Countering the Threat

Current Federal Frameworks and Initiatives

Understanding government roles and responsibilities in preparing for and responding to acts of terrorism is complicated by the fact that a plethora of Federal, state, and local agencies and programs have important, often overlapping responsibilities for activities that are directly applicable to terrorism. To begin, there is in place a substantial framework--the Federal Response Plan (FRP)--for managing Presidentially declared disasters. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (as amended by the Stafford Act in 1988) defines disaster as "all conceivable manmade or natural occurrences whose catastrophic consequences could lead to a (state) governor's request for Federal assistance."⁹⁶ Presidential declarations of major disasters or emergencies have usually been invoked for weather-related events, but a recent annex to the FRP ("Terrorism Incident Annex") now includes terrorism in the FRP framework.

While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has overall responsibility for Federal disaster assistance, FRP recognizes that local governments have the primary responsibility for preparing for and managing disasters that affect communities. FRP sets forth policies, plans, and structures by which the Federal Government "mobilizes resources and conducts activities to augment state and local response and recovery efforts."⁹⁷ FRP also clarifies the roles of 27 Federal departments and agencies in providing disaster assistance. Key areas of responsibilities and primary responsible agencies include:

• transportation (Department of Transportation)
• communications (National Communications System)
• public works and engineering (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and DOD)
• firefighting (Forest Service and USDA)
• information and planning (FEMA)
• mass care (American Red Cross)
• resource support (General Services Administration)
• health and medical services (Health and Human Services)
• urban search and rescue (FEMA)
• hazardous materials (Environmental Protection Agency)
• food (Food and Nutrition Service and USDA)
• energy (Department of Energy).

Catastrophic, highly publicized terrorist incidents (for example, the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and American Embassies in Africa, as well as the sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo in 1995) have pushed the Federal Government to develop a separate but related framework for consequence management, with specific application to WMD incidents and terrorism. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, issued in June 1995, designated the FBI as the lead Federal agency for response to domestic terrorism incidents. In 1996, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132), which established national policy to counter terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction directed against personnel. In the same year, Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-201, "Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act"), which authorizes DOD to develop a Domestic Preparedness Program to combat terrorism.⁹⁸

Building on PDD 39, President Clinton issued two new decision directives in 1998: PDD 62, "Combating Terrorism," and PDD 63, "Critical Infrastructure Protection." Establishing a new National Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure, and Counter-Terrorism in the National Security Council to coordinate the policies in both directives has effectively linked these two PDDs.⁹⁹ The structure linking PDD 62 and 63 is envisioned to provide a coordinated mechanism to address critical infrastructure protection and terrorism through three interagency groups: WMD Preparedness Group; Counter-Terrorism Security Group; and Critical Infrastructure Protection Group. In addition to the NSC, 10 Federal departments (Defense, Justice, Energy, State, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Commerce, Treasury, Interior, and Transportation) and 7 independent Federal agencies (Office of Managemýnt and Budget, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and General Services Administration) were designated responsibilities for WMD and terrorism issues.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the National Science Foundation supports major research programs that could support science-based counterterrorism initiatives. The Federal framework, under PDD 62 and 63, for national coordination for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism is presented in appendix A.

Agriculture and Food Safety was identified as one of eight subgroups in the NSC structure, with USDA in a nominal coordinating role. In addition to the framework provided by PDD 62, a number of Federal programs to coordinate efforts to combat terrorism have been established in various agencies, including:

• National Domestic Preparedness Office and the Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section (FBI)
• Office of Emergency Preparedness, National Disaster Medical System (Health and Human Services)
• Office of Emergency Response (Department of Energy)
• Defense Threat Reduction Agency (a new DOD agency reporting to the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology)
• Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Response Plan, Rapid Response Information System (RRIS)
• National Response Center and National Response Team (EPA).

Appendix C depicts Federal agencies and programs--more than 40 altogether--with responsibilities or capabilities for counterterrorism. Appendix D provides more detailed information on key Federal antiterrorism programs with specific applicability to bioterrorism and biowarfare.

Efforts to strengthen the Federal role in anti- or counterterrorism, including combating bioterrorism, have largely focused on DOD because of its specialized expertise in consequence management and unique capabilities to deter and respond to WMD attacks.¹⁰¹ In turn, DOD has enhanced its ability to work closely with civilian authorities through the creation of a Joint Task Force for Civil Support under the newly established Joint Forces Command.¹⁰² The Office of Management and Budget requested $10 billion for Federal programs to combat terrorism in the fiscal year 2000 budget.¹⁰³ Funding for fiscal year 1999 was $9.647 billion.¹⁰⁴

Preparedness for Countering Terrorism

Despite these programs, initiatives, and capabilities, there is still widespread concern that the Nation is poorly prepared to combat terrorism in general and bioterrorism in particular.¹⁰⁵ Credible observers have expressed many concerns. For instance, there is no official definition of consequence management, nor an official explication of the relationship between consequence management and disaster preparedness or response.¹⁰⁶ The Department of State (responsible for consequence management abroad) has nine separate definitions for consequence management; DOD has two; and FEMA has its own separate definition. All of these definitions "differ on the scope and type of disasters that would be addressed by consequence management."¹⁰⁷ Similarly, terminology related to terrorism is confusing and often ambiguous.¹⁰⁸ For example, there are multiple definitions among different Federal agencies and others for weapons of mass destruction, mass casualties, and terrorism.

