The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran
Chapter One

Iran's World View and NBC Weapons

Tehran's current security policies--including its abiding interest in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons--antedate the Islamic revolution and are deeply rooted in Iranian nationalism and historical sense of regional leadership. The present views of the Islamic Republic toward regional affairs, security threats, and Persian nationalism mirror those of the former Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in defining security policies. In the Shah's time, Iraq was not always seen as an immediate security threat, but ancient animosities as well as current hostile revolutionary regimes and volatile ethnic groups on Iran's borders breed suspicions of potential threats posed by Russia or the United States to Central Asia as well as American domination in the Persian Gulf.

The Enemy Is Everywhere

Iran's defense strategy is based on safeguarding Iran's territorial integrity and interests, preventing the creation of a strategic vacuum in the region, and working for regional integration . . . and deterring threats. . . . The main threat comes from Israel and [the United States] . . . Iran's defense capabilities constitute part of the defense power of the Islamic countries and will only be used as a deterrent force in defense of the Islamic ummah.

--Ali Shamkhani, October 1998

Iran viewed the world with great trepidation at the end of its 8-year war with Iraq in 1988 and after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the next year. Uncertain of how the first internal political succession would work, Iran also faced hostile neighbors angry at Tehran's clumsy efforts to export its revolution across the Gulf, even though its military had been weakened by years of war and political purges. Moreover, Iranian leaders noted the growing involvement of the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf, and they almost certainly suspected that the United States was behind the escalating turmoil across Iran's borders in Central Asia and Afghanistan. In 1989, Iran began a major program to rebuild, expand, and modernize its ravaged armed forces.

Several factors shaped Iran's postwar strategic thinking:

• Independence and self-sufficiency in strategic and tactical terms. Considered a pariah by the West and its Arab neighbors for its aggressive efforts to export the revolution and for its sponsorship of international terrorism, Tehran fought the war with Iraq in near-total isolation. In contrast, Iraq received nearly $80 billion in loans from Gulf Arab governments and got U.S. assistance in fighting Iran. At the same time, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Iran, complicating Iran's efforts to recoup its losses and sustain its war effort. Moreover, the world paid little attention to Baghdad's use of chemical weapons against its own people or in the war. From this frame of reference, most Iranian leaders probably assume that Iran will one day face a hostile Iraq and will have to fight alone. Toward this end, Iran is determined to build its own defense industries, reconstitute a modern force, and rely only nominally on foreign suppliers. This policy includes acquiring nuclear weapons to compensate for its weakness and relative strategic isolation.⁴
• Reassertion of Iran's traditional role of regional hegemon in the Gulf and beyond. As the largest and most populous country bordering the Persian Gulf, Iran under the Shah acted as its protector--a role that the United States and Britain encouraged. Iran's clerical leaders also believe that it is their country's natural right and destiny to dominate the region as well as to lead the world's Muslims. They are particularly determined to defend national interests and security.
• Enhanced capability to defend Iran against any threat of military aggression. Iranian leaders perceive threats from across all their borders--from U.S. forces in the region and from possible U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and potentially Iraq; from a rearmed Iraq; and from a hostile Pakistan or Afghanistan. Iran has benefited from the efforts of United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors to find and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Tehran understands that effective inspections are virtually over--even if Baghdad accepts a new inspection regime--and that Baghdad has retained the knowledge, if not some of the capability, needed to resume weapon production quickly.⁵ Once all United Nations-imposed sanctions are removed, Baghdad will continue developing chemical and biological weapons and the missile systems to deliver them. Iraq also will resume efforts to acquire components for nuclear weapons programs. Tehran almost certainly views nuclear weapons systems as the only way to reach strategic parity with Israel or the United States, a balance that it could not achieve by relying on a conventional buildup.⁶

How Iranian Leaders View Nuclear Weapons

Chemical and biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper. With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the [Iran-Iraq] war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed on the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.

--Ali Rafsanjani, October 1988⁷

Who Decides?

The division of power in Iran is important in determining who will make decisions about acquisition, deployment, and doctrine of use for nuclear weapons. Although Iran's leaders hold different political views and belong to competing power blocs, they probably have reached consensus on NBC acquisition to protect national interests. However, opinions may diverge on how many weapons would be enough and on when, where, and against whom Iran would deploy them.

The question of who determines deployment and usage is a critical one. The answer depends in part on who controls the instruments of security policymaking. In the Islamic Republic, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the conservative faction traditionally have set security and defense policy. The Defense, Intelligence, and Security Ministries, as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and paramilitary factions, report to Khamenei. In addition, the conservatives control much of the state apparatus, including the Leader's Office, the Council of Guardians, the judiciary, the radio and television media, and, most importantly, the military and security services. In contrast, President Khatami controls the Foreign Ministry and has a reformist-dominated Parliament. Thus far, however, he has been unable to put his imprint on much other than improved relations in the Gulf and with some European governments.

Whether Khatami and Khamenei agree on a common enemy or a usage doctrine cannot be determined from their public statements. For example, Khatami may see Iraq as the primary threat to Iranian security. If so, his defensive doctrine could include acquiring nuclear weapons and building closer relations with Gulf States and the United States. On the other hand, Khamenei's speeches and public statements make clear that he regards the United States as Iran's major threat. Therefore, he may be more aggressive in his doctrine to counter expansion of U.S. influence into territory that the Supreme Leader regards as coming under Iran's traditional religious, cultural, and territorial influence--such as the Persian Gulf, Lebanon, and Central Asia. Whatever the perception of the threat, no Iranian leader would be willing to trade future weapon development for security guarantees, even after a minimal deterrent capability is achieved.

The issue here becomes who decides how much nuclear weapon and missile development is enough. Although some may hold that 20 to 30 missiles with nuclear warheads--or whatever number is deemed sufficient to hit targets in Israel and Iraq accurately and effectively--are adequate, others may see the need for a much higher number. Such thinking did not apply in the United States or the Soviet Union when both sides, through the years of the Cold War, determined that they needed tens of thousands of warheads to respond to a threat.⁸

The U.S. knowledge base about Iranian decisionmaking has serious gaps. Rival centers of authority and decisionmaking exist--including the Iranian National Security Council, the IRGC, the Speaker of the Parliament, and former president and current head of the Expediency Council Hashemi-Rafsanjani--although all ultimately report to Khamenei. Whether these individuals constitute a national command authority, whether an individual senior military officer or cleric could order a military operation involving nuclear weapons, or if the paramilitary forces (basij) would have nuclear weapons are not known. Would the nuclear trigger be given to the military or be retained by the civilian and clerical leadership? At what point does the commander in the field receive decisionmaking authority for use? No clear chain of command may exist for the decision on usage; it probably is a highly centralized system with control in Tehran, but circumstances could turn control over to commanders in the field who are out of touch with the capital and the national command authority.⁹

What might determine the answers to these questions? Several factors could affect Iranian thinking about the use of nuclear weapons.

• Further economic deterioration. Another period of declining oil prices and tightened sanctions could force Iranian leaders to limit the acquisition, development, and deployment of NBC weapons. Worsened economic conditions could also increase the possibility of violent domestic unrest. The result could be a Tienanmen-style crackdown on antiregime protesters, a consolidation of support behind conservative elements by those fearing renewed social tumult, or a surge in demands for reform. Less money would be available for nuclear weapons development, unless a clear and present external threat emerges. On the other hand, increased oil revenues or windfall profits from a period of shortages and high prices could enable Iran to intensify its nuclear acquisition programs.
• Electoral backlash returns hard-liners to power. A conservative or hard-line majority in Parliament and in control of the presidency could bring in Iranian leaders who are willing to resume more aggressive foreign and defense policies. This shift would mean more money for weapons systems, broader deployment, and increased belligerency in threatening to use the systems in defense of Iran, the Islamic revolution, or embattled Muslims abroad.
• Significant changes in the threat environment. Certain circumstances could convince Iranian leaders to step up nuclear weapons development and deployment rather than to consider arms control measures. Possible catalysts include an Iraq without sanctions--or with ineffective sanctions and inspections--and with large oil revenues to pursue reconstruction of its nuclear weapons programs; an Israeli launch of preemptive military strikes against suspected Iranian weapon sites or Israeli acquisition of a new generation of weapons systems; or a heightened Iranian perception of a more aggressive U.S. military posture in the Persian Gulf. Conversely, an easing of the threat environment would not eliminate interest in possessing nuclear weapons. Better relations with the United States, a successful Arab-Israeli peace process, or the creation of a regional security organization in which Iran plays a role would ease regional tensions but would not eliminate the perceived need for nuclear deterrence.

Iranian leaders probably see several benefits in having advanced NBC weapons systems. These include:

• Bolstering regime standing in the eyes of Iranians and throughout the Arab and Muslim world;
• Intimidating the Gulf Arab States to follow Iranian guidance on issues such as oil pricing and production levels and undermining their confidence in U.S. security guarantees, thereby limiting if not ending U.S. military presence in the Gulf;
• Deterring Iraqi use of nuclear weapons in attacking Iran;
• Gaining leverage over Israel, the United States, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in a potential military confrontation or diplomatic crisis;
• Protecting oil shipments from threatened disruptions; and
• Undermining potential anti-Iranian actions in Central Asia or Afghanistan.

Current Leadership Thinking

Since the election of President Mohammad Khatami in 1997, analysts inside and outside of Iran have talked about the shift in regime policies under a new, more liberal and enlightened leadership. The debate applies to Khatami's social and domestic policies, but its relevance for foreign and defense policies is much less clear. Iran's more conservative leaders--such as Supreme Leader Khamenei, Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani, and IRGC Commander Major General Yayha Rahim Safavi--define Iran's role in world affairs as the standard bearer of the Islamic revolution and the defender of oppressed Muslims globally. It is Iran's responsibility, they argue, to support radical Islamist movements in the Middle East and elsewhere, to undermine those powers seeking to weaken Islam--meaning Israel and the United States--and to burnish Iran's revolutionary Islamic credentials at home and abroad. They deplore improving Iranian ties to Europe and criticized Khatami's visits to Italy and France in 1999 and to Germany in summer 2000. They warn of U.S threats to Iran from the Gulf. Safavi, for example, is deeply suspicious of the reasons for the U.S. military presence in the Gulf. In an interview on Iranian television in January 2000, he accused the United States of trying to loot the oil resources of the Persian Gulf region and to gain a springboard for access to Caspian Sea energy resources as well.¹⁰

Other Iranian officials talk in terms reminiscent of the Shah's time and of Persian nationalism. These officials and members of the new reformist factions welcome expanding Iranian contacts with Saudi Arabia and Europe. They see security policy under a Persian Empire or Islamic Republic as the same--defense of the homeland and national interests regardless of the source of threat. However, like the conservatives, they would not consider making territorial concessions in the Gulf--for example, conceding the disputed islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa to Abu Dhabi--or disavowing Lebanon's Hizballah.

Khatami, a cleric and a product of the Khomeini revolution, has a more liberal view of domestic issues, including personal, press, and cultural freedoms, but he probably differs little from his more politically and socially conservative rivals on security policy. Since his election, a virtual stalemate in domestic, foreign, and security policies has prevailed as the reformists loosely aligned around Khatami vie for power with the beleaguered conservatives. The conservatives have closed newspapers, imprisoned outspoken clerical critics and officials, intimidated, imprisoned, and murdered scholarly opponents of clerical authoritarianism, and sentenced students to long prison terms for antiregime disturbances. They have successfully blocked Khatami's initiatives to improve relations with the United States and delayed his overtures to Europe. Nevertheless, Khatami's liberal supporters have been unable to break the conservative hold on the political and judicial processes. Initiatives in domestic political issues are likely to remain stalled beyond the 2001 presidential elections.

Differences over domestic policies are unlikely to spill over into considerations of defense and security policies. Factional stalemates and bitter bipartisan battles in Iran--as in the United States and other Western democracies--tend to make debates over security policy hawkish for both sides. No faction probably would be able to argue for limiting NBC weapons development, especially if proposals to do so coincided with or were linked to U.S. initiatives. Weapons development and relations with the United States would be secondary issues in a debate fought along the more critical issue of which leaders of which political ideology control Iran.

More important, Iran's so-called reformists and conservatives probably have few differences concerning security policy in defending Iranian national interests. Both factions are highly nationalistic and are convinced that Iran needs to maintain a strong defense against threats posed by Iraq, Israel, the United States, and other regional actors. Moreover, the various leaders appear to share almost universal consensus that a strong defense must be maintained and that, under prevailing circumstances, nuclear weapons-based deterrence is the most feasible way to establish defensive capabilities. No public debate has been perceptible in Iran about halting, delaying, or negotiating away NBC weapons development. A change in regime philosophy or of rulers--from conservative to moderate or from Khamenei/Khatami to a more liberal configuration--would not halt or delay nuclear weapons development, at least not until the country's capabilities were deemed sufficient to deter the threats posed by its many adversaries.

Gauging how the factional balance of power will work itself out over the longer term is difficult. The 2000 Iranian parliamentary elections--which resulted in large numbers of pro-Khatami reformers elected only to be challenged by conservatives intent on unseating many of the new deputies--gave the reformists a clear majority and boosted prospects for Khatami's reelection bid in 2001. On the other hand, Khatami could be ousted in the presidential election if he has not moved on long-anticipated domestic reforms. The real question will be whether Khatami is the capstone of Iranian reform or part of a broader and irreversible trend toward a more open political system and a more reasonable (in Western terms) defense policy.

The answer probably lies with the gradual displacement of the aging, politicized clerics who support a hard line against reform and for exporting the revolution by the younger generation of Iranians, who voted in overwhelming numbers for Khatami and reform. This transition will occur over the next decade or more, at the same time that Iran is perfecting its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. If a younger, more politically moderate generation sees Iran with nuclear weapons as capable of deterring perceived threats, then its leaders may perceive less need to expand capabilities beyond what has been developed. A moderate, pragmatic foreign policy that successfully defended Iranian national interests and avoided conflict with neighbors would strengthen this trend. In this more secure environment, Iran's political leaders might see little need to continue developing and deploying extensive (and expensive) nuclear weapon systems. Moreover, these leaders might be more willing to use future nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States.¹¹

Alternatively, frustration with the inability of Khatami and the moderates to introduce real reform or improve the standard of living of many Iranians could encourage a backlash against the reformists and a turn to more aggressive foreign and defense policies. Resurgent conservatives could try to rally Iranians around perceptions of an external threat and could call for higher rates of defense spending with greater investment in nuclear weapon systems. We believe that this is a less likely prospect, but the risk that such a change would carry for U.S. forces and interests in the region cannot be discounted.

Iranian Capabilities: The Evidence

Specialists on Iran and nonconventional weapons acquisition and proliferation have enough information to sketch only an incomplete picture of Iran's research programs and its intentions to develop or otherwise acquire WMD. Iran began its efforts to acquire nuclear technology and expertise under the Shah in the 1970s. Despite chronic shortages of investment capital, an exhausting and expensive war with Iraq, and restricted access to foreign technology, Iran has been able to obtain long-range missiles and produce chemical and biological weapons and has tried to acquire the technology, expertise, and material necessary to develop a nuclear capability. The following summarizes Iran's efforts to acquire WMD.¹²

