Endnotes




¹  The last volumes of the Sibylline Books were destroyed in the great fire during the reign of the emperor Nero. This was considered the beginning of Rome's collapse caused by a series of unforeseen dangers. Once the books had been sold, Amalthaea was never seen again.

²  The U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century, "Study Addendum" to New World Coming: American Security in the 21^st Century (published at http://www.nssg.gov/Reports/reports.html only; not released with report text), September 15, 1999, 10-11. Not all of these studies are designed to address the overall character of the future security environment; many address a more narrow set of topics, or provide an indirect assessment.

³  Some studies published in 1996 might not have achieved wide circulation by the May 1997 completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review 1997; hence the inclusion of sources which appeared in that year. Two 1995 studies were included because they represent organizations that did not sponsor a later study on the future security environment.

⁴  Chapter one includes a listing of common subjects as well as details on methodology. A summary of the 36 primary sources is found in appendix A.

⁵  An approximately 85 percent agreement among sources was considered a majority.

⁶  The consensus points are discussed in detail in chapter five and the points of divergence are discussed in chapter six.

⁷  The dissenting positions are also discussed in detail in chapter five. A bibliography of the more than three hundred secondary sources constitutes appendix B. In general, publications from the 1996-2000 period were used to identify dissenting views; older sources were used as background.

⁸  These wild cards are described in chapter seven.

⁹  Quoted in Peter G. Tsouras, Warrior's Words (London: Cassell, 1992), 322.

¹⁰  An emerging fad in business literature can be termed "jamming instead of planning." In a December 1999 article, Daniel Gross argues that "in today's chaotic economic environment, the best business plan might be to have no plan at all." His logic is that plans, particularly long-range plans, are quickly overtaken by events, and that the entrepreneur must operate more like a jazz musician in a "jam" session than a driver following a detailed road map. Gross unconvincingly links the futility of planning argument to chaos theory, but his primary inspiration is John Kao's Jamming: The Art and Discipline of Business Creativity (New York: Harperbusiness, 1997). Though citing the statistic that only 14 percent of small businesses have annual business plans in writing, Gross appears to eventually contradict himself by admitting that even jam sessions need to be scheduled. See Daniel Gross, "No Plan," U.S. Airways Attaché (December 1999): 14-16. According to one source, Richard Holbrooke, special envoy to the Balkans who negotiated the Dayton Accords of 1995, also likens diplomacy to jazz rather than chess--its traditional metaphor. Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Company, 2000), 17, 35.

¹¹  From the DOD perspective, QDR 1997 followed in the mode of an earlier series of Secretary of Defense-directed reviews, conducted at approximately four-year intervals, including the Bush administration's Base Force/New National Security Strategy of 1989-1990 and the Clinton administration Bottom-Up Review of 1993. The distinction is the Congressional mandate for the QDR series.

¹²  Officially the National Security Study is chartered by the Secretary of Defense, rather than Congressional mandate. In reality, it was the brainchild of then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and its funding was originally a part of legislation. De facto, it is a Congressionally-mandated study.

¹³  "We lack a clear threat to provide an identifiable template against which we can shape our forces." From James R. Blaker, "The American RMA Force: An Alternative to the QDR," Strategic Review 25:3 (Summer 1997): 29-30. For discussion of the "optimistic thesis" predicting the "end of all forms of major military conflict," see Richard L. Kugler, "Nonstandard Contingencies for Defense Planning," in Paul K. Davis, ed., New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), especially 168-170.

¹⁴  "During the current strategic lull, the absence of a clear competitor removes one of the major motivations and compasses for change and innovation." Blaker, 29.

¹⁵  Among early discussions of the difficulties in identifying threats in the post-Cold War era is W.Y. Smith, "U.S. National Security After the Cold War," The Washington Quarterly 15 (Autumn 1992): 23-34.

¹⁶  This idea that the post-Cold War world was brief is still under debate. For an opposing argument see Paul W. Schroeder, "Rediscovering the New World Order: A Historical Perspective," The Washington Quarterly 17 (Spring 1994): 25-43. An argument that the period of strategic euphoria was an illusion can be found in Joseph S. Nye, "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs 71 (Spring 1992): 83-96.

¹⁷  A discussion that uses nuclear and weapons of mass destruction proliferation as a benchmark for a post-post-Cold War world is Brad Roberts, "1995 and the End of the Post-Cold War Era," The Washington Quarterly 18 (Winter 1995): 5-25.

¹⁸  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, November 1997).

¹⁹  U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century, "Study Addendum" to New World Coming , 10-11.

²⁰  A number of studies do pick and choose supporting documentation from their predecessors. But none appear to begin with an across-the-board survey of previous assessments. Philip Ritcheson's effort for the National Security Study Group supporting the U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century does not appear to have had a significant impact on their published report. The World Future Society's publication Future Survey provides "a monthly abstract of books, articles, and reports concerning forecasts, trends, and ideas about the future." This is the most comprehensive effort to collect alternative views, but it does not attempt to compare and contrast them. Future Survey also tends to highlight normative and prescriptive publications that focus on peace building rather than defense analysis.

²¹  These categories were initially derived from the topics addressed in the future security environment section of the QDR 1997 report. However, the results of the surveys and analyses required a narrowing of these categories. For clarity, the findings identified in chapter five are recategorized as threats, military technology, and opposing strategies.

²²  Appendix B is a listing of these secondary, consulted sources.

²³  All the material presented in this study comes exclusively from unclassified information. Although several of the primary sources have an overall classification level above unclassified, the information derived from such sources came solely from sections within the document that are unclassified. As a further guarantee that classified material is not inadvertently presented, there are no footnotes citing any source with a higher overall classification level. Therefore, there are no direct citations in this study for the following sources: Transformed World, 2015, "The Projected Security Environment" from Defense Planning Guidance 1999, and Joint Strategy Review 1998.

²⁴  As is always the case with such selections, judgments were required as to how closely particular material conformed to the criteria; not all sources conform to the same degree.

²⁵  An additional, particularly useful study is the report of the Harvard University-sponsored 1999 Wianno Summer Study. Although conducted by an independent working group, the findings of the Wianno study were integrated into and form the basis for the 1999 OSD Office of Net Assessment Summer Studies. Because of that, the Wianno study was consulted, but not surveyed as a primary source. Its published version is: Eliot A. Cohen, Aaron L. Friedberg, and Stephen Peter Rosen, The Future Security Environment and American Defense Planning (Cambridge, MA: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, November 1999).

²⁶  It should be noted that IFPA conducts contract research for the U.S. Government.

²⁷  Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser, eds., Sources of Conflict in the 21^st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 34.

²⁸  U.S. House of Representatives, 106^th Cong., 1^st Sess., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Conference Report to Accompany S. 1059), August 6, 1999, 782.

²⁹  Ibid., 781.

³⁰  Peter A. Schwartz, The Art of the Long View (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1996), 29.

³¹  Cold War era discussions of the capabilities versus intentions controversy can be found in Derek Leebaert, ed., Soviet Military Thinking (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 12-13, and Thomas Rona, "Deception and the Formulation of National Intelligence Estimates," in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, Soviet Strategic Deception (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 487-508.

³²  "Study Addendum" to New World Coming, 2. The addendum does not state that Delphi variants are most frequently used; this conclusion is based on the author's survey.

³³  Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall, Learning From the Future: Competitive Foresight Scenarios (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 6.

³⁴  Ibid.

³⁵  Harry G. Summers, Jr., The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 61.

³⁶  An echo of Summers' views in the sound bites from other critics can be found in "Future Schlock?" Foreign Policy 113 (Winter 1998-99): 82.

³⁷  In his introduction to a new edition of Kahn's classic work, Brent Scowcroft points out that it was Kahn's deliberate efforts to broaden his scope beyond "the technical aspects of the nuclear threat and potential" that made his scenario work unique. Kahn himself originally referred to scenario work as "Gedanken (thought) experiments." Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 11, 55, 58.

³⁸  Schwartz, xiv.

³⁹  Ibid., 8.

⁴⁰  Ibid., 9.

⁴¹  Ibid., 227-239.

⁴²  Although the effort, Project 2025, may have been designed in part to prepare the Air Force for future comprehensive defense reviews, the timing of QDR 1997 was such that it is difficult to determine if the project had any impact on the QDR. It is also difficult to link Air Force resource requirements planning to project 2025, primarily because of the impact of such subsequent real world events as NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo. Because of that, and the significant effort involved, Project 2025 is included among the current (i.e., post-QDR 1997) futures studies.

⁴³  Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., et al., Alternative Futures for 2025: Security Planning to Avoid Surprise (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, September 1996), 14.

⁴⁴  Arguably, many aspects of human behavior are well known and can be reasonably predicted in a particular context or set of circumstances. This is, in fact, the very rationale behind the use of wargames (or other decisionmaking games) as preparatory tools and training in decisionmaking. However, the nature of human behavior is hotly debated throughout the realms of psychology, philosophy, and religion and most estimates shy away from overtly incorporating a particular philosophy of human decision-making. This is discussed in greater detail in chapter three.

⁴⁵  A harsher criticism by Ed Smith, Boeing Corporation: "Intelligence--the military kind--doesn't work [in predicting out to 2020]. [It is] only good for 5-10 years out. [It relies on] evidence based projections, [but, there] may be no evidence [and the] projections are probably wrong." From "What...From the Sea Didn't Say" (Boeing Corporation briefing, presented June 2000).

⁴⁶  While acknowledging the use of forecasting for commodity speculation, Charles F. Doran argues that the traders ultimately expect forecasting to fail. See Doran, "Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in International Relations and Economics," International Studies Review 1 (Summer 1999): 11-42.

⁴⁷  Pierre Wack, "Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead" (article in two parts) Harvard Business Review 63 (September-October 1985): 73-89, and 63 (November-December 1985): 139-150.

⁴⁸  Schwartz, 9.

⁴⁹  Ibid., 75.

⁵⁰  National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, December 1997, 8-11; U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century, New World Coming: Supporting Research and Analysis, 133-139. However, the scenarios appear to have little direct connection to the recommendations of the National Defense Panel for transformation, nor to the "Major Themes and Implications" identified by the Commission members.

⁵¹  Richard Danzig, The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risks and How to Address Them (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 6.

⁵²  Quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 239.

⁵³  Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, "The British Armed Forces, 1918-39," in Allen R. Millet and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 101.

⁵⁴  Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 96.

⁵⁵  Ibid., 96-97.

⁵⁶  Ibid., 97.

⁵⁷  See discussion in David C. Gompert, Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age, McNair Paper 59 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 15-39.

⁵⁸  Behavior discussed in William Powers, "Information Waterbugs," National Journal 31 (December 4, 1999): 3458-3461.

⁵⁹  The impossibility of value-free research in the social sciences, and the necessity to be value-explicit, are reflected in the foreign policy analysis writings of James N. Rosenau. See Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 33-34.

