Chapter Four Recommendations and ConclusionPrior to initiating development of a coordinated national strategy to combat agricultural bioterrorism, USDA must identify critical needs of such a strategy and give careful thought to an effective approach to its development. This paper provides a number of separate recommendations for Federal actions, as follows: Clear, well-coordinated Federal interagency mechanisms must be established for gathering, assessing, and sharing sensitive intelligence information on terrorist threats to U.S. food and agriculture. The information must be relevant and timely, while simsltaneously ensuring security of classified data. Proposed mechanisms must be acceptable to intelligence agencies. There should be a significant expansion of research capabilities related to animal or plant health and food safety, as well as a program focus on agricultural bioterrorism, even as it is recognized that expanded research in this area will benefit efforts in both food safety and the health of livestock, poultry, and crops. The principal target of increased funding should be USDA laboratories and programs. Expanded funding should be provided for intramural research in ARS laboratories, extramural research in universities and private laboratories through CSREES (via major research programs such as the National Research Initiative), and upgrading of laboratory facilities (see appendix B for relevant ARS research funding needs). Substantial funding should be provided to upgrade ARS and APHIS biocontainment facilities, particularly at A-B DRL, Laramie, Wyoming; FADDL and PIADC, Plum Island, New York; NADC and NVSL, Ames, Iowa, and the Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, Athens, Georgia. USDA presently has no biosafety level (BSL) 4 facilities. BSL 4 facilities are required for research on pathogens that confer highly contagious, hot diseases, including the animal diseases Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, as well as Hendrah and Nipah viruses.154 An expanded research initiative should also include economics research, coordinated by ERS. It is also important to expand research related to agricultural bioterrorism in non-USDA agencies with relevant capabilities or responsibilities, including FDA, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, and DARPA. As noted earlier, DARPA does not presently have the legislative authority to support agricultural research.155 Professional Federal staff in key areas must be expanded. For example, there is a critical shortage of qualified personnel in APHIS Veterinary Services who could readily respond to widespread disease epidemics that terrorists could initiate.156 Well-coordinated interagency mechanisms must be established among the FBI, USDA, and DOD for collaborative forensics investigations. In particular, USDA specialized expertise in pathogens and diseases affecting agriculture must be effectively married to the FBI forensics capability to ensure that credible evidence can be gathered to support convictions of terrorists.157 CDC performance plans--"Public Health Response to Terrorism" and "Infectious Diseases"--should be considered for potential applicability to a national strategic plan to combat agricultural bioterrorism.158 These CDC plans are incorporated into the overall Health and Human Services Strategic Plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act. The plans address the following Performance Measures related to bioterrorism:
Significantly, the Performance Measures related to bioterrorism either match or directly support those related to infectious diseases, and vice versa. A considerable Federal program must be initiated to expand and locate the national supply of vaccines and pharmaceuticals to protect against or treat the most likely agricultural diseases launched by bioterrorists. The initiative should include research to improve or develop new vaccines and drugs (including effectiveness against a variety of agents and shelf life extension); manufacturing and strategic stockpiling; professional training; and assurance of a surge capability to expand manufacture and distribution in a crisis. A Federally-coordinated nationwide electronic communications and data management network also must be established that links the private agribusiness community with emergency management staff, field response personnel, and key Federal, state, and local agencies. This network could facilitate pathogen monitoring, reporting and tracking diseases, and communicating response measures and their effectiveness. Chalk has recommended establishment of "emergency management control centers" that could coordinate communications and data management.159 A national emergency disease response plan should be developed and implemented.160 In 1996, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service established a Working Group on National Animal Health Emergency Management, with representatives from the Veterinary Services division of APHIS, the Animal Agriculture Coalition, the U.S. Animal Health Association, and the American Veterinary Medical Association.161 This working group could be expanded to include APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine representatives as well as key organizations and interests representing agricultural crops and could provide leadership for development of an agriculture emergency response plan. The USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) could initiate a similar program for bioterrorism targeting the food supply, building on existing frameworks such as the Food-borne Diseases Active Surveillance Network. This program, described above, is a collaborative effort of FSIS, FDA, CDC, state health departments, and local investigators to track food-borne illness throughout the United States. Emergency response plans should include provisions for training exercises with mock terrorist attacks. Coordination must be improved and clear roles, responsibilities, expectations, and performance measures must be established for Federal, state, and local organizations and interests (both public and private) that will be involved in combating agricultural bioterrorism. Chalk has concluded that, at present, there is inadequate coordination between APHIS and state and local agencies involved in animal and plant