

NEGOTIATING THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

A Review Essay by

CASIMIR A. YOST

Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through Old Friends

by Richard H. Solomon

Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.
224 pp. \$14.95
[ISBN 1-878379-86-0]

Russian Negotiating Behavior: Continuity and Transition

by Jerrold L. Schecter

Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998.
256 pp. \$14.95
[ISBN 1-878379-78-X]

Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior

by Scott Snyder

Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.
236 pp. \$17.50
[ISBN 1-878379-94-1]

International negotiations are often regarded as the province of diplomats and official trade representatives, but they can also engage military officers. Like other negotiators, those in uniform will benefit from the growing body of scholarship being published by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) in its cross-cultural negotiation project. Thus far three generic and three country studies have appeared, with more in the queue. The country studies are *Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through Old Friends* by Richard Solomon, *Russian Negotiating Behavior: Continuity and Transition* by Jerrold Schecter, and *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* by Scott Snyder. The premise of the books in the series is that "culture and institutional differences significantly shape negotiating behavior." In time USIP intends to bring out titles that will

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Negotiating at Panmunjom, July 1953.



DOD

prove useful to conflict managers, governmental and nongovernmental officials, et al.

The project will publish studies on Japan and Germany in 2001. The country studies that have appeared so far examine cases where negotiators exhibit identifiable styles. All three nations have had intense relationships with the United States since World War II. Moreover, arms control and proliferation issues have been central to American interaction at the negotiating table in dealing with the People's Republic of China, Russia, and North Korea.

Chinese Negotiating Behavior is not a new work. It originated as a classified RAND study in 1983 and covers the period 1967-84. Despite the passage of time and the evolution of bilateral relations, Chinese behavior retains characteristics laid out in the RAND study, including identifiable stages. The first involves cultivating ties and agreement on Chinese-initiated principles. That is followed by an assessment stage in which the negotiators seek to have interlocutors to present their positions. Pressure may be applied to turn counterparts into supplicants. A third stage—known as the end game—can come quickly because the Chinese feel nothing more can be gained through negotiations. The implementation phase of the agreement can involve Chinese backtracking.

The author offers common sense guidelines for bargaining with Beijing. In sum, enter discussions well prepared, be patient, and know the bottom line while recognizing that the Chinese will seek to play on supposed friendships to get counterparts to relax their stance.

Richard Solomon, president of the U.S. Institute of Peace, sets his study in historical context, identifying sources of Chinese negotiating style and phases in the evolution of bilateral relations. He points out that "the Chinese emphasize to foreigners the importance of being treated with equality and with full respect for their sovereignty and national independence." In this matter, as in other aspects of their national character, they are not unique; however, they are even more effective in turning pride into making their opposite numbers appear to be supplicants. This manipulation is reinforced by a Chinese preference to negotiate on home turf.

The new edition of *Chinese Negotiating Behavior* also includes an essay by veteran China watcher Chas. Freeman, who notes that while the book has enduring value, things have changed. National politics are less constraining and negotiators have vastly more sources of information. Today there are more bureaucratic players, including representatives of the People's Liberation Army. Nonetheless, the Chinese remain hampered by frequently ineffective interactions in the diplomatic milieu, particularly in communicating with legislators, media, and interest groups.

China has gained experience dealing with America and has adapted. For example, Freeman argues that they have concluded "that most Americans expect to reach agreement at a price or on terms roughly midway between those asked and those offered." As a result, although they eschew salami tactics, he maintains that they have "gotten pretty good at salami-slicing themselves."

Russian Negotiating Behavior depicts a nation perched between old style Soviet diplomacy and a quest for a new approach. On balance, “psychological conditioning behavior patterns and personal style of those raised under the Bolshevik code continue to dominate Russian negotiating culture.” Moreover, “Russian nationalism has replaced Marxist-Leninism as an ideological driving force in foreign policy decisionmaking.” (The same can be said of China.) “The role of authority, the avoidance of risk, and the necessity for control are vital to understanding Russian negotiating behavior.”

Russians deeply resent the loss of superpower status and the triumph of their rivals. At the same time, they recognize the potential gains—particularly financial—of interaction with the West. Complicating the achievement of those benefits is the pluralism of their society and government. Since the foreign ministry is not necessarily the lead agency in negotiations, the bureaucracy cannot be counted on to deliver on any deal.

Jerrold Schecter traces the stages of Russian negotiation that closely mirror bargaining by the Soviet Union. The Russians begin with cautious prepositioning by which negotiators cultivate relationships with counterparts. Their opening moves can be aimed at bringing opposing positions out in the open. Moreover, Russian negotiators want to look good at home and are likely operating under tight instructions. Their opening position is usually extreme. The next period can be long as Russians probe for weaknesses. Once satisfied that there is no more to gain they move rapidly to a conclusion.

The author closes by saying, “Only negotiators who understand the cultural and emotional baggage their Russian counterparts are carrying can hope to be effective and achieve their goals.” Based

on this observation he offers specific advice: be sensitive, but not oversensitive, to Russian problems; treat Russian counterparts with respect; stand tall and maintain dignity; insist on agreed rules (for example, leave nothing to goodwill or unwritten agreements); use incentives, especially financial, for cooperation; and implement problem-solving mechanisms early. While these pointers reflect common sense, they do not preclude dealing with negotiators who cannot—as opposed to will not—deliver on commitments.

The author of *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* had the task of analyzing negotiations on which there is little known or published. Moreover, the decision process in Pyongyang is more opaque than in Beijing or Moscow. Korean behavior has roots in a Marxist-Leninist state imposed on a Confucian society with a revolutionary, anticolonial heritage.

Scott Snyder claims that “North Korea’s negotiating style and objectives have conformed to a consistent and all-too-predictable pattern.” Negotiators typically begin with a firm position, move to a period of give and take, then finish with hard bargaining. Compromise usually comes in informal venues, not in formal meetings. “The most distinctive characteristic . . . is brinkmanship, a negotiating tactic closely related to crisis diplomacy.” Crisis is used to shape and affect agendas. Moreover, the implementation process of agreements may be contentious.

The book offers some guidelines: do not expect progress until the leadership in Pyongyang is persuaded that every alternative has been explored, do not confuse rhetoric with reality, resist North Korean attempts to seek weaknesses on your team, expect crisis tactics, signal

negotiating objectives but do not overinvest in them, and be patient.

China, Russia, and North Korea share the legacy of Lenin but each has a special cultural base. None has a strong legal tradition. And all three nations have had ambivalent experiences with the West—the United States in particular—and each has a basic suspicion of Washington. In some cases, necessity rather than desire has driven each to negotiate. The authors all note the importance attached to being taken seriously by American counterparts and being accorded respect. Thus it is not surprising that there are common features in descriptions of styles offered by Solomon, Schecter, and Snyder. Russian, Chinese, and North Korean negotiators traditionally have acted on short leads held by watchful superiors at home. They are given limited flexibility. Each tends to respond to American initiatives rather than putting forward their own solutions. By contrast with some counterparts, Russia, China, and North Korea are not described as hurrying negotiations, at least in the opening and middle phases. All three countries place great importance on the initial “getting to know you” phase, reflecting the substantial weight placed on the personal dimension of the interaction, particularly by Asian cultures.

On American styles of negotiation, another book in the series, *Negotiating across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*, by Raymond Cohen, contrasts low and high context communication. Cohen argues that “one is associated with the predominantly verbal and explicit, or low-context, communication style of the United States which is infused with the can-do, problem-solving spirit, assumes a process of given-and-take, and is strongly influenced by Anglo-Saxon legal habits.” The alternate model, high context communication, “declines to view the immediate issue in isolation; lays particular stress on long-term and effective aspects of the relationship between the parties; is preoccupied with considerations of symbolism, status, and face; and draws on highly developed communication strategies for evading confrontation.”

Americans enter negotiations with predispositions. They normally believe that both sides can benefit. They expect to compromise and split the difference. They bring lawyers to the table and are much focused on the particulars. They are naturally in a hurry. They want to quickly get to a deal and expect a vigorous and

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Joint Force Quarterly
on the Joint Doctrine Web site

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm

direct given and take. Americans see negotiations leading to a defined settlement while others may be more interested in what evolves after the agreement.

Not all negotiators fit this pattern. Max Kampelman, one of America's most distinguished and effective negotiators, explicitly rejects salami tactics. He is legendary for refusing to be rushed into a deal or settle for a bad one. When a counterpart complained that Moscow was making all the concessions, he remarked "I considered their beginning position totally off the wall, but that it was impossible for the U.S. position to be equally excessive because [the Americans] were required to go through complex interagency negotiations before they came to a beginning position." As a result, the U.S. approach can sometimes appear bizarre to the other side.

