

## MODERNIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

A Book Review by  
BATES GILL

### Chinese Views of Future Warfare

Edited by Michael Pillsbury  
Washington: National Defense  
University Press, 1997.  
421 pp. \$22.00  
[ISBN 1-57906-035-8]

Summing up his view of future warfare, Wang Pufeng, a prolific writer on the revolution in military affairs (RMA), states that: "... the authorized strength and equipment, strategy, tactics, and military theory of China's military are still basically the products of the industrial era and are far from satisfying the demands of information warfare. We have much work to do. ..."

From this and other analyses in *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, we gain greater insight into the paradoxes of the Chinese military: it faces new challenges and opportunities but has limited resources to address them. Its officer elite struggles to reconcile emergent doctrinal debates while their conservative and outdated forces seek to shape traditional concepts to meet future demands.

High marks go to the editor of this volume, Michael Pillsbury, for assembling these articles for a wide audience. The collection presents translations of 40 pieces by 44 authors—including 31 with the rank of colonel or higher, including several senior Chinese military leaders—and not only makes the People's Liberation Army (PLA) far more transparent but reveals an institution with high-tech visions of the future albeit one which lacks a coherent plan on how to get there.

Many articles in this volume appeared previously. Most are drawn from an open-source Chinese-language peri-

odical published by the PLA Academy of Military Science, *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* (*China Military Science*). Its issues in recent years have carried numerous pieces such as those found in Pillsbury's collection, often in large special sections devoted to RMA. In addition, at least a dozen books on high-tech warfare and RMA have surfaced in China. Articles found in open literature such as *Xiandai Junshi* (known as *Con-milit* in the West) routinely discuss the same subjects. In sum, the Chinese have written extensively about RMA since the early 1990s.

But these works have not been widely available to American readers, particularly those who do not focus on Chinese military affairs. Some of these articles have appeared in translations by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service or other translation services, but this is the first time the vast majority have appeared openly in English sources.

Pillsbury has compiled articles that first came out between 1988 and 1996, with about half published in 1995–96. Written over seven years, the original purpose of these pieces was not to present a coherent blueprint for China to achieve revolutionary military-technical breakthroughs but to inform Chinese military readers in two ways: to promote the correct ideological understanding of future PLA strategy and to describe developments in Western (mostly U.S.) military thinking and technology. As such, the discussions about future warfare mainly describe what others are doing, not PLA intentions. The last chapter, "Nanotechnology Weapons on Future Battlefields," is a case in point. It simply describes a RAND Corporation report on microscale electromechanical systems which appeared in 1993, not Chinese capabilities or intentions regarding such technologies.

The volume is divided into four sections, moving from the general to the specific. The first two—on Deng Xiaoping's strategic thought and future security trends respectively—perhaps will be the least interesting to China specialists and general readers alike. For specialists the contents will seem all too familiar or redundant while for general readers the articles may appear

oblique and overladen with ideology and unfamiliar references. The editor addresses this potential problem in explanatory notes in the preface. China's greatest strategic objective comes out clearly in these first two sections: economic modernization and the realization of "comprehensive national strength." Rapid high-tech military modernization, force projection, and adoption of RMA are not prevalent themes in the 11 articles which make up these first two sections.

Sections 3 and 4—comprising the last 300 pages—are the most directly related to views of future warfare and treat "local wars under high-tech conditions" and RMA. Section 4 will likely be interesting to some readers but old hat to devotees of RMA. It focuses on systems, hardware, and operations that will characterize battlefields of the next century, including naval systems, airpower, land operations, information warfare, stealth, and the nature of conflict during the current RMA. Here the more forward-thinking authors demonstrate their mastery of the theoretical concepts of the current RMA, at least on paper. Of less concern is how to apply those concepts within the reality of the Chinese military-technical system. Many articles in this section advocating greater attention to RMA seem to almost blindly accept the silver bullet of high technology and uncritically assess the Gulf War of 1991 as the appropriate template from which to understand the current RMA.

Among the gems in the book are "Managing China's Future Security Crises" by Zheng Jian and a comparison of Chinese "local war" and U.S. "limited war" by Chen Zhou. In "Weapons of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," Chang Mengxiong displays a broad grasp of "information-intensified" weapons of the future, with an informed discussion of how a country might use "information deterrence" to prevent the outbreak of war. Perhaps the best piece is a refreshingly frank and critical assessment by Wang Pufeng of China's tasks in facing the high-tech realities of future conflict.

