An Emerging Threat to Food Security

Agriculture is a critical national infrastructure. Agriculture's overall contribution to the Nation's gross domestic product (GDP) is over a trillion dollars a year--one-sixth of the national total GDP.⁴⁵ The food and agriculture sector is the Nation's largest employer. Although farming directly employs less than 3 percent of the U.S. population, one out of eight Americans works in an occupation directly supported by food production.⁴⁶

With a solid research foundation and extensive infrastructure, the American farming system is the most productive and efficient in the world. As a consequence, Americans spend less than 11 percent of their disposable income on food, compared with a global average of 20 to 30 percent.⁴⁷ In 1998, the United States produced 48.1 percent of the world's soybeans, 41.5 percent of its corn, 20.5 percent of its cotton, 11.8 percent of its wheat, and over 16 percent of its meat.⁴⁸ Also, agriculture may have a critical regional impact; for example, in some Northern Plains states, farming accounts for over 10 percent of total employment and gross state product.⁴⁹

Agricultural exports total over $50 billion annually, making the farm sector the largest positive contributor to the U.S trade balance.⁵⁰ Exports of American agricultural products account for 15 percent of all global agriculture exports.⁵¹ The economic multiplier of a farm commodity is a measure of total economic activity associated with a commodity and is a reflection of the farm gate value for that commodity, plus the value accruing from transportation, marketing, and processing of the commodity.⁵² The Department of Commerce has concluded that the economic multiplier of exported farm commodities is 20 to 1; this compares with a multiplier of less than 2 to 1 for domestic crop sales (and the manufacture of major weapon systems) and less than 3 to 1 for domestic livestock sales.⁵³

Potential Targets

There are five potential targets of agricultural bioterrorism: field crops; farm animals; food items in the processing or distribution chain; market-ready foods at the wholesale or retail level; and agricultural facilities, including processing plants, storage facilities, wholesale and retail food outlets, elements of the transportation infrastructure, and research laboratories. To date, concern about agricultural bioterrorism has focused primarily on field crops and farm animals on the production side. It is important to remember that bioterrorism attacks could also be directed against foods destined for near-term human consumption, or against facilities, including research laboratories engaged in investigations that may be offensive to extremist organizations.

Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture

Despite the importance of agriculture to the U.S. economy and the well-being of American citizens, scant attention has been given to agricultural vulnerability to terrorist attack. Simply put, America is exceedingly vulnerable to agricultural bioterrorism. The reasons for this situation are numerous. To begin, there is limited appreciation for the economic and social importance of agriculture in the industrialized West. Abundant, affordable, and safe food supplies are largely taken for granted, and agricultural products are not viewed as vulnerable to significant disruption.⁵⁴ It is hard for American citizens to imagine a world where the availability of food radically changes for the worse.

Moreover, because of its large size and complexity, the U.S. agribusiness infrastructure is a tempting target,⁵⁵ and access to American farms and agribusiness facilities is comparatively easy.⁵⁶ Much of the agricultural industry is highly concentrated in monoculture (single species) croplands, livestock feedlots, poultry houses, and major food processing and distribution centers, making it relatively easy for infection or contamination to spread rapidly.⁵⁷ The extent of production concentration in agriculture is indicated by the fact that a large proportion of sales of individual commodities originates in a relatively small percentage of farms. For example, less than 10 percent of cow and calf production facilities, approximately 20 percent of American grain and vegetable and citrus farms, 25 percent of dairy cattle and pig farms, 33 percent of poultry farms, and about 45 percent of cotton farms account for 75 percent of U.S. sales of those commodities.⁵⁸

The industry's widespread vertical integration (where a single company controls much of the commodity production, processing, and distribution system) also facilitates the geographical spread of pathogens.⁵⁹ This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the American retail food industry presently does not have established procedures for preventing food contamination by terrorists; therefore, it is highly vulnerable to such incidents because of the large number of undocumented workers in the industry, particularly in fast food restaurants.⁶⁰ Monitoring for deliberate terrorist contamination of foods in retail establishments is significantly complicated by the large number of potential food-borne pathogens that could be employed; by the current absence of continuous, in-line monitoring of food products; and by the difficulty of holding food items long enough at any point in the distribution process to enable precise and accurate detection of pathogens.⁶¹ In addition, it would be difficult to distinguish between natural contamination by food-borne pathogens and a terrorist incident.

Current animal husbandry methods in the United States (including crowding, hormone injections, branding, dehorning, castration, and disinfectant sterilization) have increased stress levels in livestock and poultry, lowering their resistance to infection.⁶² Also, limited genetic diversity in most U.S. agriculture species may make those species particularly vulnerable to specific pathogens.⁶³ Because American livestock and poultry are the most protected and healthiest in the world, vaccines are not routinely used. Moreover, because many foreign diseases are not endemic to the United States, animal agriculture is highly vulnerable to a non-endemic pathogen.⁶⁴ Widespread use of antibiotics to treat common diseases makes American animals vulnerable to antibiotic-resistant pathogen strains.⁶⁵

Rapid advances in genetic engineering of commercial plants to confer enhanced performance or desirable traits have raised the prospect of the creation of transgenic plant pathogens, pests, or weeds that are resistant to conventional control methods.⁶⁶ This prospect has already been realized through the development of a genetically mutant superweed, which is reportedly resistant to current herbicides. The superweed was reportedly designed to "attack corporate monoculture" and target genetically engineered crops.⁶⁷ Pathogens developed for plant bioterrorism do not have to be highly specific for the targeted crop, thus making them easier to produce than human pathogens.⁶⁸ It could be hard to distinguish a bioterrorist attack from a natural outbreak of animal or plant disease, thus providing cover for a terrorist.⁶⁹ In contrast to humans and animals, signs of infection in plants may take some time to develop, delaying effective response by authorities.⁷⁰

Compared with attacks against humans, attacks against agriculture are less risky to perpetrators. Anti-agriculture pathogens are generally safer to work with than human pathogens.⁷¹ It also is easier to develop and deploy biological agents against agriculture than against humans: less technical knowledge is required.⁷² In addition, public reaction may be less intense because, unless the goal is contamination of processed, ready-to-eat food, humans are not being directly targeted.⁷³ However, some livestock and poultry diseases are zoonotic, presenting the possibility that they could jump to humans, resulting in widespread human disease.

Although the economic consequences of a biological attack on U.S. agriculture are likely to be severe, penalties for agricultural biowarfare and bioterrorism prescribed by existing U.S. Code are trivial, and the record of prosecution has been sparse.⁷⁴ Financial losses would accrue from a number of interrelated consequences, including:⁷⁵

• direct losses of agriculture commodities to diseases
• costs of diagnosis and surveillance
• required destruction of contaminated crops and animals to contain disease
• costs of disposal of mortalities and carcasses
• damage to consumer and public confidence
• need for long-term quarantine of infected areas
• losses due to export and trade restrictions
• disruption of commodity markets.

In fact, because the economic impact of terrorism directed against U.S. agriculture is likely to be substantial, the term econoterrorism has been proposed as an alternative to agricultural bioterrorism.⁷⁶

When one considers the economic and social consequences of the natural outbreak of Mad Cow disease in England in the 1990s, the potential impacts of a well-coordinated, targeted bioterrorist act come into perspective. Mad Cow disease has already cost England between $9 billion and $14 billion in compensation costs to farmers and laid-off employees, and at least another $2.4 billion in loss of export markets.⁷⁷ These costs continue to escalate as confidence in British beef has been severely undermined; it will be exceedingly difficult to restore public confidence.

Consider another example. A devastating outbreak of Foot and mouth disease (FMD), a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals, was first reported in Taiwan in March 1997. FMD, comprising over 70 different strains, is the most infectious virus known, capable of spreading as a wind-driven aerosol over 170 miles from its source.⁷⁸ Within 6 weeks, FMD had spread throughout Taiwan, necessitating the slaughter of more than 8 million pigs and shutting down the nation's valuable pork exports.⁷⁹ The origin of the disease was reportedly traced to a single pig from Hong Kong, and China was suspected of deliberately introducing the disease into Taiwan.⁸⁰ The disease is still affecting Taiwan, and the ultimate costs to that nation are estimated to be at least $19 billion--$4 billion to diagnose and eradicate the disease and another $15 billion in indirect losses from trade embargoes.⁸¹ Was this an act of biowarfare or bioterrorism? The answer may never be known, but it is a plausible hypothesis that it indeed was. The recent (spring 2001) outbreak of FMD in England could ultimately have even more devastating consequences than the Taiwan epidemic.

Could an FMD outbreak in America have similar consequences? Given the fact that the Nation's 100 million cattle, 70 million pigs, 10 million sheep, and over 40 million wild, cloven-hoofed animals are susceptible to the 70-odd strains of FMD in the world, America is at great risk for a devastating outbreak that could persist for years.⁸² It has been estimated that even a limited outbreak affecting no more than 10 farms could have a $2 billion economic impact. Because one infected pig could release enough virus every day to infect, in theory, 100 million cows, it would be exceedingly difficult to contain the disease to such a small number of farms.⁸³

FMD is by no means the only disease of livestock that would have devastating consequences if an outbreak occurred. A study published in 1994 projected the economic impact on the U.S. swine industry of an outbreak of African swine fever.⁸⁴ The authors concluded that the cost, over a 10-year period, would approximate $5.4 billion, a figure that could be three to five times higher today.

