

A Word from the



Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF, meeting peacekeeping commanders in Haiti

Chairman

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Andy Dunaway)

As we struggle against international terrorists, we have learned that the very freedoms that define America also create vulnerabilities. Terrorists attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities to force us to abandon the hard-won freedoms we enjoy and destroy our way of life. Benjamin Franklin once said, “They that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” The challenge of maintaining America’s security and freedom falls to our brave servicemen and women.

Today, violent extremists, with their potential to create catastrophic effects with weapons of mass destruction, make success imperative. Weapons of mass destruction, a global economy,

accessible technology, unregulated cyberspace, and widely available satellite navigation and communications provide our enemies with cheap resources that were previously available only to first world powers.

Many call the terrorists’ strategy *asymmetric warfare*, that is, attacking us at our weak points—our citizens and commerce—while avoiding our strengths by generally steering clear of direct military confrontation. We spend considerable energy studying terrorists and their methods and motivations. While we must not underestimate the threat, we must also recognize that America possesses asymmetric advantages.

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One of our key advantages is our battlespace management capability. Overall, I think of *battlespace management* as the aggregate of our command, control, communications, and computers (C⁴) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, or what we often call C⁴ISR. It is a *system of systems*.

In the past, we have used many of these systems in custom architectures that are elaborate and functional but expensive. Now we are learning how to integrate and standardize these systems, cutting across service and command stovepipes, to facilitate control of not just one battlefield but of multiple operations across a larger battlespace.

Taking a holistic view, the goal of the battlespace management system is to give commanders the best situation awareness possible. Accurate battlespace awareness provides the capability to turn knowledge into effects tailored to achieve our Nation's military and political objectives.

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The information age has made it possible to achieve desired effects with such speed, precision, and power that new concepts of battlespace management are absolutely required. We also need to move past stovepipes that may have outlived their helpfulness. *ISR* was a Cold War term that many organizations continue to use. The acronym evolved as people recognized the connection between the elements. But today the distinction between these specific intelligence-gathering terms is blurred.

In the past, I have used *battlespace awareness* to replace *ISR*, and it is really a subset of the greater battlespace management system. Now all battlespace management components must work together to facilitate information collection, fusion, and sharing with the goal of enabling rapid, accurate decisions both in the field and at the national level. This data fusion must help build an accurate, real-time, common operating picture so all commanders can seamlessly share information and execute operations or missions.

In our present conflict with violent extremists, the battlespace includes the entire world. The conflict spans nation-states and cultures, continents and oceans, and international boundaries and combatant command regions of responsibility. Individuals fighting terrorists are operating

P-3 on battlespace
surveillance training



U.S. Navy / Alesha A. Stanaitis

on nonmilitary and cross-border fronts, and their efforts involve law enforcement, diplomacy, and finance. We thus need new battlespace management capabilities to transform our military competencies from joint operations to integrated operations that reflect the new partners we must coordinate with to defeat terrorists, such as other U.S. agencies, allied militaries and governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private industry. And to maximize our effectiveness, we must integrate from planning, to execution, to the transition to peace. Employing a coherent strategy that uses all instruments of power in concert will ensure success over the long term.

While we traditionally have done fairly well at moving intelligence and other information up and down chains of command, we sometimes have trouble exchanging information horizontally. We need better horizontal integration, fox-hole-to-fox-hole and among agencies and allies, as well as across organizational stovepipes.

We also need a more coherent approach to building battlespace management and integrating all the moving parts. We built an effective but expensive custom command and control system for Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and another for operations in Haiti. But we cannot continue to fight that way because it takes too long to build a team and train it, and it costs too much.

To maximize effectiveness and better use limited assets, we need to standardize battlespace management capabilities across the joint force. Each regional combatant command is creating a standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ). In peacetime, these organizations will train and stand ready to respond on day one of a crisis. In wartime, they become the core and cadre for the commander's headquarters. SJFHQs will be able to deploy using reachback to reduce the forward footprint or to fully deploy, as the situation requires.

Integral to the SJFHQ is a powerful, deployable joint command and control (DJC2) suite. Because we will have a standardized, comprehensive suite of tools and experts trained to use it, DJC2 will improve our battlespace management advantage in standing joint force headquarters. Some of the DJC2 systems are operational, and more tools will be coming on line over the next few years. This joint capability will soon be far more standardized among the combatant commands, cutting across traditional regional stovepipes. Standardized plug-and-play equipment and similarly trained personnel will enable commanders to more flexibly tailor their headquarters for each joint task force in their areas of responsibility.

Elements of the SJFHQ deployed to Haiti in the spring of 2004, but the headquarters ele-



1st Combat Camera Squadron (Andy Dunaway)

Marine officer and Director General of Haitian National Police reviewing map of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, March 6, 2004

JIACGs make it easier for commanders to build strategies that are better integrated with nonmilitary instruments of national power

ment and all its planning tools were not yet fully operational. With DJC2, we will have a scalable headquarters capability, with the latest standardized battlespace management tools, available and ready in each regional combatant command.

An important part of each SJFHQ is the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), a team of interagency representatives working together to integrate from planning through execution and resident in each combatant commander's SJFHQ. JIACGs help integrate operations by sharing information and planning with other U.S. Government agencies. Ultimately, JIACGs make it easier for commanders to build more

coherent strategies that are better integrated with other nonmilitary instruments of national power.

The SJFHQ concept is a departure from the ad hoc staffing of our operations centers in the past. We are moving into the information age and realizing the vision of network centric operations. The SJFHQ is the kind of innovative organization we must pursue if we want to maintain our asymmetric advantage in battlespace management. We are linking computers, databases, sensors, and platforms while encourag-

ing a new information-sharing culture to grow across stovepipes.

More remains to be done to meet the high demand for joint task forces (JTFs) for the war on terrorism, humanitarian assistance missions, and emerging threats. The number of operational JTFs has increased nearly 150 percent since 2000, with 24 operational in 2004, creating enormous personnel challenges for the services and combatant commanders. U.S. Joint Forces Command is leading the effort to determine the best way to meet this demand.

America's command and control advantage is a combination of incredible tools, such as DJC2, and the people who expertly employ them. The services and combatant commands must ensure that enough personnel are available with the skill sets needed to maintain our superiority in battlespace management. Likewise, JTF commanders must balance the benefits and challenges associated with trading reachback for forward presence in their joint force headquarters, such as footprint, bandwidth, logistic impact, mobility, and personnel.

Our battlespace management capability is one of America's greatest military advantages. We are transforming the Armed Forces while we fight to secure our legacy of liberty. It is a tough task, but the stakes could not be higher. The enemy is agile and determined. Fortunately, we have the resolve, dedication, and ingenuity of millions of dedicated servicemen and women and civilians ensuring that freedom triumphs over fear.

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff