The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran
Preface

--Mohammad Khatami, August 1998

Iran, driven in part by stringent international export controls, is acquiring the ability to domestically produce raw materials and the equipment to support indigenous biological agent production . . . [Iran] could quickly advance their nuclear aspirations through covert acquisition of fissile material or relevant technology.

--George J. Tenet, March 2000

Scholars and other specialists on Iran have argued about that country's political intentions and strategic ambitions since the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. In the 1980s Iran's efforts to export its revolution and support international terrorism raised the question of whether a moderate Islamic republic that was able to deal with the West could ever exist. The death of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the succession of Ali Hashimi-Rafsanjani as president raised new issues for the 1990s. As the European and American oil and investment communities considered the race to open Iran commercially, scholars and diplomats debated Iranian efforts to recover from nearly a decade of war and revolution. They compared the merits of the European approach of initiating critical dialogue with the U.S. policy of containing and isolating Iran. Neither approach seemed to have much impact, both conceded, and Iranians continued to sort out their domestic political agenda and to decide how best to protect their strategic and national interests. The U.S. Government, for example, tried to estimate how much time and money Iran would need to modernize its military and to acquire new weapons systems despite projected low oil prices and the country's need to rebuild its damaged and neglected civilian and industrial infrastructure.¹ The assumption underlying the U.S. projections was that Iran would be pursuing weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear technology and long-range missile systems.

This essay begins with the assumption that Iran is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and the long-range missile systems needed for their delivery. The assumption is based on documented evidence of Iranian efforts to acquire the elements essential for development of a nuclear program and on Iranian leaders' expressed interest in regional power projection based on weapons of mass destruction.² This analysis does not attempt to determine whether Iran possesses nuclear weapons now or how long it might take to acquire them, both of which are important questions whose answers have significant consequences for the security of the United States.

Instead, we focus on the approaches that policymakers have taken or could still take to avert or to slow this development, and we examine the potential impact on national interests, particularly on U.S. nonproliferation strategy, when Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state. We believe the issue that merits careful consideration has become how to manage a nuclear-armed Iran. This essay is meant principally as a policy analysis rather than an academic treatise. That is, it intends to build intellectual capital about how to manage the problem of a nuclear-armed Iran and to suggest courses of action that would minimize the negative impact on national interests.

Not all specialists on Iran share our assumption. Some scholars argue that Iran has no intention of developing a nuclear weapons capability and no aspirations to use its acquisition of nuclear technology to dominate regional security debates or to bolster territorial ambitions. Even hinting at such a goal for Iran, they say, will set back efforts to improve or normalize ties to Iran and to open its society to the outside world. Others in this discourse argue that assuming Iran has only pacific intentions would be naive. They note the growing nationalist trend in Iranian foreign and defense policies and argue that Iranians, regardless of their political or ideological leanings, agree on the need to pursue the best technical means available to ensure national security.³

There are important disincentives for Iran to consider should it choose to become a nuclear-armed state. Direct breach of its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would damage Iran's international standing and relations with Europe and the United States, the repair of which appears to be an important component of President Mohammad Khatami's foreign policy initiatives. However, Iran's longstanding enmity with Iraq, hostility toward Israel, desire to constrain U.S. military activities in the Persian Gulf, and ambitions to lead the Islamic world suggest stronger incentives for developing nuclear weapons. Widespread support across the Iranian political spectrum for national defense (including nuclear) programs, an indigenous professional scientific base, and a reliable supply network for technology and fissile material reduce the likelihood that the United States will be able to prevent or disarm Iran's military nuclear research and development programs.

The consequences of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems will raise the stakes considerably for U.S. engagement in the Middle East. National security strategy is predicated on the ability to separate regional policies and homeland defense. The development of a nuclear weapon capability coupled to long-range ballistic missiles will give Iran the ability to threaten its neighbors, the West, and the United States in a newer and more dangerous way than the asymmetric use of international terrorism. A nuclear-armed Iran also is likely to complicate U.S. relations with Russia and China and possibly with Europe as well.

Because of the acrimonious relationship that has existed between the governments of the United States and Iran since the revolution in 1979 and the mutual suspicions that persist between the two societies, policymakers in Washington know little about how Tehran's national security apparatus functions. Iranian policymakers almost certainly are equally ignorant of U.S. methods. This essay attempts to elucidate Iranian nuclear policies, programs, and decisionmaking procedures. It also identifies what is not known about Iran and assesses how it might behave in the international arena if armed with nuclear weapons. These judgments attempt to take into account trends in Iran's political behavior and the reactions of states that would perceive a threat from a nuclear-armed Iran.

For many Americans, viewing a nuclear-armed Iran with dispassionate judgment may be difficult. The relationship is freighted with grievances and mutual misunderstandings. Both parties feel a strong pull to assume the worst, and the United States is inclined to plan to defend its interests and those of its allies and friends in the region from what it assumes to be an implacably hostile and soon-to-be nuclear-armed Iran. In the current Iranian context in which reformists and conservatives are competing for control of domestic policies and institutions--and are likely to do so for an extended period of time--such worst-case scenarios could precipitate a situation less conducive to U.S. national interests than would a more carefully calibrated approach.

We conclude that how the United States prepares for and responds to Iran's crossing of the nuclear threshold will be pivotal in determining the consequences of Iran's action. We believe that the primary national objective should be to minimize the political gain to Iran of acquiring nuclear weapons. The potential response may affect Iran's calculations on whether and how to cross the nuclear threshold. Moreover, it will influence how America's friends, allies, and adversaries react to Iran as a nuclear power.

Dealing effectively with the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran will require changes in current U.S. policy before Iran becomes a nuclear power. We recommend further tightening preventative nonproliferation measures, ending policies designed to isolate Iran, reaffirming military commitments to and presence in the defense of the Persian Gulf region, and expanding efforts to build links between the two countries. These policies would provide the United States--and, with luck, Iran--with greater strategic and political transparency and better information on what is occurring in the region and in the other country. They could also expand incentives for Iran not to cross the nuclear threshold, reassure regional states friendly to the United States about its commitment to their security, and allow Washington to exploit possible openings to improve relations with Tehran.

The optimal outcome for U.S. interests would be for Iran not to become a nuclear power. Thus far, the United States has been able to delay but not prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear technology, project assistance, and material. The more realistic outcome for which the United States should prepare is a nuclear-armed Iran that reserves its new military capability for defensive purposes and for state survival, that does not challenge freedom of American operations or political relations in the Gulf region, and that does not spread its newly acquired capabilities to other governments or organizations. The United States would best position itself to manage the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran by pursuing a strategy of reducing the political and military value to Iran of acquiring nuclear weapons and by clearly communicating its willingness to defend its interests and those of its allies.

Endnotes

 ¹According to one press account, U.S. officials believed Iran would be able to construct a crude but workable nuclear device by 2000. See Bill Gertz, "Iran's Regional Powerhouse," Air Force Magazine 79, no. 6 (June 1996): 52. A senior Pentagon official acknowledged to The New York Times in July 2000 that Iran's ballistic missile program had problems and was "certainly not clicking along really fast." U.S. Government specialists currently have pushed the threat back to 2010 or 2015. See Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Meyers, "U.S. Study Reopens Division Over Nuclear Missile Threat," The New York Times, July 5, 2000, A1, A6. [BACK]

 ²Central Intelligence Agency, Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997 (http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html). The report concludes that "during the reporting period, Russia, China, and North Korea continued to supply missile-related goods and technology to Iran." See also Nonproliferation Center, Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 1999 (http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2000.html).
This report assesses that "Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially Russia, during the first half of 1999 . . . the expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts established--even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in nature--could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons research and development program." [BACK]

 ³Geoffrey T.H. Kemp of the Nixon Center and Gary G. Sick of Columbia University are two scholars who argue for Iran's strategic and nonnuclear intentions. See Geoffrey T.H. Kemp, "The Persian Gulf Remains the Strategic Prize," Survival 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998/1999): and Gary G. Sick, "Iran: The Adolescent Revolution," Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 1 (Summer 1995). David Schwarzbach of the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University has questioned why a country with enormous reserves of natural gas and other fossil fuels and a gross domestic product of only $62 billion would commit itself to spending billions of dollars on a nuclear plant that would be less efficient than a natural-gas plant. He believes the only answer is that Bushehr, Iran's nuclear power plant under construction, is a "foothold from which Iran could climb toward an atomic bomb." See Schwarzbach, "Iran's Nuclear Puzzle," Scientific American 276, no. 6 (June 1997): 62-65. Shahram Chubin makes a compelling argument for Iranian strategic goals and threat perception in Iran's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions, and Impact (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), and "Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?" Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 86-104. [BACK]