The large and growing number of Federal agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts complicates program management and coordination. There is existing and potential overlap among programs.¹⁰⁹ Also, Congressional roles and responsibilities for counterterrorism issues are dispersed among several committees.¹¹⁰ There is no overarching strategy with a clear definition of end state to guide Federal efforts to manage potential WMD incidents.¹¹¹ Development of Federal budgets for counterterrorism has occurred in the absence of "soundly established, defined, and prioritized program requirements" that cut across agencies.¹¹²

No credible national-level risk assessment has been undertaken of potential chemical and biological terrorism.¹¹³ This lack has resulted in disagreement among authorities regarding terrorist threats and preoccupation with worst-case scenarios.¹¹⁴ Timely and accurate sharing of information about terrorist threats is impeded by national security considerations in regard to protecting classified intelligence data.¹¹⁵ While combating terrorism is a national responsibility, domestic response to emergencies is almost always a state and local responsibility. In the case of terrorism incidents, apportionment of Federal responsibilities is complicated by the complex Federal structure relating to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁶

More problematic, there has not yet been clear designation of overall Federal leadership for domestic counterterrorism. PDD 62 did establish a National Coordinator for Security, Critical Infrastructure, and Counter-Terrorism in the National Security Council. In addition, on October 8, 2001, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was sworn in as the director of a new White House Office of Homeland Security. By reporting directly to the President, the director has substantial authority to improve the focus and effectiveness of the complex Federal antiterrorism bureaucracy. However, even though a National Coordinator in the NSC and new Office of Homeland Security will bring greatly needed order to the Federal counter-terrorism structure, coordination should not be confused with leadership. Complicating matters, a number of Federal agencies have been assigned various counterterrorism leadership roles. The National Domestic Preparedness Office in the FBI has been tasked with developing a national strategy to address domestic preparedness.¹¹⁷ PDD 39 designates the FBI as the "lead Federal agency for crisis response in the event of a terrorist incident in the United States" and identifies FEMA as the "lead Federal agency for consequence management."¹¹⁸ The boundary between a crisisand a consequence management situation is, at best, diffuse.¹¹⁹ There is similar fragmented or uncertain leadership for responding to terrorist attacks on U.S. civilians or support infrastructures overseas.¹²⁰ DOD does have clear responsibility for responding to terrorist attacks on the Armed Forces and military facilities in foreign lands, but not for attacks on U.S. civilian personnel and facilities where a State Department lead is likely.

While DOD would assume primary leadership in the event of terrorist attacks on domestic military installations and personnel, probable collateral effects on civilian populations (particularly if bioweapons are employed) would necessitate shared responsibilities and close coordination with civilian agencies. Hersman and Carus point out that the DOD role in responding to terrorism is complicated by the increasingly blurred line between an act of warfare (where DOD would have lead responsibility) and an act of terrorism (where civilian agencies would have major responsibilities).¹²¹ Complicating the situation still further, responsibilities for preventing or deterring terrorism are even less well defined than for managing the consequences of terrorism.

Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism

As inadequately prepared as America is to combat terrorism in general, the Nation is even less prepared to counter terrorism directed against the food and agriculture infrastructure. Agricultural bioterrorism has gotten little attention in Federal counterterrorism initiatives.¹²² There are three principal reasons for this lack of attention. First, Americans take food for granted. With availability of abundant, safe, and affordable food the status quo for most of the 20th century, citizens find difficulty in conceiving of circumstances under which food would be scarce, expensive, or risky to consumers. Second, the national visibility of agriculture has been declining for decades. Though the United States produces more food than ever, far fewer Americans are involved in its production. Farming accounted for 2.6 percent of U.S. employment in 1998--down from 23 percent in 1929--and the number of American farms declined from 6.3 million to 2.2 million in the same period.¹²³ Finally, there is limited public or official awareness of the potential threat of bioterrorism directed against food and agriculture. Most Americans think immediately and exclusively of human diseases when considering bioterrorism.

Consequently, agriculture is not included among the eight critical national infrastructures identified in PDD 63, "Critical Infrastructure Protection."¹²⁴ Agriculture and Food Safety is identified as one of eight subgroups of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness group in the new NSC WMD and Terrorism structure established by PDD 62.¹²⁵ USDA serves as chair of this subgroup; however, this department is a relative newcomer to national security and defense structure and presently lacks requisite visibility and clout to champion greater Federal attention to countering agricultural bioterrorism.¹²⁶ Agriculture tends to be overshadowed by other terrorism issues--including cyberterrorism and nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism against humans--that already have the attention of the national defense community.

Even the catastrophic events of last September have failed to galvanize national attention to the American agriculture infrastructure. For example, a recent analysis of national vulnerability to chemical and biological attacks cited 39 articles in the popular press published since the terrorist attacks. Only one article made specific reference to potential attacks on U.S. food supplies.¹²⁷

As a result, Federal efforts to develop a strategy to counter agricultural terrorism are hindered by limited funding to date. Federal and national attention to bioterrorism has been primarily focused on potential attacks against people, resulting in substantial new resources directed to counter terrorist-initiated human disease outbreaks. For example, counterterrorism funding in the Department of Health and Human Services increased from $13.8 million in fiscal year (FY) 1997 to $160 million in FY 1999. The budget request for FY 2000 was $230 million. In contrast, the food and agriculture sector has been largely ignored so far. No funds were specifically appropriated for USDA for counterterrorism in FY 1999 or requested in FY 2000.¹²⁸ The Agricultural Research Service (ARS) requested $391 million for fiscal year 2001 to support research to combat agricultural terrorism.¹²⁹ However, ARS FY 2001 appropriations specifically designated for counterterrorism research were only $500,000.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 have resulted in one encouraging response from Congress in regard to protecting the Nation's food supplies. Senators John Edwards and Chuck Hagel recently drafted new legislation entitled "The Biological and Chemical Weapons Preparedness Act of 2001." Among bill provisions are proposed appropriations ($250 million for FY 2002 and "such sums as may be necessary through [FYs] 2003 through 2006") for the Department of Agriculture for protecting the American food supply from biological or chemical terrorism.