Three main aspects of *Chinese Views of Future Warfare* combine to make it an interesting and valuable

Bates Gill is research professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

PLA destroyer *Harbin*  
arriving in San Diego.



U.S. Navy (Felix Garza)

work: it demonstrates the differences of opinion among China's military elite, exhibits China's ongoing military-technical deficiencies, and reveals a continued adherence to certain basic traditions of Chinese military thinking.

The debates which emerge from these pages will partially dispel the myth of a monolithic Chinese "center" whose policies can be easily characterized in black and white. For example, as in the United States, the opportunities and risks of the new technological age present clear differences on the fundamental concepts that should guide doctrine and strategy in the future. Those Chinese authors published here assign varying degrees of importance to "people's war," "local war under high-tech conditions," and RMA while also trying to fit these concepts into a single strategic vision that is both ideologically acceptable and militarily feasible.

Americans will find it interesting that the Chinese also argue over whether the current RMA is "concept-driven" or "technology-driven" and debate the nature and number of previous RMAs. On the first point, most authors probably agree with Zheng Qinsheng who admonishes those who "tend to place greater emphasis on hardware instead of software." For many of the authors, the current RMA is clearly "concept-driven" (probably more a practical than a philosophical opinion, given China's technological difficulties with RMA). Less explicit but present in these articles is the tension between traditional highly-centralized command structures (which are far more vulnerable to precision-strike and information attack) and decentralized, dispersed, redundant, and interlinked C<sup>3</sup>I networks which are far less familiar in Chinese planning.

There are also differences among and within articles over the respective roles of "state" and "market" forces to

encourage the defense industrial base to exploit new technological opportunities inherent in RMA. There are even divergences of opinion—as in this country—over the nature and role of peacekeeping forces. Defense Minister Chi Haotian notes approvingly that China "actively participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations, making a positive contribution to world peace and stability," while Yu Qifen criticizes peacekeeping as "new interference from the U.S. and Western countries" and as attempts to "overthrow governments" that alarm the developing world.

Secondly, careful reading of this volume demonstrates that the contributors are for the most part very aware of the many military-technical difficulties China must overcome to take advantage of the current RMA. A colonel states that "the chief contradiction" for modernization is "between the objective requirements of modern warfare and the relative low level of modernization of our national defense." Solving it "will be the central task of our national defense construction." In the articles about future military trends, an analyst from the Academy of Social Sciences cautions that "there will be a big gap in the military capability between China and other relevant countries" and that in the future the "gap will be wider." One author warns the Chinese military "to overcome the enemy in ourselves" to meet the "severe historical requirement" of high-tech warfare.

Ding Henggao, formerly head of the ministry-level body in charge of the military-industrial base, directs attention to the "relationship between requirements and possibility." He predicts that "for a considerably long time, the gap between available funds and the large investment needed for developing high-tech weapons will be a restriction on development." The contribution on logistics modernization by the Chief of the General Staff goes on at length about what "should" be done and stresses the problems to overcome rather than solutions to them. Such comments abound.

According to Pillsbury, U.S. analysts have decided that China “lacks a vision of the nature of future warfare.” But this may be an overstatement. Most American observers are clearly aware of Chinese military aspirations but seriously question how the gap between visions and reality will be closed. These articles do not greatly alter that understanding. There is no systematic effort in the articles, even at a theoretical level, to map out a strategy over time to meet the requirements and achieve the military-technical breakthroughs which they describe in detail as the next RMA.

In the end, in spite of pointed debates and revealing insights, one is struck with the lack of fundamental conceptual change in military thinking even as China contemplates the importance of RMAs. In one rather strange instance, an author calls on PLA leaders to conduct a conscientious study of “magic weapons” starkly reminiscent of Chinese military reformers more than a century ago who urged mastering “superb and secret weapons” to defeat foreign threats.

But significantly, Chinese military thinkers remain closely wedded to concepts of Maoist people’s war, and several authors attempt to apply those to modern warfighting and RMA. On the one hand, the implications of this outlook extend beyond political or ideological considerations: the continued intellectual adherence to people’s war doctrine also suggests sluggishness on the part of the Chinese military to adapt to a rapidly changing military-technical environment which will define the future of warfare. On the other hand, drawing on Sun Zi and Mao, the people’s war concept of “defeating the superior with the inferior” runs throughout this collection. This approach suggests a more realistic sense of Chinese capabilities and encourages creative thinking in a new technological era to confront and defeat a more powerful adversary.