Does culture matter? Cohen contends that it can "complicate, prolong, and even frustrate particular negotiations where there otherwise exists an identifiable basis for cooperation." But culture is not the entire answer. Chinese, Russian, and North Korean negotiators have a mix of backgrounds, traditional and communist. It is not clear where one begins and the other leaves off. Moreover, particularly in the cases of China and Russia, experience in negotiating across cultural divides has rubbed off. Freeman observes that China adopts a different style with Japan than with America. North Korea deals very differently with South Korea than with the United States.

These books suggest that U.S. negotiators would do well not to focus their preparations on substance alone. They must be aware of larger geopolitical issues and how specific exchanges fit, understanding that achievable deals may not be desirable deals. They must also appreciate that the mindsets and approaches their counterparts bring to the table are based on unique histories and cultures. Recognizing differences is helpful in reaching an outcome that serves national interests. American officials must envision how their approach may be interpreted across the table and affect outcomes. In such matters, this series of recent books offers negotiators valuable advice. **JFQ**

DOUGHBOYS IN BATTLE

A Book Review by
BRIAN M. LINN

Soissons, 1918

by Douglas V. Johnson II and
Rolfe E. Hillman, Jr.

College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1999.
213 pp. \$29.95
[ISBN 0-89096-893-4]

Until recently most accounts of World War I fell into a rather predictable mold. The focus was on the high command or the individual soldier in the trench with little consideration of events in between. European scholarship, particularly in Britain, was dominated by bitter disagreement over leadership, casualties, and the horror of combat. Critics assailed brass hats for their stupidity, callousness, and chateau generalship. Efforts to describe battles and campaigns often degenerated into descriptions of rats, mustard gas, and futile charges against machine gun nests. For the most part, Americans have escaped this historical debate, in part because there was little challenge to the interpretation of events reported by General John Pershing and his supporters immediately after the war. This version held that despite resistance from the Allies and the War Department, Pershing shaped the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) into an effective, aggressive organization that carried the offensive in the final months of 1918. Heroic doughboys such as Sergeant Alvin York reinvigorated the Allies and decisively snatched victory from the Germans. Perhaps because it was such a satisfying myth—proving both military prowess and intellectual and moral superiority over Europe—this uncritical emphasis on Pershing and AEF exceptionalism continued for decades. Douglas Johnson, a research professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, and the late Rolfe Hillman, an accomplished writer and military authority, break from this uncritical mold in *Soissons, 1918*.

In recent years, scholars have returned to documents on the war and

reexamined command, tactics, operational efficiency, combined arms doctrine, and myriad other topics. Indeed, virtually no area of World War I scholarship has been left unchallenged. The result is a greater appreciation of the immense problems of fighting on the Western Front, the importance of coalition warfare, and the scope and range of Allied tactical and doctrinal innovation. Indeed, most recent evaluations of the operational ability of the British and Commonwealth forces in the latter half of the war are quite favorable. Not surprisingly, the new scholarship has contributed to a reappraisal of American contributions and raised some troubling questions about Pershing and dysfunctional AEF tactics and overall battlefield performance.

Soissons, 1918 is a significant reassessment of the American effort on the Western Front. Written by two soldier-scholars, it examines the first major AEF offensive operation. Anticipating a renewed enemy offensive on the Aisne-Marne salient, General Ferdinand Foch ordered a spoiling counterattack on a vulnerable German flank. He selected Tenth Army, commanded by General Charles Mangin, which included 1st and 2^d Divisions, to attack toward Soissons. In the battle of July 18–22, the Americans broke through the German lines but could not sustain the attack. By the time the divisions were pulled out of the line they had lost 13,000 dead. Although they did not take Soissons, Johnson and Hillman argue that the offensive unhinged the enemy attack and disrupted German long-term strategy.