Need for a Coordinated National Strategy

The United States ignores the potential for agricultural bioterrorism at its peril. The relative ease of a catastrophic bioweapons attack against the American food and agriculture infrastructure, and the devastating economic and social consequences of such an act, demand that the Nation pursue an aggressive, focused, coordinated, and stand-alone national strategy to combat agricultural bioterrorism. The strategy should build on counterterrorism initiatives already underway; leverage existing Federal, state, and local programs and capabilities; and involve key customers, stakeholders, and partners. USDA should lead the development of this strategy.

USDA Leadership of a Stand-Alone Initiative

USDA should provide strong Federal leadership to develop and manage a coordinated, stand-alone interagency plan and program to combat agricultural bioterrorism. Stand-alone attention is desirable for two reasons. First, if subsumed into larger national counterterrorism programs, agricultural concerns may be buried in the enormously complex Federal counterterrorism bureaucracy and may be overshadowed by human health issues, cyberterrorism, and more conventional military threats. This concern is borne by the lack of dedicated appropriations to combat agricultural bioterrorism. Second, the U.S. food and agriculture community is clearly distinct from the medical and public health community and the traditional national defense establishment. However, stand-alone attention should not be construed as acting in a vacuum. A national program to counter agricultural bioterrorism should not only be linked to other national counterterrorism programs through the PDD 62 structure but also should involve strategic partnerships between USDA and other agencies and organizations with programs and capabilities that can contribute to the agriculture program.

While USDA chairmanship of the Agriculture and Food Safety subgroup under PDD 62 seemingly provides USDA with a mandate to exercise Federal leadership, this mandate would be strengthened by clear administration and Congressional designation of leadershipý initially through a Presidential Executive Order, and, subsequently, through legislation. Formal designation of leadership should be accompanied by a requirement for USDA to develop, within a reasonable time period, a comprehensive agricultural counterterrorism plan, involving Federal, state, and local government agencies, as well as the private sector.

There are likely to be objections to a USDA-led, stand-alone program to combat agricultural bioterrorism. Other Federal agencies may have territory concerns, especially where overlapping jurisdictions already occur (for example, food safety responsibilities in the Food and Drug Administration at the Department of Health and Human Services and in the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service). Agencies may also perceive that new funding targeting agricultural terrorism may detract from other funding initiatives. Some agencies may believe that agriculture is adequately addressed in the existing NSC antiterrorism framework, obviating the need for a separate initiative. Still others may not be convinced of a threat against agriculture--or may believe that agriculture is not a critical national infrastructure, thus not a priority for antiterrorism programs.

Other objections may come from outside the Federal government. State and local agencies with responsibilities for farm programs or public safety may not support substantial Federal involvement in what could be viewed as a regional or local issue. Agribusiness interests may oppose a counterterrorism initiative because they are not convinced of the threat, because of the potential expense to taxpayers, or because of concerns that elevated public awareness may reduce confidence in the safety of the Nation's food and integrity of its agriculture systems.

These objections can be overcome. Skepticism about the threat can be addressed by a thorough, objective threat and risk assessment that provides a sound basis for an action plan and proposed budget. Concerns about territory and competing budgets can be offset by involving all relevant agencies in a counterterrorism plan; clarifying roles and responsibilities; ensuring that budget initiatives include appropriate funding for agencies with relevant programmatic responsibilities; building strategic partnerships; and ensuring effective, ongoing communications.

USDA should lead the development of an agricultural bioterrorism strategy because it has overall Federal responsibility for food safety and security; it has a broad range of programs to deter and respond to threats against food and agriculture (including natural disease outbreaks); and it is exceedingly well-connected to the national agribusiness spectrum through an extensive network of field offices, agricultural extension specialists, research facilities, and land-grant universities. In fact, USDA may be unique among Federal agencies in its closeness to constituencies. Randall Murch, formerly of the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, appreciates these points. Dr. Murch has a background in plant pathology and is aware of the unique expertise and experience required for protection of the Nation's food and agriculture infrastructure. He is supportive of USDA providing leadership for a coordinated, interagency program to combat agricultural bioterrorism, while recognizing the challenges presented by this role.¹³⁰ The consequences of a successful terrorist attack against agriculture could be devastating--in terms of both its economic impact and the undermining of public confidence in the Nation's food supply. Given the potential risks--and the fact that the United States is inadequately prepared to deter or respond to an attack--it cannot afford not to act.

Finally, an aggressive, well-coordinated effort to combat agri-cultural bioterrorism will have substantial ancillary benefits. Many anti-terrorism actions could simultaneously help improve food safety for consumers and prevent or contain natural livestock and crop diseases, including an abundance of newly emerging diseases. Natural diseases cost U.S. agriculture billions of dollars annually. In addition, the effort will likely strengthen partnerships and improve coordination among agencies and organizatýons with responsibilities, programs, and capabilities to address a significant national threat. Because the threat is, arguably, more focused and manageable than other potential threats against the national infrastructures, an effective, coordinated program may provide a model for other counterterrorism efforts.

Relevant USDA Programs and Capabilities

USDA has substantial existing programs and capabilities that are directly applicable to combating agricultural bioterrorism. Key among these are programs in agricultural research and education, prevention and control of diseases and pests, and food safety.

Research and Education

The Agricultural Research Service (ARS) is the principal in-house research agency of USDA and is one of four agencies in the USDA Research, Education, and Economics (REE) mission area. ARS conducts research in over 100 national and international locatioýs where approximately 1,900 ARS scientists carry out close to 1,100 research projects annually. The ARS appropriation was approximately $1 billion in FY 2001. It has proactively sought to strengthen agency capacity to conduct research to combat agricultural bioterrorism. ARS administers several major facilities that conduct research on animal diseases. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located in New York state, undertakes "research and diagnosis to protect United States animal industries and exports against catastrophic economic losses caused by foreign animal disease (FAD) agents accidentally or deliberately introduced into the United States."¹³¹ PIADC research is presently focusing on Foot and mouth disease and African swine fever. PIADC is collocated with the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of USDA.