Spelling and translation miscues can be a bit distracting and confusing. For example, the well-known Maoist “third line” military-industrial strategy is rendered as the “three-line,” and the “Mydao Co.” should be McDonnell Douglas Corporation. Two workhorses

of the Chinese troop transport fleet—the Yun-8 and the Yun-12 aircraft—are misnamed; the term for “national security” often gets translated as “national safety.” Similar errors pop up elsewhere, but they are minor. (The promise of a revised edition of this book is welcome news.)

More importantly, this volume would profit from greater analytical input from the editor. As a long-time specialist on China and its military-technical development, he certainly could have gone beyond the useful but basic descriptive summaries of the chapters and applied his skill for the analytical benefit of readers. Greater contextual discussions would have been especially useful to those who are approaching Chinese military writings for the first time. For example, without more analysis to provide context, non-specialists might come away with the impression that these articles represent capabilities that China can readily develop and employ. Such misperceptions only bolster Beijing’s psychological deterrent or encourage those who predict confrontation with China, though neither alternative seems to be intended by this work. An index would also have proven useful.

China will likely continue a steady but problem-ridden integration of advanced technologies into its force structure. These developments will not resemble the current U.S.-style RMA, but there is no reason it should. Future changes in PLA modernization might be revolutionary by Chinese standards and best be termed an “RMA with Chinese characteristics.” Its most capable aspects are those whereby China can use its “inferior position” to defeat a “superior enemy” and may combine old and new: stand-off weaponry such as ballistic and cruise missiles, information deception, sabotage, and deterrence, and methods to manage disadvantageous conflict escalation.

But no matter which direction China takes in pursuit of RMA, we will have a better sense of the process and problems it will face thanks to this unique and timely volume. **JFQ**

## PENETRATING THE HERMIT KINGDOM

A Book Review By

ROBERT W. SENNEWALD

### The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History

by Don Oberdorfer

Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997.

480 pp. \$30.00

[ISBN 0-201-40927-5]

Don Oberdorfer’s account of contemporary Korea is a must read for Asian specialists and laymen alike. It provides excellent background on complex events in the two Koreas over the last two and a half decades, the part played by the United States, and the impact of other major powers on the peninsula. While the book reminds us that formal U.S. contact with Korea began in 1882 (America being the first Western nation to establish diplomatic relations) and briefly touches on the Korean War, it is focused on the period from the early 1970s until the present.

Considered by many observers (including this reviewer) as the finest American reporter on East Asia, Oberdorfer is well qualified to write a detailed account of this period in Korean history. He covered most of the crises reviewed in *The Two Koreas* and conducted hundreds of interviews in the course of his research. While academics may be disappointed by the lack of documentation, his efforts to identify sources and offer a balanced view of events are impressive. Readers should heed the author’s admonition in the foreword that the book is a contemporary history which “seeks to transcend journalism but is written only a few years after the events it describes.” It requires a certain degree of intellectual courage to undertake such a work. Many controversies raged in both Seoul and Washington over issues treated in the book which continue to generate strong reactions for those involved in the saga on the Korean

General Robert W. Sennewald, USA (Ret.), was commander in chief of U.S. Forces Korea from 1982 to 1984.

Korean officer standing watch on *USS Princeton* during RIMPAC '96



U.S. Navy (Felix Garza)

peninsula. Finally, one should not be deterred by the tendency of journalists to take some liberties with their prose.

*The Two Koreas* chronicles a legacy of strife which is attributed in large part to geography. It explains tensions on the Korean peninsula that range from contacts between North and South, to high-sounding peace initiatives, to violence along the demilitarized zone and the assassination of a South Korean president. Moreover, the pivotal role of the United States is examined throughout. Many lessons emerge for government leaders on both sides of the Pacific, including that:

- Washington has had little leverage on the domestic scene in South Korea since the 1970s
- dealing with both Koreas is not a typical exercise in diplomacy for the United States
- lack of accurate information on the North seriously complicates policymaking in both Seoul and Washington
- Seoul has a difficult time dealing with Washington on issues involving the North.

