



Camp Alicia, Bosnia.

55th Signal Company (Alejandro Francisco)

WANTED:

A NATO Logistics Headquarters

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When the Berlin Wall fell, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) suddenly lacked a threat against which to defend. It needed new roles. With some states redrawing their borders and mounting ethnic friction—cracks in the new world order—NATO has come under pressure to respond. Alliance initiatives have yielded MC 319, a mutually supporting logistics agree-

ment, and the combined joint task force (CJTF), a command and control element.

As new roles surface for NATO, so too do shortfalls in its ability to execute them. Initial efforts have proven inadequate in terms of logistics, reflecting a lack of doctrine to enable the Alliance to react flexibly and sustain deployments outside its operational area. This flaw is exacerbated by the absence of an organization to integrate logistics from planning through execution.

While NATO was seeking to stabilize European security, the United Nations became fully engaged in peace operations on the margins. As political changes in Europe became more volatile

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the United Nations could not cope with the situation and increasingly looked to NATO. There was rising anticipation in autumn 1992 that the world organization would either engineer a peace plan in the former Yugoslavia or require a tactical withdrawal of its troops. Both needed NATO help.

After the initial Balkan tragedy, the Alliance sent mixed signals on possible involvement in a peacekeeping mission under U.N. stewardship. In February 1993, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) established a CJTF at Kelly Barracks, Germany, for this purpose. Its headquarters was later collocated with the commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Command (AFSOUTH) in Naples. An ad hoc organization, it mainly represented U.S. component commands in Europe.

Extracting the U.N. Force

The personnel drain on component commands for CJTF support was extreme, particularly in the case of key leadership positions in the areas of logistics and command and control. This led EUCOM to request relief from the Joint Staff. In

response the Army provided a senior AFSOUTH logistician to develop a plan for NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia. Then peace initiatives in the Balkans dissipated and NATO involvement waned. The CJTF

staff was reduced and a wait-and-see attitude arose over atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, possible U.N. success, and future NATO involvement.

Possible NATO involvement in the Balkans warmed up again in early 1995. Concern over a first out-of-sector deployment became prevalent as troubling reports emanating from the former Yugoslavia reached AFSOUTH headquarters. As anxiety mounted, conferences and exercises were conducted at headquarters to address the deteriorating situation.

The growing anxiety led AFSOUTH to reconvene an ad hoc logistics planning staff. The notion of a CJTF had dissipated and a new organizational arrangement, the commander for support (C-SPT), was established to direct logistical planning. The mission was to develop a viable plan to extract some 50,000 U.N. troops from the former Yugoslavia using NATO military assets.

The magnitude and complexity of the effort became clear during an AFSOUTH simulation exercise held in February 1995 at the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Warrior Preparation Center (WPC) at Ramstein. The tactical implications of inserting 40,000 NATO troops in order to secure

and stabilize the theater prior to removing the combined 90,000 NATO-U.N. force were apparent, but the sleeper was the enormity of the logistical effort. The simulations indicated only one NATO nation was capable of ensuring a successful outcome. By consensus the United States would take the lead in developing a NATO logistics plan.

Coalescing a multinational team was critical since there was no written mission statement, doctrine, or resources (people, funding, and equipment). The fact that the timeline was ill-defined exacerbated the situation, and it was unclear who would be ultimately involved. NATO militaries showed respect for the challenge of the operation and confidence that American logisticians could master it. From a practical standpoint they sensed the need to be part of the planning process.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was briefed on the WPC exercise. Key points regarding the magnitude of the logistics effort led the Army to authorize a hand picked initial staff of 15 to 20 to support C-SPT logistics planning. The decision by the Chief of Staff to accept responsibility for the initial staffing was opportune and started the planning ball rolling.

Extraordinary People

It took several days to select the logistics planning team. It was apparent early on that junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers with solid functional skills were needed. There was no demand for multifunctional experts below the grade of O-6, and only four U.S. colonels were required: a chief of staff and officers to head the movements control, medical control, and logistics operation centers.

An urgent call for the most capable personnel to support NATO appealed to many officers and noncommissioned officers. As a result, most of the captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels requested by name were obtained. Their commanders deserve credit since they were left to carry on despite major voids in their organizations.

The team assembled in Naples in March 1995, essentially with continental U.S. (CONUS) and EUCOM personnel. Local constraints meant space was limited in the AFSOUTH compound, but it was enough to get started. Briefings from AFSOUTH staff agencies and discussing general AFSOUTH and NATO expectations consumed the first few days. As planning unfolded, C-SPT needed more working space as well as better travel options and accommodations. Since Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) together with most of its subordinate headquarters, Alliance national capitals, and many transportation hubs and arteries are located north of the Alps, it was economical to ask NATO to sponsor C-SPT headquarters at Allied Forces

growing anxiety led Allied Forces Southern Command to reconvene an ad hoc logistics planning staff



U.S. Air Force (Jeffrey Allen)

C-130s on flight line, Joint Endeavor.

Central Europe (AFCENT) in Brunssum, Netherlands. NATO concurred and AFCENT accommodated C-SPT, going an extra step by providing space, equipment, and people to assist with functional areas, in particular office administration and automation repair and maintenance.

As a game plan was pieced together, nurtured by consultations with NATO commands and nations, it became apparent to members of the Alliance that this was an opportunity to learn from American experience and become knowledgeable in the complex world of multinational logistics. An urgent call to SHAPE for more assets to augment the meager C-SPT staff brought another 20 people. The staff was small yet outstanding and multinational, totalling 40 individuals with equal numbers from the United States and from other NATO countries. The commander for support had a skilled and ready core.

