Bioterrorism, Biowarfare, and National Security
The United States faces a host of threats to its national security from diverse, nontraditional, unpredictable, and potentially covert sources. Of special concern are hostile nations or special interest groups that represent a spectrum of causes from religious fundamentalism to extreme environmentalism and threaten a wide range of military and civilian targets. These interests are likely to use weapons of mass destruction to achieve their goals, employing tools and technologies that are not only powerful but also difficult to detect or deter. A resourceful enemy bent on a destructive mission has potential access to an arsenal of horrific, readily transportable, and easily hidden weapons, including conventional explosives, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological agents.
An Emerging Threat
Biowarfare and bioterrorism are emerging as particularly worrisome and insidious threats.2 The Clinton administration National Security Strategy (NSS) included several references to the containment of the spread of biological weapons and enhancement of domestic preparedness for a biological weapons attack.3 President Clinton became personally engaged in the issue, reportedly after reading The Cobra Event, Richard Preston's 1997 novel about a bioterrorism attack on New York City.4 Yet, despite this high-level concern and attention, the Nation remains poorly prepared to deal with a biological attack. Of particular concern, there is not yet a cohesive national strategy to address a bioterrorism threat.5 Current policies are inadequate to address terrorism attacks because there are no provisions for attribution or retribution.6
Defining Bioterrorism and Biological Agents
Terminology relating to bioterrorism can be confusing. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as a "deliberate act or threat committed by an individual or group for political or social objectives."7 This definition evidently does not preclude terrorism carried out by sovereign nations. With greater specificity, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) defines terrorist as a "a non-state actor not provided with a state-developed weapon."8 Complicating the issue, Rebecca Hersman and Seth Carus note the increasing difficulty of distinguishing between not only a terrorist event and an act of war but also terrorist and military use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).9 For example, they suggest that state adversaries may use terrorist surrogates to carry out attacks on civilian or military targets. Furthermore, biological attacks carried out by individuals or small groups for nonwarfare or nonpolitical purposes (especially for economic objectives) may be more properly described as biocrimes. 10 This paper simplifies the terminology by considering terrorism as a hostile, covert act committed by any inimical interest against an individual, interest, or group for political, economic, or social gain that occurs outside the framework of a formally declared war.
Although terrorists may employ a wide variety of means to accomplish objectives, from acts of vandalism and violence to the use of conventional or unconventional weapons, most observers are concerned about the potential employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists. The General Accounting Office defines WMD as "chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons or agents."11 Others have added radiological to this listing and use the acronym CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) to describe devices of mass destruction.12
Carus defines bioterrorism as "the threat or use of biological agents by individuals or groups motivated by political, religious, ecological, or other ideological objectives."13 Paul Rogers, Simon Whitby, and Malcolm Dando cite a Federal Government definition of biological warfare as "the intentional cultivation or production of pathogenic bacteria, fungi, viruses . . . and their toxic products, as well as certain chemical compounds, for the purpose of producing disease or death."14 In this paper, biological warfare (synonymous with biowarfare) denotes the hostile use of biological agents against an enemy in the context of a formally declared war. Bioterrorism is considered an act of terrorism that employs biological agents. Although this paper focuses on bioterrorism (considered synonymous with biological terrorism), much of the discussion also applies to biological warfare or biocrimes--the consequences of which are likely to be similar whether conducted by a nation-state during a formally declared war or by a hostile actor outside of war.
Biological agents that could be employed as biological weapons include living organisms (micro-organisms and macro-organisms), chemical products of living organisms (including biological toxins), manufactured substances that mimic the action of biological substances,15 and genetically modified organisms.16 Some 39 agents have been identified as potential bioweapons.17 Among biological agents, anthrax and smallpox have the greatest potential for mass human casualties and disruption.18 Both agents are highly lethal; stable enough to be applied as an aerosol; capable of large-scale production; and have already been weaponized by hostile nations (anthrax by Iraq and both anthrax and smallpox by Russia). There are limited vaccines for both agents, and there would likely be a delay before their effects are recognized. Each would carry a powerful psychological punch as well. Other agents of significant human concern include plague, tularemia, botulinum toxins, and viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola.19
Scientists have recently expressed concern that terrorists could exploit the potential for the creation of life forms using new knowledge about the gene sequences of living organisms. This technology could result in the manufacture of genetically engineered pathogens, toxins, or synthetic superbugs, which could be employed as biological weapons or even programmed to target specific ethnic groups.20 Russian scientists recently reported that they have developed a genetically engineered anthrax strain that is resistant to the vaccine currently being given to U.S. troops.21
Terrorists could also develop and deploy a cocktail involving multiple biological agents or a combination of biological and chemical agents, severely impeding efforts to identify the cause of illness and to provide effective treatment. Saddam Hussein employed a chemical cocktail involving multiple agents in his attack on the predominantly Kurdish Iraqi town of Halajba in March 1988.22 Soviet émigré Kenneth Alibek, former first deputy chief of Biopreparat--the biological weapons program of the former Soviet Union--is concerned that Russian scientists may have recently developed a recombinant virus containing genetic components of both Ebola and smallpox virus.23
The most effective biological weapon agents would be highly infectious, communicable, and lethal; efficiently dispersible; easily produced in large quantities; stable in storage; resistant to environmental degradation; and lacking vaccines or effective treatments.24 Biological agents may be targeted directly against humans through injection or topical application; deployed against agricultural crops, livestock, poultry, and fish; applied as a contaminant of food or drinking water; disseminated as an aerosol; or introduced through a natural vector such as an insect.25 Motives of terrorists may include commission of selective or mass murder; incapacitation of enemies; achievement of political goals; undermining of social stability or creation of mass panic; or pursuit of economic objectives through destabilization, blackmail, extortion, or market disruptions.26 Potential perpetrators cover the spectrum from hostile nation-states and large, well-funded, and possibly state-supported organizations to small, political or religious extremist groups such as the Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese sect responsible for the sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subw ystem in 1995.27 Even disaffected individuals could be bioterrorists.
Biological warfare (BW) agents are easily distinguished from chemical warfare (CW) agents. Unlike BW agents, CW agents do not involve the use of living organisms for their application or manufacture. In addition, CW agents are targeted against specific areas to achieve tactical effects. In contrast, BW agents can have enduring effects over very large areas to achieve strategic objectives.
Biological Agents as Weapons: Pros and Cons
Biological agents have much to make them appropriate as weapons of warfare or terrorism--whether employed against humans or used to attack agricultural targets (see table 1). First, they are relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain from culture collections or to produce.28 Saddam Hussein purchased his base anthrax culture from an American mail order biological supply company, which obliged the dictator by shipping it via overnight express.29 Kathleen Bailey, formerly with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reportedly believes that a substantial biological weapons arsenal could be constructed in a 15-by-15-foot room at a cost of $10,000--the price of a beer fermenter, a protein-based culture, a gas mask, and a plastic lab coat.30 Compounding the problem of ease of manufacturing biological agents is that the technology to produce them is dual-use, which means that they could also be put to such benign and legitimate purposes as fermentation or vaccine manufacturing. These purposes could easily provide cover to the would-be terrorist.31This presents significant challenges to implementing an effective verification program for any international protocol or convention banning biological weapons.32
Silent, invisible, microscopic, and odorless, biological agents can be introduced without fanfare and strike without warning. Because micro-organisms readily reproduce in hosts at rapid rates, a tiny amount of pathogen, properly introduced, can quickly cause a devastating infection. An infection in the host can then be transmitted rapidly to nearby members of the population. An infection may go undetected or undiagnosed for days; thus, a major disease outbreak could be well under way before medical, veterinary, or agricultural authorities are alerted.
Another advantage of biowarfare, or bioterrorism, is the wide range of effects that biological agents can confer on victims, ranging from near-certain mortality to temporary disability. The toxins of some living organisms--including microscopic bacteria, viruses, and venomous snakes and marine animals--are among the most poisonous agents known. In fact, some biological agents are more lethal than thermonuclear weapons; by one calculation, 100 kilograms of anthrax, effectively dispersed, could kill twice as many people as a one-megaton nuclear warhead.33 Other biological agents may cause short-term incapacitation. Consequently, biological agents can be selected and employed according to the specific military, political, or economic objective. Mortality is not necessarily required to accomplish the objective. Furthermore, authorities may be persuaded that a disease outbreak is natural, providing cover or plausible deniability to biological terrorists.34 This is exemplified by the outbreak of West Nile virus in the greater New York area in the summer of 1999. Authorities have been unable to determine if the exotic disease, never before identified in America, was a naturally transmitted infection or an act of bioterrorism.35 The investigation has been complicated by a report, prior to the outbreak, that Iraq was developing and planning to deploy a strain of the virus as a bioweapon.
Use of biological agents as weapons offers significant psychological advantages to terrorists, triggering primal fear reactions among humans familiar with the horrors of Dark Age plagues and popularized accounts of hypothetical or real modern-day disease outbreaks, such as Mad Cow disease and Ebola virus.36 Even the threat of bioterrorism could cause panic in populations, providing substantial leverage to terrorists. Bioterrorism may also exploit fundamental national vulnerabilities--including porous borders, an open society, and dense population centers--and severely challenge the public health infrastructure, which presently does not have the experience, surveillance capability, or treatment capacity to monitor or respond to massive, widespread, and simultaneous disease outbreaks.37 Finally, it is important to recognize that during the Cold War, the approach of the U.S. national security community was to describe a threat first (by collecting incriminating intelligence) and then to formulate an appropriate response. In the post-CoŽd War era of asymmetric threats, a clear understanding of national vulnerabilities is a prerequisite to identifying and elucidating a threat.38
While biological agents have many benefits as instruments of warfare or terror, they are not ideal weapons, particularly in a battlefield situation. To be effective, most agents must be widely disseminated, infecting numerous targets simultaneously. The most effective dispersal method would be an aerosol cloud; however, microscopic pathogenic agents lose virulence or die rapidly on release because of exposure to ultraviolet radiation and desiccation. There are also substantial practical difficulties in controlling the dispersal path of the agents in unpredictable conditions of atmospheric or other transport.39 Further, biological weapons, in contrast to high explosives, lack the overwhelming and immediate show of physical force that demoralizes enemies.40
Additional disadvantages of biological weapons include the need to protect handlers from accidental contamination; the difficulty of maintaining quality control and containment during manufacture and harvesting of agents; the poor survival in storage of agents; and the difficulty of maintaining biological weapons in a delivery state.41 Finally, using water or food as a vector for biological contaminants or pathogens is complicated by the fact that agents would be diluted in water; potable water is routinely purified in municipal treatment facilities, and cooking food would destroy most (but probably not all) biological toxins or pathogens.42
Current and Future Threats
National and international authorities are beginning to sound the alarm that American agriculture is an increasingly likely target of biological warfare.43 The concerns largely derive from expanding knowledge about bioweapons programs in other nations, including those inimical to the United States. As summarized in table 2, it is well documented that at least 17 nations have current known or suspected bioweapons programs and that another 12 nations conducted biowarfare programs in the past. It has also been well established that both Iraq and the former Soviet Union have had substantial anti-agriculture programs targeting the United States.
In contrast, there is considerable debate about the extent to which America in general, and the food and agriculture infrastructure in particular, are threatened by biological attacks carried out by terrorist organizations (as opposed to attacks by nation-states or criminal acts conducted by individuals). There are only two documented examples of biological attacks attempted by terrorist organizations (table 2). The first example is widespread food poisoning carried out by the Baghwan Shree Rajneesh cult in Oregon in 1984. The other example is a number of unsuccessful attempts by the Japanese-based Aum Shinrikyo organization, in the early 1990s, to spread anthrax and botulinum toxin. The General Accounting Office considers bioterrorism to be an emerging threat but has concluded that terrorists are less likely to use biological weapons than conventional explosives.44 It does consider the possibility that terrorist use of bioweapons may increase over the next decade and does acknowledge that there are substantial differences of opinion among experts regarding the extent of the bioterrorism threat. GAO recommends the undertaking of sound threat and risk assessments to ensure that counterterrorism investments are wisely spent and that effective, well-coordinated preparedness programs are formulated and implemented.
Regardless of whether a biological attack, targeting food or agriculture, is carried out by hostile states, terrorists, or criminals, the consequences of such an attack could be devastating. Risks, however small, are ignored at peril. It may also be assumed that any entity that has the demonstrated interest or capability to conduct biological warfare could inflict biological agents on food and agriculture interests as well as on human populations.
Endnotes
2See, for example, Philip H. Abelson, "Biological Warfare," Science 286, no. 5 (November 26, 1999), 1677; William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the National Academy of Sciences, January 22, 1999," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 35, no. 3, 103-106; Lois R. Ember, "DARPA Expands R&D on Biowarfare Defense Tools," Chemical and Engineering News 76, no. 7 (February 16, 1998), 7; Sidney J. Freedberg, Marilyn W. Serafini, and Siobhan Gorman, "Be Afraid, Be Moderately Afraid," National Journal 31, no. 13 (March 27, 1999), 806-817; Donald A. Henderson, "The Looming Threat of Bioterrorism," Science 283, no. 5406 (February 26, 1999), 1279-1282; Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons: A Reawakened Concern," The World & I 14, no. 1 (January 1999), 289-305; Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch, Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Plenum Press, 1998); White House, White Paper: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63, May 22, 1998; White House, Fact Sheet: Preparedness for a Biological Weapons Attack, May 22, 1998, available at <http://www.nbcindustrygroup.com/0522pres1.htm>; White House, Fact Sheet: Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62, May 22, 1998, available at <http://www.nbcindustrygroup.com/0522pres3.htm>. [BACK]
3White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999. [BACK]
4Clinton, "Remarks at the National Academy of Sciences"; Lois R. Ember, "Bioterrorism: Countering the Threat," Chemical Engineering News 77, no. 27 (July 5, 1999), 8-17; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). [BACK]
5Ember, "Bioterrorism: Countering the Threat"; Freedberg, Serafini, and Gorman, "Be Afraid, Be Moderately Afraid"; Donald A. Henderson, "Weapons for the Future," The Lancet 354 (supplement, December 1999), S64. [BACK]
7General Accounting Office, "Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination," letter report, October 27, 1999, GAO/RCED-00-3, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>. [BACK]
8General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives," testimony, March 16, 1999, GAO/T-NSIDA-99-112, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>. [BACK]
9Rebecca Hersman and W. Seth Carus, "DOD and Consequence Management: Mitigating the Effects of Chemical and Biological Attack," Strategic Forum no. 169, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press (December 1999). [BACK]
10W. Seth Carus, "Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century," Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University (August 1998; rev. July 1999). [BACK]
11General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations," letter report, May 13, 1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-135, accessed at <http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov>. [BACK]
12Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Part I: Assessing the Threat," December 15, 1999. [BACK]
13Carus, "Bioterrorism and Biocrimes." [BACK]
14Paul Rogers, Simon Whitby, and Malcolm Dando, "Biological Warfare Against Crops," Scientific American 280, no. 6 (June 1999), 70-75. [BACK]
15Ronald E. Hurlbert, "Microbiology 101 Internet Text: Chapter XV, Addendum: Biological Weapons; Malignant Biology," accessed at <http://www.wsu.edu/~hurlbert/pages/101biologicalweapons.html>. [BACK]
16Abelson, "Biological Warfare"; Ethirajan Anbarasan, "Genetic Weapons: A 21st Century Nightmare?" The UNESCO Courier 52, no. 3 (1999), 37-39; "Bioterrorism, Foodborne Diseases, and ‘Superbugs' Pose New Threats to U.S. Cities," PR Newswire (October 6, 1998); Cultural Terrorist Agency, "Genetics Activists Create Superweed Kit" (January 24, 1999); Hurlbert, "Microbiology 101 Internet Text"; Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars; Richard Preston, "The Bioweaponeers," The New Yorker 74, no. 3 (March 9, 1998), 52. [BACK]
17Mark G. Kortepeter and Gerald W. Parker, "Potential Biological Weapons Threats," Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (July/August 1999), available at <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/kortepeter.htm>. [BACK]
