

A Word from the



Soldiers preparing for mission in Afghanistan.

U.S. Army (Milton H. Robinson)

Chairman

Joint warfighting is constantly evolving in theory and practice. Military and defense professionals train for and expect operations to be joint. To win, we must fight as a team. And combatant commanders plan on joint operations as a matter of course. Recently, the term *joint* has begun to assume a broader common definition and an air of expectedness.

It is routine for more than one service to perform together in experiments, exercises, or battles. Joint operations are our baseline. Yet in discussing jointness we tend to envision far more than just two services working together. We see a joint team functioning with other agencies as

well as foreign nations and perhaps even non-governmental organizations.

The global war on terrorism ushered in an era of enhanced jointness in which coalition and interagency participation is the norm. Professional military education promotes integration among services, agencies, and allies, who are all routinely included in exercises and operations.

Within the Government, we find considerably more common, comprehensive, and important interagency cooperation. Warfighting commands and various agencies must be aware of

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each other's plans and coordinate actively. Intelligence sharing, homeland defense, and synchronizing instruments of power are necessary to win the global war on terrorism.

Moving from service competition to routine joint operations has been accompanied by a significant cultural change. We must continue this evolution to embrace a new concept of enhanced joint operations—changes in the Armed Forces, governmental agencies, and allied nations.

History not only tells us where we have been; it offers clues about where we need to go. To illustrate the evolution of jointness, let me touch on just a few examples, from tentative cooperation among services to the enhanced joint warfighting required to combat terrorism.

Experimenting in Wartime

Interestingly, the tradition of joint warfighting can be traced to the early days of the Nation. For example, by April 1863, General Ulysses Grant had been trying to take Vicksburg for months. But nature provided an obstacle, spring rains. Union forces had to move quickly down the Mississippi River past the deadly Vicksburg defensive batteries to attack from the east—Grant's preferred approach. After seeking the counsel of Admiral David Porter, they elected to sail Union troops and supplies down the Mississippi.

With cavalry raids as a distraction, the riverborne transport scheme worked. The Union lost only one ship to the batteries. Grant was able to isolate Vicksburg from the east. Confederate forces finally surrendered July 4. Experimenting with joint warfighting helped the Union turn the tide of the Civil War. This series of events foreshadowed the importance of jointness to later military successes.

A Costly Lesson

The defeat at the Kasserine Pass exemplifies the poor integration and communication that led to tragedy during Operation Torch in February 1943. The operation was designed to drive Axis forces out of North Africa, but our troops were inexperienced and untested. American leaders tried to use airpower simultaneously as artillery and an umbrella for ground units. Unfortunately, inadequate communications, planning, and synchronization plagued the Allied forces.

The Allies ceded air superiority, leading to insufficient air support for ground operations in the pass. Unable to achieve control of the air over the battlefield, ineffective air support combined with inexperienced American troops and poor battlefield communications led to a costly defeat by troops under General Erwin Rommel.

F/A-18C taking off,
Iraqi Freedom.



U.S. Navy (Philip A. McDaniel)

However, the Allies learned from their mistakes and issued new orders for Allied airpower to strike interdiction and rear echelon targets. This allowed airpower to decimate Axis support logistics in Tunisia and helped turn the balance in favor of the Allies.

With a more focused and synchronized air campaign, fortified Allied surface forces pushed the Axis back. Adolf Hitler all but abandoned his

African army. And in May 1943, the Axis lost North Africa and the Allies prepared for a push north through Italy.

The North African campaign illustrated that Allied combined arms warfare could be inefficient

and dangerous when planned poorly. Allied commanders quickly learned the importance of coordinated and integrated planning between components and nations.

Jointness in the Storm

In 1991, Operation Desert Storm showed unprecedented jointness on a theater-wide scale. Yet while successful in achieving U.S. and Coalition

objectives, the war was often a segregated affair—more deconflicted than integrated.

Desert Storm introduced new concepts of operations and innovations that previewed the military transformation of the 1990s. Perhaps the greatest was effects-based operations. This concept promoted an attempt to control an enemy, as opposed to traditional warfighting strategies of attrition or annihilation.

The Coalition commander would restrict enemy decisionmaking processes in order to take away options. In Desert Storm, the Coalition was able to accomplish this without entirely crushing Iraq's infrastructure or annihilating its army.