This book can be appreciated as a precise day-by-day narrative of the five days of combat. Chronologically organized chapters follow regiments, brigades, and divisions. Extensive quotes from participants provide insights into the hardships and confusion. The authors are particularly effective in reconciling conflicting accounts and reconstructing events. They also provide an astute and detailed analysis of AEF command from the corps to regimental level. Although the Allies had developed a complicated and centralized system of command and control, inexperienced American troops lacked the training and willingness to implement it. Pershing claimed that AEF command would be decentralized but in practice insisted on centralized direction. The result was that AEF command in fact had the inflexibility of the Allies but little of their efficiency. Pershing added to the problem by insisting that his commanders both demonstrate drive and get

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results regardless of the tactical situation. That led to a command climate permeated by fear in which officers often became victims of the uncertainties and ambitions of their superiors. One vignette is the sad tale of the relief of Colonel Conrad S. Babcock of the 28th Infantry, whose reputation was damaged by his division commander's ruthlessness, animosity, and ignorance.

The authors argue that Soissons was "a confused mess . . . a complete mix-up of men and organizations" but also a key transition for the American Expeditionary Force. The battle revealed not only a lack of American preparedness, but how rapidly AEF units adjusted. Like an increasing number of American historians, the authors recognize the skill and ability of the Allies. They give full credit to the French command, particularly to Foch's ability to see the German vulnerability on the Soissons flank and Mangin's ruthless drive. They discuss the usually overlooked but crucial role of tanks and detail the intricacies of coordinating World War I battles. They criticize Pershing on several counts but are sympathetic to the great burdens he shouldered. Ultimately, the doughboys and leathernecks paid a high price for their victory, partly because of inexperience and lack of training. They attacked in tight formations, did not use support weapons, and also failed to coordinate infantry and artillery. Americans at Soissons were a force in transition, the victims of rapid expansion, untested commanders, inadequate training, and dysfunctional doctrine. That they fared as well as they did may be the most telling argument in favor of Pershing's methods.

Soissons, 1918, while advancing our knowledge of the American effort in World War I, raises questions on the ability of militaries to learn from mistakes in time to avoid repeating them. Moreover, it addresses the issue of putting driving leaders in charge of untrained and inexperienced troops. Placing soldiers in harm's way without adequate preparations always leads to disasters. This book deserves a careful reading. **JFQ**

PREPARING FOR THE NEXT WAR

A Book Review by
JOHN F. ANTAL

After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1939

by William O. Odom
College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999.
288 pp. \$44.95
[ISBN 0-89096-838-1]

The military is undergoing a transformation. To adapt to the international environment and maintain full spectrum overmatch on battlefields of the future, doctrine is being reconceptualized. This is a daunting task for any organization, let alone one with global responsibilities. However, this is not the first transformation the Armed Forces have undergone, nor will it be the last.

Army reform and reorganization after World War I, an effort of the War Department, was profound. William Odom has captured the essence of that interwar effort in a new book, *After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1939*. It is must reading for those interested in the relationship of transformation to doctrine, organization, and technology.

Without effective doctrine acting as a rudder, military institutions can't meet operational, organizational, and informational requirements to steer a course through strife. Lacking relevant, well-practiced doctrine a force can flounder. War is a constant struggle of action and counteraction between two thinking enemies. Doctrine must change to meet the threat. Thus reliable doctrine is difficult to produce in peacetime and even more so if future dangers are unclear or nonexistent. Doctrine must close the gap between theory and reality in peace as well as for conflicts yet to come.

The challenges facing the Army in 1919 were quite profound. Its previous methods of warfare were overturned following four years of observing the European conflict, and then participating in it. Doughboys went to war with leaders whose military expertise was largely garnered from the Indian and Spanish

American Wars. Armed with revolvers and sabers and sporting campaign hats, the Army ended the Great War in metal helmets and gas masks, and armed with machine guns, rapid firing artillery, combat aircraft, and armored vehicles.

After the Armistice, the lessons learned were used to revise doctrinal tenants to match changing strategic, operational, and tactical conditions. Odom holds that the lessons of World War I were rigorously studied and captured in field service regulations in 1923, but then something went terribly wrong. True to its tradition, the Army was largely disbanded, retaining only a small corps of professional soldiers from 1919 to 1939. Manpower and matériel shortages led to a rapid decline in the quality of Army doctrine. Meanwhile, warfare evolved. Germany continued to study and advance the lessons of the Great War, improve on methods and weapons, and in spite of disadvantages transform doctrine and training. Odom explains the less deliberate evolution of U.S. Army doctrine throughout this period and traces the intellectual life of a service trying to find its way, detailing the infighting and bureaucratic strife resulting from lack of resources and focus.

Guided by John Pershing, Hugh Drum, George Lynch, Frank Parker, and Lesley McNair, the Army attempted to balance technology and the human dimension of war but came up short. Rapid development of combat methods changed doctrine from one "built on infantry-artillery coordination to one based on a highly mobile combined arms team." Doctrine did not keep pace. With few troops, little matériel, miserly funding, and no maneuvers conducted between 1919 and 1939, it is not surprising that the Army was unprepared for global conflict. Hassles in the War Department, friction between branches, and an inept doctrinal development process combined to create an atmosphere so bad that the service failed to coordinate a combined arms doctrine up to the eve of World War II. Then, with German victories in Poland, Norway, and France providing a blueprint, the Army raced to catch up. In a few brief years it had its own breakthrough, cranking out manual after manual and then revising them almost before the ink was dry. Initial experience in combat demonstrated that even this doctrine was still flawed both conceptually and in practice. It took many battles for the Americans to learn the art of war.

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After the Trenches concludes that the biggest reason doctrine lagged was an institutional inability to maintain a well-coordinated doctrine development process. Thus the events described in this book offer an important cautionary tale for doctrine writers. Complex systems today require an intricate procurement process measured in years, often decades. Doctrine speeds procurement along the fastest route. The challenge in interwar years is to develop and test doctrine using debate, experimentation, and wargaming to increase the odds that new systems will prove themselves under fire.

As Odom contends, "an organization dedicated to monitoring and accommodating change is the most important element in successful modernization. This organization must address weapons, organizations, and doctrine to avoid the same calamity that befell the Army from 1919 to 1939." The Armed Forces must overcome similar demands today. More than a decade after the Cold War, the military must be transformed to become the objective force to fight and win tomorrow's wars. *After the Trenches* should be included on the reading list of those officers and civilians who must contemplate future forces. **JFQ**

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IN THE SHADOW OF HANOI

A Book Review by
ROD PASCHALL

The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam

by Richard H. Shultz, Jr.
New York: HarperCollins, 1999.
408 pp. \$27.50
[ISBN 0-06-019454-5]

The only problem with the book under review is its title. While Richard Shultz, director of the International Security Studies Program in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, has certainly covered covert activities by America during the Vietnam War, he has done far more. This work details operations in Laos and Cambodia and provides highly useful insights and judgments on why the United States and its allies fared so poorly during the 1960s and 1970s. The author offers a thorough account of the failures and triumphs in a long and ruinous war.

The Secret War Against Hanoi offers a range of operational and tactical details to engage the professional officer and serious reader of military history while offering the policymakers of today a rich menu of politico-military lessons. Shultz details intelligence operations, reconnaissance missions, cross-border raids, target identification actions, prisoner-snatching incursions, deception plans, and psychological and political warfare. Based on a wealth of both declassified documents and interviews with officers who ran the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG), as well as senior officials who directed the war, this book is the first definitive and comprehensive account of the covert war in Indochina. The author weaves a web of Kennedy and Johnson administration missteps and explains why most clandestine activities were doomed to failure or reduced to modest success by officials in Washington who crippled them through delays and self-imposed geographical or operational limitations.

Colonel Rod Paschall, USA (Ret.), is the editor of *Military History Quarterly*.

Despite constraints, questionable leadership, and stifling oversight, MACSOG managed to cobble together a valuable adjunct to the war. Its operations were nowhere more successful than in interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the supply line used to infiltrate troops and supplies to South Vietnam through Laos. It is worth pondering the consequences if such operations had been aggressively pursued earlier in the conflict in Southeast Asia.

Readers are likely to draw two critical conclusions from this book. The Laotian panhandle, the communist route south and the geographic linchpin of North Vietnamese strategy, was ceded to Hanoi by the Kennedy administration through a major diplomatic blunder in 1962. This argument is persuasively made by Norman Hannah in *The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War*, which appeared in 1987. Shultz's treatment adds to the story—he was given access to recently declassified material that links policies made in Washington and operations conducted in Indochina.