ARS also administers the National Animal Disease Center (NADC) in Ames, Iowa, the primary USDA facility for conducting research on animal diseases of economic importance to U.S. agriculture. NADC is located immediately adjacent to the APHIS National Veterinary Service Laboratories (NVSL) and the APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics (CVB). The ARS Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory (SPRL) in Athens, Georgia, is the major USDA poultry health research facility for conducting research on exotic and emerging poultry diseases.

The Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES) is the USDA research agency that provides leadership for and works closely with the land-grant university system and other research and educational institutions in agricultural research and education endeavors, including extension education. CSREES partners with approximately 75 universities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and six U.S. territories. Appropriation is approximately $1 billion in FY 2001. As part of its education mission, CSREES supports the Extension Disaster Education Network (EDEN). EDEN is a collaborative, multistate network to provide agricultural extension educators and agents with ready access and linkages to information and resources related to d/saster preparedness, recovery, and mitigation.¹³²

The Economic Research Service (ERS) is the principal intramural economics and social science research agency of the department. ERS conducts research on the efficiency, equity, and efficacy of issues related to food safety and nutrition, rural development, and the environment. Appropriation in FY 2001 was approximately $66 million.

Prevention and Control of Diseases and Pests

The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has the principal Federal responsibility for ensuring the health and care of animals and plants, including preventing and responding to outbreaks of diseases and pests affecting American agriculture. Two major divisions of APHIS--Veterinary Services and Plant Protection and Quarantine--carry out this responsibility, working closely with state and local veterinarians or plant or pest control officials. The Veterinary Services (VS) division of APHIS is resýonsible for protecting the farm animal industry, including livestock, poultry, and cultivated fish, from diseases. Personnel include veterinarians, scientists, epidemiologists, and diagnosticians. Since 1983, VS has administered a National Animal Healtý Monitoring System (NAHMS) to track the health and productivity of farm animals and establish a long-term database on American livestock and poultry diseases, disease conditions, and associated costs and production practices. NAHMS is coordinated through a Center for Animal Health Monitoring and conducted cooperatively with the farm animal industry.¹³³

Veterinary Services also administers an Emergency Programs staff that works closely with private veterinarians to prepare for and respond to exotic animal disease outbreaks. Program components include surveillance systems to detect and diagnose diseases rapidly and coordinate prompt Federal and state responses through an animal health emergency plan.¹³⁴ VS administers its emergency response program through a formal organization, the Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization (READEO). READEO works closely with state and local authorities to contain and respond to livestock disease outbreaks.¹³⁵

Veterinary Services both employs a Field Epidemiologic Data System (FEDS), which is accessible to regional and national emergency management and response personnel,¹³⁶ and operates two major laboratories that serve as principal biocontainment reference centers for contagious and virulent animal diseases. One laboratory is in Ames, Iowa (National Veterinary Services Laboratories, immediately adjacent to the ARS National Animal Disease Center); the other is on Plum Island, New York (Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, administered by ARS and co-located with the ARS Plum Island Animal Disease Center). Plum Island is the only U.S. location where studies can be,conducted on foreign animal disease agents.¹³⁷

The Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) Division of APHIS is responsible for protecting American agricultural crops and plants from the national and international spread of diseases and pests.¹³⁸ Since 1982, PPQ has conducted a Cooperative Agricultural Pest Survey that gathers information about plant diseases, weeds, insects, and other pests and compiles it in a nationwide database called the National Agricultural Pest Information System. If a foreign or exotic disease were discovered, PPQ would activate Rapid Response Teams to contain the disease. PPQ also administers the agricultural quarantine inspection (AQI) at airports, seaports, and borders. AQI is the Nation's first line of defense against the introduction of foreign diseases and pests.¹³⁹ APHIS also administers a Wildlife Services Division to manage agricultural problems, including diseases, caused by wildlife.

Food Safety

The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is the USDA agency responsible for ensuring that the Nation's meat and poultry products are safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and packaged. FSIS responsibilities are addressed in several pieces of legislation, including the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Poultry Products Inspection Act. The service shares regulatory responsibilities for food safety with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the Department of Health and Human Services. FDA is responsible for the safety of seafood, plant and dairy foods and beverages, and special nutritional products, including dietary supplements and infant formulas. FSIS also administers a number of programs to prevent or respond to outbreaks of food-borne illness.¹⁴⁰ These programs would constitute an effective framework for combating acts of deliberate food contamination by terrorists.

In 1996, FSIS implemented the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) regulatory system. This science-based system applies to slaughter and processing plants in the United States as well as in countries that export meat and poultry products to America. FSIS is expanding the HACCP program by undertaking a comprehensive farm-to-table approach to improve product safety at each step in the production, processing, distribution, and marketing process. FSIS is a partner in the Federal Food Safety Inýtiative launched in January 1997. The initiative includes improved food safety inspection and preventive measures; expanded research; development of a national early warning system for food-borne illness outbreaks; a national education campaign; and improved interagency coordination and program efficiency.