Precision, speed, and superior intelligence allowed the Coalition to target the enemy by disrupting its command and control and decisionmaking. Countrywide military pressure all but paralyzed the Iraqi leadership, and a crushing ground assault pushed dug-in enemy troops from Kuwait.

Desert Storm highlighted the role of precision and ad hoc innovations in the area of time-sensitive targeting. The Scud hunting operations in western Iraq particularly reflected a new capability, leading to a decade of experimentation with joint time-sensitive targeting procedures and technology.

Desert Storm highlighted the role of precision and ad hoc innovations in the area of time-sensitive targeting

The Scud hunt saw Special Operations Forces (SOF) closely collaborating with the air component on near real-time strikes. In one case in 1991, a team was bracing for assault by an enemy helicopter in western Iraq. The team radioed an airborne F-15E and passed their position and situation. The fighter launched and guided a 2,000-pound laser guided precision bomb, destroying the hovering helicopter.

This type of SOF-airpower coordination was desperate, unplanned, and impractical, but it worked. As a result, nascent collaboration between Special Operations Forces and joint aerospace power became a preview of hugely effective tactics used in Afghanistan. However, despite some limited successes in Desert Storm, the potential of special operations was largely unrealized.

Enduring Freedom

After the atrocities of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom showed the inherent flexibility of the U.S. joint force and the importance of a new style of coalition operations. Special operators of all services, and coordination with elements of several U.S. and allied governmental agencies, were commonplace and critical.

SOF teams collaborated successfully with Coalition air components and together delivered bombs and shared

satellite communications, navigation, and a host of intelligence assets. The result reinforced the importance of even more effective integration and new operational concepts. The services had gone to school on Desert Storm experiences in Scud hunting and integrating sea, air, space, and SOF assets.

Afghanistan demonstrated a new paradigm where select U.S. forces, supported by joint air- and spacepower, could act as force multipliers. In Enduring Freedom, 21st century technology paired cavalry charges—right out of the 14th century—with the most advanced weapons to defeat a larger army of well-equipped fighters. In fact, the force multiplication capability of air- and spacepower teamed with Special Operations Forces was unprecedented. In December 2001, when the Taliban fell from power, only about 1,500 American military personnel were on the ground. However, their combat effectiveness surpassed traditional views of their capabilities.

The importance of this new jointness became evident after 9/11 and was reinforced by American successes in Afghanistan. SOF and interagency assets were integrated and integral to the plan and the operation. And in preparing lessons learned while the operation was unfolding, the services, joint components, and combatant commands shared notes and experimented with improvements in strategy, technology, and operational coordination.

Millennium Challenge

In summer 2002, U.S. Joint Forces Command conducted Millennium Challenge, a large experiment that generated thousands of data points and hundreds of ideas. Participants examined dozens of concepts, initiatives, and warfighting issues. One highlight was the joint fires initiative for time-sensitive targets, a Web-based, collaborative tool that allowed land, maritime, and air commanders to share awareness and knowledge simultaneously. Allies also participated.

All components knew the priority targets selected by the joint force commander. They had access to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets of other components to find targets. Once found, they chatted in real time on which component could engage those targets. At the same time, they decided which assets could best conduct post-strike battle damage assessment.

During Millennium Challenge, the decision and execution process in time-sensitive targeting often took less than an hour. By sharing information and fostering trust, the joint team got the job done with considerably improved timelines. They had developed a faster decision cycle—and history shows that those who make better decisions faster usually win.

Iraq and the War on Terrorism

The joint fires initiative and the time sensitive targeting tested and refined in Millennium Challenge and in Afghanistan continued to evolve during Iraqi Freedom. An attack against Saddam Hussein in a hotel took 45 minutes—from the time we received the intelligence to bombs hitting the target. Our time to attack can be under an hour, but we need to push for a faster response.

The common operating picture is also a great example of the type of integration and information sharing that speeds decisionmaking and is truly transformational. In Desert Storm, the air component commander had a reasonably good battlefield picture. During the battle in Afghanistan, the air component commander had a much better picture, with considerably more real-time sensor information conveniently displayed in addition to the blue force positions.

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Marines refueling near
Az Zubayr, Iraq.



1st Marine Division Combat Camera (Kevin C. Quibus, Jr.)

But throughout the 1990s, and even in Afghanistan during Enduring Freedom, the ground component had poorer connectivity and a less complete picture.

