

JOINT DOCTRINE WORKING PARTY

U.S. Space Command hosted the 15th Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) meeting at the U.S. Air Force Academy on April 4-5, 1995. Projects underway in the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff, were briefed to include work on a revised hierarchy of publications; a professional desk library; and consolidating, revising, and reformulating current joint doctrine pubs.

The Operations Directorate (J-3), Joint Staff, briefed a proposal to combine joint command and control warfare and information warfare (IW) in Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare*. This initiative was originally raised at a JDWP meeting last autumn, and J-33 subsequently reported on it to the group. There was a consensus that development of a joint pub on command and control warfare should proceed and that IW doctrine should be addressed in the future. There was emphasis on the need for a chapter in Joint Pub 3-13 to establish the linkage between command and control warfare and IW architecture. Because it is a relatively new concept, development of doctrinal pubs on IW was deferred pending further guidance. Another information brief will be provided at the next JDWP meeting to track development.

The Joint Warfighting Center proposed that Joint Pub 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-02.1, *Landing Force Operations*, be combined by placing doctrine in Joint Pub 3-02 and retaining Joint Pub 3-02.1 for tactics, techniques, and procedures. In addition, information found in Naval Warfare Publications 22-2 and 22-3 would be deleted and redundancies between the pubs would be eliminated. On a related note, a recommendation was made to seriously examine the continuing need for Joint Pub 3-18, *Forcible Entry Operations*.

JDWP gave unanimous approval to a proposal by the Naval Special Warfare Command to staff a program directive on Joint Pub 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations*, to clarify its scope and purpose.

ACOM recommended changing the title and focus of Joint Pub 3-01.6, *Joint Air Defense Operations/ Joint Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ)*, to fully cover fighter engagement zone or missile engagement zone (FEZ/MEZ) procedures. JDWP agreed unanimously to change the title to *Joint Air Operations* and thoroughly incorporate these procedures into the publication.

The Operations Directorate (J-3), Joint Staff, proposed consolidating the 3-50 series of pubs on search and rescue. This calls for preparing an edition of Joint Pub 3-50 that covers overarching doctrine on personnel recovery; restructuring Joint Pubs 3-50 and 3-50.1 (National SAR Manual) as Joint Pub 3-50.1, volumes 1 and 2; combining Joint Pubs 3-50.2 and 3-50.21 as Joint Pub 3-50.2; and retaining Joint Pub 3-50.3 unchanged. The Air Force is lead agent for Joint Pub 3-50; the Joint Services SERE Agency and the Air Force Doctrine Center are primary review authorities.

In addition, information briefings were presented on the Joint Targeting Control Board, Joint Doctrine Futures Project, Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, defense transportation system 2010, and inclusion of combat camera capabilities in joint doctrine. The next JDWP meeting is scheduled for October 1995 with the Joint Warfighting Center serving as the host. **JFQ**

PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVES

Over the last year, the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) has initiated an effort to assist joint forces in planning, training, and preparing for peace operations. Three products

have resulted: *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, a peace operations database, and a compilation of peace operations tasks for inclusion in the universal joint task list.

The *Commander's Handbook* was developed in concert with both U.S. and allied military organizations as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations. The draft of this work, which was circulated among flag officers and the joint doctrine community for review, has drawn positive reactions. The handbook will be distributed this year and also be made available through the Joint Electronic Library (JEL).

A JEL peace operations database has been created which contains policy, doctrine, articles, lessons learned, etc., from joint, service, and multinational sources. It contains over 14,000 pages of text which can be accessed on-line (dial-up). A significant byproduct of the database is a special CD-ROM version for distribution to selected agencies. The database will eventually include results from other peace operations and related initiatives such as JTF mission training plans developed by ACOM. Publications, articles, and lessons learned are still being accepted and all suggestions are welcome. A classified database is being created for access via the classified JEL which is under development. It also will be available in a limited distribution CD-ROM.

The last product was a review of universal joint tasks. Research and analysis resulted in a list of joint tasks, with definitions, for use by joint forces in the preparation and conduct of future peace operations. JWFC efforts addressed specific voids and provided proposed changes and additions for use in the Universal Joint Tasks List, JSM 3500.14.