20Anbarasan, "Genetic Weapons: A 21st Century Nightmare?"; Philip Cohen, "A Terrifying Power," New Scientist 161, no. 2171 (January 30, 1999), 10; Lois R. Ember, "A Double-Edged Sword," Chemical and Engineering News 77, no. 49 (December 6, 1999), 109-117. [BACK]
21Deb Riechmann, "Russian Lab Develops Anthrax Strain that Might Defeat U.S. Vaccine," The Associated Press, February 14, 1998. [BACK]
22Christine M. Gosden, testimony before the Senate Judiciary ttee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons Threats to America, "Are We Prepared?" April 22, 1998. [BACK]
23Preston, "The Bioweaponeers." [BACK]
24Hurlbert, "Microbiology 101 Internet Text"; Kortepeter and Parker, "Potential Biological Weapons Threats." [BACK]
25Cited in W. Seth Carus, "Biological Warfare Threats in Perspective," Critical Reviews in Microbiology 24, no. 3 (1998), 149-155. [BACK]
26Ibid.; Peter Chalk, unpublished review of agricultural bioterrorism, The RAND Corporation, 1999; Robert P. Kadlec, "Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare," in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, eds. Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995). [BACK]
27Kortepeter and Parker, "Potential Biological Weapons Threats." [BACK]
28Cited in Carus, "Biological Warfare Threats in Perspective"; Carus, "Bioterrorism and Biocrimes"; Freedberg, Serafini, and Gorman, "Be Afraid, Be Moderately Afraid"; Robert P. Kadlec, "Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare," in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues; Hurlbert, "Microbiology 101 Internet Text"; Al J. Venter, "New-Era Threat: Iraq's Biological Weapons," Middle East Policy 6, no. 4 (June 1999), 104-117. [BACK]
29Terry N. Mayer, "The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction," in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, 205-226. [BACK]
30Hurlbert, "Microbiology 101 Internet Text." [BACK]
31Freedberg, Serafini, and Gorman, "Be Afraid, Be Moderately Afraid." [BACK]
32Federation of American Scientists, Working Group on Biological Weapons Verification, Report of the Subgroup on Investigation of Alleged Release of Biological or Toxin Weapons Agents (April 1996). [BACK]
33W. Seth Carus, testimony before a joint hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Washington, DC (March 4, 1998). [BACK]
34Ibid.; Kadlec, "Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare." [BACK]
35Richard Preston, "Taming the Biological Beast," The New York Times, April 21, 1998, 21. [BACK]
36Ember, "Bioterrorism: Countering the Threat"; Freedberg, Serafini, and Gorman, "Be Afraid, Be Moderately Afraid"; Laurie Garrett, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World out of Balance (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994). [BACK]
37Freedberg, Serafini, and Gorman, "Be Afraid, Be Moderately Afraid." [BACK]
38Norm Steele, personal communication, March 22, May 24, 2000. [BACK]
39Carus, testimony, March 4, 1998; Hurlbert, "Microbiology 101 Internet Text." [BACK]
40Michael Heylin, "Ag Biotech's Promise Clouded by Consumer Fear," Chemical and Engineering News 77, no. 49 (December 6, 1999), 73-88. [BACK]
41Hurlbert, "Microbiology 101 Internet Text." [BACK]
42W. Seth Carus, "The Threat of Bioterrorism," Strategic Forum no. 127, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press (September 1997). [BACK]
43USDA, Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology, Federal Register Notice 64, no. 108 (June 7, 1999), 30297; "Man Who Poisoned Food Gets 11-Year Jail Term," The Boston Globe, September 24, 1999, A16; Chalk, unpublished review; Steve Goldstein, "U.S. Could Face New Terror Tactic: Agricultural Warfare," The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 22, 1999; Siobhan Gorman, "Bioterror Down on the Farm," National Journal 31, no. 13 (March 27, 1999), 812-813; Debora MacKenzie, "Run, Radish, Run," New Scientist 164, no. 2217 (December 18, 1999), 36-39; Rogers, Whitby, and Dando, "Biological Warfare Against Crops." [BACK]
44General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives"; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks," letter report, September 7, 1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-163, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>; General Accounting Office, "Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism," testimony, October 20, 1999, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>. [BACK]