Since 1995, FSIS has been collaborating with the FDA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, state health departments, and local investigators in a new program--the Food-borne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet)--to track food-borne illness throughout America.¹⁴¹ FoodNet initially targeted seven bacterial pathogens and established seven locations across the country to monitor incidents of food-borne illness and the effectiveness of food safety programs in preventing illness.¹⁴² FSIS also administers the Animal Production Food Safety Program. This outreach and liaison program works with producers, researchers, and other relevant parties to apply scientifically based practices to the reduction of food safety risks during the raising of live food animals. FSIS is also involved with several programs to educate consumers about food safety. These programs include the dissemination of a variety of electronic and print-based information products; a USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline; the Fight BAC Campaign (a highly visible public education campaign similar to the "Smokey Bear" campaign); and participation in the Partnership for Food Safety Education, a coalition of Federal agencies, industry representatives, and consumer and public health organizations. If an incident of food contamination recalled a food product, the recall would be initiated by the Emergency Response Division (ERD) of FSIS, according to the category of risk presented by the contamination. Recalls are voluntary actions by food manufacturers or distributors, but ERD provides close oversight of recall actions.¹⁴³

In addition to the programs described above, USDA and FSIS have undertaken several steps, in partnership with the FBI, Health and Human Services, and state and local health departments, to respond to acts or threats of deliberate contamination of food, including by terrorists.¹⁴⁴ FSIS has written procedures for investigating and responding to reports of deliberately or inadvertently contaminated food. A recall may be requested (but not mandated) if warranted by the investigation. USDA also has a Food Emergency Rapid Response and Evaluation Team, chaired by the Under Secretary of Food Safety, which brings together all departmental agencies (including FSIS) that could contribute to responding to a food emergency. This team is developing a response plan for deliberate acts or threats of contamination, including by terrorists. USDA and DOD jointly planned and conducted a multi-agency exercise, in August 1999, involving Federal response to a hypothetical terrorist act of deliberate biological contamination of FSIS-regulated food.

Other Relevant USDA Programs and Agencies

A number of additional USDA agencies have relevant responsibilities and capabilities that could contribute directly to a coordinated, department-wide effort to combat agricultural bioterrorism. The Farm Service Agency (FSA) administers farm commodity prÐgrams; farm ownership, operating, and emergency loans; conservation and environmental programs; emergency and disaster assistance; and domestic and international assistance and international export programs.¹⁴⁵ A particular strength of FSA is its grassroots organization: FSA delivers services to the farming community through an extensive network of field offices, including over 2,500 USDA Service Centers and 51 offices in every state and Puerto Rico. Elected cwmmittees, comprised of local farmers, have responsibility for delivery of FSA services at the state and county level.

The USDA focal point for coordination of emergency planning and response activities, including antiterrorism activities, is the Office of Crisis Planning and Management (OCPM) under the Assistant Secretary for Administration.¹⁴⁶ The OCPM program coordinates USDA participation in the Federal Response Plan, described above, and is the department's principal contact with FEMA and other Federal departments and agencies that have emergency responsibilities. The program operates through Headquarters Agency Emergency Contacts in the 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

The Department of Agriculture has mandated responsibilities and substantial existing expertise, programs, and mechanisms in place to protect the Nation's food and agriculture infrastructure. These capabilities and networks could readily be brought to bear on combating bioterrorism because they extend to the grassroots level in virtually every county of the United States. As with natural outbreaks of livestock and crop diseases or food contamination, biological attacks will not be immediately apparent; therefore, existing frameworks for detecting, identifying, reporting, tracking, and managing disease outbreaks will have to be applied to combating agricultural bioterrorism, and appropriate responses will be formulated based on the specific pathogen, target organism, and other circumstances surrounding the attack. The key is to develop a well-coordinated strategy that leverages--to the maximum extent possible--relevant programs, capabilities, and resources across the department and Federal Government.

USDA Actions to Date

Based on intelligence reports subsequent to the Gulf War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, USDA became aware that Iraq and the former Soviet Union had active biological warfare programs directed at animal and plant agriculture and that American agricu¼tural and food supplies were potential targets of bioweapons developed by these nations and other hostile actors. Consequently, USDA has undertaken several actions to address this threat.¹⁴⁷ For instance, USDA has worked closely with intelligence agencies, including through temporary personnel details and mutually developed briefings, to clarify the extent of the threat and to expand awareness of the threat among Federal agencies and the general public. In addition, an ad hoc interagency working group has been established, with representatives from the USDA, CIA, DIA, and FBI.¹⁴⁸

A USDA interagency committee has developed a preliminary plan to provide leadership to protect the Nation's food and agriculture against terrorism. Key goals of the plan are to prevent and deter terrorism within the United States and against its interests abroad; maximize international cooperation to combat terrorism; improve domestic crisis and consequence planning and management; safeguard public safety and protect agriculture and the Nation's food supply; safeguard critical infrastructures in agriculture and the Nation's food supply system; and conduct research to enhance counterterrorism capabilities. Furthermore, USDA participates in the NSC counterterrorism structure established by PDD 62. The department chairs a subgroup on Agriculture and Food Safety under the NSC Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group. It also has established collaborative research programs with former Soviet scientists who were involved in the Soviet bioweapons programs. The collaborative research is funded by the Department of State's Biotechnology Collaborative Research Program under the Freedom Support Act. The program is a threat reduction initiative designed to provide appropriate and rewarding research opportunities to unemployed former Soviet scientists whose expertise could be directed against the United States.