⁶⁰  Discussed in W. Warren Wagar, "Utopias, Futures and H.G. Well's Open Conspiracy," in Howard F. Didsbury, Jr., ed., Frontier of the 21^st Century: Prelude to the New Millenium (Bethesda, MD: World Future Society, 1999), 141-147.

⁶¹  Abridged version published in Howard F. Didsbury, Jr., ed., Frontier of the 21^st Century: Prelude to the New Millenium (Bethesda, MD: World Future Society, 1999), 148-154.

⁶²  Public organizations that promote futures research, such as the World Future Society, generally have two faces. On the one hand, they encourage discussion of rigorous, scholarly futures analysis from various sources. On the other hand, they also provide a forum for a wide variety of normative prescriptions for the future dressed in scholarly language. Often the normative prescriptions are themselves the aspirations of noted scholars, or are the underlying motives for a whole field of academic inquiry, such as peace research. It must be noted that the World Future Society has continued to move in the direction of value explicitness, particularly in its professional journal, Futures Research Quarterly.

⁶³  For discussion, see Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

⁶⁴  The Commission on America's National Interests admonishes that "interests are not just whatever the current government says they are." Graham T. Allison and Robert Blackwill, lead authors, America's National Interests (The Commission on America's National Interests, July 2000, available at http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/nationalinterests.pdf ), 16.

⁶⁵  Address given at the Naval War College-sponsored "Alternative Futures in War and Conflict" Conference, Pell Center for International Relations, Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, November 30, 1999.

⁶⁶  I have been unable to identify any current study that is explicitly based on a particular view of human nature or exclusively based on historical analysis.

⁶⁷  See for example Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982).

⁶⁸  An excellent discussion of economic thinking in this period can be found in Paul Starobin, "What Went Wrong," National Journal 49 (December 1999): 3451-53.

⁶⁹  Ibid., 3451-3452.

⁷⁰  The reigning classic on this subject is John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). An excellent survey of the literature is Charles T. Allen, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?" The Washington Quarterly 17 (Summer 1994): 203-233.

⁷¹  A detailed analysis is Kenneth F. McKenzie, The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR, McNair Paper 62 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000).

⁷²  Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, v. Hereafter refered to as QDR 1997.

⁷³  U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century, "Study Addendum ," 16.

⁷⁴  QDR 1997, 5.

⁷⁵  Ibid., 11.

⁷⁶  An excellent categorization and description of such operations from a traditional, primarily naval, point of view can be found in James Cable, Navies in Violent Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

⁷⁷  QDR 1997, 11.

⁷⁸  Ibid., iv.

⁷⁹  National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 6.

⁸⁰  Khalilzad and Lesser, 121-122.

⁸¹  On January 5, 2000, Italy announced that it intended to recognize North Korea. Italy is the first of the G-7 states to do so, and the move appears to indicate some success of the North Korea regime to break out of its pariah state status. See stratfor.com, "Global Intelligence Update--January 6, 2000" (website, posted Jan 5, 2000).

⁸²  The RAND study discusses the argument that the United States should take the lead in preventing the complete collapse of North Korea (the so-called "soft landing school") because the "negative and destabilizing aftershocks" are not in the interests of the United States, Japan, or South Korea. However, the study concludes that a North Korean collapse is inevitable, given that "the root causes of collapse are entrenched within the North Korean system." Actions taken by other states could postpone, but not prevent such a collapse. (p. 123)

⁸³  See discussion in Jacquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning for a New Era (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1999), 106-107.

⁸⁴  National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 23.

⁸⁵  Ibid.

⁸⁶  There may be, in fact, political reasons for not publicly discussing American defense policy in terms other than the threat of rogue states. However, this approach has a stifling effect on open public debate on the future security environment.

⁸⁷  The term "prominent dissenters" is meant to describe those analytical, political, or scholarly sources who are likely to have an effect on U.S. defense policy. Generally, these are authorities who are used by the Department of Defense for analysis or have a track record of influencing the thinking of government decisionmakers. Other scholarly dissenters without such a track record have not been included, even if prominent within their fields of study.

⁸⁸  Recent scholarship appears somewhat ambivalent about the role of ideology in modern conflict. Marxists and others have often argued that economic factors are the prime drivers of conflict. Since Marxism itself became a dogmatic ideology, there is no small irony in this argument. More recently, others have questioned whether conflict studies have been too focused on ideology or "grand causes" as motives for conflict. An illustrative statement by David Tucker is that "with the end of the Cold War, commentators began to notice that men fought for reasons other than ideology." David Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians," Parameters 28 (Summer 1998): 71.

⁸⁹  A particularly elegant statement of this argument can be found in Starobin, 3452.

⁹⁰  A brief discussion on the role of the United States as "an ideological power" from a military perspective is contained in Norman Friedman, "Steaming Into a New World," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (May 1999): 53-59.

⁹¹  A recent discussion of Fidel Castro's unique ability to blend Soviet-style communism with his own style of anti-American politics and cult of the personality is www.stratfor.com , "The Geopolitics of Fidel," Stratfor.com Weekly Global Intelligence Update, 10 April 2000.

⁹²  Brian R. Sullivan states directly: "Chinese Communism is dead as an ideology, and the Party survives only as a tool of the national government." From Sullivan, "A World of Great Powers," in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., 2015: Power and Progress (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), 34.

⁹³  John Train, "Foreign Intelligence Penetration," Strategic Review 27 (Fall 1999): 78.

⁹⁴  National Military Strategy of the United States--Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Century (1997), 9.

⁹⁵  A succinct statement of this argument can be found in Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the Future: World Politics in a New Century, 3^d ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 128-130.

⁹⁶  Davis and Sweeney, 14-15.

⁹⁷  A discussion of democratic claims and illiberal democracy appears in Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 195-199.

⁹⁸  "Evolutionary" is a key word in this assessment. A number of previously enthusiastic authorities on the post-Cold War expansionism of democratic values now suggest that exponential growth in democracies may be over. See, for example, Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37.

⁹⁹  Perhaps one of the most powerful arguments that such discouragement and disillusionment not only are already occurring, but should be expected as natural human reactions with international security implications, is Ralph Peters, "Our Old New Enemies," in Lloyd J. Matthews, Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 1998), 215-238. Peters states: "Our future enemies will be of two kinds--those who have seen their hopes disappointed, and those who have no hope. Do not worry about a successful China. Worry about a failing China." (p. 223). See also Robin Wright, "Democracy: Challenges and Innovations in the 1990s," The Washington Quarterly 20 (Summer 1997): 23-36.

¹⁰⁰  The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, iv.

¹⁰¹  The December 1999 version of A National Security Strategy for a New Century, does not use the same language and is not explicit concerning potential disillusionment. However, such a possibility is implied in discussions on "Promoting Prosperity" and "Promoting Democracy" in Section III, "Integrated Regional Approaches," 32-34, 37-39, 40-41, 44, 46-47.

¹⁰²  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

¹⁰³  See discussion on separation of authority in Islam in Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2 (Spring 1991): 27-29.

¹⁰⁴  Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 109-110.

¹⁰⁵  Ibid., 111.

¹⁰⁶  Ibid., 116.

¹⁰⁷  U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century, New World Coming: Supporting Research and Analysis, 88. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999 version, seeks to distance itself from any implication that Islamic views on separation of religious and secular power are a potential for conflict. See p. 45.

¹⁰⁸  John L. Esposito, "The Islamic Factor," in Phebe Marr, ed., Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 61-62.

¹⁰⁹  See Max Rodenbeck, "Is Islamism Losing Its Thunder?" The Washington Quarterly 21 (Spring 1998): 177-194.

¹¹⁰  The thesis of democratic peace is given official standing in A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 2. Scholarly support is given by Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for the Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 119. Detractors among current futures assessments include Sullivan, 3-4.

¹¹¹  Globalism is thought by some to be the replacement to nationalism, which itself has often been decried as the source of war. This trend is rapidly becoming common wisdom. As described by Paul Bracken: "The unquestioned assumption in the West is that globalization is the force of the future, while nationalism stands for the world of the past." Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), xxiv.

¹¹²  Thomas Friedman, "Was Kosovo World War III?" The New York Times, July 2, 1999, A17. Friedman does admit that Belgrade, Serbia, along with all the NATO countries, had McDonald's franchises during the NATO air strikes of 1999.

¹¹³  This perception was particularly prevalent following the collapse of communism and the Chinese freedom movement that led to the Tiananmen Square standoff. However, recent arguments maintain that "democracy lost the information war," and that authoritarian control of the media (including the Internet) is now shaping perspectives. See, for example, Tim Zimmermann, "All propaganda, all the time," U.S. News and World Report, November 11, 1996, 48.

¹¹⁴  Derived from discussion in Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39 (Spring 1997): 163-165.

¹¹⁵  An example is the Italian Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini's view of Hitler and his motives for joining the invasion of France. Mussolini's commitment to the Axis Pact initially appeared ambiguous because he did not want Germany's power to eclipse Italy's glory. See, for example, Edwin Hoyt, Mussolini's Empire: The Rise and Fall of the Fascist Vision (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), 163-194. Scholarly interest in Mussolini appeared to have a revival in the mid-1990s. Hitler himself seemed to have concerns that "...the British Empire would collapse, to the net benefit of Japan, America, and others, rather than Germany." He preferred a negotiated peace with Britain in 1940 rather than allowing others to benefit. Geoffrey Megargee, Inside Hitler's High Command (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 89.

¹¹⁶  Sullivan, 3.

¹¹⁷  Ibid.

¹¹⁸  Steven M. Walt, "Coalitions," in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., 2015: Power and Progress (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), 92.

¹¹⁹  See discussion in www.stratfor.com, "Global Intelligence Update--5 June 2000; Retrieving the Irretrievable: The Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy," June 4, 2000.

¹²⁰  Snow, 39.

¹²¹  Ibid., 39-40.

¹²²  However, there are discussions of how an independent European military structure could balance American power. See, for example, Jean-Marie Guehenno, "The Impact of Globalisation on Strategy," Survival 40 (Winter 1998-99): 16-18; Frederick Bonnart, "U.S. Starts to Fret Over EU Military Independence..." International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2000, 1.

¹²³  Russia as "honorary member" is Snow's interpretation of WTO activities. As of May 2000, Chinese membership was not concluded. See Clay Chandler, "Talks Break Off on China Bid to Join WTO," The The Washington Post, April 1, 2000, A15.

¹²⁴  However, in contrast to Snow, Samuel Huntington argues that economic ties do not create a common culture and that "the image of an emerging universally Western world is misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous." Huntington, "The West and the World," Foreign Affairs 75 (November/December 1996): 28-46.

