The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran
Acknowledgments

This essay grew out of the work of a study group and a series of seminars conducted on Iran sponsored by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University in 1999 and 2000. The participants included academic specialists, government analysts, and military planners from the Joint Staff and U.S. Central Command. We are indebted to many individuals for their willingness to contribute their time and ideas to this critical topic.

We are especially grateful to Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, F. Gregory Gause III of the University of Vermont, Kenneth M. Pollack, formerly of INSS, Marvin G. Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute, and David A. Ochmanek of RAND for their contributions; Stephen J. Flanagan, Director of INSS, and Stephen A. Cambone, former Director of Research at INSS, for their guidance throughout; and Justin P. Bernier and Bastian Giegerich for their research assistance.

Thanks are also due to the editorial staff of NDU Press--William R. Bode, George C. Maerz, Lisa M. Yambrick, and Jeffrey D. Smotherman--who brought this publication to completion under the supervision of Robert A. Silano, Director of Publications. Ms. Yambrick served as lead editor throughout the project. In addition, the assistance of William A. Rawley of the Typography and Design Division of the U.S. Government Printing Office is gratefully acknowledged for the design and layout of this publication.