

CAMPAIGNING IN THE BALKANS

A Review Essay by

MICHAEL C. DESCH

Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat

by Wesley K. Clark

New York: Public Affairs, 2001.

512 pp. \$30.00

[ISBN: 1-58648-043-X]

War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals

by David Halberstam

New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.

543 pp. \$28.00

[ISBN: 0-7432-0212-0]

Two books on war in the 1990s, which deal with events before September 11, 2001, may appear to be accounts of a time when Presidents had the luxury of focusing on domestic issues and dabbling in international affairs. If that is true, *Waging Modern War* by Wesley Clark as well as *War in a Time of Peace* by David Halberstam will fade into memory. But that fate is unlikely since the conflicts of the recent past were not aberrations but harbingers of a new era.

In presenting a military view of Bosnia and Kosovo, Clark contrasts traditional wars of the 19th and 20th centuries with modern wars. The former were waged for territory and survival of states, fought by conscripts, animated by nationalism, and conducted by regimes which sought decisive victory over other nation-states. Modern wars, by contrast, are rarely about the control of territory or the survival of states. They are waged not with vast armies of conscripts but rather with small professional forces. They are often asymmetric, pitting different sorts of forces against each other. They divide rather than unify states, and victory is at best ambiguous and often highly qualified.

Clark is a practitioner and not a theorist, however, and his object is recounting the modern wars in which he participated. What is so striking about his book, compared with the traditional memoir, is that much of the fierce combat he



encountered was not on the battlefields of the Balkans but in the halls of the Pentagon. Indeed, modern war is deeply divisive not only between countries but within them. This was not just true in Bosnia and Kosovo, which were torn apart by ethnic conflict, but in the U.S. Government—especially the Armed Forces, which could never fully come to grips with waging modern war.

Clark broke ranks with his comrades and embraced an activist U.S. policy to counter Serb aggression in Bosnia and Kosovo. He started out like most the Army leadership as a skeptic over the sort of limited warfare and nation-building that civil war in the Balkans required. Vietnam lay as heavily on his soldiers as it did on the rest of his cohort. But something changed in his attitude. Perhaps it happened on a mountain road in Bosnia when he lost three colleagues in an accident or maybe in one of the seemingly endless late night confrontations with Slobodan Milosevic during the Dayton process. Whenever he changed, Clark gradually became a rare bird: a military hawk on the Balkans.

It is striking that *Waging Modern War* offers few details on the campaign against the Serbs over Kosovo. The book largely consists of a report on bureaucratic struggles between Clark—as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe—and most of the defense establishment. It is told with an amazing lack of rancor, given the intensity of institutional strife. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the battle between the theater commander and the Pentagon was waged with a ruthlessness that reflected the

ethnic conflict in Kosovo. The reason for this exchange was simple: Clark challenged an article of faith, that the post-Vietnam military would not “acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons.” As a result, his colleagues increasingly shunned him for being too close to interventionist administration officials like Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright. So intense was the animus that Clark was rewarded for winning the modern war in Kosovo by being replaced by an officer who was more in sync with the Pentagon ethos.

While Clark deals with the politics of waging modern war within the military, Halberstam looks at the battles that played out in the Government as a whole. These politics turned Clausewitz on his head. Again, the chief adversaries are not so much the butcher of Belgrade or Haitian junta but members of the bureaucracy both in and out of uniform.

Halberstam portrays modern war as a contest between hawks in Foggy Bottom and doves across the Potomac. Even before Clinton campaigned on an interventionist platform in 1992 over Sarajevo, voices at the Department of State were calling for a forceful response to ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. Not surprisingly, given the account Clark provides, their chief enemies were members of the military who wanted to avoid what they viewed as the Balkan quagmire. To be sure, this version is somewhat simplified: many civilians in the first Bush administration and on

Michael C. Desch is the author of *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*.

Capitol Hill shared the reluctance of the military on waging modern wars. Nevertheless, the story in *War in a Time of Peace*, especially after 1992, is primarily about how modern war affected civil-military relations.

Two figures stand out in this context. General Colin Powell played a straightforward role as Chairman. But whereas Clark broke with conventional wisdom, Powell epitomized it. In fact, the principle that force should be used decisively and in defense of vital interests was originally his doctrine. Both on and off active duty, Powell was a major combatant on the domestic front in the wars of the 1990s. According to Halberstam, the other figure, William Clinton, was a reluctant warrior who is portrayed as caught between the interventionists in his camp and the skeptics in the military and on Capitol Hill. Modern war was a contest for the heart and mind of the President; the interventionists got his heart, the skeptics his mind.