¹²⁵  Even sources concerned with the possible expansion of Chinese military power argue that "given the favorable conditions presented by the international economic order, it is still very much in China's self-interest to work within a system from which it has profited so greatly." Karl W. Eikenberry, "Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability," Parameters 25 (Spring 1995): 96. See also Felix K. Chang, "Conventional War Across the Taiwan Straits," Orbis 40 (Fall 1996): 606.

¹²⁶  Davis and Sweeney, 226.

¹²⁷  Ibid.

¹²⁸  Others suggest that a massive military strike without warning--spearheaded by ballistic missile attack--would be the more likely method for China to employ against Taiwan. See, for example, Robert Kagan, "How China Will Take Taiwan," The Washington Post, March 12, 2000, B7; and Gary Schmitt and Thomas Donnelly, "Our Interests Lie With Theirs," The Washington Post, April 23, 2000, B4.

¹²⁹  Ibid., 238.

¹³⁰  Henry Chu and Richard C. Paddock, "Russia Looks to China as an Ally Amid West's Ire," Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1999, 1. Rajan Menon describes Russian-Chinese rapprochement as a "strategic convergence" directed toward the U.S. rather than "trust or goodwill." Menon, "The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China, Survival 39 (Summer 1997): 101-125. For the impact of Russian-Chinese arm sales on "a strategic cooperative partnership," see Stephen J. Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 4, 1997).

¹³¹  www.stratfor.com, "Herding Pariahs: Russia's Dangerous Game," Stratfor.com Weekly Global Intelligence Update, February 8, 2000.

¹³²  Agence France-Presse in Beijing, "Alliances Can Defuse Hegemonism by US," South China Morning Post, March 8, 2000.

¹³³  However, their willingness to support security cooperation with the United States is discussed in Brian Robertson, Royal Australian Navy, "Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 122 (March 1996): 65-68.

¹³⁴  For a study of recent Sino-Russian relations that argues an effective alliance is unlikely, see Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 315 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, December 1997). Her conclusion is that: "Russia and China's strategic partnership is unwieldy and imprecise...weighed down by contradictory commitments, hyperbolic rhetoric...[and] inherently and deliberately vague." (p. 79) Additional Russian-Chinese contentions are discussed in Norman Friedman, "The China Puzzle Continues to Baffle the West," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (March 2000): 4-6.

¹³⁵  QDR 1997, 5.

¹³⁶  Ibid.

¹³⁷  National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 77.

¹³⁸  Ibid., 5.

¹³⁹  See, for example, the debates in: Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," and Robert S. Ross, "China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs 76 (March/April 1997): 18-44, and Gerald Segal, "What China Threat?" 78 Foreign Affairs (September/October 1999): 24-36. A balanced "neither partner nor adversary" assessment is David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," Survival 42 (Spring 2000): 97-115.

¹⁴⁰  Joint Vision 2010, the current joint military vision of future capabilities, states "power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force." Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1996), 3.

¹⁴¹  Strategic Assessment 1999, 91-99; Davis and Sweeney, 60-64.

¹⁴²  Strategic Assessment 1999, 129-130.

¹⁴³  Despite the name and presumed constitutional restrictions, the JMSDF "is in fact a navy in all but name and the most powerful one in Asia-Pacific after the U.S. Navy." John Downing, "A Japanese navy in all but name," Jane's Navy International 104 (April 1, 1999): 33. See also Edward L. Martin, "The Evolving Missions and Forces of the JMSDF," Naval War College Review 68 (Spring 1995): 39-67.

¹⁴⁴  QDR 1997, 12.

¹⁴⁵  Ibid., 33.

¹⁴⁶  Ibid., 12.

¹⁴⁷  As a foreign commentator on the lessons of the Gulf War noted: "The 'super-power' of the U.S. stemmed not simply from its size or its superior resources, but from its ability to harness its power and concentrate it effectively....Above all it came from an ability to mount an integrated effort across a broad spectrum of capabilities and to marshal the resources--social and political--as well as economic and military in an integrated manner." Quoted in Patrick J. Garrity, "Implications of the Persian Gulf War for Regional Powers," The Washington Quarterly 16 (Summer 1993): 154.

¹⁴⁸  Khalilzad and Lesser use the term "global peer competitor," defined as "an adversarial power that would attempt to challenge the United States and its interests worldwide." Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser, eds., Sources of Conflict in the 21^st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 19.

¹⁴⁹  The total number of nuclear warheads permitted by the START 1 treaty for the U.S. and Russia is 6,000 on each side. START 2, which is planned for implementation in 2007 calls for a total of 3,500 for each nation. Source: Jane's Intelligence Review 10 (November 1, 1998): 10.

¹⁵⁰  The National Defense Panel argues that although China's current nuclear arsenal may be small, "China has the capability to be a more significant nuclear power by 2010-2020." National Defense Panel, 50. Shambaugh provides an estimate of 17 to 20 ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S. Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations," 112. Others argue that the U.S. Government should be more concerned about China's nuclear modernization programs, but concede that at present "China's nuclear missile force is closer in size to a so-called rogue state's than it is to Russia." Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, "China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power," Foreign Affairs 79 (July/August 2000): 58. A brief discussion of the Chinese ballistic missile submarine program is Larry G. Vogt, "China's Strategic Seapower," The Submarine Review, July 1997, 47-56.

¹⁵¹  Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," International Security 23 (Winter 1998/99): 83-85.

¹⁵²  As the Commission on America's National Interests asserts: "The United States is unique in its ability to conduct large-scale military operations at great distances from its own territory. This ability to fight and win wars in the 'backyards' of potential adversaries is essential to preventing the emergence of a hostile hegemon and to ensuring the survival of American allies." Allison and Blackwill, 52.

¹⁵³  Although Khalilzad and Lesser argue that it is doubtful a competitor with such "supraregional" capabilities will develop before 2025, they hedge their assessment by stating that "the rise of a 'global competitor' is uncertain." Their argument, however, is very similar to that above. Khalilzad and Lesser, 19-20,

¹⁵⁴  Davis and Sweeney suggest that China would not be able to integrate RMA-type technologies until 2030. See Davis and Sweeney, 92.

¹⁵⁵  Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, Asia 2025 (assembled briefing slides and text), Newport, RI, July 25-August 4, 1999, 102-114.

¹⁵⁶  A discussion of factors that limit Chinese power projection capabilities can be found in Davis and Sweeney, 86-92.

¹⁵⁷  Ibid., 127-141.

¹⁵⁸  There are, however, sources that argue that "prudent force planning must take such a worse case scenario into account." See, for example: William T. Johnsen, Force Planning Considerations for Army XXI (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 18, 1998).

¹⁵⁹  The leading examples being the politician and filmmaker Shintaro Ishihara and Sony Corporation Chairman Akio Morita. See Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).

¹⁶⁰  George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War With Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

¹⁶¹  See Secretary of State James A. Baker, "America in Asia--Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," Foreign Affairs 70 (Winter 1991/92): 1-18; Robert A. Scalapino, "The United States and Asia: Future Prospects," Foreign Affairs 70 (Winter 1991/92): 19-40; Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70 (Winter 1991/92): 58-74; Howard H. Baker and Ellen L. Frost, "Rescuing the U.S.-Japanese Alliance," Foreign Affairs 71 (Spring 1992): 97-113. Even articles largely critical of Japan, such as Richard Holbrooke, "Japan and the United States: Ending the Unequal Partnership," Foreign Affairs 70 (Winter 1991/92): 41-57, insist that the U.S.-Japanese security alliance is unassailable.

¹⁶²  A recent essay on the linkage between economic and military competition with China is Dana Rohrabacher, "Q: Should Congress be concerned about China and the Panama Canal?" Insight on the News, December 27, 1999, 40. A discussion on American fears of a competition with the European Union can be found in William Wallace and Jan Zielonka, "Misunderstanding Europe," Foreign Affairs 77 (November-December 1998): 65-79.

¹⁶³  See C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Nolan, Reconcilable Differences? United States-Japan Economic Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, June 1993). A review of recent sources on U.S.-Japanese security arrangements is Chris B. Johnstone, "Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance," Survival 42 (Spring 2000): 173-181.

¹⁶⁴  See Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999); Davis and Sweeney, 14-15.

¹⁶⁵  New World Coming, 141.

¹⁶⁶  Allen Hammond, Which World? Scenarios for the 21^st Century (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998), 110-112. For extended water scarcity assessment, see also Sandra Postel, Pillar of Sand: Can the Irrigation Miracle Last? (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

¹⁶⁷  This view also has its roots in the perception of the worldwide advance of democracy in the 1980s. A representative argument that economic liberalization precedes and helps create the conditions for political change to democratization (and more peaceful relations) is John D. Sullivan, "Democracy and Global Economic Growth," The Washington Quarterly 15 (Spring 1992): 175-186.

¹⁶⁸  www.stratfor.com, "Decade Forecast--Decade Through 2005," December 24, 1994 (currently available on website), 1.

¹⁶⁹  Ibid.

¹⁷⁰  Ibid.

¹⁷¹  Ibid., 3.

¹⁷²  QDR 1997, 3.

¹⁷³  Current MTW planning focuses on Iraq rather than Iran. However, the two contingencies are often linked when addressing American foreign policy objectives in the Gulf region. "This approach is consistent with the dual containment policy of the United States, which treats Iran and Iraq as twin pariahs. Although both reject being classified as a pair, American policy groups them together." From Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), xiii.

¹⁷⁴  An opposing view is that of Thomas Hirschfeld and W. Seth Carus who argue that "with any luck, the adversaries of the two major regional conflicts...will disappear by the early days of the next century." They base their conclusions on the fact that "rogue status" is transitory, with such authoritarian states prone to frequent regime changes. "In reality, the history of the states presently labeled 'rogue' suggests that relatively few will pursue hostile policies over an extended period." Hirschfeld and Carus, "We Need to Understand," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 123 (February 1997): 66.

¹⁷⁵  Although Global Trends 2010 issued by the National Intelligence Council argues that internal contradictions in both states would prevent such dominance in the near term. See 8-10.

¹⁷⁶  New World Coming, 47.

¹⁷⁷  If the START 2 treaty is implemented in 2007, the Russian arsenal of nuclear warheads will be reduced to 3,500, which would still massively dwarf the arsenals of China, Britain, and France.

¹⁷⁸  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2010, 8. Richard F. Staar estimates that Russia has retained approximately 70 percent of the former Soviet Union's military-industrial complex. See Richard F. Staar, The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths that Shape the Image (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 76-79.

¹⁷⁹  The consensus of the literature on military operations in Chechnya is that Russian forces performed poorly and would not have been successful were if not for absolute air supremacy. On the most recent fighting in Chechnya, see: "Russia's Chechen War: Second Time Lucky?" Jane's Defence Weekly 33 (March 8, 2000): 32-36; Jamie Dettmer, "Requiem for a Heavyweight," Insight on the News, February 21, 2000, 22, and David A. Fulghum, "Air War in Chechnya Reveals Mix of Tactics," Aviation Week and Space Technology 152 (February 14, 2000): 76. On previous operations, see Andrew Wilson, "Russian Military Haunted by Past Glories," International Defense Review 29 (May 1, 1996): 25. An assessment of overall lessons learned is Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Russia's Clash in Chechnya: Implications for Future War," National Security Studies Quarterly 6 (Spring 2000): 49-58.

¹⁸⁰  Special forces and elite units, such as spetsnaz, were considered the most reliable troops in the Soviet armed forces. Although the readiness of Russian spetsnaz is nowhere near Cold War standards, and they did not fight as well as expected in Chechnya, they are one of the few forces of the Russian military apparently not slated for further cuts. It is easier to increase the readiness of these units than the Russian army as a whole. See David C. Isby, "Russia's once-revered spetsnaz look to rally after Chechnia," Jane's Intelligence Review 9 (December 1, 1997): 534-537. In fact, it was announced in July 2000 that Russia would increase elite airborne troops by 5,000 by the end of 2001. See www.stratfor.com, "Russian Military Quarrel Winds Down," Stratfor.com Weekly Global Intelligence Update--August 2, 2000.

¹⁸¹  Some sources view this dominance as fleeting. See, for example, forecasts contained in Howell M. Estes III, United States Space Command Long Range Plan (Peterson Air Force Base, CO: U.S. Space Command, March 1998).

¹⁸²  A brief discussion of the ASEAN community's efforts to prevent Chinese military confrontation in the South China Sea is contained in A. James Gregor, "Qualified Engagement: U.S. China Policy and Security Concerns," Naval War College Review 52 (Spring 1999): 74-75. An eloquent view on Chinese military expansion into South East Asia from an Asian perspective is Anton Nugroho, "The Dragon Looks South," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (March 2000): 74-76.

¹⁸³  China also appears to view NATO expansion and the extension of the Partnership for Peace program to Central Asian states as "separate pincers in a grand strategy of containment against China." Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations," 104.

¹⁸⁴  See notes in Engelbrecht et al., 91-92.

¹⁸⁵  New World Coming, 77; see explanation in footnote 53 (p. 29), which demonstrates that by conventional measurements this forecast is unrealistic.

¹⁸⁶  Reports indicate that China increased defense spending by over 200 percent between 1988 (near end of Cold War) and 1995. Nayan Chanda, "Fear of the Dragon," Far Eastern Review, April 13, 1995, 24. See also the assessment of new technologies under study by China in Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999).

¹⁸⁷  For example, see the translations of Chinese military writings contained in Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare, revised edition (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), especially 249-420.

¹⁸⁸  Roberts, Manning, and Montaperto argue that: "It is time Washington turned its eyes to the East and came to grips with the fact that over the next decade it will likely be China, not Russia or any rogue, where nuclear weapons policy will concern America most." Roberts et al., 53.

¹⁸⁹  Paul Bracken discusses this perception of China's willingness to use force as "the will to bomb," which is why, he argues, Britain--with an impressive nuclear arsenal--has never been taken seriously as a nuclear power, yet China--with a small arsenal--has always evoked fear. See Bracken, Fire in the East, 108-109.

¹⁹⁰  Khalilzad and Lesser argue that this threat to Beijing's legitimacy, combined with a Taiwanese declaration of independence, is such that "a Chinese resort to force would likely occur regardless of the state of the military balance at the time or the adverse consequences such actions would pose for Chinese reform policies and Beijing's relations with other powers." Khalilzad and Lesser, 85.

¹⁹¹  This is a perspective of the Kuomintang (KMT) as the historical ideological opponent of Chinese marxism rather than the current state of the KMT as a political party. See John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? 3^d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 42-48; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living With China," The National Interest 59 (Spring 2000): 12-13; and Chang, 577.

¹⁹²  Khalilzad and Lesser, 84-85. Part of the irony is that it is less likely that the KMT--presumably the ideological opponent of the mainland--is less likely to declare Taiwanese independence than other Taiwanese political parties that have no claim whatsoever to the loyalty of mainlanders.

¹⁹³  See discussion in Jianxiang Bi, "Managing Taiwan Operations in the Twenty-first Century: Issues and Options," Naval War College Review 52 (Autumn 1999): 30-58.

¹⁹⁴  A particularly thorough discussion of this possibility is Douglas Porch , "The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy," Naval War College Review 52 (Summer 1999): 15-48. A good summary of the dilemma between America's support of democracy and human rights and the desire to develop a strategic relationship with China is Walter Neal Anderson, Overcoming Uncertainty: U.S.-Chinese Strategic Relations in the 21^st Century, INSS Occasional Paper 29 (U.S. Air Force Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, October 1999). See also Asia 2025, 67-72; Strategic Assessment 1999, 127-128. On the other hand, informal interviews with leaders of the U.S. business community indicate that there is some sentiment that the U.S. Government will ultimately abandon its support of Taiwanese self-determination in exchange for a dominant position in the Chinese import market.

¹⁹⁵  An excellent source for Chinese military writings on the potential for future conflict is Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000). See also the discussion of the anti-U.S. focus of the PLA in David Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," International Security 24 (Winter 1999/2000): 52-79.

¹⁹⁶  Such a scenario, entitled "The New South Asian Order," is developed in Asia 2025, 83-100.

¹⁹⁷  A useful brief history of the change in relations between the U.S., Pakistan and India is Sumut Ganguly, "South Asia After the Cold War," The Washington Quarterly 15 (Autumn 1992): 173-184.

¹⁹⁸  These incentives are discussed in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-U.S. Strategic Cooperation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 313 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, September1997), 37-78; Strategic Assessment 1999, 151; Institute for National Strategic Studies, The United States and India in the Post-Soviet World (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993); and Darrin W. S. MacKinnon, "The Asian Anchor," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124 (September 1998): 62-66.

¹⁹⁹  Asia 2025, 73-76.

²⁰⁰  Sources referring to these states as "pivotal states" advise that the United States should design its foreign policy primarily to maintain such positive relations. See Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs 75 (January-February 1996): 33-51.

²⁰¹  While no formal definition of rogue state may exist, the general description "...correlates closely to those states that support aggression and terrorism. A rogue state is an outlaw country capable of instigating conflict with the United States and its allies." Strategic Assessment 1999, 3. In his study, Rogue Regimes, Raymond Tanter identifies the "primary criteria" for rogue status as "large conventional forces, [support for] international terrorism, and [desire to possess] weapons of mass destruction....secondary criteria is appearance on the State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism, a list released annually by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism." Tanter, 261, note 1.

²⁰²  Specifically conflict with North Korea and Iraq. There is no official list of rogue states. However, there are usually five that are included in intelligence assessments: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya. Common characteristics are the support of terrorism and a history of hostility toward the United States by the current regimes. For diplomatic purposes, and to "encourage reentry into the community of nations," one or the other of these states, most recently Syria, is removed from the rogue list. At the moment, sources suggest that Libya has reduced its support for terrorism and may be a candidate for reentry. North Korea and Iraq under Saddam Hussein appear to be implacable. Tanter includes Cuba under the category of rogue regimes because it appears to support international terrorism. Sudan, which is also considered a rogue because of its support for terrorism, generally is not included in the list because it is thought to be a client state of another rogue--Iran--and does not possess large conventional forces. (Tanter, 261, note 1.) On June 19, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright announced that the Clinton administration would no longer use the term rogue states, but that "henceforth nasty, untrustworthy, missile-equipped countries would be known as 'states of concern.'" This would appear to be a reaction to a recent meeting of the South and North Korean heads of state. See Steven Mufson, "What's In A Name? U.S. Drops Term 'Rogue State,' The Washington Post, June 20, 2000, 16. However, the term rogue state is ubiquitous within the analytical literature and, therefore, has been retained in this study.

²⁰³  Strategic Assessment 1999, 219-228.

²⁰⁴  The National Intelligence Council paints the rogue states as opponents to globalization and insisting on retaining regional ambitions and the "trappings of power" in opposition to a more cooperative world community. This contrasts with a more common view that rogue states oppose the status quo and are trying to promote violent change in the international system. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2010, 2. A brief survey of potential rogue states based on open source literature can be found in Kori N. Schake, "Beyond Russia and China: A Survey of Threats to U.S. Security From Lesser States," in Lloyd J. Matthews, Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 303-326.

²⁰⁵  Sullivan, 3-6.

²⁰⁶  A discussion of factors contributing to North Korean resilience can be found in Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 27-34.

²⁰⁷  There is a wealth of published recommendations in this regard. Prominent among them is Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New National Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, March 1999), which discusses the immediate need for engagement of both Russia and China.

²⁰⁸  A particularly witty treatment of this argument is Hank Gaffney, "Oh, to be weak" (unpublished paper circulated in 1998; available from author at Center for Naval Analyses).

²⁰⁹  An excellent bibliography of sources on the new world order debate is Jane E. Gibish, comp., The New World Order: A Second Look (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Library, August 1994).

²¹⁰  The terms "core" and "periphery" were frequently used in studies on complex interdependence in the 1970s and 1980s to describe the developed nations/West and the less-developed nations/Third World. Although the terms are tinged with neo-marxist philosophy, they can be traced to earlier studies of geopolitics. On the neo-marxist use see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). One of the best brief discussions of geopolitical writing remains Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russack, 1977). A recent update is Mackubin Thomas Owens, "In Defense of Classical Geopolitics," Naval War College Review 52 (Autumn 1999): 59-76.

²¹¹  New World Coming, 142.

²¹²  QDR 1997, 3.

²¹³  Ibid.

²¹⁴  Steven Kull, I. M. Destler, and Clay Ramsey, The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public (College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland University, 1997), 91-92.

²¹⁵  On postintervention developments in Haiti, see Kathie Klarreich, "The legacy of US, UN intervention in Haiti," The Christian Science Monitor, March 30, 2000, 7; James Varney, "Democracy Falters and Haiti Flirts With Chaos: A Nation in Tatters," New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 12, 2000, A01; and John Donnelly, "Haiti's Renewal Slow, and Painful Profound Misery Abounds as Foreign Powers Curtail Aid to Country," The Boston Globe, December 27, 1999, A1.

²¹⁶  A critical assessment of the Clinton administration's shift from promotion of democracy to a "pragmatic status quo as the benchmark for safeguarding U.S. interests" is Michael J. Mazarr, "Clinton Foreign Policy, R.I.P.," The Washington Quarterly 21 (Spring 1998): 11-14. David Tucker argues that "after Somalia the Clinton administration's policy of 'aggressive multilateralism' disappeared." Tucker, 71.

²¹⁷  One argument for intervention to prevent massive but not normal levels of war-related deaths can be found in Stephen J. Solarz and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Humanitarian Intervention: When is Force Justified?" The Washington Quarterly 20 (Autumn 1997): 3-14.

²¹⁸  David Tucker makes this case pointedly: "Contrary to what proponents of the coming anarchy imply...it is not the case that instability and conflict anywhere requires us to respond militarily. In the current strategic setting there are very few places where we would be justified in deploying forces or to police civil unrest." Tucker, 73.

²¹⁹  New World Coming, 142.

²²⁰  National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2010, 2-3.

²²¹  A dissenting viewpoint that argues that the cumulative effect of failed states is a significant international security threat is Susan L. Woodward, " Failed States: Warlordism and 'Tribal Warfare,'" Naval War College Review 52 (Spring 1999): 55-68.

²²²  Based on evaluation of the Somalia and Bosnia experiences, Donald Snow identifies four limitations that the American people have implicitly placed on humanitarian intervention: (1) "there is little public support for more than small efforts," (2) "involvement must be relatively bloodless if support is to be sustained," (3) "when atrocity becomes widely evident through publicity, there will be a strong tendency to want to 'do something,' but that reaction will be highly ephemeral," and (4) "ultimately, public support for this kind of action will almost certainly depend on whether any lasting good comes from involvement." Snow, 170-172.

²²³  On food shortages, see Kevin Sullivan, "North Korea Says It Is Running Out of Food," The Washington Post, March 3, 1998, 11. A more detailed discussion argues that "North Korea's economic crisis is so severe that the economy cannot be sustained without outside help." See David Reese, The Prospects for North Korea's Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 323 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, November 1998).

²²⁴  A brief economic analysis of North Korean staying power is Marcus Nolan, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through," Foreign Affairs 76 (July/August 1997): 105-118.

²²⁵  An open-source assessment on the history of North Korean ballistic missile development efforts is Joseph S. Bermudez, A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 1999).

²²⁶  The vital interest most often noted is "the whereabouts and control of North Korean weapons of mass destruction." See Davis and Sweeney, 105-106. Of additional concern are the reports that North Korea has already developed a ballistic missile capable of hitting the continental United States. See Don Kirk, "New Missile Reported in North Korea," International Herald Tribune, February 19-20, 2000.

²²⁷  See, for example, the discussions in New World Coming, 80-82, and Davis and Sweeney, 107-110.

²²⁸  The National Defense Panel hedges slightly by envisioning "a reconciled, if not unified Korea" in the timeframe. National Defense Panel, 6.

²²⁹  Khalilzad and Lesser, 24.

²³⁰  QDR 1997, 5.

²³¹  As David Tucker notes: "Every briefing on the future now contains an obligatory slide on 'failed states.'" Tucker, 71.

²³²  New World Coming, 96-99. Several NGOs claim that pessimistic forecasts for Africa discourage investment, therefore perpetuating instability. The implication is that they should be balanced by more optimistic assessments. See, for example, Peter Veit, ed., Africa's Valuable Assets: A Reader in Natural Resource Management (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1998).

²³³  New World Coming, 99.

²³⁴  See discussion in James Miskel, "Are We Learning the Right Lessons from Africa's Humanitarian Crises?" Naval War College Review 52 (Summer 1999): 136-147.

²³⁵  As noted earlier, these are profuse. Many are listed in the World Future Society's Future Survey, sometimes without a clear separation between subjective and objective literature.

²³⁶  National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 16-17.

²³⁷  As an example, it is perceived that in expelling Kosovar refugees, "Milosevic had perfected a new weapon of war: the use of refugee flows to destabilize neighboring countries, to immobilize the logistics of NATO forces by handing them a humanitarian catastrophe, then keeping them off-balance by turning on and off the flow of refugees at the border and finally--following the adage that a guerilla swims in the local population like a fish in the sea--by draining the sea, exposing the guerillas, the Kosovo Liberation Army, who were left behind so they could be finished off." Ignatieff, 41.

²³⁸  The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999, 14.

²³⁹  Examples include: Clive Archer, International Organizations (London: University of Aberdeen, 1983); Richard Falk, A Study of Future Worlds (New York: Free Press, 1975); Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Robert C. North, War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990). All four have been used as texts for graduate courses in international relations.

²⁴⁰  Examples include Inis L. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1971); Richard A. Falk et al., eds., The United Nations and a Just World Order (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); and James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). A collection of essays that includes virtually every such proposal and titles itself "Readings for Leaders" is Lincoln Bloomfield, The Management of Global Disorder: Prospects for Creative Problem Solving (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).

²⁴¹  On OAU and peacekeeping, see William H. Lewis and Edward Marks, Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations, McNair Paper 58 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, June 1998), 96-99, 108-110.

²⁴²  For such a critique of IGOs from an NGO, see Amnesty International 1999 Annual Report: International Organizations at www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/intorgs.htm.

²⁴³  An opposing view is that of Martin van Creveld, whose historical and theoretical perspectives have had some influence on current military thinking. Van Creveld argues that because the development of the nation-state was primarily the result of organizing for war, the "waning" of interstate conflict (a development presumably caused by the existence of nuclear weapons) necessarily brings about the weakening of the state. Additionally, reduction of the postwar guarantees of social welfare, growing internal disorders, and the destruction of faith in government will eventually cause the concept of state to dissipate. However, van Creveld is unable to clearly identify what will replace the state in maintaining civil order; the implication is that order and security functions will be carried out by a blend of for-profit multinational companies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional agreements. See van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 336-421.

²⁴⁴  David Tucker argues that "migration and conflict, even civil war, historically have helped build states as often as they have destroyed them." Tucker, 72.

²⁴⁵  Ibid.

²⁴⁶  From a military perspective, nonstate and transnational threats are but one end of a spectrum of conflict that has been largely consistent throughout history. As the Defense Science Board stated in 1997: "Transnational threats do not represent a new mission for DOD, but a different and difficult challenge to the traditional mission." Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Science Board, 1997 DSB Summer Study: DOD Responses to Transnational Threats, Volume 1--Final Report (December 9, 1997), vii. Thomas Hirschfeld and W. Seth Carus maintain: "Claims about the growing numbers of internal conflicts and more ethnic strife are...hard to sustain. Internal wars and ethnic conflicts are not increasing in number or intensity; they just have become more visible now that our anxieties about the danger of global war have receded." Hirschfeld and Carus, 66.

²⁴⁷  A brief discussion on self-imposed risks, particularly as concerns computer network attack, is contained in Martin Libicki, "Rethinking War: The Mouse's New Roar?" Foreign Policy 117 (Winter 1999/2000): 35-36.

²⁴⁸  This is not meant to label NGOs as nonstate "threats" or imply a direct linkage to the threats identified by the National Defense Panel. Rather, it is an intellectual convenience to identify international actors (whether "threats" or "solutions") as either states or nonstates.

²⁴⁹  "Sins of the secular missionaries," The Economist 354 (January 29, 2000): 25-27.

²⁵⁰  It is also argued that within nations, the power of emerging NGOs is "outweighed by more traditional parts of civil society" such as religious organizations and labor unions. See Thomas Carothers, "Civil Society," Foreign Policy 117 (Winter 1999-2000), 18-24. (Quote is from p. 20.)

²⁵¹  "Ship rams Greenpeace; sub unleashes Trident 2," The San Diego Union-Tribune, December 5, 1989, A-10; Jeffrey Schmalz, "After Skirmish with Protestors, Navy Tests Missile," The New York Times, December 5, 1989, A1. On public reaction: "Greenpeace's Risky Tactics," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 7, 1989, A35.

²⁵²  New World Coming, 141.

²⁵³  Ibid.

²⁵⁴  The potential for an anti-technology backlash is linked to fear of globalization. See "Globalization Fear Runs Deep, Leaders Tell World Forum," The Toronto Star, May 24, 1998, B1.

²⁵⁵  A discussion of potential effects on democracy can be found in Edward Wenk, "Socio-Pychological Aspects of Information in a Democracy," in Didsbury, 129-140. See also Ashley Dunn, "The Cutting Edge: Virtual World Leads to Lonely Place, Study Says," Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1998, D1.

²⁵⁶  An extensive discussion on this point and the effects of globalization on taxation in general can be found in "Globalisation and Tax," The Economist 354 (January 29, 2000): 64-68.

²⁵⁷  Ibid., 142.

²⁵⁸  However, there are technologies that might be useful in countering chemical and biological terrorism. See Randy D. Curry and Thomas Clevenger, "New Approaches to Countering Biological Terrorism with Electrotechnologies: an Overview," in David W. Siegrist and Janice M. Graham, Countering Biological Terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Issues and Status (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1999), 161-174. Most of the technologies are useful as elements of consequence management, but others may prove useful in detection of weapons prior to use.

²⁵⁹  There is a difference between assessing the future security environment as the result of actions and reactions, and viewing it as a worse case scenario. The Department of Defense has formally recognized the importance of preparing for nonstate and transnational threats, as well as the need to devote increased resources to defending against them and providing for consequence management. An influential statement of this view is Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DOD Responses to Transnational Threats (Washington, D.C.: October 1997). An underlying assumption of the "evolving nature" view assumes actions are carried out to respond to such threats.

²⁶⁰  An argument that "superterrorism" is unlikely and that measures taken to prevent it may be counter-productive is made in Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy 112 (Fall 1998): 110-119.

²⁶¹  A short, balanced assessment of this possibility is the Congressional Research Service Report to Congress 97-75 ENR by Zachary S. Davis, Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Terrorist Threat? (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 8, 1997). A more recent and lengthier official source is: Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities For Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, First Annual Report: Assessing the Threat (Washington, D.C.: RAND, December 15, 1999). A list of current sources on the topic of catastrophic terrorism can be found in New World Coming, footnote 95, p. 48.

²⁶²  McKenzie, 29, 32, 35-36.

²⁶³  Some argue that terrorist information warfare or cyber-terrorism is much harder to do than is popularly claimed. See Libicki, 35-36, 38.

²⁶⁴  A number of sources identify information operations or information warfare as "weapons of mass destruction." The logic of this argument is that death and destruction on a large scale can occur by attacks on the computer networks controlling public utilities and transportation. However, these sources are unable to convincingly demonstrate that such attacks would result in casualties in the numbers expected from a successful nuclear or biological attack. From that perspective, the WMD label for computer network attack (CNA) is largely used for attracting attention or identifying its potential seriousness. In New World Coming, the more realistic term "weapons of mass disruption" is used (p. 52). On the lower end of the spectrum, information operations using new media, such as the Internet, can have effects on the morale of combatants without actually causing any physical casualties. This would put it in the category of nonlethal weapon, a category that can include propaganda throughout history.

²⁶⁵  During the mid-1980s, the SS-N-22 was considered the most potent Soviet anti-ship weapon because its Mach 2.0-2.5 speed made it very difficult for U.S. close-in weapons systems to shoot down. It was reportedly sold to Iran in the late 1980s, but that report was apparently incorrect. It was, however, sold to China in the mid-1990s. An authoritative source states that the U.S. considered buying the entirety of the Russian inventory (841 missiles) in 1994 to prevent it from being sold to potential opponents, but a price was not agreed upon. See Norman Friedman, World Naval Weapons Systems 1997-1998 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 243-244. In April 2000, it was reported that the U.S. point defense system Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) had successfully engaged a simulated SS-N-22 conducting a high speed weave. See "RAM Passes OpEval," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (April 2000): 6.

²⁶⁶  As detailed in House of Representatives, 105^th Cong. 2^nd Sess., Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the People's Republic of China, Report 105-851 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999); otherwise known as the "Cox Report." See especially, Vol. 1 19-52, 80-82, 116-118, and Vol. II, 2-5, 47-48, 68-75, 161-171.

²⁶⁷  See Thomas Orszag-Land, "How to Keep Soviet Science Out of the Wrong Hands," The Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 1995, 10; "A Funding Imperative," The Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 1998, 10; Rebecca K. Graeves, "Russia's Biological Weapons Threat," Orbis 43 (Summer 1999): 490-491; U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists (Washington, D.C.: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 1999.)

²⁶⁸  New World Coming, 51. See discussion in Center for Counterproliferation Research, The NBC Threat in 2025 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997).

²⁶⁹  Paul Bracken, "Sidewise Technology: A 21^st Century Driver," unpublished paper prepared for the Alternative Global Futures 2015 Workshop, Washington, D.C.: September 26-27, 1999.

²⁷⁰  Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs 73 (January/February 1994): 112.

²⁷¹  New World Coming, 51. See also Strategic Assessment 1999, 293-294.

²⁷²  Frederick Thompson et al., Vision-21 Source Book, Volume 1: The Process (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, November 26, 1996), 62.

²⁷³  Libicki, 31-32.

²⁷⁴  See discussion in Andrew Richter, "The American Revolution? The Response of the Advanced Western States to the Revolution in Military Affairs," National Security Studies Quarterly 5 (Autumn 1999): 1-28.

²⁷⁵  See discussion on "the Burundi Exercise" of the 1996 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of U.S. Intelligence in Robert D. Steele, "Information Peacekeeping: The Purest Form of War," in Matthews, Challenging the United States, 169-170 (note 18).

²⁷⁶  See discussion on the commercialization of remote sensing in Dana J. Johnson, Scott Pace, and C. Bryan Gabbard, Space: Emerging Options for National Power (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 31-32.

²⁷⁷  Ibid., 32.

²⁷⁸  Thompson, 62.

²⁷⁹  New World Coming, 54.

²⁸⁰  Ibid. On this point, New World Coming cites Roger C. Molander, David A. Mussington, and Richard F. Mesic, Strategic Information Warfare Rising (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1998) as its source.

²⁸¹  This is supported by the language carefully chosen for the U.S. Space Command Long Range Plan, which states: "Prior to hostilities or during peace operations [emphasis added], an adversary will have sophisticated regional situational awareness." Estes, 2.

²⁸²  (2) is suggested by insights from the "Zaibatsu" alternative future developed by the Air University's 2025 study. Engelbrecht et al., 49-53, 150, 169. See also Larry K. Grundhauser, "Sentinels Rising: Commercial High-Resolution Satellite Imagery and Its Implications for U.S. National Security," Airpower Journal 12 (Winter 1998): 74-76. A source that cites wargaming experience as indicative that a commercial cut-off cannot be presumed is Frederick W. Kagan, "Star Wars in Real Life: Political Limitations on Space Warfare," Parameters 28 (Autumn 1998): 117-118.

²⁸³  For definitions and discussion of RMAs by proponents, see Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign Affairs 75 (March/April 1996); James R. FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," Joint Force Quarterly 4 (Spring 1994): 24-31; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Calvary to Computer: The Patterns of Military Revolutions," The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994): 30-42. A more skeptical discussion that is supportive of transformation is Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?" Foreign Policy 113 (Winter 1998-99): 72-86; and further developed in O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000).

²⁸⁴  A particularly direct criticism of the concept of an ongoing RMA can be found in Steele, who charges that, "The Revolution in Military Affairs is a joke. It is nothing more than lip service, substituting astronomically expensive systems with no sensor-to-shooter guidance...for outrageously expensive systems with no sensor-to-shooter guidance..." (p. 144).

²⁸⁵  One of the most enthusiastic advocates of pursuing the RMA, William A. Owens, describes the result as proving a "system of systems" in which information can be drawn from a wide array of sources so that knowledge of a targeted area could be near absolute. Recently, he has argued that the RMA would require creating a state-of-the-art military force from scratch, but that it would cost 35 percent less than current military capabilities. See William A. Owens with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), especially chapter 6, "Winning the Revolution."

²⁸⁶  Technical discussions on the potential for moving "from microelectronics to nanoelectronics" can be found in Surge Luryi, Jimmy Xu, and Alex Zaslavsky, Future Trends in Microelectronics: The Road Ahead (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999).

²⁸⁷  But in the case of biological weapons, technological "advances" are seen as pushing us closer to a bloody killing field filled with dying and panic-stricken civilians. Richard Danzig refers to this as "traumatic attack." See Danzig, 34-39.

²⁸⁸  The overall theme of Earl H. Tilford, Jr., The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 23, 1995). See also Kenneth F. McKenzie, "Beyond Luddites and Magicians: Examining the MTR," Parameters 25 (Summer 1995): 15-21.

²⁸⁹  New World Coming, 143.

²⁹⁰  As Andrew Richter explains: "Only one country--the United States--currently has capabilities in all [RMA] areas, thereby indicating its centrality in any discussion of the RMA." Richter, 3.

²⁹¹  FitzSimonds and van Tol, 29.

²⁹²  Ronald Huisken, The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile (New York: Praeger, 1981), 20-21, 28.

²⁹³  "The Soviet Navy was at its most innovative when it developed various classes of submarines capable of firing cruise missiles." From Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 111.

²⁹⁴  New World Coming suggests that "the relative U.S. technological edge may actually grow over the next quarter century." (pp. 122-123)

²⁹⁵  In the words of New World Coming: "American commercial successes should also keep the United States the leader in command and intelligence systems development, systems integration, and information management." (p. 56).

²⁹⁶  See Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. Mey, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives, McNair Paper 60 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, April 1999), 97-104.

²⁹⁷  Engelbrecht et al., 171-172.

²⁹⁸  From this perspective, all war planning and technology development are efforts at adaptation. As Robert H. Scales, Jr., writes: "The evolving sequence from dominance through challenge and adaptive response has been the hallmark of the Western way of war." Scales, Future Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999), 36.

²⁹⁹  New World Coming, 120.

³⁰⁰  Michael Dorgan, "Few surprised at firing of Los Alamos Scientist; 'Tip of iceberg ' seen on Chinese spying," The Arizona Republic, March 14, 1999, A17; Fox Butterworth and Joseph Kahn, "Chinese Intellectuals in U.S. Say Spying Case Unfairly Cast Doubts on Their Loyalties," The New York Times, May 16, 1999, 1:32 David Talbot and Ed Hayward, "Students say focus is studies, not spying," Boston Herald, May 26, 1999, 030.

³⁰¹  For example: Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "Military Experimentation--Time to Get Serious," www.csbahome.org , March 3, 2000.

³⁰²  Concerning a lack of funding for the RMA, see John Gamboa, "The Cost of Revolution," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124 (December 1998): 58-61. For commentary on a loss of focus on development of military technology, see J. H. Beall, "Restore the Focus on Technology," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (June 2000): 56-57, and Pete Stevens, "The Silence of the Labs," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (June 2000): 96.

³⁰³  The potential for such a leapfrog has been the "dreadnought factor." In 1906, the Royal Navy commissioned the first big gun, steam-turbine battleship, HMS Dreadnought, which was widely perceived as making all other warships, and thus the naval fleets of all other nations, instantly obsolete. Although other weapons systems were developed to defeat the dreadnought (submarines, carrier-based aviation), the leapfrogging of existing naval technology allowed the Royal Navy to maintain a military advantage that was thought to have been slipping away to Germany, Japan, and the United States. (This later came to pass due to organizational choices concerning naval air power, rather than loss of the technological lead.) See discussion in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Restructuring for a New Era: Framing the Roles and Missions Debate (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, April 1995), 44-47. Elsewhere Krepinevich points out that in many cases, as in the Dreadnought case, the initial advantage of a technical revolution is ephemeral, and "there do not seem to be any prolonged 'monopolies' exercised by a single competitor in periods of military revolution...[However,] it may be that although the period of competitive advantage appears to be fairly short there may be a potentially great advantage from being first, as the French discovered to their dismay and the Germans to their elation in the spring of 1940." Krepinevich, "Calvary to Computers: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," 37.

³⁰⁴  See Chris Hables Grey, "Our Future as Post-Modern Cyborgs," in Didsbury, 20-40, and Robert B. Mellert, "The Future of God," in Didsbury, 76-82.

³⁰⁵  See discussion in Schwartz, 73-78.

³⁰⁶  However, the dominant authority in future scenario building, Peter Schwartz, claims that novels, "even science fiction novels," have not been useful in his scenario research because "the ideas are not surprising enough." Schwartz, 80.

³⁰⁷  Andrew Richter articulates this view in reference to the RMA: "At present, the vast majority of countries in the developing world appear totally unprepared to adapt to the RMA, and thus any study that focused on them would, by definition, be brief." See Richter, 1.

³⁰⁸  Additionally, there are future studies devoted specifically to potential wildcards, such as John L. Petersen, Out of the Blue: Wild Cards and Other Big Future Surprises (Washington, D.C.: Arlington Institute, 1997).

³⁰⁹  Khalilzad and Lesser, 36. The chapter in which this appears was written by Zalmay Khalilzad and David Shlapak, with Ann Flanagan.

³¹⁰  Ibid.

³¹¹  Ibid. A similar proposal is by David R. Klain, "Are We Ready for Tomorrow?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 122 (April 1996): 55-56.

³¹²  In contrast, Davis and Sweeney mention technological surprise but do not include it among their "three wildcards worth considering." (pp. 219-221).

³¹³  Although sources maintaining that the United States is not taking the biological warfare threat seriously use the Pearl Harbor rhetoric to describe a potential biological attack on the continental United States. See, for example, Pietro Marghella, "December 7, 1999: The Second, Silent Attack on Pearl," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (May 1999): 60-65.

³¹⁴  The lethality of massive cruise missile attacks against surface ships is a current concern. However, such a potential attack would be conceptually similar in intensity to that experienced in the Okinawa campaign of April 1945 when over 355 kamikazes struck at the U.S. fleet. It is estimated that Japan could have generated as many as 7,500 kamikaze sorties to defend the home islands from the anticipated amphibious invasion (McKenzie, 8). But these attacks, even on that level, could do little to enable Japan to regain the control of the seas it held in 1941-1942.

³¹⁵  "Indeed, it is true to say that, with a single exception [the U.S.], most states no longer maintain ocean-going navies at all." Van Creveld, 346.

³¹⁶  The concept of a distinctively transoceanic navy--one that can operate across oceans to project combat power onto land--originated with Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80 (May 1954): 483-493. Under a rigorous application of Huntington's definition, the Navy is the world's sole transoceanic maritime force.

³¹⁷  It should be noted that some sources would object to "the use of major platforms as the prime units of account for comparing particular military capabilities with those of another country" because of resulting analytic "distortions." Hirschfeld and Carus, 67-68. However, the two tables in this chapter are intended to illustrate relative force size rather than directly compare capabilities.

³¹⁸  Danzig, 22-24.

³¹⁹  There are indications of an increased emphasis on such aircraft programs under Russian President Vladimir Putin's leadership. See Craig Covault and David A. Fulgham, "Russian Stealth Bomber Design Work Underway," Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 10, 2000, 18.

³²⁰  James J. Wirtz, "QDR 2001: The Navy and the Revolution in Military Affairs," National Security Studies Quarterly 5 (Autumn 1999): 52-53.

³²¹  Ibid., 50-51.

³²²  Jan S. Breemer refers to this circumstance as "the end of naval strategy," implying that U.S. forces can focus on directly influencing effects on land. Jim Wirtz refers to it as "the golden age of United States seapower." See Breemer, "The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of American Naval Power," Strategic Review 22 (Spring 1994): 40-53; Wirtz, 43-60.

³²³  See discussion in A. D. Baker III, "World Navies in Review," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (March 2000): 30-42.

³²⁴  Illustrative of this argument is John A. Tipak, "Can the Fighter Force Hold Its Edge?" Air Force Magazine 83 (January 2000): 25-31.

³²⁵  Ibid. See also Robert S. Dudney, "Battle of the F-22," Air Force Magazine 82 (September 1999): 16-17; and Richard Hallion, Control of the Air: The Enduring Requirement (Bolling Air Force Base, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, September 8, 1999).

³²⁶  At first glance this seems to contradict the concept of network-centric warfare, which claims to shift the focus away from platforms to network. Network-centric operations promise to increase the value of individual units by providing effective information linkages and a common operational picture, that, in turn, allow for the optimization of weapons and effects. Presumably that would allow for achieving a greater operational effect from fewer platforms. However, as recently argued by the Navy leadership, "numbers do count," since, ultimately, the weapons are launched from platforms. If network-centric operations increase the value of a small, widely dispersed but highly networked force, then logically it would increase even more the dominance of a larger, widely dispersed but highly networked force. The concept of overwhelming force--a principle that the U.S. armed forces and the American public seems most comfortable with--requires dominance in numbers as well as capabilities. On network-centric warfare, see Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124 (January 1998): 28-35, and David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick Stein, Network-Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2^d ed. (Washington, D.C.: DOD C⁴ISR Cooperative Research Program, August 1999). On "numbers count," see Jay L. Johnson, "Numbers Do Matter," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (November 1999): 32. On the doctrine of overwhelming force, see F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force: The New American Way of War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996).

³²⁷  See discussion in Thomas S. Momiyama, "Russia, Inc.--Open for Business," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 122 (February 1996): 66-69. However, Stephen Blank--among other sources--maintains that the Russian military complex is in a period of "comprehensive demodernization" and will prove unable to develop future RMA-type systems. See Blank, "Preconditions for a Russian RMA: Can Russia Make the Transition?" National Security Studies Quarterly 6 (Spring 2000): 1-28.

³²⁸  As of March 2000, the 44,570-ton VSTOL-aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov had not been transferred to the Indian Navy, although a protocol to buy the ship was signed on November 8, 1999. Reports indicate that India wants the carrier modified to operate conventional fixed-wing aircraft and will purchase several dozen MIG-29K aircraft as a possible complement. See A. D. Baker, "World Navies in Review," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (March 2000): 31-32. On the Sovremenny-class destroyer sale, see Nikolai Novichkov, "Four Sovremennys in total for Beijing," Jane's Defence Weekly 33 (March 15, 2000).

³²⁹  The debate on whether such an arms race dynamic exists is heated and extensive. Whether or not it is a reality, naval construction has historically been identified as a cause or propellant of arms races. See, as a historically recent example, Richard Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka, Superpowers at Sea: An Assessment of the Naval Arms Race (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). For an opposing view, see Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 37-47.

³³⁰  Along these lines, van Creveld maintains that the warmaking abilities of the modern state will continue to weaken, ensuring large-scale clashes of naval or air forces will not occur. In a sense, his overall argument implies that all states will become failing states. See van Creveld, 337-354, 419.

³³¹  The most recent work by the Office of Net Assessment emphasizing that "increasingly, other countries strategies will be oriented around keeping the U.S. out of their region" is the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, Maintaining U.S. Military Superiority (assembled briefing slides and text), Newport, RI: July 25-August 4, 1999. (The quotation is found on page 19.)

³³²  The naval roots of the antiaccess or area-denial concepts can be traced from such sources as Sanjay Singh, "Indian Ocean Navies--Learn from War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 118 (March 1992): 51-54, and Yedidia Ya'ari, "The Littoral Arena: A Word of Caution," Naval War College Review 48 (Spring 1995): 7-21. The Office of Net Assessment construct originated in a series of briefings by Pat Curry, in the mid-1990s.

³³³  See Tim Sloth Joergensen, "U.S. Navy Operations in Littoral Waters: 2000 and Beyond," Naval War College Review 51 (Spring 1998): 20-29.

³³⁴  Detailed in, Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1997).

³³⁵  These weapons can be considered asymmetric because the Navy is largely configured for open-ocean operations. From an historical perspective, use of such weapons or their antecedents would be considered a normal aspect of naval warfare in narrow seas. An excellent study of the historical and environmental factors influencing near-shore naval operations is Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).

³³⁶  With the development of theater ballistic missile defense systems, cruise missiles could replace ballistic missiles as the prime area-denial threat. See Rodney Rempt, "We're in the Enemy's Backyard," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127 (July 1999): 43-46.

³³⁷  A skeptical view of the ballistic missile threat to CONUS can be found in "NMD: The Hard Sell," Jane's Defence Weekly 33 (March 15, 2000): 19-23.

³³⁸  See discussion in McKenzie, 4-6.

³³⁹  The most detailed discussion is Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996).

³⁴⁰  See discussion in Thomas G. Mahnken, "America's Next War," The Washington Quarterly 16 (Summer 1993): 171-184.

³⁴¹  See discussion in McKenzie, 22-23. Sources that link antiaccess strategies with WMD include Robert W. Chandler, Tomorrow's War, Today's Decisions (McLean, VA: AMCODA Press, 1996) and Greg Weaver and D. J. Glaes, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass Destruction Undermine U.S. Strategy for Projecting Military Power (McLean, VA: AMCODA Press, no date).

³⁴²  Quoted in Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment, Occasional Paper of the Center for Counterproliferation Research (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 4.

³⁴³  The battle of Thermopylae is well known in military literature as one of the great episodes of self-sacrificing heroism in battle. Thus, it makes a useful example in pointing out the timeless nature of antiaccess strategies.

³⁴⁴  A typology of antiaccess strategies that could be used against power projection forces can be found in McKenzie, 47.

³⁴⁵  An example of the willingness of rogue states to use such means is the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988 in which ballistic missiles and chemical weapons were used. See discussion of potential "alternative operational concepts" of rogue states in McKenzie, 39-40.

³⁴⁶  Sources suggesting that emerging military technology can neutralize antiaccess strategies include: James R. Boorujy, "Network-Centric Concepts Can Guarantee Access," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (May 2000): 60-63; Gary W. Schnurrpusch, "Asian Crisis Spurs TBMD," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (September 1999): 46-49. Other sources argue that long-range aviation in "extended range operations"--particularly stealth bombers--can effectively defeat antiaccess strategies.

³⁴⁷  See discussion in Sam J. Tangredi, "The Fall and Rise of Naval Forward Presence," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (May 2000): 28-32.

³⁴⁸  John Jumper: "Access is an issue until you begin to involve the vital interests of the nation that you want and need as a host. Then access is rarely an issue..." James R. Callard: "The issue of access is a red herring...Is access a problem when our vital interests are threatened? The short answer is no....When our vital interests are threatened, we will have access. The American people will demand it....The American people will not allow us to protect an ally that refuses to allow us access." Quoted in "The Access Issue," Air Force Magazine 81 (October 1998): 42-46. See also "Operating Abroad," Air Force Magazine 81 (December 1998): 28-29.

³⁴⁹  The willingness to use such weapons to prevent the defeat of NATO or in response to nuclear use by the Soviets was considered to have considerable deterrent value. At what point permission to use these weapons would be given was kept ambiguous to forestall Soviet calculations. Yet, this remained essentially a last resort strategy. Whether NATO leaders would actually bring themselves to use nuclear weapons is now a moot point. There is, however, considerable literature that suggests that the absolute distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons was not a view held by Soviet military planners. See, for example, Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," in Derek Leebaert, ed., Soviet Military Thinking (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 50-69.

³⁵⁰  For an assessment of the military effectiveness of chemical warfare in the Iraq-Iran conflict, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume Two: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 495-529, 598-600.

³⁵¹  See Art Pine, "U.S. Targets Heart of Terror," Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1998, A1; Paul Richter, "U.S. Says Raids A Success," Los Angeles Times, August 22, 1998, A1; Paul Richter, "Sudan Attack Claims Faulty, U.S. Admits," Los Angeles Times, September 1, 1998, A1.

³⁵²  Robert W. Chandler with John R. Backschies, The New Face of War: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Revitalization of America's Transoceanic Military Strategy (McLean, VA: AMCODA Press, 1998), 199-223; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV: The Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 879-915.

³⁵³  See, for example, discussion in Gerard Roncolato, "Methodical Battle: Didn't Work Then...Won't Work Now," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 122 (February 1996): 32-33.

³⁵⁴  Dunlap argues: "Given the West's still-sizable nuclear arsenal and its relatively robust capability to deal with other-than-nuclear WMD warfare, are WMD really asymmetrical to the West? So long as the West maintains its current capabilities, it seems rather unlikely that an adversary could decisively employ WMD against it." Dunlap, "Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset," in Matthews, Challenging the United States, 5.

³⁵⁵  Robert Kupperman and David Siegrist, "Strategic Firepower in the Hands of Many?" in David W. Siegrist and Janice M. Graham, Countering Biological Terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Issues and Status (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1999), 49.

³⁵⁶  Danzig, 32-34.