While the economic impact of bioterrorism against farm animals would be substantial, experts have concluded that an attack against American crops would have even greater consequences.⁸⁵ Crops comprise a larger percentage (54 percent) of the $202.3 billion farm gate value of American commodities than farm animals and their products and contribute more to exports.⁸⁶ More important, crops comprise the major components of prepared feeds for livestock, poultry, and farm-raised fish. Finally, deliberate contamination of processed foods by terrorists could have devastating consequences, not only in terms of human health, but also because of economic impact and loss of consumer confidence in the safety of the Nation's food supplies.

Agricultural Bioterrorism Agents

Just as there are a number of micro- and macro-organisms that could be employed in biological warfare against humans, a host of diverse bioweapons could be used against agriculture. These include microscopic pathogens, insects, weeds, and other organisms or biological substances. ⁸⁷ Table 3 provides a summary of categories of biological agents that could be employed against agriculture.

There have been recent efforts to assess the anti-agriculture bioweapons potential and threat from the host of biological agents that could be used. Table 4 presents a comprehensive, unclassified listing developed for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Table 5 lists additional animal pathogens, not included in the DIA assessment, which other observers have identified. Both lists signify agents that cause animal diseases recognized as List A diseases by the Organization Internationale des Epizooties (OIE). List A diseases are considered not only to be highly infectious and capable of being widely and rapidly spread across international borders but also to have the potential to inflict catastrophic economic losses and social disruption.⁸⁸ List A diseases are rigorously monitored worldwide by OIE, whose member countries are required to report outbreaks of List A diseases within 24 hours of laboratory confirmation. Reports of List A outbreaks trigger immediate, severe trade restrictions on affected products. It is noteworthy that a number of existing or potential bioweapons pathogens are not included among the disease agents in List A (tables 4 and 5).

Historical Perspective

Biological warfare is not a recent phenomenon; in fact, there are many examples throughout history of lethal or debilitating biological agents being used against enemies.⁸⁹ Two millennia ago, the Romans dumped bodies into wells to foul enemy drinking water supplies. In the 14th-century siege of Kaffa, Tartars catapulted plague-infested bodies into the walled city to spread disease, perhaps triggering a subsequent outbreak of Bubonic plague that swept medieval Europe, causing 25 million deaths. Historians believe that an epidemic of smallpox that decimated Indian populations during the French and Indian War was attributable to the deliberate issue of smallpox-exposed blankets by the English to Indians presumed loyal to the French.

Given its relative ease and low risk, surprisingly few national or international incidents of agricultural bioterrorism have occurred. Carus has undertaken a comprehensive inventory and assessment of bioterrorism and biocrimes in the 20th century.⁹⁰ He has documented 222 cases, categorizing the cases and number of reported cases:

• confirmed use of biological agents (24)
• probable or possible use (28)
• threatened use (probable or confirmed possession) (11)
• threatened use (no confirmed possession) (121)
• confirmed possession (no known attempts or threats to use) (5)
• probable or possible possession (6)
• possible interest in acquisition (no known possession) (13)
• false cases and hoaxes (14)

It is surprising that there have been only 222 bioterrorism-related incidents in a 100-year period and that in only 24 cases have there been confirmed attacks--an average of 1 every 4 years worldwide. Furthermore, only one attack resulted in mass human casualties--the Salmonella contamination of food by the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon in 1984.⁹¹

Fourteen of the 24 confirmed cases of bioterrorism or biocrimes are food or agriculture-related; of these cases, 11 involved food poisoning and only 3 targeted commercial animals or plants (table 6). Of the 222 documented incidents, only 6 appear to be clearly linked to attacks on commercial plants and animals (table 6).

One sobering statistic from the Carus survey is that 144 incidents occurred in the 1990s--nearly two-thirds of the total. This may reflect better incident tracking and record keeping in recent years, or it may indicate a dramatic increase in the propensity of terrorists or criminals to employ biological agents. Available evidence supports the latter premise. For example, FBI statistics indicate that U.S. incidents involving weapons of mass destruction using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear ˇaterials have soared from 37 in 1996 to over 200 in 1999, with three-fourths of the cases involving biological agents--usually the threatened release of anthrax.⁹² Notably, the vast majority of incidents have been directed against individuals or small groups, not mass populations.