The other conclusion is more tactical in nature but perhaps more applicable to contemporary affairs. Readers may assume that once an attempt to subvert a totalitarian regime through support of a resistance movement fails, the next best policy alternative is making the regime believe that it is being threatened internally. To a certain extent, that is what the United States did in North Vietnam in the late 1960s. Autocrats are almost always paranoid and prone to expend scarce resources and energy to counter internal security dangers at the expense of external aggression. Unfortunately, America did not follow through and this stratagem was needlessly ceded away.

The Secret War Against Hanoi exposes the implications of pursuing national strategy while limiting the use of force. There are lessons for military planners and policymakers. **JFQ**

The Secret War Against Hanoi

was the subject of a recent *JFQ* book lecture by the author which was held at the National Defense University on December 9, 1999, and televised by C-SPAN [see video 154101].



BLUEPRINT FOR STRATEGIC THOUGHT

A Book Review by

HAROLD R. WINTON

Modern Strategy

by Colin Gray

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
412 pp. \$29.95
[ISBN 0-19-87825-19]

Colin Gray is known for his contributions on strategic studies and defense policy. *Modern Strategy* is intended as a magnum opus and addresses three important issues. The first is that the underlying logic of strategy as the use (or threat of the use) of force to further political purpose is immutable though it is manifest in rich and varied forms. The second is that strategy has 17 enduring elements that can be grouped in three rubrics: people and politics, preparation for war, and war proper. The third is that *On War* by Clausewitz, from which Gray derives the construct for his logic, remains the touchstone for strategic thought despite the limits of time and circumstance.

Modern Strategy is simultaneously an ambitious, flawed, and important book. Its ambition is evident in the author's attempt to establish a paradigm for strategic understanding to endure over time: "I am capturing the whole nature of strategy for all periods." It is also evident in the breadth of subjects addressed: strategic culture, guerrilla war, terrorism, nuclear deterrence, and conduct of operations in the dimensions of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace warfare.

But the book is flawed in important respects. The basic tasks of any theoretical work are defining the field under investigation, categorizing its elements, and explaining relations among the elements. Gray gets high marks on the first. His definition of strategy is useful and consistent but his categories are confusing and, save for two, his explanations of them are less than rigorous. When one divides a phenomenon into categories for investigation, the categories should meet the test of comprehensiveness and

mutual exclusiveness. That is, taken together they should cover the field with little overlap. Two theorists who accomplished this task were Clausewitz, whose basic elements of war were reason, violence, and chance, and J.F.C. Fuller, whose elements were the mental, moral, and physical dimensions of war. Two categories outlined by Gray, preparation for war and war proper, are mutually exclusive; but the third, people and politics, overlaps the others significantly. To avoid categorization errors, Gray could have identified the strategic environment as the third element to differentiate it from preparation for both war and war proper, although that would have required rethinking subelements included under all three categories.

It can be argued that categorization, while interesting to students of theory is not important. But the challenge in organizing the concepts underscores a glaring deficiency in *Modern Strategy*, its failure to explain. Two caveats to this criticism are that Gray does, in various contexts, provide explanations for relations between force and political purpose and demonstrates fairly conclusively that the needs of strategic practice had a profound influence on strategic theory. But the exposition on the 17 elements does not explain their interaction but simply reveals that they are vital elements of strategy. One learns that military operations are critical, but nowhere is actual

empirical evidence offered on how and if strategy should shape operational design or whether operational parameters affect strategic choice. The core of any theory is its ability to lay bare the dynamics of relationships among elements of a given phenomenon. Even if Gray's categories were not elegantly composed, he had the opportunity to explore what he judged to be the most important of the relations among his elements of strategy. This opportunity was largely missed.

Modern Strategy is an important work. The first reason is the intrinsic significance of the subject. The world remains a dangerous place. Good strategy is still needed and bad strategy can ruin the destiny of whole peoples. The book is also valuable because its most important argument is accurate: there is an essential logic to strategy that is neglected only at great peril. As an adjunct to this debate, the work is also significant because it points back to Clausewitz. Gray is balanced in assessing the insightful Prussian, clearly recognizing the temporal and geographic limitations under which he worked, yet giving due credit to his probing intellect and reminding us that much in *On War* is still of value. In a day when many enthusiasts are trumpeting that everything under the sun is new, this is a useful corrective. But if an appeal to old ideas is one reason to value this book, its great modernity is another. **JFQ**

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INTERVENTION IN HAITI

A Book Review by
RONALD H. COLE


Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997

by John R. Ballard
Westport, Connecticut: Praeger
Publishers, 1998.
292 pp. \$62.95
[ISBN: 0-275-96237-7]

The Persian Gulf War represented the last conventional military operation conducted by the Armed Forces in the 20th century. During the 1990s the United States participated in many peace and humanitarian operations including Iraq (Provide Comfort), Somalia (Eastern Exit and Provide Hope), Bangladesh (Sea Angel), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Deny Flight and Joint Endeavor), and Haiti (Uphold Democracy). In *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997*, John Ballard has produced a comprehensive account of that last operation, in which he served with the joint analysis and assessment team under U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM).