For Iraqi Freedom, however, U.S. Central Command insisted that all the components share a very similar picture of the battlefield and theater. Information sharing enabled the component commanders to provide reachback support to forward tactical units and to coordinate and integrate their plans. The ground command operations center in Doha, Qatar, was as sophisticated as the combined air operations center in Saudi Arabia. And just as importantly, the corps commander and division commanders shared this common operating picture as well.

Iraqi Freedom portended a crucial trend useful for fighting the global war on terrorism: the increasing importance of multiple agencies and nations combining efforts over an extended period. It demonstrated the effectiveness of long-term, multifaceted relationships between organizations and allies geared toward achieving common goals. In the case of Iraq, this meant:

- diplomatic efforts at coalition building
- years of weapons and tactics improvements in all the components
- reducing Iraqi air defense and command and control capabilities through months of targeted airstrikes

- months of focused and deliberate psychological operations against Iraqi military commanders, troops, and regime supporters

- years of sanctions on the regime and terrorist leaders

- preparation for humanitarian and civil emergencies

- maritime control of the Arabian Gulf

- in due course, a closely coordinated and flexible, 24/7, all-weather land-sea-air and SOF component blitz that crushed the Iraqi military.

But what won the war was the ability of the Coalition to remove the enemy sanctuary in time and space. This was done by integrating a range of combat and other capabilities, as well as overcoming unique logistic challenges. Iraqi Freedom has illustrated the importance of enhanced jointness—with shared intelligence and coordinated informational, diplomatic, economic, and military actions contributing to an unprecedented success.

The combatant commander achieved superiority in all areas of space and time, which led to Coalition success in the major combat phase. He was able to make better decisions faster than the enemy. Well understood rules of engagement and exceptional red teaming and planning for what-ifs made the most of Coalition flexibility—and gave friendly forces a tighter decision cycle. He

B-52 heading for Iraq.



30th Communications Squadron (Richard Freeland)

gained air and space superiority. And joint air- and spacepower enabled persistent surveillance and strike operations. A rapid maneuver campaign by the ground component was supported by air and psychological operations, as well as by space navigation and communications. Though the fighting was intense, Coalition ground forces were able to push quickly to Baghdad with skill and determination.

When some pundits erroneously stated that the ground advance was bogged down or stalled during a blinding sandstorm, they missed the deadly precision attacks and incredible all-weather capability of the joint and combined team. During that sandstorm, Coalition airpower worked in concert with precision ground maneuvers to decimate two Republican Guard divisions—breaking the back and crushing the morale of the Iraqi military. Coalition precision attack and C⁴ISR capability was the result of years of research and development, exceptional weapons, shared knowledge between component and combatant commanders, and appropriate rules of engagement.

Effectively, integrated components did the fighting in Iraqi Freedom. Commanders and planners included allied and American personnel from other agencies from the start. This enhanced capability, whereby components integrate and include allies and interagency personnel in planning and execution, must be a key characteristic of combatting terrorism.

Unlike Iraqi Freedom, most battles in the global war on terrorism will not be conventional. As a result, all elements of national power must

be better integrated. Financial services, law enforcement, diplomatic efforts, and commercial activities both at home and abroad, as well as humanitarian and civil organizations, must be included in all appropriate phases, from planning to combat to the transition to a lasting peace.

As Iraqi Freedom moves into the stability phase, we will continue to fight the global war on terrorism. This requires continuing to coordinate and share information across agency, component, and command lines. We must do better in synchronizing current operations with all instruments of national power and in sharing intelligence to anticipate and deny future attacks.

To fully integrate the Armed Forces, we must breach institutional stovepipes and establish effective lines of communication. For the most part, culture will also have to change with regard to classified intelligence—*need to know* must give way to the *need to share*. We must calculate the risk of exchanging intelligence in this new enhanced environment with other agencies and countries. I bet that careful calculation will indicate that it is safer to share information to preclude terrorist attacks than retain overclassified information that no one acts on. I know this will be a big change, but a new risk calculus reflects our enhanced joint world.

Historical lessons are anecdotes, not prescriptions for the future. The only thing we can be sure of after the recent war in Iraq is that our next major operation will be quite different. Therefore, we must be prepared for a variety of contingencies. The enhanced joint environment I have described will encourage sharing information and deliberately coordinating the instruments of power in planning and in execution.

This flexibility accompanied by operating across organizational seams will ultimately make the United States and its allies stronger and safer. We can be certain that in moving from a segregated to an integrated approach, the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts—just as our forebears found in fighting the Nation's wars of the distant past.

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff