Introduction

The attacks of September 11, 2001, have made Americans acutely aware of their vulnerability to terrorism. Now the Nation is focused on improving defensive measures and rooting out and destroying the global infrastructure of terrorism. In response to the terrorist offensive, the Bush administration has engineered an international coalition against terrorism; dedicated substantial new resources to prevent or deter this blight; undertaken military action against blatant practitioners of terrorism; and established a new Office of Homeland Security, under the leadership of former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, to coordinate the Federal response to terrorism.

As America prepares defenses against catastrophes barely conceivable only a few months ago, the threat of bioterrorism in particular looms larger than ever. Fears of anthrax, smallpox, and plague pervade the American consciousness, fueled by reports that some of the plane hijackers involved in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks had specific interest in crop duster aircraft that could be used to disseminate aerosols of pathogens. Because of this, the Nation is stepping up its defenses against bioterrorism.

Nevertheless, little attention has been given to agricultural biowarfare and bioterrorism or to the roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors in deterring and responding to potential attacks. Few Americans appreciate the gravity of the threat of bioterrorist attacks against the American food and agriculture infrastructure. This point is exemplified in a General Accounting Office (GAO) report on combating terrorism released 9 days after the attacks of September 11.¹ The report did not address threats to American agriculture, nor did it involve participation by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). It focused only on terrorism directed against "civilian targets"; therefore, according to GAO, it "did not focus on terrorism directed against agricultural targets." GAO explained that agriculture was not included in the review because it has not been designated a critical national infrastructure.

But agriculture is a critical American infrastructure. It constitutes one-sixth of gross domestic product (GDP)--over a trillion dollars a year. The food and agriculture sector is the Nation's largest employer; one of eight Americans works in an occupation directly supported by food production. Agriculture exports total over $50 billion annually, making the farm sector the largest positive contributor to the national trade balance. The farming system is the most productive and efficient in the world, enabling Americans to spend less than 11 percent of disposable income on food, compared to a global average of 20 to 30 percent.

Officials are beginning to recognize that this vast network of food and fiber production, processing, distribution, and sales is a potential--even inevitable--target of hostile interests employing biological agents for political, economic, or criminal objectives. Even the threat of attack could jeopardize consumer confidence, disrupt commodity markets, and wreak economic havoc.

American agriculture is often concentrated, highly accessible, vertically integrated, and of limited genetic diversity; historically it has been free of major disease outbreaks, so vaccines are not routinely used. Consequently, pathogens could be introduced easily and spread rapidly. Widespread use of antibiotics in livestock production makes U.S. animals vulnerable to antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Advances in genetic engineering have raised the prospect of transgenic pathogens and pests that are resiýtant to conventional control methods. In addition, it may be hard to distinguish a biological attack from a natural disease outbreak. Signs of infections may be manifested slowly, delaying effective response by authorities. Finally, attacks against agriculture may be less risky to perpetrators than attacks against humans because many anti-agriculture pathogens are comparatively safe to work with. Also, public reaction may be less intense because humans are not being directly targeted (unless the goal is food contamination), and there is currently no national policy prescribing criminal penalties for biological attacks against targets other than humans.

The Federal Government is beginning to respond to the emerging threat of agricultural biowarfare and bioterrorism. Federal intelligence agencies, in cooperation with USDA, are defining the extent of the threat and briefing key Government officials. Federal research agencies, led by USDA, are mobilizing resources and developing research plans to detect and identify, epidemiologically map, and control deliberately introduced pathogens and pests. Agriculture and food safety are now included in a National Security Council (NSC) framework for preparedness against weapons of mass destruction. Yet, despite these initiatives, the Nation is poorly prepared to prevent and respond to attacks on its food and agriculture infrastructure. The Federal Government mustÕact quickly and decisively to protect food and agriculture systems. If we fail to act, the consequences could be far more damaging and long lasting than a direct and more visible terrorist attack against people.

To combat this threat, it is critical that the Federal Government, state and local governments, and the agribusiness sector clearly identify mutual roles and responsibilities and develop a coordinated strategy to address the threat. USDA should lead the development of this strategy.

To assure readiness, USDA should provide Federal leadership with a coordinated, stand-alone, interagency strategy and program to combat agricultural biowarfare and bioterrorism. Stand-alone attention and USDA leadership are both desirable and justified because the department has overall Federal responsibility for food safety and security and a broad range of programs and capabilities to deter and respond to threats against food and agriculture. It also has connections with the grassroots interests and the national agribusiness spectrum through an extensive network of field offices, agricultural extension specialists, research facilities, and land-grant universities in virtually every American county. In fact, USDA may be unique among Federal agencies in the closeness of its ties to constituencies. If subsumed into larger Federal programs, agricultural concerns could be buried in the enormously complex national security and counterterrorism bureaucracy, where it would be overshadowed by human health is5ues, cyberterrorism, and more conventional threats.

However, stand-alone attention should not be construed as acting in a vacuum. A national program to protect food and agriculture must be strongly linked to other national security and counterterrorism programs through the NSC structure and should involve strategic partnerships with other Federal, state, and local agencies and nongovernmental organizations--all of which have programs and capabilities that can contribute to the agriculture program--and with the private sector. Key objectives of a national strategy should be to:

• establish clear, well-coordinated Federal interagency mechanisms for gathering, assessing, and sharing sensitive intelligence information about hostile threats to U.S. food and agriculture
• increase significantly Federal research capabilities related to animal or plant health, food safety, and agricultural biowarfare and bioterrorism
• expand Federal staff in key areas
• create well-coordinated interagency mechanisms among USDA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Defense for collaborative forensics investigations
• identify and include elements of other Federal terrorism and bioterrorism strategies that are applicable to countering agricultural bioterrorism
• expand and strategically site national supplies of critical vaccines and pharmaceuticals to protect against and treat the agricultural diseases most likely to be launched by terrorists
• establish a nationwide electronic communications and data management network that links the private agribusiness community with emergency management staff, field response personnel, and key Federal, state, and local agencies
• develop and implement a national emergency disease response plan for food and agriculture
• establish clear roles, responsibilities, expectations, and performance measures, as well as coordination mechanisms, for Federal, state, and local public and private organizations and interests
• identify feasible options for providing financial assistance to agribusiness interests impacted by biological attacks
• develop and implement professional and public education programs
• improve international cooperation to deter and respond to agricultural biowarfare and bioterrorism.

This paper reviews the nature and threat of agricultural bioterrorism, examines present national capabilities and plans to meet the threat, and proposes a USDA-led Federal strategy, including partnerships with key public and private organizations, that could strengthen American ability to prevent, respond to, and remediate biological attacks against national food and agriculture infrastructures. This paper focuses particularly on agricultural bioterrorism; however, a scenario of agricultural biowarfare, carried out by hostile nations, or a criminal action (biocrime), is at least as plausible as an act of terrorism, and a strategy to deter and respond to agricultural bioterrorism would apply equally to biowarfare and biocrime.

Endnotes

 ¹ General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations," report, September 20, 2001, GAO/NSIAD-01-822, accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. [BACK]