. Given the human emotions that propel revenge and retribution, it is difficult to say what reaction use of WMD by terrorist groups might provoke. And contrary to the most alarmist speculations, effective terrorist groups tend not to be crazy or self-destructive.⁴⁷⁸

Proponents of the deterrence-is-possible position point to the example of the 1986 Eldorado Canyon reprisal against Libya, which appeared to cause Muammar Qaddafi to reduce his support of terrorist activities.⁴⁷⁹ At the time, Libya was judged a significant threat to peace, with tremendous military potential--at least on paper--and ongoing WMD programs. By the time of the Gulf War in 1991, Libyan activities as a rogue state seemed greatly reduced.⁴⁸⁰ With a combination of intelligence, overt reprisal, covert reprisal, effective law enforcement, and some degree of consequence management preparations, it would seem possible that terrorist activities--particularly with weapons as sophisticated as WMD, which are extremely difficult to obtain or utilize effectively--could be prevented, dissuaded or deterred.

The question of whether information warfare is a facilitator of or deterrent to terrorism hinges on the assumption of whether defenses will always lag behind offenses. Presumably, terrorist groups with never be able to outspend the United States government or commercial sector in information technology. Therefore, terrorist use of information will always be dependent on the vulnerabilities that are built into the information systems themselves. Could systems be designed to function something like reactive armor on a tank? If launching an information attack were to lead to an immediate counterattack, would such attacks be deterred in the same ways as nuclear or conventional deterrence? It would seem quite possible for such a deterrent to be developed. Likewise, it appears possible that protective defenses could be developed that may not be one-hundred percent leak-proof, but that can be supplemented with an offensive counterstrike capability. It is this combination of defense capabilities with the overwhelming offensive strength of U.S. forces that makes terrorist groups vulnerable to an effective American response.

The nine points of divergence described above are based on differing assumptions concerning the implications of previously identified consensus points. It is possible for opposing points of view to accept the plausibility of any or all of the consensus points and yet advocate substantially different defense policies. While that seems to make the creation of a consensus scenario an academic exercise, in reality it allows for the development of baseline expectations that American defense policy will need to fulfill to maintain security in 2001-2025. From this baseline, alternative policy options can be explored.

The identification of divergent viewpoints helps to frame the more contentious issues of the defense debate. It also suggests that there may be developments that future defense policies may need to hedge against. If reputable, well-informed sources differ as to the future impact of chaos and urban warfare, or the future role of nuclear deterrence, it may be prudent to develop policies that are effective under multiple alternatives. This leads back to the concept that the validity of any particular policy is derived from its ability to adjust--relatively intact--to a changing future, rather than to be optimized for a particular future alternative.

Another element that suggests the need for hedging strategies is the identification of outliers and wildcards.




Table of Contents  |  Chapter Seven  |  Endnotes