Certainly, Clinton was not out front. When push came to shove, he appeared to side with the Pentagon doves on the use of force in the Balkans. But perhaps his heart was not really in it, as Halberstam and others believe, and Clinton wanted to devote himself to domestic politics, like another reluctant warrior, Lyndon Johnson. That is one plausible explanation. Another is that he was actually with the humanitarian hawks, which explains his bellicose words on the campaign trail and his propensity to appoint interventionists like Anthony Lake, Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, and Wesley Clark to

key posts in his administration—but that he understood it would be impossible to prevail in bureaucratic confrontation with military professionals. Maybe the story will become clear when the former President publishes his memoirs.

But what does all this reveal about the nature of war after September 11, 2001? Surely the bureaucratic infighting and civil-military skirmishing has subsided and the war on global terrorism is being conducted within a more traditional framework. After the direct attacks on the homeland, one might expect an end to the petty bickering of the 1990s. But that is not a sure thing.

Terrorism has all the hallmarks of modern war. It does not involve national survival, nor is it about controlling territory. It will not be fought with large national armies, but rather with small elite forces. Since this war is likely to have a major political component, including nation-building, it has generated intense debate on how it is to be waged. Finally, as in most modern wars, we may win battles in Afghanistan and elsewhere but it will be difficult to be sure when we have won the global war on terrorism. For the foreseeable future, we are likely to face modern wars rather than traditional wars, so the experience of the 1990s will be relevant for decades. *Waging Modern War* and *War in a Time of Peace* should be read not only as chronicles of a unique period in American history, but as previews of the bureaucratic skirmishes ahead as the Nation wages the modern wars of the 21st century. **JFQ**

THE OUTLOOK FOR AIR WARFARE

A Book Review by

MARK CLODFELTER

The Transformation of American Air Power

by Benjamin S. Lambeth
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000.
320 pp. \$29.95
[ISBN: 0-8014-3816-0]

As Benjamin Lambeth states in *The Transformation of American Airpower*: “Operation Desert Storm was a watershed event in modern American military history.” For the author, the Persian Gulf War changed airpower from a force geared towards either nuclear war or support of the Army to one that could achieve independent strategic effects in a conventional conflict by attacking enemy military capabilities. He argues that this transformation should have a profound impact on how the United States fights in the future.

Transformation hinges on many factors. Stealth, high accuracy from standoff ranges, and information dominance are cornerstones. A new mindset is essential—one that no longer assumes strategic attacks are raids on industrial or leadership targets, but rather on the key assets of fielded forces. That mindset contends that the concept of airpower as only a supporting element of ground forces no longer applies, given the technological wizardry that now enables the Air Force to shape the deep battle. In addition, according to Lambeth, transformation is predicated on fighting a major theater war against a conventional enemy which employs armor and mechanized forces.

The underlying thesis in *The Transformation of American Airpower* also defines military aviation broadly—as a blend of hardware and intangibles such as doctrine, concepts of operation, training, tactics, leadership, adaptability, and experience. Spacepower falls under this definition of airpower, and Lambeth devotes a chapter to “The Synergy of Air

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Clodfelter, USAF (Ret.), is the author of *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*.

Look for
Joint Force Quarterly
on the Joint Doctrine Web site

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm

B-2 bomber.



2nd Marine Division (Craig J. Shell)

and Space.” He further claims that airpower is inseparable from battlespace information and intelligence. Lastly, the author does not limit himself to the Air Force. “Airpower, properly understood, knows no color of uniform.” He gives considerable attention to the development of air components within the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps following the Vietnam War.

For airpower professionals and novices alike, there is much that is good, indeed superb, in this book. The chronological review of American airpower since Vietnam is masterful. Relying on a mix of primary and secondary sources as well as his own expertise as a defense analyst who has logged 280 flights in 35 types of aircraft, Lambeth spins a narrative that reads easily. While much of his work highlights technological developments, he adroitly explains the essence of new capabilities without getting mired in mind-numbing detail. The book is organized logically in broad chapters with a liberal use of subheadings to make the text readily accessible. These include “Red Flag and Its Offshoots” and “Tank Plinking and Its Impact” in the chapter on Desert Storm, and “The Promise of Space Power in New Era Warfare” and “Stray Weapons and the Loss of Innocents” in the chapter on Kosovo.

The author complements solid organization and clear style with an argument that is even-handed and well-reasoned. He takes pains to present both sides of an issue. On Vietnam he states: “There is no denying that the American defeat in Southeast Asia was, first and foremost, a product of a flawed strategy and a lack of abiding national commitment and purpose.” Then he adds: “. . . U.S. air operations throughout most of the war also leave little room for doubt

that there were significant deficiencies in the character of the American air weapon, in the appropriateness of its use in many cases, and in the organization and ability of its wielders to make the most effective use of it.” Lambeth is mindful of the Army view in the debate over roles and missions after Kosovo: “The problem is not simply one of petty bickering over rice bowls, as interservice rivalry is so often portrayed as being, but rather one of honest disagreement among professionals who find themselves viewing the world through very different perceptual filters.”

Yet the filters used by Lambeth for both Vietnam and Kosovo call into question the ultimate viability of his transformation thesis. He says that his analysis “concentrates on airpower’s combat potential in major theater wars, as opposed to smaller-scale operations and irregular conflicts such as urban combat, since it is the former situations in which airpower has registered its greatest effects and is most likely to prove pivotal in determining combat outcomes.” Then he devotes part of his book to Vietnam, particularly the predominantly guerrilla war from 1964 to 1968. He also devotes a long chapter to Kosovo, which he acknowledges was fought by a dispersed enemy that waged irregular warfare in which only a few troops could terrorize a village with ethnic cleansing.

The author admits that many factors were likely key in the decision by Slobodan Milosevic to capitulate, and that the most discomfiting factor “may well have been what he perceived, rightly or wrongly, to have been the prospect of an eventual NATO ground intervention of some sort.” Yet he contends that “the campaign’s successful

outcome despite its many frustrations suggested that U.S. airpower may now have become capable enough to underwrite a strategy of incremental escalation irrespective of the latter’s inherent inefficiencies.” He continues,

What made the gradualism of Allied Force more bearable than that of the earlier war in Vietnam is that, in the more recent case, the Allied advantages in stealth, precision stand-off attack, and electronic warfare meant that NATO could fight a one-sided war against Milosevic with near impunity and achieve the desired result even if not in the most ideal way. That was not an option when U.S. airpower was a less developed tool than it is today.

The implication is that the transformation of airpower has made it a valuable instrument in all wars, not just major theater contingencies.

Such assertions give a polemical character to *The Transformation of American Airpower* similar to the writing of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell, which Lambeth decries throughout this book. But he does not subscribe to the strategic ring theory developed by John Warden. He continually faults Warden for his focus on bombing so-called *center ring* targets like leadership, infrastructure, and modes of production, and insists that such attacks are only of marginal benefit to an air campaign. Instead, he calls for attacks on military capabilities—particularly fielded forces—a thesis found in *Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War* by Robert A. Pape. Lambeth only disagreed with the belief that attacks against fielded forces yield the greatest dividend. While Pape labels such attacks as tactical, they are strategic according to Lambeth, and *strategic bombing* is an invalid concept that distorts the strategic effects which airpower may have against virtually any target.

One might add that the ultimate strategic goal of defeating enemy military capabilities is far more likely to be obtained under the author’s original assumptions and if potential enemies wage major theater war with armor and mechanized forces. In the final analysis, it is not that American airpower has been transformed; rather its overwhelming advantages have transformed the type of war an enemy will fight against the United States into one that minimizes air assets. Doubtless Lambeth is correct in asserting that airpower “has fundamentally altered the way the U.S. might best fight any major wars over the next two decades.” But the best way may not conform to what the other side presents. **JFQ**

A PRUSSIAN GUIDE TO DIXIE

A Book Review by
HOLGER H. HERWIG

A Prussian Observes the American Civil War: The Military Studies of Justus Scheibert

edited by Frederic Trautmann
Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2001.
272 pp. \$34.95
[ISBN: 0-8262-1348-0]

The Civil War occurred during a decade of violence in Europe that began with the Franco-Italian war against Austria in 1859 and ended with the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. It also came at a time of intense debate over the relative merits of rifled versus smooth-bore artillery and the efficacy of brick and masonry forts versus earthen entrenchments. Thus it was not surprising that Prussia dispatched a young captain of engineers, Justus Scheibert, to observe the war in America.