health protection.162 Clearly, there is an opportunity to improve coordination between USDA as a whole and all interests that could be affected by terrorist attacks against U.S. food and agriculture. It is particularly important to determine the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the private sector, vis-à-vis those of government agencies, in areas such as biosecurity; detection, diagnosis, tracking, and reporting of pathogens or disease outbreaks; disease containment and treatment procedures; and po isease remediation. Feasible options must be identified and investigated fully to provide financial assistance to agribusiness interests impacted by terrorism. For example, Chalk has suggested establishment of a national insurance plan "where a percentage of (agricultural) sales are held in reserve to help offset contingency costs in the event of a major or deliberate disease outbreak."163 Also, a coordinated, interagency, Federally funded professional education and training program that is related to agricultural bioterrorism must be undertaken. The program should include focused professional education to train plant pathologists, veterinarians, and other first responders in the detection, identification, diagnosis, treatment, and containment of potential bioterrorist diseases and biosecurity training for agribusinesses. In addition, a coordinated, interagency, Federally-funded public education and information initiative should be undertaken. Agriculture extension personnel and land-grant university educators should lead this effort. Public education and information programs must be carefully conceived and managed to raise public awareness without engendering public loss of confidence in the Nation's food supply. Stronger international cooperation should be encouraged to deter or respond to agricultural bioterrorism, including cooperative research and exchange programs; monitoring and identification of potential biological agents; and disease detection, tracking, and containment. For example, the Office International des Epizooties is a highly effective de facto "world animal health organization" that could include bioterrorism in its purview.164 It is also important that international agricultural interests work to ensure both that agricultural bioterrorism gets attention in the effort to strengthen the international Biological Weapons Convention and that effective verification measures are developed and implemented for biological agents of concern to food and agriculture. Sequential Approach for USDA Strategy DevelopmentThe Secretary of Agriculture appoints a small working group to develop the strategy. Michael Goldblatt, Deputy Director of Defense Sciences at DARPA, and a former director of research at McDonalds Corporation, has suggested that the development of the plan be an intense but low-profile effort.165 In his opinion, it should be undertaken by a core working group of objective, highly credible, nonagency personnel (with no vested interests), with expertise in food and agriculture.166 Key individuals from industry and both public and private organizations could serve as resource persons for the working group, which should have a strong mandate from the Secretary of Agriculture. It is important to emphasize that this group will fundamentally create a Federal strategy--that it not purport to tell state and local agencies, or the private agribusiness sector, what to do. Assess threat and risk. The next step in developing the national strategy should be a thorough assessment of the threat and risk of agricultural bioterrorism. When persons with access to sensitive information regarding the threat are convinced that it is real and substantial, they may question the need for a threat and risk assessment to confirm the obvious.167 On the other hand, the General Accounting Office has concluded that the absence of such an assessment has impeded development of a coordinated, effective, and appropriately focused strategy for combating bioterrorism in general.168 An objective assessment of the threat and risk of agricultural bioterrorism, whether it provides substantial new information, will provide a solid and credible foundation for proposed counterterrorism actions and budget requests. The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences should be tasked with conducting the assessment. An NRC report would assure objectivity and engender credibility with skeptical observers. Frame the issue properly. Development of an effective strategy to combat agricultural bioterrorism is critically dependent on asking the right questions at the outset. Goldblatt believes that, to engage fully the agribusiness sector in counterterrorism activities, it is important to focus on broad, important issues affecting food and agriculture today.169 Thus, he proposes that the following two questions be asked up front: What are the most important problems facing the food and agriculture industry today? How do we solve these problems in a way that simultaneously deters terrorism? Goldblatt suggests that the two most important problems are food safety and plant and animal diseases. Since agricultural bioterrorism is likely either to compromise food safety or to introduce catastrophic diseases, strategies to assure food safety or the health of crops and farm animals will simultaneously deter terrorism and engender support among customers and stakeholders. Identify and involve key customers, stakeholders, and potential partners (public and private) in development of the strategy. These individuals could serve as resource personnel for the working group. Review and evaluate related, relevant programs in other agencies and organizations. This issue was addressed above where it is recommended that CDC Performance Plans for "Public Health Response to Terrorism" and "Infectious Diseases" might be models for a USDA-led strategy. It is noteworthy that HHS in general, and CDC in particular, were initially slow in developing strategies to respond to bioterrorism but are now considered to be well on the way to developing highly effective interagency counterterrorism programs.170 Develop a white paper that lays out the key elements of the strategy for review and comment by stakeholders. It is important to take this step before developing a full strategic