Putting together a NATO support extraction plan surfaced additional issues that required constant attention. Given potential logistical contributions, member nations examined their ability to support NATO fiscal and troop requirements. Interpretation of national responsibilities pursuant to existing Alliance policy (such as MC 319) was disparate. Many members realized they lacked an expeditionary logistics capability which imposed greater reliance on the United States, United Kingdom, France, and contractors. Recognizing that logistical shortfalls would directly influence tactical intentions, it was important that the collective logistics efforts coalesce.

Each minister of defense, chief of defense staff, and major NATO commander was briefed. Frequently members of the C-SPT staff from the nation being visited gave the actual presentation. This increased interest in the plan and enhanced the visibility of the briefer. Giving each nation or its players their due proved valuable. Discussing plans early with the governments and militaries of member nations influenced their decisions to assign quality people to the team. The commander for support also worked closely with the Allied Ready Reaction Corps (ARRC), both a principal customer and tactical headquarters directly responsible for the operation, to insure that everything was being done to facilitate the difficult corps mission.

One Team, One Mission

Synergy and output were helped by a decision to billet everyone together. Moreover, since all personnel received per diem, quality-of-life issues were a minor factor. Everyone, regardless of nationality, command, or service, lived in the same hotel. A family spirit was fostered. The effort was focused on logistical success in an out-of-sector mission. The commander for support was dedicated to the endeavor and realized the EUCOM motto of one team, one mission.

Output increased as the group matured and plans for the extraction took shape. The C-SPT staff was well versed in computer skills, and automation needs increased exponentially as planning advanced. Using AFCENT funding, CINCAFCEM satisfied the immediate C-SPT needs, often to the chagrin of his staff. The response to requests was extremely positive as evidenced by an unselfish view of the challenges confronting NATO, especially in logistics. For the commander for support, CINCAFCEM was the right person in the right place at the right time.

NATO logistical obligations and responsibilities became clear as the extraction plan evolved and even more time was spent with ARRC. A mutual confidence developed between headquarters, and the respective commanders were in total agreement on how to support the corps.

It was a proud day in May 1995 as the first out-of-sector logistics plan to deploy, sustain, extract, and redeploy a combined U.N./NATO force was completed. It gave the C-SPT full command and control over theater logistics forces. He traveled throughout the NATO community to gain approval of the plan from its ministers of defense, chiefs of defense staff, and major NATO military commanders. Then, as the plan received AF-SOUTH concurrence, diplomatic posturing indicated that it would be prudent to temporarily shelve it, dismiss the team (but on a short string

USNS Leroy R. Grumman
(foreground) in Adriatic Sea.



U.S. Navy (Chris Vickers)

Unloading British
vehicles from Russian
ship in Split, Croatia.



55th Signal Company (Brian Gavin)

for recall), and await the order for possible execution. While the plan was approved by SHAPE, Alliance members unfortunately were unwilling to provide resources to execute it. Nevertheless, the planning process was useful for the C-SPT staff.

Multinational Logistics

Creating an ad hoc logistical planning headquarters is complex. On the multinational level culture, language, service parochialism, and political reality must be addressed before any planning is initiated. Avoiding potential rifts among staff members starts with a degree of control over the national processes

that supply personnel to a headquarters. In this case the Alliance recognized that the United States had state-of-the-art expertise in logistics and members wanted to profit from it. Getting other nations to assign quality people was thus not an issue. C-SPT headquarters received the best and brightest and, in turn, produced highly skilled multinational logisticians.

NATO members, particularly Britain, France, and Germany, seemed more interested in the logistical plan than the United States and more eager to provide personnel and resources to develop the Alliance logistical solution to NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Their intent was to allow as many individuals as possible to gain experience in multinational logistics. Their senior military leadership was directly and intimately interested in every aspect of plan development and the rationale behind it. Except for the response by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to EUCOM for personnel relief, senior U.S. leaders showed little interest in the strategy or concept of the NATO logistical plan. That indifference was not lost on members of the Alliance, and its impact on our ability to influence NATO logistical planning in the future remains to be seen.

Marketing the organization and mission on the highest national military level from the start is essential to obtaining quality personnel. Those assigned to the organization must have functional expertise to ensure credibility, an imperative for any multinational success. Logistical functionality saves time, money, and anguish and expedites plan completion and approval. It is important to ensure that assigned personnel also have computer talents. As a result of this effort and the creation of the commander for support, NATO/SHAPE has a real architecture for multinational logistics.

Assigned staff members should be housed under one roof to build an organization that gets synergy from the sum of its parts. This will help ensure that the team focuses entirely on the mission and is not encumbered by petty squabbles. Billeting everyone together will also facilitate security, transportation, dining, and productivity while reducing cost.

Counting on improvisation to succeed next time is a risk. Ad hoc multinational logistics begins from a standing start—without doctrine, staff, or resources—and it is all uphill from there. A standing multinational logistical headquarters, with people, funding, and equipment to develop doctrine and to prepare and execute logistical plans, will reduce the deleterious effect of ad hoc-ery. Today there is a nucleus of trained multinational logisticians to staff such a headquarters. It would be a shame to squander it.

The quick implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords is arguably attributed to the fact that NATO had the nucleus of a logistics headquarters available. The importance of that capability was demonstrated by recalling the staff of the commander for support to plan and execute logistics for Joint Endeavor. The range of responsibilities undertaken by the C-SPT headquarters on recall has proven the value of having a standing NATO logistics headquarters. **JFQ**

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