In June 1999, USDA Secretary Dan Glickman established a Counterterrorism Policy Council chaired by Deputy Secretary Richard Rominger and co-chaired by Catherine Woteki, Under Secretary for Food Safety. The council serves as the USDA senior policy forum to coordinate and leverage USDA-wide counterterrorism efforts. The Agricultural Research Service developed a proposal for a $391 million funding initiative for FY 2001 for research to enhance the capabilities of U.S. agriculture to prevent, respond to, and mitigate terrorist events.¹⁴⁹ The initiative included $214 million to upgrade ARS animal biocontainment facilities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center; the Southeast Poultry Research Facility; and the Arthropod-Borne Diseases Research Laboratory (A-B DRL). Unfortunately, only $500,000 was appropriated to ARS for counterterrorism research initiatives.¹⁵⁰

Building a Strategy

The Department of Agriculture has an important opportunity to build on promising actions to date and capitalize on relevant programs and capabilities by providing strong leadership for a coordinated national strategy to combat agricultural bioterrorism, involving public and private customers, stakeholders, and partners at the Federal, state, and local levels. A comprehensive national plan to combat the threat of bioterrorism against U.S. food and agriculture must identify actions to prevent acts of terrorism in the first place and to respond to such acts if and when they do occur. Required actions cut across mission areas and capabilities of multiple Federal, state, and local agencies and organizations, and include the following measures:

Preventive Measures

• intelligence programs (identify potential threats and perpetrators; understand motivations; predict behavior; and consider preemptive action)
• monitoring programs (detect and track specific pathogens and diseases)
• targeted research (see appendix B for a description of high-priority counterterrorism research needs identified by ARS)
• moral suasion (discourage use of biological weapons)
• international treaties, protocols, and agreements (including effective verification programs)
• first-strike-deterrence strategies
• creation of agent-specific resistance in livestock, poultry, and crops
• vaccination against specific biological weapons agents
• modification, as appropriate, of vulnerable U.S. food and agriculture practices to minimize impacts of terrorist acts
• education and training of Federal, state, and local agencies in emergency drills
• public awareness via education programs.

Response Measures

• consequence management (also included in several of the following actions)
• early detection and prediction of patterns of dispersion
• early detection of specific biological weapons agents, delivery mechanisms, origins, and targets
• early management to check spread and minimize infection
• epidemiology
• treatment regimes
• casualty management (including carcass disposal and decontamination)
• diplomatic responses
• military responses
• legal responses
• economic responses
• compensation for losses
• management of economic consequences (including disruption of exports and commodity markets)
• education and training of Federal, state, and local agencies in emergency drills
• public awareness via education programs.

The strategic plan should provide a detailed action plan for each of these courses of action and a program for implementation, including time frame, milestones, specific responsibilities of involved organizations and interests, mechanisms for coordination and partnerships, budgetary requirements, and accountability mechanisms, including appropriate metrics to determine progress and success.

Key Issues to Address

In addition to identifying key actions to be undertaken in each of the areas listed above, the strategic plan should address several additional critical issues. These include linking or incorporating plan elements into the agency- and department-wide strategic plans required by the Government Performance and Review Act; defining roles and responsibilities of the private sector, including the agribusiness sector, to implement components of the plan; creating public awareness through education; and building a strong case for funding.

Leveraging and Coordinating USDA Programs

It is essential that, at the outset, the Secretary of Agriculture issue a strong and clear mandate to USDA agency heads, including specific leadership responsibilities for development of the strategic plan. The Department of Agriculture should ensure full involvement of all departmental agencies that can contribute to efforts to combat agricultural bioterrorism. The department should identify specific roles and responsibilities for all agencies, coordination mechanisms, and budgetary requirements.

Strategic Partnerships

While USDA should provide Federal leadership for a national strategy to counter agricultural bioterrorism, the department does not possess sufficient resources or the requisite range of responsibilities and capabilities to develop and implement the strategy. Instead, it must rely on strategic partnerships to accomplish this goal. A plethora of public and private organizations at the Federal, state, and local levels have responsibilities or capabilities related to protecting the Nation's food supplies. Building strategic partnerships with these interests will stimulate buy-in to the plan, facilitate consideration of different perspectives, leverage resources and capabilities across agencies, and help define specific roles and responsibilities of different organizations and agencies, thereby reducing program duplication and improving coordination.

Other Federal Agencies

Partnerships with other Federal agencies are desirable for two principal reasons: to address gaps in a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, which are not within the USDA mission areas or range of capabilities, and to leverage capabilities in other Federal agencies with capabilities already existing in USDA. With reference to gaps, there are three major functional areas where the lack of requisite mission or expertise in USDA requires that these functions be performed by other agencies, in close communication with USDA. The first is intelligence, which is properly the primary responsibility of Federal intelligence agencies, including the CIA, DIA, armed services intelligence branches, and FBI. Timely, accurate, properly evaluated, and secure intelligence is critical to deterring bioterrorism. It is equally important that relevant intelligence information be shared with USDA officials quickly enough to be useful; however, because USDA has limited experience working with intelligence agencies, and relatively few employees with security clearances, building effective partnerships between USDA and intelligence agencies will be a challenging undertaking.

The second major gap is in the area of law enforcement and criminal proceedings. The USDA Office of Inspector General has responsibilities and capabilities to investigate threatened or actual criminal actions against U.S. food and agriculture. The FDA Office of Criminal Investigations has similar responsibilities. However, law enforcement is clearly the principal responsibility of the FBI, state and local law enforcement agents, and the courts. The key to effective partnerships between USDA and these entities is good communication, both at the local level and between the USDA Office of Inspector General and the Department of Justice.

The third important gap area is international relations and diplomacy. Although the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) has some experience and capability in this area, with FAS personnel located in U.S. Embassies in many countries, this is the principal responsibility of the Department of State with support from U.S. intelligence agencies.

In addition to filling gaps in strategy, USDA should build strategic partnerships with other Federal agencies to leverage better its in-house capabilities and resources with related capabilities in other agencies and to enhance coordination of programs across agencies. There are five principal areas where this applies: research; detection, identification, and monitoring of biological agents and epidemiology; disease containment, including development and application of vaccines, therapeutics, and other treatments; consequence management, including disaster relief, financial relief, and cleanup and restoration of affected areas; education, training, and communications. Appendix C provides a framework for Federal agencies and programs that could complement USDA capabilities in these areas.