plan, not only to ensure that its proposed actions are feasible, complete, and acceptable, but also to help establish buy-in from key stakeholders. The white paper should be revised to address concerns and recommendations of the key stakeholders, then shared with the Secretary of Agriculture for review, comment, and approval. Draft a complete strategic plan, including an implementation plan and timetable. Development of a full strategic plan, incorporating the elements of the white paper, should be the responsibility of USDA personnel, designated by the secretary, in cooperation with designated representatives of other Federal agencies with relevant capabilities, programs, and responsibilities. It is important that the strategic plan is consistent with and meshes well with the overall USDA strategic plan and individual USDA agency plans, as mandated by the Government Performance and Review Act. The plan should identify implementation actions, timetables for implementation, budget requirements, performance measures, and accountability mechanisms. The plan should address each of the Preventive Measures and Response Measures identified above, as well as roles and responsibilities, opportunities for strategic partnerships, and coordination issues. Develop a budget. Paying for implementing the national strategy will be a significant challenge--perhaps the key issue in the entire process. It is particularly important that new, sustained funding be secured--to require agencies to reallocate existing budgets would inevitably affect performance in core mission areas. Securing funding for a new Federal program is difficult under any circumstances. Resources are invariably short, and competition among agencies and Congressional committees for control of scarce resources exacerbates the problem. The challenge to secure new funding to combat agricultural bioterrorism is especially daunting because agriculture is a relatively minor player in the national security establishment in general and in the counterterrorism arena in particular. To overcome this challenge, it is important that a budget to prevent and respond to agricultural bioterrorism be developed and presented as an interagency initiative. The proposed budget should identify appropriate levels of new funding for all Federal agencies that have roles to play in implementing the national strategy. It should also emphasize strategic partnerships among agencies that will reduce püogram overlap and duplication and effectively leverage appropriated resources. This approach will not only enhance collaboration among agencies but also encourage non-USDA agencies to champion the budget proposal. It is also important that key representatives of the agribusiness community strongly endorse the proposed budget. For example, the National Pork Producers Council has already identified the need for expanded research to deter agricultural bioterrorism as its highest research priority.171 Sell the plan. Once a draft of the strategic plan has been completed and accepted by the designated Federal team, it must be sold to the current administration (via the Office of Management and Budget) and to Congress. It will be important to enlist key, selected stakeholders in this effort to provide confidence that the proposed plan is acceptable to, and endorsed by, the agribusiness community and state and local organizations that will play a key role in plan implementation. ConclusionThe consequences of a biological attack against U.S. food and agriculture could be devastating--in terms of both economic impact and the undermining of public confidence in the Nation's food supply. USDA should provide strong leadership for a coordinated Federal interagency strategy and program to combat agricultural biowarfare or bioterrorism. The strategy and program must address coordination and strategic partnerships with all agencies, organizations, and private interests that have relevant roles, responsibilities, or stakes in program outcomes. The program will not be cheap--an investment of several hundred million dollars is needed. However, given the potential risk and the fact that the United States is ill prepared to deter or respond to an attack, it cannot afford not to act. An aggressive, well-coordinated effort to combat agricultural bioterrorism will have substantial ancillary benefits. Many antiterrorism actions could simultaneously help prevent or contain natural livestock and crop diseases, including a plethora of newly emerging diseases. Natural diseases cost U.S. agriculture billions of dollars annually. In addition, the effort could improve the safety of America's food, already an important national priority. Finally, this initiative will strengthen partnerships and improve coordination among agencies and organizations with responsibilities, programs, and capabilities to address a significant national threat. Perhaps, because the threat is more focused and manageable than other potential threats against the Nation's infrastructures, an effective, well-coordinated program may provide a model for other counterterrorism efforts.
154Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK] 155Goldblatt, personal communication. [BACK] 156Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK] 158Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Performance Plans, IV: Infectious Diseases," accessed at <http://www.cdc.gov/od/perfpln/2000iv.htm>; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Performance Plans, XIV: Public Health Response to Terrorism," accessed at <http://www.cdc.gov/od/perfpln/2000xiv.htm>. [BACK] 159Chalk, unpublished review. [BACK] 164Wilson et al., "A Review of Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture." [BACK] 165Goldblatt, personal communication. [BACK] 167Murch, personal communication. [BACK] 168General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessment of Chemical and Biological Attacks"; General Accounting Office, "Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism." [BACK] 169Goldblatt, personal communication. [BACK] 170Murch, personal communication. [BACK] 171Horn, statement before the United States Senate Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee; Norm Steele, personal communication, March 22, May 24, 2000. [BACK] |
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