Ballard interviewed many key planners of Uphold Democracy including two marines who had been assigned to the Joint Staff at the time, General John Sheehan and Colonel Robert Garner. He also used countless published sources. One he did not consult is *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, another comprehensive treatment of the operation. Published by three members of the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann, and John Fishel, this work overlaps *Upholding Democracy* in both sources and themes. But unlike *Upholding Democracy*, it covers the operation in Haiti primarily from a joint task force (JTF) perspective—with less political and strategic analysis but with important details about activities on the operational level.

Ronald H. Cole serves in the Joint History Office and is coauthor of *Roles of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1878–1945*.



Providing security at Port-au-Prince airport, Uphold Democracy.

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis)

Aside from some triumphal language and pedantic asides, Ballard's account is readable and valuable for the depth and clarity of its analysis. After a survey of Haitian history, he considers the planning for forced and permissive entry, initial operations by JTF 180, follow-on stability and political-military operations by JTF 190, and ensuing U.N. missions. In his concluding chapter, he presents some lessons learned on flexible planning, command and control, joint interoperability, media relations, managing transitions between forces, theater strategic coordination, joint training, interagency coordination, and "mission success."

Upholding Democracy documents progress in improving jointness. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the enhanced powers of the Chairman and unified commanders significantly bolstered joint

operations. In 1993 ACOM was transformed from a naval into a genuinely joint command. Its subordinate commands produced entry plans for Haiti, a bridge plan among them, related options, and troop lists to accompany each plan. Using worldwide communications systems and computer simulation programs, frequent command exercises enabled commanders and planners to become familiar with one another. The resultant team spirit facilitated the eleventh hour switch on September 19, 1994 from invasion to peaceful entry.

Uphold Democracy also highlighted the limited use of the military in complex contingency operations. From the outset of the Haitian crisis, two Chairmen and commanders understood that armed entry was only the initial challenge.

There were also political, economic, and social aspects of the operation known as *nationbuilding*. The military worked with other agencies, international organizations, and Haitian authorities to rebuild security and justice systems, establish a modern transportation and communications infrastructure, and privatize inefficient state-run industries.

Not surprisingly, Haitian elites preferred the status quo, which preserved their monopoly on land and wealth, a problem neither military planners nor civilian officials sufficiently considered. The Armed Forces focused on what they do best, entering a country in strength to remove threats and bring temporary stability. The peaceful disposition of the Haitian military and partial disarmament of paramilitary units were significant

achievements, but they did not assure success of democracy and free enterprise. As Ballard notes, even after four years of U.S. military protection, civilian organizations proved unable to reform or remove Haitian elites who blocked political and economic reform. Today foreign firms are reluctant to invest in Haiti, economic conditions are worsening, the democratic regime seems unwilling to take action, and Haitians are again migrating by boats for a better life elsewhere.

For these reasons, the talk of mission success in *Upholding Democracy* rings hollow:

Just as the [multinational force] met all objectives assigned to it, the U.N. mission in Haiti completed its tasks in superb fashion prior to its planned mission end date. Although U.N. efforts continued into 1998, there is no doubt that the application of

multinational and U.N. military and civilian support accomplished the tasks assigned. The effects of the anti-Aristide coup of 1991 were corrected, and Haiti was returned to the path of democratic advancement.

One can recall claims by General William Westmoreland, later echoed by Colonel Harry Summers, that American troops never lost a battle in Vietnam. But assuming that assertion, tactical successes mean little if they don't add up to strategic victory. Similarly, achievements by the Armed Forces during Uphold Democracy created a chance for progress in Haiti. No matter how competently the civilian and military communities accomplished the tasks assigned, the claim of overall success in that troubled country remains premature. **JFQ**

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
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