Terrorism by Animal Rights Extremists

One additional category of agriculture-related terrorism merits close attention: acts of violence or vandalism conducted by animal rights extremists.⁹³ Though often directed against the agricultural infrastructure, these acts are not technically considered agricultural bioterrorism because they do not typically involve the use of biological agents (although they could), and they may target commercial animal enterprises that are not strictly agricultural (for example, pet shops, zoos, aquariums, rodeos, and circuses). There is strong evidence that these incidents are increasing.

In response to the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Agriculture jointly provided Congress with a comprehensive report on the extent and effects of domestic and international terrorism on animal enterprises through 1992. The Act defines animal enterprise as "1) a commercial or academic enterprise that uses animals for food or fiber production, agriculture, research, or testing; 2) a zoo, aquarium, circus, rodeo, or lawful competitive animal event; or 3) any fair or similar event intended to advance the agricultural arts and sciences."⁹⁴ The report identified 313 incidents of terrorism involving 28 different kinds of animal enterprises by animal rights extremists between 1977 and June 1993. Of these incidents, 79 targeted agriculture or food enterprises, including agricultural or food production facilities (28 incidents); markets, delis, or butcher shops (33); restaurants (6); breeding ranches (7); fur-animal farms or breeders (3); and feed cooperatives (2). In addition, 63 incidents occurred at university medical and research facilities, 21 at private research facilities, laboratories, or medical centers, 8 at Federal research or medical facilities, and 3 at local government facilities.

In a more recent report, the National Animal Interest Alliance cited 42 incidents of such terrorism conducted by animal rights extremists between 1996 and 1999, of which 35 occurred in the United States.⁹⁵ Incidents included the release of domesticated animals raised for the fur trade; attacks on animal research facilities, pet stores, restaurants, supermarkets, slaughterhouses and meatpacking plants; and threats against farmers.

üost incidents perpetrated by animal rights extremists have involved vandalism or theft and release of animals. There have been no documented attacks that involved the use of biological agents. Nonetheless, the potential for animal rights extremists or ecoterrorists to employ biological agents should be taken seriously.

Endnotes

⁴⁵General Accounting Office, "U.S. Agriculture: Status of the Farm Sector," fact sheet for Congressional committees, GAO/RCED-95-104FS, March 1995. [BACK]

⁴⁶USDA, Agricultural Research Service, "Econoterrorism, a.k.a. Agricultural Bioterrorism or Asymmetric Use of Biological Weapons," unclassified briefing, February 28, 2000; Terrance M. Wilson et al., "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture," draft manuscript. [BACK]

⁴⁷USDA, Agricultural Research Service, "Econoterrorism." [BACK]

⁴⁸USDA, Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology, Federal Register Notice 64; USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, "Selected Farm Products--United States and World Production and Exports: 1995 to 1998," Foreign Agricultural Commodity Circular Series, no. 1124, 1999. [BACK]

⁴⁹General Accounting Office, "U.S. Agriculture: Status of the Farm Sector." [BACK]

⁵⁰USDA, Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology, Federal Register Notice 64; USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, "Selected Farm Products." [BACK]

⁵¹Wilson et al., "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture." [BACK]

⁵²Norm Steele, "Econoterrorism: U.S. Agricultural Productivity, Concentration, and Vulnerability to Biological Weapons," unclassified Defense Intelligence Assessment for the DOD Futures Intelligence Program, January 14, 2000. [BACK]

⁵³Ibid. [BACK]

⁵⁴Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

⁵⁵USDA, Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology, Federal Register Notice 64. [BACK]

⁵⁶Gorman, "Bioterror Down on the Farm." [BACK]

⁵⁷Chalk, unpublished review; Goldstein, "U.S. Could Face New Terror Tactic"; Gorman, "Bioterror Down on the Farm." [BACK]

⁵⁸USDA, Agricultural Research Service, "Econoterrorism." [BACK]

⁵⁹USDA, Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology, Federal Register Notice 64; Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

⁶⁰Michael Goldblatt, personal communication, April 6, 2000. [BACK]

⁶¹Ibid. [BACK]

⁶²Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

⁶³"Terrorists on the Green," Discover 20, no. 11 (1999), 30; Chalk, unpublished review; Rogers, Whitby, and Dando, "Biological Warfare Against Crops." [BACK]

⁶⁴Chalk, unpublished review; Goldstein, "U.S. Could Face New Terror Tactic." [BACK]

⁶⁵Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

⁶⁶Ibid. [BACK]

⁶⁷Cultural Terrorist Agency, "Genetics Activists Create Superweed Kit." [BACK]

⁶⁸MacKenzie, "Run, Radish, Run." [BACK]

⁶⁹Chalk, unpublished review; Rogers, Whitby, and Dando, "Biological Warfare Against Crops." [BACK]

⁷⁰Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

⁷¹Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Part I: Assessing the Threat," December 15, 1999; Chalk, unpublished review; MacKenzie, "Run, Radish, Run." [BACK]

⁷²Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

⁷³Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report"; Chalk, unpublished review; Goldstein, "U.S. Could Face New Terror Tactic." [BACK]

⁷⁴Wilson et al., "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture." [BACK]

⁷⁵Chalk, unpublished review; Goldstein, "U.S. Could Face New Terror Tactic"; Kadlec, "Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare"; MacKenzie, "Run, Radish, Run"; Judith Miller, "U.S. to Use Lab for More Study of Bioterrorism," The New York Times, September 22, 1999, A1, A25; Rogers, Whitby, and Dando, "Biological Warfare Against Crops"; Wilson et al. "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture"; Tabassum Zakaria, "Soviet Era Bugs Threaten U.S. Farming," The Times of India, September 16, 1999. [BACK]

⁷⁶Steele, "Econoterrorism: U.S. Agricultural Productivity, Concentration, and Vulnerability to Biological Weapons." [BACK]

⁷⁷Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

⁷⁸Floyd P. Horn and Roger G. Breeze, "Agriculture and Food Security," in Food and Agricultural Security: Guarding against Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks Affecting Health, National Food Supplies, and Agricultural Economics, eds. Thomas W. Frazier and Drew C. Richardson, Annals of the New York Academy of Natural Sciences 894 (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1999), 9-17. [BACK]

⁷⁹Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Worldwide Agricultural Biological Warfare Threat," unclassified briefing, Biological Warfare Division, Office for Counterproliferation Support, 2000; Goldstein, "U.S. Could Face New Terror Tactic"; Grant Robertson, "Crop Warfare Combat Plan Urged," Calgary Herald, August 21, 1999; USDA, Agricultural Research Service, "Econoterrorism"; Wilson et al., "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture." [BACK]

⁸⁰Chalk, unpublished review; Goldstein, "U.S. Could Face New Terror Tactic." [BACK]

⁸¹Wilson et al., "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture." [BACK]

⁸²Horn and Breeze, "Agriculture and Food Security." [BACK]

⁸³Ibid. [BACK]

⁸⁴Wilson et al., "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture." [BACK]

⁸⁵USDA, Agricultural Research Service, "Econoterrorism." [BACK]

⁸⁶Ibid. [BACK]

⁸⁷Hurlbert, "Microbiology 101 Internet Text." [BACK]

⁸⁸Wilson et al., "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture." [BACK]

⁸⁹Ronald M. Atlas, "Combating the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism," Bioscience 49, no. 6 (June 1999), 465-467; George W. Christopher et al., "Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective," Journal of the American Medical Association 278, no. 5 (August 6, 1997), 412-417; Mayer, "The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction." [BACK]

⁹⁰Carus, "Bioterrorism and Biocrimes." [BACK]

⁹¹Jonathan B. Tucker, "Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis," Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (July/August 1999), available at <http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/tucker.htm>. [BACK]

⁹²J.B. Orenstein, "Now Fear This," The Washington Post, December 26, 1999, B1. [BACK]

⁹³Alliance for America, "Bombings of Two USDA Facilities in Washington State," memorandum, July 7, 1998; Alliance for America, "Congress Holds Hearings on Eco-Terror," memorandum, July 7, 1998; "Agriculture Fears Terrorist Threats to Food Supply," Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Monthly Terrorism and Security Report 3, no. 10 (October 1999); National Animal Interest Alliance, Request for Action by the Senate Judiciary Committee of the Congress of the United States: Animal Experts Representing Livestock Production, Farming, Science and Pets to Petition U.S. Senate to Focus on Terrorism, 1999, available at <http://www.naiaonline.org>; National Animal Interest Alliance, "Terrorism Gains Momentum: Animal Rights and Environmental Criminals Use Violence to Achieve Their Ends," 1999, available at <http://www.naiaonline.org/body/articles/archives/arterror.htm>; G. Davidson Smith, "Single Issue Terrorism," Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Commentary no. 74 (Winter 1998). [BACK]

⁹⁴U.S. Department of Justice, "Report to Congress on the Extent of Domestic and International Terrorism in Animal Enterprises," September 2, 1993. [BACK]

⁹⁵National Animal Interest Alliance, "Terrorism Gains Momentum." [BACK]