The overall result of this effort is a comprehensive and accessible set of tools for planning and conducting peace operations. For further details contact the Joint Warfighting Center, Ingalls Road (Bldg. 100), Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000. **JFQ**

Lessons Learned

UNOSOM II

The CENTCOM joint after action report (JAAR) on U.N. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II is being incorporated in the master joint universal lessons learned system (JULLS) database. The interim and final CENTCOM JAARs are the official joint reports on UNOSOM II. The final JAAR contains 53 individual JULLs covering a wide range of topics, some of which are briefly highlighted below. It also contains the TRANSCOM interim report and the MARFOR SOM summary report for JTF Somalia.

In May 1993 operations in Somali were transferred from U.S. control under the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the United Nations under UNOSOM II. The mandate had been expanded by Security Council resolution 814 to include all of Somalia, disarming factions, and nation building. In support of UNOSOM II, COMUSFOR SOM was tasked to provide the deputy commander of UNOSOM II with selected headquarters personnel, limited combat support, and a quick reaction force (QRF). Following the ambush of a UNOSOM II weapons site inspection in June 1993, the Security Council established a new mission with passage of resolution 837 which directed that appropriate action be taken to hold those responsible accountable and also authorized that all necessary measures be taken against them. After the adoption of this resolution, U.S. forces moved to the operational forefront with the deployment of Task Force Ranger to Somalia in August 1993. The CENTCOM JAAR (Secret) summary JULL briefly discusses the events leading to the engagement in October 1993 in which 18 Americans were killed and 75 wounded. The withdrawal of U.S. forces was carried out by the end of March 1994. (United Shield, the pull out of U.N. forces from Somalia which was concluded on March 3, 1995, will be covered by a separate CENTCOM JAAR.)

Individual lessons include detailed discussions of logistics, TRANSCOM operations, SHF ability afloat, ammunition supply, convoy communications, policy on utilizing Reserve volunteers for operations other than war, and joint integration of medical evacuation. Classified JULLs cover force protection, communications, QRF, and airspace control in littoral areas. Specific information on C⁴I is found in some JULLs. Concerns associated with U.N. transportation requests, funding arrangements, and food procurement are also documented.

Of particular interest to joint staffs are lessons on developing a JTF headquarters nucleus; JTF staff designation and assignment; requirements for mission statement and planning guidance; and early planning efforts. While many issues identified during operations in Somalia have been rectified, others are common to most contingency JTF staffs and planning efforts. Regarding JTF headquarters, it is found that staffs should be formed from headquarters trained and experienced in joint operations and not formed from division staffs. The report states that corps headquarters are much better suited for functioning at the operational level. Division

staffs do not have the requisite expertise in joint doctrine as well as in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures that is required by a JTF nucleus formed and deployed in crisis action conditions. It also indicates that JTF personnel were not assigned early enough to participate in the planning process nor pre-trained as a functional staff to effectively execute the communications plan.


Early efforts at component level were hampered by unfamiliarity with JOPES crisis action planning which suggested a need for more detailed doctrine. Another observation cites the lack of a joint staff mission statement and planning guidance early in the decisionmaking process which resulted in unclear command relationships and responsibilities of supporting commands. There is a recommendation to establish liaison early in the planning cycle at higher headquarters to monitor decision-making and ensure clear guidance on the mission, troops/time available, specific command relationships, and allocation of critical resources.

Another source on this subject is being developed by the Peacekeeping Institute at the U.S. Army War College and will be named for the Deputy Commander UNOSOM II and Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia. The "LTG Montgomery After Action Report on Somalia" will be available in both classified and unclassified versions. While this report will not be an official document, it promises to be an important compilation of lessons presented from a JFC's perspective. In addition, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University has published a monograph entitled *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* under the auspices of the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff. The work is focused primarily on the operational level of joint warfare. Written by COL Kenneth Allard, USA, it draws on a multitude of sources, including the master JULLS database.

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INSTITUTE FOR
NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

***Somalia Operations:
Lessons Learned***
by Kenneth Allard



Washington: National Defense University
Press, 1995. [ISBN 0-16-045577-4]
For sale by
the Superintendent of Documents