


# Book Reviews

Starting with this issue, the book review section will have a new dimension as part of our efforts to provide readers with more timely, tailored information. In an ideal world, the subjects of the books being reviewed in an issue of *JFQ* would coincide with its Forum topic. Such coordination would give interested readers the opportunity to delve more deeply into that theme. However, major publishers historically have not released their new books to correspond to our *JFQ* Forum schedule. Therefore, in addition to the traditional critiques by subject matter experts of timely new books of interest to the national security community, NDU Press staff and guest writers will offer suggestions for further reading that complements and expands upon the themes of each issue's Forum section—in this case, defense and security of the homeland.

## Homeland Security: A Documentary History

by Bruce Maxwell


Congressional Quarterly Press, October 2004  
522 pp \$99.00 [ISBN 1-5680-2884-9]



September 11 inarguably ushered in an era of a new brand of national threat, but the United States had been facing perils on its own soil almost concurrently with becoming a nation. Maxwell places both these threats and the responses to them into historical context in this book, a collection of 142 documents culled from over 1,000 sources including Presidential orders and directives,

Supreme Court decisions, studies by governmental and non-governmental groups and commissions, and transcripts of Congressional hearings. Through these documents, Maxwell traces the path of homeland security from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1789 to the *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* of 2004. Web site addresses are provided for items that can be accessed online, as well as an extensive bibliography. Maxwell has done much of the heavy lifting for homeland security researchers needing primary sources.

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Judith S. Yaphé and Charles D. Lutes conclude that Washington may have little choice other than to live with a nuclear-armed Iran. Revisiting an earlier study, this reexamination takes into account the 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2005 elections in Iran, and new evidence of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons-related technology.

Available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, \$8.50 per copy.  
Stock number 008-020-01552-1



### Strategic Forum 218

#### *Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition: The Euro-Atlantic Dimension*

David T. Armitage, Jr., and Anne M. Moisan show the growing need for an international paramilitary police force as a possible way to fill the gap between the end of combat operations and the full restoration of civil authority.

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## Surprise, Security, and the American Experience


by John Lewis Gaddis

Harvard University Press, March 2004; paperback,

October 2004

150 pp \$18.95 [ISBN 0-6740-1174-0]

With a focus as defined as Maxwell's is broad, and a purpose as theoretical as Maxwell's is concrete, Gaddis uses three case studies to examine the effect of surprise on American national security and grand strategy: the British attack on Washington in 1814, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the terrorist attacks of September 11. Gaddis traces the pendulum swing of U.S. strategy from one of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony (followed by John Quincy Adams after 1814) to one of cooperation and alliance (employed by Franklin D. Roosevelt after 1941) and back again (but now applied on a global scale by George W. Bush since September 11). This pendulum swing has coincided with American perceptions (or at least those of America's leaders) of the likelihood of attaining national security by either expanding or contracting the U.S. circle of responsibility in the world. Gaddis attributes the fact that the circle is presently expanding to prudence, capability—and arrogance. Whether his conclusion intrigues



or angers you, Gaddis packs a lot of thought into this small book.

Finally, two new scholarly journals—one electronic and one print—recently have joined the ranks of literature contributing to the homeland security discourse and are worth a look.

Homeland Security Affairs, an online quarterly journal from the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, debuted with the Summer 2005 issue.

The center, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office for Domestic Preparedness, is part of the Naval Postgraduate School. The premiere issue highlights the theme of "Prevention"; future themes include "Critical Infrastructure Protection," "Intelligence and Information Sharing," and "Border Security." You can access the journal at <[www.hsaj.org/hsa/](http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/)>.

The second new player is from the Institute for Law and Public Policy at California University of Pennsylvania. *Homeland Security Review* is intended to be "an intellectual sounding board and research center for the many facets of homeland security." Publication was scheduled to begin in fall 2005.

L. Yambrick

## War and Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power


By James Kitfield

Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005

386 pp. \$27.50

ISBN: 1-5748-8959-1

Reviewed by JOSEPH J. COLLINS



James Kitfield's *War and Destiny* joins a growing number of books on the national security policy of the George W. Bush administration. The subject has attracted the talents of such notable writers as Bob Woodward (*Bush at War*, *Plan of Attack*), Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay

(*America Unbound*), and James Mann (*Rise of the Vulcans*). *War and Destiny* will rank with the best of them. It is the first book that encompasses Bush's foreign policy, defense policy, and defense transformation, and integrates them with a detailed first-person look at the war in Iraq.

Kitfield, a *National Journal* correspondent who was embedded with V Corps' main attack units in Iraq, has nearly two decades of national security experience and is the author of *Prodigal Soldiers* (1997), an artful chronicle of how the Army rebuilt itself after Vietnam. *War and Destiny*, his most recent book, is well written, comprehensive, and complex. It covers the gamut from high policy to the down-and-dirty aspects of war. Kitfield finds the Bush administration imprudent in its decision to fight in Iraq, insensitive to allies, intolerant of internal criticism, and harsh even toward its own generals. He is particularly critical of what he calls Bush's "revolution in foreign affairs"—the doctrine of preemption, downgrading of traditional allies in favor of coalitions of the willing, and rejection of multilateralism. These factors have, in his view, characterized Bush's approach to the world.

Another target is Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his efforts at transfor-

mation and the creation of a new model of warfare. Kitfield charges that micromanagement in the Pentagon left us too few troops in Iraq and poorly postured for the vital post-conventional combat phase of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.

Kitfield reserves most of his criticism of the war for the failure to plan for stability operations, the phase of peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction in which U.S. forces have taken over 90 percent of their casualties. He reminds us of the stability operations planning failures both in Washington and in the field. About the 3<sup>d</sup> Infantry Division, the spearhead of the coalition's offensive, he notes:

*There was no plan for occupying the city itself and transitioning to stability operations. There were no predetermined rules of engagement that would have allowed them to step in for absent police and put a halt to the rampant looting still under way. . . . Instead, there was a palpable sense of drift in those critical early weeks of liberation, as a vacuum of power settled over Baghdad like a low pressure zone* (p. 226).

In the end, the United States and its coalition partners had enough troops to defeat

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Colonel Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.), is a professor of national security strategy at the National War College and was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations from 2001 to 2004.

the Republican Guard, but not enough to deal with an insurgency. Kitfield sees gross strategic miscalculations, followed by slow adaptation to realities on the ground, as the root of the problems.

The author concludes that the war in Iraq, important as it may be, has cost the Nation political support abroad, huge amounts of money, 12,000 casualties, and precious credibility. Given the Pentagon's missteps in Iraq and its treatment of dissenters, Kitfield also finds its transformation plan suspect. His judgment of the substance of the Bush revolution is even more blunt:

[The Bush revolutionaries] failed to see how the perception of a superpower run amok would diminish the greater source of American power: the principles and ideals that others freely embraced and by which our good intentions and leadership are judged. At a critical moment in the history of the West, with storm clouds gathering all around, America's beacon flickered (p. 346).

If there is a limitation to the utility of Kitfield's analysis, it is that his eloquently written book is focused on a moving train. The war on terror demands that the Government plan and execute perfectly in a murky environment. Not only can we not accurately see the future, we also cannot know the consequences of what might have been. For example, what would have transpired if the United States and its coalition partners had not attacked Iraq? Would the world or the Iraqi people have been better off? Kitfield's analysis helps us to understand where we are today, but the complete record is more mixed, and the train has moved on.

There is much good news in the war on terror even if it often does not make the front page. In Iraq and Afghanistan, 50 million people have been liberated from horrid regimes that supported terror at home and abroad. In both countries, there have been democratic elections, and new governments grow daily in depth and effectiveness. New security forces have been trained that will one day replace American and coalition forces. Reconstruction has inched forward despite the hazards of insurgency. And in both countries, traditional U.S. allies are finally moving to do more, not less.

Elsewhere, the Bush revolution has sparked or influenced a number of democratic developments. Georgia, Lebanon, Egypt,

Palestine, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have all profited from the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan and the administration's emphasis on the spread of democracy. Much of this happened after Kitfield's book went to press, but it testifies to how fast the train is moving, and it certainly impacts on any future cost-benefit analysis of the war on terror.

Kitfield notes that the administration has been slow to learn and adapt—a fair critique—but seeing a problem and fixing it is easier to coach from the sidelines than it is to do in the arena of public policy. Many of the key tactical and logistic problems that arose after the combat phase of *Iraqi Freedom* have been or are being fixed. Our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are fighting harder and smarter. The training of competent Iraqi security forces is well under way. Both the State and Defense Departments are working on how to adapt their organizations and future policy to the necessity of stability operations.

Even defense transformation is moving ahead in all the services. Criticizing Secretary Rumsfeld may be fair, but we must also note the difficulty of his enterprise. The challenge of major structural, procedural, and organizational changes in the world's most powerful military force is daunting; doing it in wartime is as unprecedented as it is necessary.

Despite Kitfield's tough critique, the stakes must be kept in perspective. He would be the first to admit that Iraq is a "must-win" situation for the United States and the people of southwest Asia. The key to victory is the will of the American people. Senator John McCain, speaking in 2004 at the Council on Foreign Relations, made a prescient assessment:

*If we fail in Iraq, we will have taught our adversaries the lesson of Mogadishu, only a hundred fold: If you inflict enough pain, America will leave. Iraq will then descend into chaos and civil war. . . . We will have energized the extremists and created a breeding ground for terrorists, dooming the Arab world. . . . I fear U.S. public support is eroding. So I think we need to admit that serious errors have been made, increase . . . troop strength in Iraq, and do what is necessary to turn this thing around (p. 320). JFQ*

Thomas G. Mahnken is a professor of strategy at the Naval War College and a visiting fellow at the Phillip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

## Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom


by James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig

Washington, DC: Heritage Books, 2005

292 pp. \$24.95

ISBN: 0-9743-6654-4

Reviewed by THOMAS G. MAHNKEN



Although 4 years have passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the United States has waged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq since then, the American public has yet to engage in a discussion of strategy for the so-called global war on terror. Many basic but vital questions remain largely unexplored. Are we at war? If so, who or what is the enemy? What are their aims? What are their strengths and weaknesses? What is the nature of the war? And finally, what can we do to win?

In *Winning the Long War*, James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig attempt to answer these questions. Carafano, a senior research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Heritage Foundation, and Rosenzweig, a senior legal research fellow at the same institution, have complementary areas of expertise that allow them to address a broad range of national security challenges. They believe the war on terror should be viewed as a protracted engagement, like the Cold War. Indeed, they write

that the struggle with Soviet communism has much to teach us about the nature of the ongoing conflict with Salafist Islam. They further feel that figures of the early phases of the Cold War, such as Dwight Eisenhower, Paul Nitze, and particularly George Kennan, have much to teach us about how to wage and win protracted wars. Just as Kennan's "Long Telegram" provided the intellectual blueprint for the strategy of containment, Carafano and Rosenzweig mean to provide an overarching strategy for the current war.

A central challenge any democracy faces in a protracted war with an authoritarian adversary is how to win without assuming the characteristics of its enemy. How can a liberal democracy survive and even triumph while preserving liberty and prosperity? Turning to the early Cold War, the authors argue that Eisenhower devised a strategy for waging a protracted conflict that rested on four pillars: providing security, building a strong economy, protecting civil liberties, and waging a war of ideas (pp. 9–10). They argue that these building blocks remain as useful today as they were during the Cold War. The priorities for today's policymakers are to organize to fight over the long term, be patient, and get started (p. 12).

There clearly is much the Cold War can teach us about the struggle with Salafist Islamic terrorist groups. However, distilling that experience into a series of maxims can be simplistic and even dangerous. There is an understandable tendency to impose greater order on history than was apparent at the time, to see a straight, unbroken line extending from the Long Telegram to the collapse of the Soviet Union more than four decades later. That would be a mistake. The path that led to victory in the Cold War took many turns and led to detours and even such dead ends as *détente*. And containment of Soviet expansion took many forms. It is worth remembering that the title of John Lewis Gaddis' famous book refers to strategies, not the strategy, of containment. Indeed, the causes of the Soviet collapse and the role of the United States remain controversial to this day.

Carafano and Rosenzweig organize the book around a series of chapters that address the central strategic issues facing Washington today: offensive operations against terrorist groups, homeland security,

the need to provide security while preserving civil liberties, budgetary priorities, trade, and the war of ideas. In each case, the authors discuss the topic in the context of the Cold War before exploring it in a contemporary perspective and concluding with recommendations for policymakers. As one would expect from Heritage Foundation analysts, their policy prescriptions favor muscular defense, free markets, and restraints on government interference.

The book's breadth at times comes at the expense of depth. For example, its discussion of the force structure requirements of the current war is cursory. In the space of two pages, the authors argue against such "dumb" ideas as increasing the size of the Armed Forces and introducing conscription. Their argument for robust defense spending, ending the "nonessential" deployment of troops in the Balkans, shifting more troops to operational assignments, and continuing the base realignment and closure process takes another two pages. One would hope for a more extensive discussion of such important—and controversial—topics. When it comes to transforming the Armed Forces, the authors argue for reforming professional military education, restructuring combatant commands, establishing new organizations, and rethinking the equipment the Defense Department procures (pp. 42–43). It is hard to disagree with such broad recommendations. But the devil is in the details.

Carafano and Rosenzweig have written an accessible book that touches on the most important topics facing policymakers and the public. Let us hope that it triggers broad national debate over the ends, ways, and means of the current conflict. Such a discussion is very much needed. **JFQ**

**Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary:  
Constraining the Military Uses of Space**


*by Michael E. O'Hanlon*

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,  
2004

120 pp. \$16.95

ISBN: 0-8157-6457-X

**Reviewed by JOHN M. LOGSDON**



**T**his short book attempts to strike a middle ground between those who see space weaponization as inevitable and desirable, arguing that the United States should take the lead in developing capabilities to project force in and through space, and those contending that space should remain a weapons-free sanctuary. Michael O'Hanlon characterizes the 2001 report of Donald Rumsfeld's Space Commission, and especially its argument that the United States should move toward space weapons to prevent a "space Pearl Harbor," as "alarmist" (p. 120). He also calls the pressure from the arms control community for wide-ranging multilateral bans of space weaponry "unjustified" (p. 121). Rather, O'Hanlon calls for a "moderate and flexible U.S. military space policy" (p. 120).

O'Hanlon is not a space or arms control specialist. Rather, he is a national security generalist and brings that perspective to his analysis of the pros and cons of developing space weapons, which he defines to include "destructive" systems intended "for use against space or Earth targets" or "ground-based weapons designed explicitly to damage objects in space" (p. 8). His core argument is that it is in the interest of the United States, as today's dominant military space power, to adopt policies that delay the development of space weapons, without taking actions that would foreclose a future decision to develop such weapons.

The author develops his analysis in a straightforward manner. He first summarizes the current state of the argument about the future military uses of space. Then, since his study is intended for the nontechnical reader, he

**John M. Logsdon is director of the Space Policy Institute at The George Washington University.**

includes an excellent “brief primer of space and satellites.” He reviews the current and likely state of those technologies most relevant to developing space weapons and assesses probable threats to the current U.S. dominance in space. While he questions both the technological feasibility and desirability of some of the most ambitious proposals, such as space-based lasers and space-to-ground weapons, he suggests that developments in such areas as ground- or air-based high energy lasers and microsattellites could change the context for developing military space policies in coming years, particularly in terms of increasing the vulnerability of low orbit satellites.

As a useful means of demonstrating the complexities of the space weaponization issue, O’Hanlon presents a brief case study of the role of space systems in a possible conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan in the 2010–2015 time period. He asks whether, if China developed space capabilities that allowed it to track and target U.S. aircraft carrier battlegroups, it would not be in U.S. interest to have the antisatellite (ASAT) ability to deny those capabilities. And he raises the possibility that China in the coming decade could develop ASAT means of its own and thus be able to threaten space capabilities essential to current and planned U.S. approaches to warfighting. Without being faced with countervailing American ASAT threats, O’Hanlon fears that China might see its satellite capabilities as “war winning” (p. 103).

While China develops its space capabilities, it has also taken the lead within the United

Nations Conference on Disarmament and General Assembly in proposing a comprehensive international treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has argued that no such treaty is needed. O’Hanlon examines the case for arms control initiatives in space and concludes that a comprehensive ban on space weapons is neither feasible nor desirable. It would be difficult and perhaps impossible to verify whether a particular satellite possessed ASAT capabilities. He notes that space-based ballistic missile defenses could also be used in an ASAT role. Finally, as the Taiwan scenario suggests, there are situations in which the United States would not wish to be bound by such limitations. O’Hanlon does conclude that there are a number of “fairly narrowly construed” space arms control measures that make sense. For example, he argues the merit of an international treaty banning debris-causing activities in space, including the testing of ASAT measures against actual satellites.

The core of O’Hanlon’s analysis is his final chapter, “Preserving U.S. Dominance While Slowing the Weaponization of Space.” In addition to setting out several specific recommendations for achieving this objective, he warns that the United States is “probably entering an era when it should no longer count on its satellites remaining safe and secure,” and cautions against “blind optimism” regarding the availability of space assets in future conflicts (p. 129). Because this country “should assume that many types of military satellites may not be available in future wars” (p. 124),

dependence on space capabilities should not be total; alternatives for carrying out crucial missions should be retained. He also points out that national security satellites no longer “function primarily as the great stabilizers and arms control facilitators of the Cold War”; rather, they have become “tools of the tactical warfighter.” This reality, he concludes, undercuts the strategic and political case for treating satellites as protected assets or “viewing space as a sanctuary from military competition” (p. 141).

O’Hanlon calls for a “prudent hedging strategy” that makes sure the United States is not taken by surprise and technologically outdistanced by advances in military space, particularly those related to ASAT capabilities. The core principle of such a strategy is to “lead, but with restraint” (pp. 133–134).

*Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary* is a very sensible book, successfully charting a middle ground between the poles of the space weapons debate. Actually, the debate does not really exist today. Advocates and skeptics of the advantages for this country developing force-application capabilities for use in space are not yet talking to one another, and the “space weaponization” issue has not become a focus of overall national security discussions. This should change, and when it does, Michael O’Hanlon’s book will be a valuable starting point. **JFQ**

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