Scheibert originally arrived in New York but chose not to observe Union forces, in which some 200,000 German-born soldiers served. Instead, he entered the South covertly from Nassau on a blockade runner because his country was anxious to avoid recognition of the Confederacy by sanctioning an official mission. Over seven months in 1863, Scheibert came to know Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and Jeb Stuart. He witnessed 14 engagements and also fought alongside another German, Heros von Borcke, at Brandy Station. He saw the Army of Northern Virginia in action at Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and Charleston.

A Prussian Observes the American Civil War presents two works by Scheibert: *The Civil War of the North American States* and *Cooperation between Army and Navy: A Study Illustrated by the War for the Mississippi, 1861–1863*. According to the editor, Frederic Trautmann, neither has previously appeared in English.

Scheibert offers detailed accounts of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, and medical units as well as naval forces. This gives him claim to being the most

Holger H. Herwig is Canada research chair in military and strategic studies at the University of Calgary.



Foreign observers in Falmouth, Virginia.

National Archives

competent foreign observer of the war. With regard to strategy, operations, and tactics, which are lumped together, Scheibert distinguished three separate phases of combat. The opening campaigns of the Civil War up to Bull Run (1861) consisted of isolated and disjointed skirmishes fought at great distances and noted for uninspired leadership and lack of discipline. The second phase (1862–63) saw the emergence of linear tactics in which armies were deployed in two or three lines with skirmishers well in advance. The third phase (1863–65) was dominated by tactical defensive, what Scheibert called “workaday warfare” featuring “shovel and axe.” Shock tactics remained the “fundamental principle of cavalry combat,” in which the Confederates excelled because of their hunting tradition. Union cavalry was little more than mounted infantry that eventually succeeded under Philip Sheridan due to mass.

As an engineer, Scheibert reported in full on artillery and fortifications. He was impressed by the range and accuracy of the rifled siege guns fielded by the Union as well as by the efficacy of earthen bombproof quarters of the kind the Confederates used at both Fort Wagner and Charleston. The day of brick and masonry forts had been eclipsed. Moreover, barrier forts and fortified cities instilled a stifling defensive mentality in the troops, as Scheibert noted at Vicksburg and the French would corroborate at Metz and Sedan in 1870. The offensive

was critical and generalship was the crux of strategy. Lee taught Scheibert the value of temporary field fortifications after Gettysburg. From the North, perhaps the most important lessons for a European were field hospitals, transport, and excellent railways, which Prussia would emulate in 1866.

Scheibert was most impressed by the Mississippi River campaign, which he studied from official dispatches. It was an example of unparalleled combined operations across an area the size of western Europe, from north to south. After the initial Union failure to storm Island Number 10, the campaign illustrated how naval forces could suppress land batteries, transport both troops and supplies, and accord armies mobility previously

Missing an issue?

Copies of back numbers of *JFQ* are available in limited quantities to members of the Armed Forces and public institutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the address or FAX number listed on the masthead.

unknown over such vast distances. Naval power enabled the deployment of amphibious forces at will. "Success and victory," Scheibert concluded, "come with coordination, interaction, collaboration, and teamwork."

As a historian, Scheibert, like many European observers of the Civil War, was enraptured by the myth of the Old South. "I fought for the South and believed in it body and soul." The Confederate officer was "a born leader, soldier, and manager" who learned by "bossing Negroes in numbers." Born of "austere Old English" stock, his upbringing made him "physically, mentally, and morally fitter than Yankees reared in cities." He despised careerism and was devoted "to the Cause." A "vital Christianity" and "moral code of rectitude" allowed him to match an enemy three times as strong. The Union, on the other hand, was driven by "Yankee traders" who "regarded everything as a business deal." Supply and demand, "mathematical combinations," and "technical science" ruled their hearts and souls. They eventually won because they "could muster manpower beyond measure, hordes." For the Confederacy, war was an art; for the Union, it was a science.

This book has all the advantages and drawbacks of all contemporary accounts. It is written with passion. It conveys a gripping sense of the men and the times in which they fought. It offers an outsider's view of an intrinsically American event, and places it in a European context. On the other hand, it lacks real objectivity. The perspective of *A Prussian Observes the American Civil War* is Virginia in general and the Army of Northern Virginia in particular.

Scheibert attributes changes in Confederate operations more to numerical inferiority than to the increasing effect of firepower. He remained wedded to the offensive and refused to accept the final phase of the workaday war at Cold Harbor (shovel and axe) as a harbinger of things to come. Although he recognized Northern superiority in manufacturing, he clung to a romantic belief that Southern psychological treasures could overcome mass and machines.

The translation by Trautmann is first rate. He has untangled convoluted prose in the original and provided a riveting narrative. Notes augment the original text. Unfortunately, there are no maps, making it hard for the reader to observe reminders by Scheibert to "consult the map."

JFQ

DAWN OF A COLONIAL ERA

A Book Review by

EDWARD M. COFFMAN

The Philippine War, 1899–1902

by Brian McAllister Linn

Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

416 pp. \$39.95

[ISBN: 0-7006-0990-3]

The United States fought a costly three-year war at the turn of the century which has largely been ignored in more recent times. Army troops defeated Filipino forces in a traditional campaign and, with help from the Navy and

During the Spanish-American War, the Philippines was a side show as America focused on Cuba. The fact that the revolutionary leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, returned from exile and declared independence a couple of weeks before the first American troops arrived was lost in the euphoria of the quick victory in Cuba. Once the United States annexed the Philippines, relations between nationalist and American forces became increasingly strained until fighting broke out in February 1899 near Manila. The Army won a traditional campaign by autumn despite problems: senior U.S. officers down through field grade were largely Civil War veterans, many of the troops were green, and the terrain and climate was daunting, with 46 inches of rain in summer.

When wartime volunteer units went home in 1899, other volunteers who enlisted for two years replaced them and,



Entrenched against Filipinos.

National Archives

Marine Corps, in a subsequent guerilla war. Several years ago, Brian M. Linn wrote *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902*, an excellent account of American forces carrying out unconventional warfare in four regions of that country. In *The Philippine War: 1899–1902*, he presents the best narrative history of the conflict.

Edward M. Coffman is the author of *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898*.

together with regulars, won the ensuing guerrilla war, which lasted until summer 1902. An increased number of garrisons—from 53 in November 1899 to 639 thirteen months later—illustrates the expansion of efforts against the insurgents. From such bases, junior officers tried to control villages and patrol the countryside with their companies. Senior officers in launched large sweeps as the situation demanded. The intensity of hostilities varied. In half of the provinces there was no fighting, while in others periods of quiet prevailed. Gunboats blockaded the key islands among the 7,000 in the archipelago, making it

almost hopeless for Filipino leaders to control their forces, much less transport supplies between the islands.

Spreading terror through ambush, assassination, and torture is inherent in a guerrilla war. Initially, the psychological advantage was with the guerrillas, but in time they lost that edge as well as the support of the populace, who were horrified by atrocities inflicted by the guerrillas on their own people. More and more, the Filipinos turned to the Americans for protection. But there also were atrocities committed by U.S. forces, which were widely reported in the press. But America brought a much more powerful weapon to bear—benevolent assimilation—which demonstrated genuine concern for the people by setting up schools initially taught by soldiers, and establishing communications via telegraph lines and improved roads. While some military in the field thought there was too much emphasis on the carrot and not enough on the stick of military action, a proper balance paid off as the people came to grasp the possibilities of what the United States offered and switched their allegiance. The fact that former insurgent leaders surrendered and then participated in the government also helped the American cause.

A lieutenant who took part in the last months of the war on Mindoro later studied the War Department records to find out what had happened. George Marshall told his biographer, Forrest Pogue, that he was impressed by the demands placed on young officers, the accounts of loosely disciplined troops getting out of hand, and the friction between civil and military authorities.

But readers do not have to pore over multi-volume official histories. Linn has effectively mined the reports, unpublished records, memoirs, and papers of participants, as well as Philippine sources to develop a balanced account of the war. From the plans and relations of leaders on both sides to small unit tactics used in the field, he explains the initial campaign and guerrilla operations that followed. He emphasizes the value of intelligence and its timely distribution to those in need of it. Then he perceptively analyzes the merits of the Filipino as well as American leaders and their junior officers and troops, organizational structures of opposing forces, and operations. Finally, he describes the experiences of those who fought their way through the jungles and mountains. *The Philippine War: 1899–1902* is likely to become the definitive history of this war. **JFQ**

MAPPING THE GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE

A Book Review by

EWAN W. ANDERSON

Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information

by Andrew Duncan and Michel Opatowski
Stroud, United Kingdom: Sutton
Publishing, 2000.
324 pp. \$39.95
[ISBN: 0-7509-2171-4]

As the title implies, *Trouble Spots: The World Atlas of Strategic Information* is focused on areas of the world that have seen conflict in recent years. It is impossible to include every actual or potential trouble spot in a book of this size, but the major areas of strategic importance are covered. One problem with a regional approach is that not all conflicts are equally volatile. For instance, the section on the Middle East could have been developed further, while it was hard to identify many critical flashpoints in Latin America.

The book has 15 sections—12 of which are regionally focused on trouble spots—together with a useful stop-press addition. Each section is lavishly illustrated with maps and photographs, mostly in color, and there are helpful summaries and tables in the margins. Entries vary in level of detail, but are well written throughout.

As the delimitation of U.S. military commands illustrates, regions are essentially in the eye of the beholder. This volume contains sections on Europe and the Balkans, while what is normally deemed to be the Middle East is subdivided into three sections. One result of this partition is that Turkey is accorded relatively little attention. However, from the standpoint of the problems which are discussed, if not from geography, the subdivision is reasonable.

The section on the United States provides a sound analysis of the military reach and global intentions of the only superpower. In addition, there is a realistic examination of ballistic missile

defense and a critical survey of sanctions. The treatment of Russia and the former Soviet Union raises many more problems, given the abundance of trouble spots. Apart from the development of Russia itself and its military capabilities, the areas considered are the northern Caucasus, the Baltic States, and the Kuril Islands. Though the northern Caucasus has been a scene of continuing crisis, a case could be made for including Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. With regard to boundaries, the Sino-Russian frontier has produced greater tension than the Kuril Island maritime border.

In the case of Europe, save for the Balkans, boundary issues between Greece and Turkey including the partition of Cyprus seem to be paramount. Each is considered in some detail with emphasis on the difficulties that have arisen. The balance of the section is focused on NATO enlargement and the European Security and Defense Identity. The section on the Balkans presents the most complete coverage in the book. Each state is considered in the context of past, present, and future problems, and myriad issues are treated under the rubric of “The Crescent of Crisis.” The highlights are oil in the Caspian Basin, the Kurds, and the Tigris and Euphrates. Among these trouble spots are the southern Caucasus and Afghanistan. Since there are so many issues to cover under the Caucasus and Central Asia, one must not be critical of omissions. But the desiccation of the Aral Sea, with its local, regional, and global effects, might have been included.

Middle East flashpoints appear in three sections entitled “The Middle East,” “North Africa,” and the “Middle East-African Interface.” Prominence is given to the continuing Arab-Israel conflict and future water problems. Other significant subsections examine the future of Iraq and Iran. The section on North Africa is concerned with the Maghreb while the interface section deals with issues of African states abutting the Red Sea. However, neither Egypt nor Libya are considered.

The section which follows on “Sub-Saharan Africa” offers examples from each area of the continent. It is both detailed and well illustrated. All the major states are included in the section on South Asia, and there are useful subsections on Kashmir and Myanmar. The section on East and Southeast Asia considers most trouble spots in the region. Of particular note are East Timor and the South China Sea. The final section is focused on Latin America.

Ewan W. Anderson is the author of *An Atlas of World Flashpoints: A Sourcebook of Geopolitical Crises*.

Throughout the regional parts of the text, historical background provides an appreciation of the current issues which are detailed in a clear and unbiased fashion. The key points are tabulated in the margins, and each section concludes with a bibliography and list of Web sites. As a concise guide to trouble spots, these sections compare well with other available reference works.




In many respects it is unfortunate that the remaining sections on strategic matters were included. Some subsections

attempt to cover huge topics in only a few pages, while the overall selection reveals obvious omissions, such as pollution. The section on "Global Concerns" deals with a range of issues. Environmental challenges alone have occupied tomes and the treatment here can only be categorized as modest. Under "Freedom of the Seas," the treatment of maritime boundaries is incomplete at best. Chokepoints are mentioned but are not defined. The subsection on terrorism is contentious and lacks clarity. The next section on "Weapons of Mass Destruc-

tion" is more limited in scope and, like the last section on "Space—the New Battlefield," its inclusion as a separate entity is difficult to justify.

On balance, *Trouble Spots* is an invaluable reference for both experts and armchair critics who depend on television for news coverage of world events. It deserves a place on the bookshelf of anyone interested in international security affairs, if only for its excellent maps. **JFQ**

New from **NDU Press**



To order, call the U.S. Government Printing Office at (202) 512-1800, visit a GPO bookstore, or write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

GPO on-line: access.gpo.gov/su_docs/sale.html

For more on current NDU Press titles visit the National Defense University Web site on the Internet at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html>