Delivery Systems

Soviet-designed Scud-B guided missiles form the core of Iran's ballistic missile forces. Tehran first acquired these missiles from Libya and North Korea during the Iran-Iraq war and used them against Iraq in 1988 in the "War of the Cities." According to Anthony Cordesman, Iran can manufacture almost all of the Scud-B, with the possible exception of the most sophisticated components of its guidance system and rocket motors. He estimates that by 1998, Iran had more than 60 of the longer-range (310 miles or 500 kilometers) North Korean missiles and 5 to 10 Scud-C launchers with missiles. These missiles have a warhead with a high explosive capability of 700 kilograms, and they are relatively accurate and reliable. The most recent Iranian advance in missile technology is the Shahab-3, a liquid-fueled missile with a range of 1,300 kilometers (800 miles) acquired from North Korea. In July 2000, Iran announced that it had successfully test-fired an upgraded version of the Shahab-3.¹³

Chemical Weapons

Iran began purchasing large amounts of chemical defense gear in the mid-1980s. It probably captured its first poisonous chemical weapon agents from Iraq during the war. Cordesman estimates that by 1986 or 1987, Iran had developed the capability to produce enough lethal agents--including hydrogen cyanide, phosgene gas, and perhaps chlorine gas--to load its weapons. Iran also could weaponize blister (sulfur mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents and phosgene and/or chlorine gas, which it used against Iraq in 1987 and 1988. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran has been producing mustard and nerve gas and may have weaponized chemical warheads for its Scud missiles.¹⁴ Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in June 1997 but has yet to provide any data on its chemical weapon program.

Biological Weapons

Reports that Iran was importing and working on the production of mycotoxins as part of a biological warfare program first surfaced in 1982. Since the Iran-Iraq war, Iran has conducted research on lethal active agents, including anthrax, hoof-and-mouth disease, botulinum, and biotoxins.¹⁵ A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report in 1996 alleged that Iran "holds some stocks of biological agents and weapons" and that "Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant biological weapons program with little foreign assistance." In March 2000 testimony to Congress, Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet reiterated that Iran was becoming more self-sufficient in producing materials for biological and chemical weapons. "Iran," he said, "driven in part by stringent international export controls, is acquiring the ability to domestically produce raw materials and the equipment to support indigenous biological agent production." ¹⁶

Nuclear Weapons

Since the Shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1974, Tehran has been negotiating for nuclear power plants. The Shah signed contracts for nuclear fuel with the United States, Germany, and France. He concurrently began a nuclear weapons program, smuggling nuclear enrichment and weapon-related technology into Iran from the United States and Europe. Khomeini revived the program in 1984, importing support and technology from sources in West Germany, Argentina, China, and Pakistan. Since the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran has denied having a nuclear weapons program, although Russia is constructing at least one and maybe more nuclear power plants at Bushehr.¹⁷ Cordesman notes that the Speaker of the Majlis opened a new laboratory to train nuclear technicians in early 1990 and that Iran reportedly had at least 200 scientists and a workforce of approximately 2,000 devoted to nuclear research.¹⁸ Iran has tried to purchase and to smuggle into the country highly enriched fissile material from Kazakhstan, reactor parts from Germany and Czechoslovakia, centrifuge technology, and maraging steel. Its efforts apparently have failed thus far.¹⁹

In spring 1995, new details emerged about Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities. Public accounts, such as the Carnegie Endowment report entitled Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, cited evidence indicating that Iran was trying to acquire dual-use items--samarium-cobalt magnetic equipment from a British company, and balancing machines as well as diagnostic and monitoring equipment from German and Swiss firms--to establish a secret gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment program. That same year, Russia agreed to provide Iran with a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility as part of a secret protocol to their reactor sale contract. The facility would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and would be dedicated to producing low-enriched (non-weapons-grade) uranium, but it could enable Iran to build and operate a similar plant clandestinely to produce weapons-grade uranium.²⁰

Iranian efforts to recruit and train technicians in Russian institutes have been of special concern in Washington. In 1998, Iran began recruiting engineers to receive training in Russia for the Bushehr plant not long after the United States stepped up pressure on Russia to end its nuclear cooperation with Iran.²¹ Press reports in early 1999 indicated the United States had threatened to sanction two Russian nuclear research institutes that were providing training for Iranian scientists. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov responded that Moscow would continue its nuclear cooperation with Tehran but offered a concession--Russia severed ties between its Scientific Research and Design Institute for Power Technology and Iran.²²

Iranian Intentions and Strategic Outlook

The initial Iranian flirtation with nuclear technology and the development of major weapon systems capable of reaching across the Gulf began under the Shah. With the encouragement of the United States and other Western powers, the Shah in the 1970s planned the construction of nuclear power plants with the potential to develop technology and materials that could bolster its professed role as guarantor of security in the Persian Gulf. Iraq, under the relatively new leadership of the Ba`th Party, President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and security chief Saddam Husayn, had just begun modernizing its military and security infrastructure. Unlike Tehran, which had several nuclear power plants planned or under construction in the 1970s, Baghdad had only one nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, built according to a 1958 agreement with Moscow. Nuclear weapons--WMD of any kind--were still far in Iraq's future.²³

The Islamic revolution that swept the Shah out of power in early 1979 added a new element to the Iranian security equation. Still faced with a threat of unknown extent from Iraq and unsure of the hostility that it might face from the West and across the Gulf, Iran based its security policies on a revolutionary Islamic fervor with a touch of Persian nationalism. The Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 and the ensuing 8-year war, during which both sides experimented with chemical weapons, underscored for Iranian leaders the need to be able to defend against all threats and achieve self-sufficiency in developing whatever weapons needed to defend the Islamic republic.²⁴

Iran had other reasons to make NBC weapons its weapons of choice, including affordability and availability of the components needed, the apparent ease with which the international community could be deceived, the prestige factor, and the fact that several regional governments (Israel, India, and Pakistan) already had such systems.

Affordability and availability are key issues. Few governments, including Iran's, can afford to modernize their conventional military capabilities, especially with the end of the Cold War era and the accompanying demise of cheap payment terms. The new arms races are expensive, with few able to join the bidding for high-tech aircraft and tanks. By contrast, chemical and biological weapons and the longer-range missile delivery systems are relatively cheap. Moreover, nuclear technology, fissile material, NBC weapon infrastructure, and delivery systems are available from a number of sources, clandestine and overt.²⁵

Tehran also may have been impressed by the apparent ease of deceiving the international community and its ambivalence about other countries' efforts to acquire and test NBC systems. For example, Iraq was able to mask its covert nuclear programs for years without incurring sanctions, and India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998 despite the threat of sanctions and international opprobrium. Baghdad did not perceive signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a deterrent to nuclear weapon development, and Tehran, also a signatory to the NPT, might not either.²⁶

Tehran may see NBC weapons as a source of prestige or the kind of force multiplier that it lacked in the war with Iraq. Many regimes--rogue and respectable--view acquisition of NBC weapon technology, especially nuclear, as a way to enhance their credibility and prestige in regional and international political-military debates, to divide coalitions, and to intimidate neighbors. The use of chemical weapons by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war enhanced Baghdad's capability to counter Tehran human-wave attacks and was a major contributor to Iran's defeat. NBC weapons, even if used only as a psychological deterrent, serve to offset the high-tech systems used by the U.S. military.

The most frequently voiced reason for Iran wanting to acquire a weapon is that "Israel or the neighbors have it." Iran publicly cites the assumed growth of the Israeli nuclear stockpile and the modernization of its delivery capability as the primary reasons for Tehran to upgrade its capabilities. In our view, Israel may be a reason--but not the primary reason--for Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons systems. Desire for nuclear weapons reflects the assumption that the neighbors--Iraq, India, Pakistan, perhaps even a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state--have or will acquire similar capabilities and that in the next confrontation with Iraq, Iran will stand alone, as it did in the 1980-1988 war.

Crossing the Nuclear Threshold

Tehran crossed the thresholds of having chemical and biological weapons without receiving much attention. The key question is how it will enter the nuclear club. Whatever Iran's intentions are in acquiring nuclear weapons, how it crosses the threshold will be critical to determining its doctrine. Its method will also be a measure of the threat that Iran believes it will face if it chooses to risk international opprobrium as it did in the early days of the revolution.

Iran, a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, could choose one of several ways to cross the nuclear threshold. Some paths would be in clear and flagrant violation of its international treaty obligations, and others would be deceptive and infinitely more dangerous--as was the case with Iraq.²⁷ Iran could cross:

• Transparently (by openly testing): Transparency would send a clear message of Iranian intentions. It would underscore the prestige factor and advertise Iranian efforts to use these weapons to intimidate openly and deter potential adversaries. On the other hand, it would place Iran in unambiguous violation of its NPT commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and would expose Tehran to harsh international sanctions and isolation.
• Opaquely: Opacity is more characteristic of Iranian behavior. It would give Tehran plausible deniability of capability, while allowing it to pursue rapprochement with the West, including the United States. This method would allow Iran to maintain the appearance of compliance with the NPT.
• Partially opaquely: Iran would make no announcement, conduct no open tests, and deploy no forces with the new weapon systems. It instead would send the message, however subtle, that it has a new capability to wreak regional havoc. The advantage of this approach is that it would convey the suggestion of capability without overtly threatening others and perhaps would avoid sanctions. The disadvantage is that it would not deter Iraq and would not be as prestigious as open testing, a method that won public support for the Indian and Pakistani governments.
• Virtually: In this scenario, Iran would conduct research but would pass IAEA and NPT inspections because it builds no weapons. However, it would be able to acquire fissile material abroad or divert it from domestic sources and produce weapons quickly if threatened.

We judge that Iran will not test its new capabilities to mount nuclear warheads on missiles openly, even though it tests each version of its missile delivery system. The most recently tested missile, the Shahab-3, has a range of 1,300 kilometers--sufficient to hit targets across the Persian Gulf and into Iraq, Turkey, and Israel. U.S. forces in the Gulf also are within missile range. Opacity, with its promise of plausible deniability, has been a much-favored tactic the Iranians practice in supporting international terrorist groups like the Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian extremist factions opposed to the peace process with Israel. The unstated assumption in this approach is that those who need to know about the missiles will know and will act accordingly.

Whether the United States could influence Iran's choice in how it crosses the nuclear threshold would depend on several factors. The Iranian level of paranoia about American intentions is always high. Unless U.S. military movements in the Persian Gulf--on land and at sea--are very transparent and perceived as nonthreatening by Iran, Tehran could easily miscalculate Washington's intentions and activities. Iranian leaders generally assume that the United States has positioned a large force in the Gulf to monitor Iran, not Iraq, and that the United States is trying to institute a similar militarization of the Caucasus region and Central Asia, where military-to-military relations with the new republics of the former Soviet Union are highly visible. Iran also probably believes that the United States is behind its problems with Pakistan and the Taleban in Afghanistan and that Washington intends to put a pro-U.S. puppet regime in Iraq--all actions meant to encircle Iran. A change in regime in Iran is unlikely to change suspicions of U.S. behavior. Given the mistrust on both sides, Iran probably would go as far as it believes that the United States would go in defending the region--for example, if Tehran thinks that Washington will employ nuclear force in the region, then it will use nuclear force also. In our judgment, the Nation can do little to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon program, but it may, through transparency and confidence-building measures, defuse tensions.

Endnotes

 ⁴These are the same conclusions reached by Iraq. See Phebe A. Marr, "Iraq and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Case of a Nuclear Cheater," in The Diffusion of Advanced Weaponry: Technologies, Regional Implications, and Responses, eds. W. Thomas Wander, Eric H. Arnett, and Paul Bracken (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1994), 297-325. [BACK]

 ⁵See Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), for the view of the former Chairman of UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission in charge of arms inspections in Iraq from 1991 through 1998. [BACK]

 ⁶U.S. defense and intelligence officials announced in late June 2000 that Iraq had restarted its missile program and flight-tested a short-range, liquid-fueled ballistic missile that was capable of carrying conventional explosives or the chemical or biological weapons that Iraq is suspected of hiding. The range was under the 150 kilometers allowed by UN sanctions, close enough to hit targets in Iran. William J. Broad, "The Nuclear Shield: Repelling an Attack," The New York Times, June 30, 2000, A1. [BACK]

 ⁷Cited in Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 234, and Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/iran.htm.  [BACK]

 ⁸Arms control specialists in the study group dispelled the illusion held by some group members that a small number of weapons would be sufficient for Iranian self-esteem and security needs. For a detailed discussion of the technical aspects and history of acquisition of conventional and nonconventional weapon systems, see Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces in Transition and its companion volume, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999). [BACK]

 ⁹Iraq may provide a clue to the question of who decides when to use nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Military analysts in our study group noted that during the two Gulf wars, decisionmaking was centered in the capital, but commanders in the field would be allowed to decide to use weapons of mass destruction if contact with Baghdad was lost or the city was destroyed. [BACK]

¹⁰Interview with IRGC Commander Major General Yayha Rahim Safavi broadcast on Tehran's Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 19, 2000; published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East South Asia, January 19, 2000. [BACK]

¹¹This view was raised by members of the study group who tended to support arms control measures and viewed Iran as a potentially rational player in regional security discussions. [BACK]

¹²See Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces in Transition, 222-64; and Shlomo Bron and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Middle East Military Balance, 1999-2000 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2000). [BACK]

¹³See Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces in Transition, 228-29; "Iran test-fires controversial Shahab missile," Reuters, July 15, 2000. [BACK]

¹⁴Jane's Defence Weekly reported in 1997 that Iran had several hundred tons of blister, blood, and choking agents and that some weaponization had occurred to support ground combat operations. Jane's assumed that Iran could deliver chemical bombs by aircraft to strategic targets in the region. Jane's Defence Weekly, November 12, 1997, 40. See also Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces in Transition, 235-36, and Gertz, "Iran's Regional Powerhouse," 54. [BACK]

¹⁵Cordesman, ibid., Gertz, ibid. [BACK]

¹⁶George J. Tenet, testimony given to Congress, March 24, 2000. [BACK]

¹⁷Press reports in 1999 indicated that Iran wanted to order three additional nuclear reactors for power generation from Russia. Itar-TASS said that the announcement of a possible deal was made by Russian Vice Minister Ilya Klebanov following a November meeting in Moscow with Iran's Supreme Security Council chief Hassan Rouhani. Russia: Iran May Seek More Reactors, Associated Press, January 14, 2000. [BACK]

¹⁸Cordesman, Iran's Military Forces in Transition, 239. [BACK]

¹⁹Ibid. [BACK]

²⁰Jones and McDonough, 5. [BACK]

²¹According to an Agence France Press report, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization advertised for 225 engineers with specialties in nuclear physics, physics, mechanical engineering, and computer science. The Iranian, January 29, 1999. [BACK]

²²The United States penalized seven other Russian institutes in July 1998, days after Iran successfully test-fired the first Shahab-3 missile. "Iran says no curbs expected in Russia nuclear ties," Reuters, March 17, 1999. [BACK]

²³For discussion of the development of Iraq's nuclear programs, see Khidhir Hamza, Saddam's Bombmaker (New York: Scribner, 2000), and Marr, "Iraq and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." [BACK]

²⁴See Michael Eisenstadt, "Living With a Nuclear-Armed Iran," Survival 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 124-48. [BACK]

²⁵For comparison of arms purchases and costs for arms-importing nations, see the annual studies produced by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1997-1998 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 115-44. [BACK]

²⁶There was very little comment in the Iranian media on the India-Pakistan testing issue. [BACK]

²⁷Although any weapons-related activity is a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Baghdad had intended to divert fuel from the reactor inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency, according to members of the inspection teams. [BACK]