A major portion of this book is appropriately devoted to defining the Chun Doo Hwan era, including the Kwangju incident and the nuclear problem in the 1990s. The latter account warrants close consideration and presents a feasible explanation of American policy, although with a distinct State Department flavor. Oberdorfer skillfully and breathlessly recounts the U.S. slide toward war in the spring of 1994. Many Korean observers believe the potential for conflict at that time was misread and greatly exaggerated by Washington. The author acknowledges differences of opinion over the threat when he concludes the discussion of the war scare by observing that it will be years before we learn the truth about just how close the Korean peninsula came to war.

Oberdorfer has made a valuable contribution to our general knowledge of Korea and to the trials and tribulations of its people over the last 25 years. Unfortunately, his book appeared before the recent Asian financial meltdown opened another dynamic chapter in Korean history. **JFQ**

## AMERICA'S LONG ROAD TO VIETNAM

A Book Review by

ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR.

**Dereliction of Duty:  
Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara,  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
and the Lies That Led to Vietnam**

by H.R. McMaster  
New York: Harper Collins, 1997.  
446 pp. \$27.50  
[ISBN 0-06-018795-6]

Following the Bay of Pigs, President John Kennedy observed that, while victory has many fathers, defeat is an orphan. In *Dereliction of Duty*, however, H.R. McMaster ponders the period leading up to the deployment of U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam in summer 1965 and finds that their eventual defeat was fathered by almost every leader of the national security community.

The author, a serving Army officer, uses recently released documents that include records of White House meetings and deliberations by the Joint Chiefs. But he does not so much break new ground on events leading to intervention in Vietnam as deepen our knowledge of what became a decade-long, slow-motion Bay of Pigs. Although there are few revelations, readers are rewarded by his painstaking research, which presents a vivid account of the policy process that ultimately led to the greatest U.S. military defeat of this century.

Few of the players escape indictment. President Lyndon Johnson appears as a commander in chief who sees Vietnam as a subject for damage control, not serious strategic thought. He first determines that the conflict is an impediment to his election as President in his own right, and then a barrier to the Great Society, which he hopes will secure him a place in history not unlike that of Franklin Roosevelt. Toward that end LBJ is not above "slow rolling" the American

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., USA (Ret.), is the author of *The Army and Vietnam*.



Johnson, McNamara, and Taylor.

Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library

people, their elected representatives, and the media. He approves a strategy of gradually increasing pressure on the communist regime in North Vietnam. But it is more of an election and legislative consideration with little if any regard for military issues.

The President's senior civilian advisors appear to be willing (though increasingly anxious) supporters of his approach to the war and dismissive of the Nation's senior military leaders, who seem to be old warriors who do not grasp that the nuclear age has changed the nature of conflict. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy are depicted as intent on managing the war by using political science game theory and analytic methodologies, attempting to send the proper "signals" to Hanoi to cease and desist from supporting the Viet Cong.

The difficulty with efforts to micro-manage the war was demonstrated in a tragic, yet comic episode in which the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor, frets that the newly initiated Rolling Thunder bombing campaign is not

proceeding with growing intensity from the central panhandle to the northern heartland of Vietnam and thus may not send the right signal. The Joint Chiefs, however, are more interested in destroying Hanoi's military capabilities, causing strikes to be postponed—with a corresponding reduction in the tempo of the bombing—when poor weather obscures the most lucrative targets. At the same time, to safeguard his domestic political flank Johnson placed tight restrictions on "marching" bombing raids into the Red River Delta, thereby stopping Taylor's "mounting crescendo" in its tracks.

As the Nation slowly proceeded down the road toward tragic intervention, the Joint Chiefs emerge as an object of both sympathy and contempt. At times they are depicted as isolated from policymaking on the war, denied by McNamara (and supported by two Chairmen, Maxwell Taylor and Earle Wheeler) the opportunity to present their views to the President. Much more disturbing is the account of occasions when McNamara, Taylor, and

Wheeler distorted recommendations by the Joint Chiefs or selectively cited them to advance their agendas with LBJ. Here the evidence is compelling and the author's verdict is both chilling and blunt: "When the Chiefs' advice was not consistent with his own recommendations, McNamara, with the aid of the Chairman . . . lied in meetings of the National Security Council about the Chiefs' views."

But the Chiefs also appear as the "gang that couldn't shoot straight." When opportunities arose to advance a persuasive strategy, they invariably squabbled over the proper course of action. Their inability to put aside service rivalry and adopt a unified approach left them on the sidelines in senior level policy debates over Vietnam.

Far more disturbing, however, was the willingness of several members of the Joint Chiefs to put the welfare of their service ahead of national interests. General Harold Johnson, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, agonized over whether to resign in protest, then decided to stay on, in McMaster's words, to "protect the Army's interests as best he could." Admiral David McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations, mutes his criticism of McNamara's approach to the war after the latter supported retaining the position of commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command, as a Navy billet. This was an issue deemed vital for Navy morale and for McDonald's credibility within the service. General John McConnell, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was chosen for this position only after assuring the President that he could support policies inconsistent with his views as a professional officer. The Joint Chiefs backed Johnson's approach despite a lack of faith in its efficacy, while consoling themselves that their strategic logic would eventually prevail. It did not.

What the President wanted most from the Joint Chiefs was their loyalty and support, not professional military advice. Strategy was subordinate, in Lyndon Johnson's mind, to the need to protect his domestic power base and enact the Great Society. Although Robert McNamara may have been a barrier between the President and senior military leaders, the fact remains that Johnson saw the Joint Chiefs not

as a source of counsel, but rather as a constituency he wanted on board to protect himself from accusations that he was soft on the war. As the author notes, when members of the Joint Chiefs named by Eisenhower retired, Kennedy and Johnson replaced them with men who would not “pull a MacArthur” or who, like Taylor, were comfortable with the nostrums of limited war deterrence theory.

This tragic state of affairs begs several important questions: What if the Joint Chiefs had gotten their way? What if the United States had applied far more military force more quickly than the Johnson administration permitted? Would it have made a difference? On this particular point the author leaves us with the somewhat ambiguous and ultimately unsatisfying observation that the war “was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of *The New York Times* or on the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C., even before Americans assumed sole responsibility for the fighting in 1965. . . .” But that is not so. The conflict was lost principally in Vietnam. It was lost by a succession of Saigon regimes that could not command the loyalty and support of their people to extract the sacrifices required to prevail. And it was also lost because the enemy proved to be resourceful and both willing and able to wage a protracted conflict, which the United States was not.

Putting aside speculation over “Who lost Vietnam,” McMaster has written a compelling and detailed account of a policymaking process that led to defeat. Already in its fifth printing with 55,000 copies in circulation, *Dereliction of Duty* is a must-read for anyone with interest in that conflict or civil-military relations. **JFQ**

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and comments

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## THE NEW LIVING ROOM WAR

A Book Review by

ROBERT B. OAKLEY

### Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations

by Warren P. Strobel  
Washington: U.S. Institute of  
Peace Press, 1997.  
304 pp. \$29.95  
[ISBN 1-878379-68-2]

Warren Strobel has produced a well-researched and well-written study of the influence that the media exerts on U.S. foreign policy, with special emphasis on recent attempts at peacekeeping. He makes the penetrating observation that the media is apt to have more effect on peace operations than on conventional military operations and illustrates this point by examining events in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda. He shows why “understanding properly the role of the news media is vital to the future of American foreign policy.”

*Late-Breaking Foreign Policy* deals with print and electronic media, particularly the latter's accelerating impact on policymaking. Based on a range of sources and his own research, Strobel concludes that the media does not by itself exercise a determining influence on policy. That opinion is shared by others such as Ted Koppel. However, his analysis as well as some of his other conclusions reveal that this is an oversimplification. Among the operations he examines are instances in which the media had a major impact on policy.

The argument advanced by those who, like Strobel, believe that there is no “CNN effect” in the making of foreign policy is that powerful media influence results from weaknesses in policy. When there is sufficient public and congressional support and policymakers are resolute, the media cannot change policy. Yet this tends to belittle the demonstrated power of the media to

Robert B. Oakley served as special envoy to Somalia under Presidents Bush and Clinton.

alter public and congressional opinion by providing a decisive weapon to opponents of a policy who have been unable to prevail otherwise. It seems to vastly underrate our political system as it now functions within the reality of an energized public with limited long-term perspectives.

Occasionally, determined officials have tried to explain their policy to stay on course in the face of what could have been a major backlash—even with a significant loss of life, which Strobel identifies as the number one determinant of negative public reaction. One such case was the 1987 Iraqi missile attack that killed 37 sailors aboard *USS Stark* in the Persian Gulf. The President and the Secretaries of State and Defense had already argued in favor of protecting friendly shipping. Moreover, the merits of maintaining U.S. presence had been virtually an article of faith since the Carter doctrine, and the Reagan administration was firmly behind it. Contrast that with the reaction to the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, which obliged the same officials to reverse the policy of our military presence in Lebanon. However, the carnage of the bombing was shown in bloody detail shortly after it took place, creating public shock. There were no television pictures of *USS Stark* for several days since it was at sea; and there were none of the fatalities.

Certainly images of dead American soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu and another being held in captivity had a profound influence on the decision by the Clinton administration to pull out in six months. Following a meeting with congressional leaders when the President set March 31, 1993 as a deadline for withdrawal, Senator Sam Nunn and Representative Lee Hamilton privately criticized the announcement of a date for withdrawal since it would strengthen the hand of Aideed, who could simply wait out the United States. However, when asked what Congress would have done if Clinton had appealed to his prerogative as commander in chief and refused to set any limit, both men replied that Senator William Byrd could have easily gotten a law passed



SRO news conference,  
Sarajevo.

1<sup>st</sup> Combat Camera Squadron (Lance Cheung)

requiring that all U.S. forces be out of Somalia before January 1, 1993.

Strobel is on solid ground since his careful examination of peace operations draws upon interviews with military and civilian personnel in the field and in Washington, higher levels in the administration, members of Congress, and other observers. He offers perceptive insights, starting with the comment that there is much less margin of error in the conduct of peace operations than in more traditional military efforts. This can be attributed to the lower degree of national commitment to such operations—which are more complicated and must avoid an excessive use of force—and to inescapable media attention, at least during initial stages of an operation. Thus he concludes that peace operations “require a more sophisticated understanding on the part of military and civilian officials of news media behaviors.” He gives an accurate account of operations and demonstrates the negative consequences that occur when this “more sophisticated understanding” does not exist. This conclusion has not only been endorsed by officials and military commanders involved, it has become doctrine for the Army and Marines in planning for peace operations.

The book shows how the media—together with nongovernmental organizations, Congress, and individuals within a hesitant administration—promote their own policy agendas. In looking at the Rwanda and Somalia operations, Strobel documents the advocacy of interventionist policies by actors deeply concerned over dire humanitarian situations and how they provided information to the media to

advance their perspective on addressing the root cause.

Strobel cites senior officials (including a former national security advisor to the President, Brent Scowcroft) who asserted that absent TV cameras, the United States might not have mounted these operations. He also points out how Secretary of State James Baker used television coverage of his visit to Iraqi Kurds to build support for the humanitarian policies of the Bush administration and how Brian Atwood, the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, used it to precipitate the decision for massive assistance of the Rwandan refugees. On the other hand, he notes the limits of the media in influencing the Bush administration on U.N. peace operations in Bosnia. To support his arguments he has gathered data on media coverage, how the level of that coverage varied, and its ultimate impact.


*Late-Breaking Foreign Policy* is a laudable book on a controversial subject which contains useful background for civilian officials and military officers. It is worthwhile for anyone engaged in peace operations in particular and military operations other than war in general. Strobel explains both how the media operates and how to work with media representatives rather than accepting the adverse consequences of not cooperating.

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## For your reference shelf...

Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997*, provides a comprehensive summary of details on joint planning and execution that cannot be found elsewhere. It presents an overview of the players, processes, and procedures used in the joint arena as well as a wide range of reference material of interest to joint staffs as well as officers in the field and fleet.

AFSC Pub 1 can be found on the Internet (at [www.afsc.edu](http://www.afsc.edu)) and also can be accessed through the Joint Electronic Library. Copies are for sale from the Superintendent of Documents at \$38.00 each by writing to: U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, or phoning (202) 512-1800 [GPO stock no. 008-020-01422-2]. In addition, it may be purchased from the Defense Automated Printing Service (DAPS) for \$14.00 by contacting Don Mruk in San Diego, California, at (619) 556-7187/DSN 526-7187 or Everett Morton in Norfolk, Virginia, at (757) 444-7724/DSN 464-7724 (extension 19).



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