There are numerous examples of existing, successful collaboration between USDA and other Federal agencies in efforts that could contribute to counterterrorism. Key examples include the cooperative and collocated animal disease research programs of ARS and the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Maryland (APHIS is also a partner), and the cooperative efforts between USDA and HHS in the area of food safety. In recent testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Robert J. Newberry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, identified several areas in which DOD and USDA have cooperated in efforts to combat agricultural bioterrorism.¹⁵¹

Nonetheless, there is a significant opportunity to expand these partnerships, to improve coordination among agency programs with similar missions and capabilities, and to target more effectively Federal resources and capabilities to support efforts to combat agricultural bioterrorism. For example, there are substantial capabilities in the Centers for Disease Control in human disease detection and diagnosis, as well as in epidemiology, that could be brought to bear on animal diseases. There is also an opportunity for expanded collaboration between ARS, APHIS, and the Department of the Interior National Wildlife Health Center (NHWC) in monitoring diseases of domestic animals and wildlife. NHWC has been working closely with HHS in disease diagnosis and tracking and public education related to the recent outbreak of West Nile virus in New York. The DOD Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) could support research to combat agricultural bioterrorism. Reportedly, DARPA does not currently have the authority to conduct agriculture-related research.¹⁵²

State and Local Government Agencies

Because the primary responsibility for preventing and responding to acts of terrorism in the United States lies with local and state authorities, the strategic plan must address coordination and partnerships between the Federal Government agencies and those authorities. This will be facilitated greatly by the strong linkages between USDA and the state and local agriculture interests through agricultural cooperative extension programs, Farm Service Agency offices, land-grant universities, and state departments of agriculture. However, USDA will be challenged to build partnerships with state and local authorities--including public health agencies--with which it has limited experience. It will be important to work closely with other Federal agencies--such as HHS--that have closer ties to these authorities.

Private Sector

In many ways, the most important partnerships will be with the private sector, particularly with the agribusiness sector--the most likely target of a terrorist act. Active involvement of the private sector in developing and implementing the strategy will generate buy-in to the strategy, help build support for funding initiatives, and provide additional capabilities, communications networks, and site-specific disease monitoring and tracking opportunities. Most important, the private sector will ultimatelyýbe responsible for developing and implementing biosecurity measures to protect farms and agribusiness interests from acts of terrorism or to remediate the effects of terrorism if it should occur. Public-private partnerships will be essential to identify, encourage, and fund actions to deter terrorism--including improved security on farms and in businesses, revised management procedures, pathogen identification and monitoring programs, information networks, and large-scale vaccination efforts--and to manage the consequences of terrorist acts. It is encouraging to note, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, that the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Nation's largest farm group, urged the Bush administration to appoint an agriculture specialist to serve in the new Office of Homeland Security.¹⁵³

Key components of the private sector that must be involved include producers of crops, livestock, poultry, and aquaculture products. While it will be important to engage key companies possessing strategic market shares, the most effective approach will be to work with national commodity organizations that represent the broad interests of their constituencies, that have staff in place, and that are often involved in government affairs and lobbying activities. Examples of organizations representing key ýommodities include the American Soybean Association, National Cattlemen's Beef Association, American Poultry Association, American Sheep Industry Association, Catfish Farmers of America, National Corn Growers Association, National Cotton Foundation, National Livestock Producers Association, National Milk Producers Federation, and National Pork Producers Council. It will also be important to involve other agribusiness concerns, including major agribusiness companies, other trade organizations, food wholesalers and retailers, restaurants, slaughterhouses, processors, packagers, the transportation sector, feed companies, seed companies, other suppliers to the industry, and equipment manufacturers.

Other important private sector partners include the private research community, including universities (researchers from public universities and government laboratories must also be involved), private research organizations, and research divisions in agribusiness firms; professional organizations such as the American Agricultural Economics Association, American Society of Agricultural Engineers, American Society of Agronomy, American Society of Animal Science, U.S. Animal Health Association, American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, and American Veterinary Medical Association; consumer and environmental organizations; and international organizations. A comprehensive listing of potential private sector partner organizations is presented in appendix E.

Endnotes

⁹⁶Scott R. Taylor, Amy M. Rowe, and Brian M. Lewis, "Consequence Management--In Need of a Timeout," Joint Force Quarterly 22 (Summer 1999), 78-85. [BACK]

⁹⁷Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Backgrounder: Terrorism," available at <http://www.fema.gov/library/terror.htm>. [BACK]

⁹⁸General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (Fiscal Years 1995-1998)," letter report, November 20, 1998, GAO/GGD-99-7, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>; Hersman and Carus, "DOD and Consequence Management." [BACK]

⁹⁹Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Part I: Assessing the Threat," December 15, 1999, appendix A. [BACK]

¹⁰⁰Ibid. [BACK]

¹⁰¹Hersman and Carus, "DOD and Consequence Management." [BACK]

¹⁰²Ibid. [BACK]

¹⁰³Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Federal Funding to Combat Terrorism," available at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/terfund.htm>; General Accounting Office, "Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism," testimony, March 11, 1999, GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>. [BACK]

¹⁰⁴Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Federal Funding to Combat Terrorism." [BACK]

¹⁰⁵Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Part I: Assessing the Threat," December 15, 1999; "Terrorism 2000," Current Events 97, no. 24 (1998), 2a-2d; Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, "Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," report to the U.S. Senate, July 14, 1999; Jessica K. Drake, "After All These Years: Chem-Bio Defense Unequal to Threat," National DefenseW83, no. 543 (December 1998), 39; John Elvin, "Bioterrorism Breeds a Growth Industry," Insight on the News 15, no. 45 (December 6, 1999), 35; Freedberg, Serafini, and Gorman, "Be Afraid, Be Moderately Afraid"; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives"; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program," testimony, October 2, 1998, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency," letter report, November 12, 1998, GAO/NSIAD-99-3, abstract accessed at <http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov>; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs," letter report, June 9, 1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-151, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks"; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies are Poorly Managed," letter report, October 29, 1999, GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, abstract accessed at <http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov>. [BACK]

¹⁰⁶Taylor, Rowe, and Lewis, "Consequence Management--In Need of a Timeout." [BACK]

¹⁰⁷Ibid. [BACK]

¹⁰⁸Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report." [BACK]

¹⁰⁹General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program"; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Growth of Federal Programs," testimony, June 9, 1999, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, accessed at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov>. [BACK]

¹¹⁰Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report." [BACK]

¹¹¹General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency"; General Accounting Office, "Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism." [BACK]

¹¹²General Accounting Office, "Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism." [BACK]

¹¹³General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks." [BACK]

¹¹⁴Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report." [BACK]

¹¹⁵Ibid. [BACK]

¹¹⁶Ibid. [BACK]

¹¹⁷Ibid.; General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs." [BACK]

¹¹⁸General Accounting Office, "Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism." [BACK]

¹¹⁹Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report." [BACK]

¹²⁰Hersman and Carus, "DOD and Consequence Management." [BACK]

¹²¹Ibid. [BACK]

¹²²Chalk, unpublished review; Goldstein, "U.S. Could Face New Terror Tactic"; Gorman, "Bioterror Down on the Farm"; MacKenzie, "Run, Radish, Run"; Rogers, Whitby, and Dando, "Biological Warfare Against Crops"; Norm W. Schaad, "What Is an Effective Pathogen?" APSnet, Abstracts of the 1999 American Phytopathological Society Annual Meeting Symposium: Plant Pathology's Role in Anti-Crop Bioterrorism and Food Security (September 15-October 31, 1999), available at <http://www.apsnet.org/online/feature/BioSecurity/Top.html>. [BACK]

¹²³USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, "Agriculture--Farms, Acreage, and Foreign Trade: 1990 to 1998," no. 1441 (1999). [BACK]

¹²⁴The White House, White Paper: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection. [BACK]

¹²⁵Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual Report." [BACK]

¹²⁶Floyd P. Horn, statement before the U.S. Senate Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, October 27, 1999, available at <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/hearings/1999/e991027.htm>. [BACK]

¹²⁷Richard Chapman, Chemical and Biological Warfare Primer, Virtual Information Center, 2001, available at <http://www.vic-info.org>. [BACK]

¹²⁸Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Federal Funding to Combat Terrorism." [BACK]

¹²⁹USDA, Advisory Committee on Agricultural Biotechnology, Federal Register Notice 64. [BACK]

¹³⁰Randall Murch, personal communication, April 17, 2000. [BACK]

¹³¹USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, "The Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Plum Island Animal Disease Center," December 1992, available at <http://www.aphis.usda.gov:80/oa/pubs/fsfadlab.html>; USDA, Agricultural Research Service, ". . . about the Research Center at Plum Island, New York," available at <http://www.arserrc.gov/naa/home/piadc.htm>. [BACK]

¹³²Louisiana Cooperative Extension Services, "Welcome to EDEN: Extension Disaster Education Network," accessed at <http://www.agctr.lso.edu/eden>. [BACK]

¹³³USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, "Center for Animal Health Monitoring (CAHM): National Animal Health Monitoring System," available at <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cahm.htm>; USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, "Facts about APHIS: Monitoring Plant and Animal Diseases," available at <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/monitor.html>. [BACK]

¹³⁴USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, "Emergency Programs: Keeping America Free from Foreign Animal Diseases," available at <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/emergency.html>; Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

¹³⁵Ron Sequeira, "Safeguarding Production Agriculture and Natural Ecosystems against Biological Terrorism: A U.S. Department of Agriculture Emergency Response Framework," Frazier and Richardson, eds., 48-67; Anne Kohnen, "Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the USDA," BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-29 and ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000-04 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). [BACK]

¹³⁶Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

¹³⁷USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, "The Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Plum Island Animal Disease Center." [BACK]

¹³⁸USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, "Facts about APHIS: Monitoring Plant and Animal Diseases." [BACK]

¹³⁹USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, "Facts about APHIS: Excluding Foreign Pests and Diseases," available at <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/exclude.html>. [BACK]

¹⁴⁰USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service, "Agriculture Fact Book 98: Chapter 9: Food Safety," available at <http://www.usda.gov/news/pubs/fbook98/chart9.htm>. [BACK]

¹⁴¹Ibid. [BACK]

¹⁴²The program is described in detail at <http://www.fsis.usda.gov/ophs/fsisrep1.htm>. [BACK]

¹⁴³Bonnie Buntain and George Bickerton, "The U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service's Activities in Assuring Biosecurity and Public Health Protection," in Food and Agricultural Security: Guarding Against Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks Affecting Health, National Food Supplies, and Agricultural Economics. [BACK]

¹⁴⁴General Accounting Office, "Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Text Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination." [BACK]

¹⁴⁵Farm Service Agency Online, available at <http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/default.asp>. [BACK]

¹⁴⁶USDA, Office of Crisis Planning and Management, available at <http://www.usda.gov/ da/ocpm>. [BACK]

¹⁴⁷Horn, statement before the United States Senate Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. [BACK]

¹⁴⁸Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK]

¹⁴⁹USDA, Agricultural Research Service, "FY 2001 Agency Estimates: Enhancing the Capabilities of U.S. Agriculture to Prevent, Respond to, and Remediate Terrorist Events," 1999. [BACK]

¹⁵⁰Floyd P. Horn, personal communication, May 2, 2000. [BACK]

¹⁵¹Robert J. Newberry, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, October 27, 1999, available at <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/hearings/1999/e991027.htm>. [BACK]

¹⁵²Goldblatt, personal communication. [BACK]

¹⁵³Randy Fabi, "Boost Agriculture Security, Farm Groups Ask Bush," Reuters, October 2, 2001. [BACK]