³⁵⁷  Davis and Sweeney urge greater emphasis and more "candid evaluations of the impact of WMD on U.S. operations..." Davis and Sweeney, 325.

³⁵⁸  On the effectiveness of the "Scud hunt," see Eliot A. Cohen, ed., Gulf War Air Power Survey: Volume II, Part II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 330-339, which implies that allied attacks reduced both the Iraqi launch rate and the Scud operating areas, even if fewer launchers were destroyed than originally estimated. See also Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV: The Gulf War, 860-867.

³⁵⁹  Based on historical survey, Stuart D. Landersman maintains that "Chemical warfare is employed when there is no chance of reciprocal use." Landersman, "Sulfur, Serpents, and Sarin," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124 (August 1998): 42-43.

³⁶⁰  He did, however, routinely use poisonous gas in the concentration camps to destroy Jews, other targeted peoples, and potential domestic opponents of the Nazi regime or its control over conquered territories. Likewise, Saddam Hussein elected not to use chemical weapons against coalition forces even though he demonstrated that he possessed the capability. But, he has used it against his own people to suppress revolts. See Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume IV: The Gulf War, 886-887. For a discussion of the effects of Saddam's use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish village of Halabjah in 1998, see Chandler with Backschies, 215, 403-405.

³⁶¹  National Defense Panel 1977, Transforming Defense, 25.

³⁶²  See discussion in McKenzie, 1-2.

³⁶³  New World Coming, 141.

³⁶⁴  Ibid.

³⁶⁵  Hirschfeld and Carus maintain that: "Repeated claims that the post-Cold War world has become more dangerous for the United States are hard to justify. It is absurd to compare the remaining dangers to threats we faced during the Cold War." Hirschfeld and Carus, 65.

³⁶⁶  "Although the dangers of proliferation and backlash states are real, the demise of the Soviet Union and the reduction of its strategic nuclear threat mean that the U.S. has never, in recent memory, been safer." Peter Schoettle, "Key Geostrategic Trends: A Cloudy Crystal Ball," Naval War College Review 48 (Winter 1995): 70.

³⁶⁷  Khalilzad and Lesser argue: "Moscow's behavior will be conditioned by the same cold war calculus of deterrence that kept the peace during the years of East-West confrontation. The emerging and more immediate threat is not one of societal destruction, but of smaller, damaging attacks, some of which could originate from states or groups less susceptible to the 'logical' cost-benefit accounting of 'rational' deterrence theory." Khalilzad and Lesser, 18-19.

³⁶⁸  McKenzie, 3-4, 10-12; New World Coming, 49-50

³⁶⁹  Arguably, it was naval power, not the oceans and distance, that provided the sanctuary. In the case of Britain, the Atlantic proved a convenient maneuver space for the Royal Navy throughout the War of 1812, as it frequently did for pirates in earlier years. In the initial period of naval weakness, the United States rushed to build a series of coastal fortifications to prevent otherwise unopposed attacks from the sea. It was not until Americans had confidence in their own naval power that they began to see the blessings that ocean borders provided.

³⁷⁰  National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 25; Representative arguments include Chandler with Backschies, 177-194;. Raymond S. Sheldon, "No Democracy Can Feel Secure," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124 (August 1998): 39-44.

³⁷¹  National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 26-27.

³⁷²  See discussion in F. G. Hoffman, "Countering Catastrophic Terrorism," Strategic Review (Winter 2000): 55-57.

³⁷³  Gray argues that the American people would likely demand a "healthily disproportionate action" in response. See Colin S. Gray, "Combating Terrorism," Parameters 23 (Autumn 1993): 22.

³⁷⁴  This interpretation of information warfare as having two facets--(1) the use of advanced information systems for military operation, a category which also includes corresponding attempts to deny information to or destroy such advanced systems, and (2) the control or manipulation of publicly available information of military significance via media or other methods--is derived from common elements found in most references on information warfare and information operations. However, sources include a wide variety of activities within the term. As R. L. DiNardo and Daniel J. Hughes argue: "Unfortunately, information warfare has become so expansive a term that it now threatens to become a tautology by encompassing nearly everything beyond the most primitive forms of combat. Some include traditional intelligence as information warfare, while others include the capabilities inherent in certain weapons systems....This logic could be extended to acts of politics, advances in weaponry, and uses of propaganda." DiNardo and Hughes, "Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information Warfare," Airpower Journal 9 (Winter 1995): 73.

³⁷⁵  A discussion of the vulnerability of these systems can be found in Steve Goldstein, "Pentagon Planners Gird For Cyber Assault," The Philadelphia Inquirer, December 1, 1999, 1; and Robert E. Podlesny, "Infrastructure Networks Are Key Vulnerabilities," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (February 1999): 51-53.

³⁷⁶  Almost every discussion of information warfare cites "Moore's Law"--which postulates (thus far correctly) that computing power will roughly double every year--as evidence of the exponential increase of future information processing capabilities. This leads to the claim that there is "a new world coming" in which information warfare will be the dominant style of war. However, rarely cited is Moore's Second Law, which postulates that the cost of microchip production is increasing faster than revenues. In other words, there is a limit to commercially affordable computer technology. This may imply that information warfare will not be as ubiquitous as anticipated--most states and nonstate actors will not be able to afford top-of-the line systems. See Charles C. Mann, "The End of Moore's Law," Technology Review, May/June 2000 (published by M.I.T. at www.techreview.com/articles/may00/mann.htm).

³⁷⁷  Three particular areas of vulnerability include: maintaining security and privacy, achieving interoperability, and network reliability. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Superhighway: An Overview of Technology Challenges, Report to Congress GAO/AIMD-95-23, January 23, 1995.

³⁷⁸  Vernon J. Ehlers, "Information Warfare and International Security," The Officer 75 (September 1999): 28-32.

³⁷⁹  "Second-generation information warfare will probably look a lot like advertising." John L. Petersen, "Info War: The Next Generation," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 123 (January 1999): 62.

³⁸⁰  Engelbrecht et al., 169-171.

³⁸¹  The linkage between command and control (C²) warfare and psychological operations as elements of information warfare is detailed in Joint Pub. 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 7, 1996).

³⁸²  A discussion of the effect of the Internet on the debate over the Department of Defense anthrax vaccination policy is Mark F. Cancian, "Anthrax and the Internet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126 (May 2000): 42-46. Cancian suggests that distrust of government fuels the misinformation and conspiracy theories that can be found on the Web.

³⁸³  A North Vietnamese commander is quoted as saying: "The conscience of America was part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win." From "How North Vietnam Won the War," The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1995, A8. For a discussion of future effects, see Brent Baker, "War and Peace in a Virtual World," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 123 (April 1997): 36-40; and Ignatieff, 191-196.

³⁸⁴  Robert Callum, "Will Our Forces Match the Threat," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124 (August 1998): 51-52. A contrary view is that of E. Anders Eriksson who argues that "the cyber WMD problem is likely to be transitional in the sense that as information technology matures, defense will outweigh offense." From Eriksson, "Information Warfare: Hype or Reality?" The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1999): 58.

³⁸⁵  www.stratfor.com, "I Love You and the Problem of Cyberforce," May 15, 2000, 3.

³⁸⁶  The contrast between resources given to information processing and efforts at information security is discussed in William E. Pohde, "What is Information Warfare?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 122 (February 1996): 36-38.

³⁸⁷  Roger Barnett argues that the United States is "the country with the greatest capability to conduct information operations" and therefore has considerable ability to deter attack through punishment or denial. This deterrence capacity would be effective even against masked attacks. See Roger W. Barnett, "Information Operations, Deterrence, and the Use of Force," Naval War College Review 51 (Spring 1998): 7-19.

³⁸⁸  Davis and Sweeney, 14-15.

³⁸⁹  An argument that e-mail provided an alternative and more accurate means for military personnel to identify shortfalls in military readiness to Congress is made by Donald E. Vandergriff, "truth@readiness.mil," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (June 1999): 56-60.

³⁹⁰  "Information superiority" is the term used in the 1997 National Military Strategy and in Joint Vision 2010 to indicate "the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of precise and reliable information, while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same." (National Military Strategy, 18) "Knowledge superiority" is the term used in a U.S. Navy briefing to describe the objective of developing network-centric warfare capabilities.

³⁹¹  As Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Information Operations (August 5, 1998) states: "Information has long been an integral component of human competition--those with a superior ability to gather, understand, control and use information have had a substantial advantage on the battlefield. History is replete with examples of how information has influenced political and military struggles--from the earliest battles of recorded history to current military operations in Bosnia." (p. i)

³⁹²  See discussion in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs 75 (March-April 1996): 20-36.

³⁹³  A primary implication of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming!" Comparative Strategy 12 (Spring 1993): 141-165.

³⁹⁴  This is an anecdote that was included in classified intelligence briefings in 1999. I have yet to be able to ascertain its accuracy, although it seems plausible.

³⁹⁵  A representative discussion is James T. Jenkins, "Use Technology...But Don't Trust It!" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124 (August 1998): 69-70.

³⁹⁶  See argument in Erik J. Dahl, "We Don't Need an IW Commander," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (January 1999): 48-49.

³⁹⁷  Thomas P. M. Barnett, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125 (January 1999): 36-39; Vandergriff, 56-57.

³⁹⁸  A representative argument is T. X. Hammes, "War Isn't a Rational Business," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124 (July 1998): 22-25.

³⁹⁹  Charles Dunlap argues that potential opponents can combine selected high-tech operations with low-tech redundancies common to less technologically-sophisticated cultures. See Charles J. Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007: A Warning From the Future," The Weekly Standard, January 29, 1996, 22-28. See also Paul K. Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Preparing for War in the 21^st Century," Strategic Review 25 (Summer 1997): 14-20.

⁴⁰⁰  See discussion in Katherine McIntire Peters, "Split Decision," Government Executive, October 1999, 43-48.

⁴⁰¹  Paul K. Van Riper and F. G. Hoffman, "Pursuing the Real Revolution in Military Affairs: Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare," National Security Studies Quarterly 4 (Summer 1998): 1-19; Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Technology, the RMA, and Future War," Strategic Review 26 (Spring 1998): 63-70; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21^st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters 27 (Autumn 1997): 27-37.

⁴⁰²  Primary proponents of this view are William A. Owens and James R. Blaker. Perhaps the ultimate expression of this aspiration is a fictional essay by Scott Billigmeier and Ed Glabus, "Future War: 'Information Operations Corps' Comes of Age," Army 47 (December 1997): 45-51.

⁴⁰³  National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, 23.

⁴⁰⁴  "To the German military leaders, allies were a nuisance that, at best, one could expect to do one's bidding without any concern for their own interests." Megargee, x.

⁴⁰⁵  However, the German armed forces command staff posited an American Germany-first strategy for worst-case planning. See Megargee, 170-171.