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Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 5

The Future Nuclear Landscape

In important ways, the world is at a nuclear crossroads. The complex and dynamic nuclear landscape presents us with challenges along at least four axes: regional nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, great power nuclear relations, and the security implications of increased interest in nuclear energy. These problems are interrelated in ways that the national security community does not fully understand. Strategy and policy frameworks do not address them in sufficiently integrated fashion. New conceptual thinking is required to develop a more unified understanding of and approach to managing the risks and opportunities posed by these 21st-century nuclear challenges.

Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4


China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools

Economic imperatives and strategic challenges are leading China to expand its international activities into different regions of the world. In this paper, Dr. Phillip C. Saunders analyzes the rationale and drivers for China's increased global activism; examines the tools China is employing and how they are being used; assesses the empirical evidence about priorities and patterns in China's global activities; and considers whether these activities reflect an underlying strategic design. The paper concludes with an overview of likely future developments and an assessment of the implications for the United States. (Available from NDU Press only)

Off the Shelf

As the articles in this issue's Forum highlight, the Iraq war and the war on terror are only two of myriad regional and functional threats that the United States must keep on its radar screen. The complexity of these threats precludes unilateral U.S. solutions and will require partnership—diplomatic, military, or economic—with allies. The United States and Europe barely had time to recalibrate their relationships to post-Cold War realities before September 11, and its aftermath necessitated another shift (in U.S. eyes, at least). Much of the world stood with the United States on September 12; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) surveillance planes and personnel were dispatched to patrol the east coast of the United States. Yet a few months later, NATO forces were left on the sidelines as the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan began, and many European and worldwide allies rejected participation in what they considered a war of choice in Iraq. The following book addresses the subject of how relations derailed, seemingly so quickly, and what might be done to reach a new state of normalcy for a new era.

*America and Europe After 9/11
and Iraq: The Great Divide*
by Sarwar A. Kashmeri
Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006
128 pp. \$44.95
ISBN: 0-275-99301-9



Sarwar Kashmeri, a fellow in the Foreign Policy Association, took up this topic after attending a conference exploring the European Union's impact on the transatlantic alliance. His approach was to talk with "eminent people with substantial expertise and hands-on experience in managing various aspects of the alliance and use their expertise to understand better the alliance's decayed state and to help chart a future for it" (p. xiv). The interlocutors were George H.W. Bush, James A. Baker, Wesley K. Clark, Chuck Hagel, John Major, Hugo Paemen, Ana de Palacio, Brent Scowcroft, Paul Volcker, and Caspar Weinberger.


Kashmeri concludes that the current transatlantic rift over the Iraq war is fundamentally different from ones that have occurred (and been overcome) in the past because the foundation of the post-World War II alliance has eroded to such a point that trying to rebuild on it is futile. One cornerstone of the foundation, Europe itself, has been transformed by the growth and strength of the European Union; unless the United States repositions its alignment with this altered European cornerstone, relating to it as an ally rather than a potential geopolitical rival, the foundation for relations will remain unstable.

A second source of friction is the role of NATO in a post-Cold War world: "The attempt to remake NATO as a global fighting machine makes the divide worse. . . . It is being forced to take on a new mission—operating anywhere in the world—for which it is singularly unqualified" (p. 44). The close connection between NATO and the United Nations, a tie held in high esteem by Europeans but largely disregarded by Americans, is another area of disagreement.

Kashmeri explains his perceptions of the sources of friction well, deftly interspersing his interviewees' comments to bolster his argument (the rather jolting candor of some comments, considering their sources, is a high point of the book). However, he falls short in recommending actionable ways to recreate the alliance, defaulting in several cases to a series of "Why not?" suggestions that are conceptually broad but practically weak ("why not reenergize NATO by using it to forge a consensus on new rules of engagement? . . . Who knows where this exercise will take the erstwhile alliance?") (p. 97). Who knows, indeed.

—L. Yambrick

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**Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond:
The U.S. Marine Corps
in the Second Iraq War**

by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds,
USMC (Ret.)
Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2005
276 pp. \$32.95
ISBN: 1-59114-717-4

Reviewed by
MARTIN J. SULLIVAN

Reynolds' first-draft history of Marine Corps participation in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) is intended as a framework for understanding how Marines coped with the challenges of their mission in 2002 and 2003: defeating Saddam's regime and its supporters and liberating the Iraqi people. Reynolds and his colleagues from the United States Marine Corps History and Museums Division collected an impressive amount of data from varied sources to present the story. Like most services' official historians, Reynolds appears to wage a battle to pull together a factual and informative narrative while avoiding exaggerated praise for Marine exploits. Nevertheless, his book raises several critical issues, particularly as it juxtaposes the Corps leaders' confident approach to combat in Iraq with their distaste for postcombat stabilization and security operations (SASO) and as it reveals the Iraqi conflict's implications for the U.S. military in preparing to fight socially complex and adaptive adversaries in the future.

Operations in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002 appeared to validate the organizational, planning, and operational flexibility of Marine Air Ground Task Forces claimed by Marine Corps planners. However, encounters with Taliban elements during Operation *Anaconda* in spring 2002 exposed systemic flaws in U.S. planning, decisionmaking, and warfighting methods at all levels. The Pentagon's excessive concern with troop levels and

deployments to Afghanistan, coupled with the U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM's) inadequate assessment of its mission, drove warfighters toward an operational solution insufficient for achieving the desired strategic endstates. Operation *Anaconda* should have reinforced to military planners how uncertainty and chance on the battlefield can overcome accepted doctrinal procedures and technological advances. The disputed issues in Afghanistan, chief among them a clear understanding of the differentiation between desired military effects and campaign endstates, would appear again during the march to war with Iraq in 2003.

Reynolds details I Marine Expeditionary Force's (I MEF's) efforts to align its operations and objectives to fit the USCENTCOM campaign plan's "shock and awe" rubric. Yet he does not address the most critical issue in the planning of this or any campaign: how senior leaders choose the effects their forces' actions would have against an adversary and ensuring those potential effects are consistent with achieving the Nation's endstates. Reynolds describes USCENTCOM's approach to its adversary as more forensic than anticipatory and molded by technicians with templates rather than by a realistic assessment of why and how an enemy might adapt its actions.

Reynolds recounts Marine officers complaining about the need for synchronicity between air and ground operations and expressing their uneasiness with an input-

based, procedural approach to war as exemplified by the Air Force's Air Tasking Order process. During OIF Phase III—decisive offensive operations—Marine combat units easily raced north from Kuwait and "liberated" Iraqi cities and towns as far away as Tikrit. But did prewar modeling, simulations, and wargames do nothing toward predicting or assessing the impact of USCENTCOM's "war-winning actions" on the Iraqis' complex political, economic, and social systems? If so, Reynolds does not account for how U.S. military officers found themselves facing an enemy they were not prepared to deal with in a country whose culture they did not understand. Rather, he implies that senior civilian leaders relied too much on information from the naive Iraqi expatriate coterie and made grossly erroneous assumptions about the Iraqis, their security forces, and the state of Iraq's economic and industrial infrastructure.


Still, it is hard to comprehend how USCENTCOM components overlooked the SASO mission during the campaign planning to the degree that Reynolds outlines. In prewar estimates, stability operations should have been proposed to last at least until the Iraqis or a coalition entity stood up a functioning government and reestablished the rule of law. There were opportunities during the rehearsals and preparations for the campaign to identify what kinds of interagency help commanders would need in conducting SASO missions. To test their validity, USCENTCOM and its components could have had independent experts review and challenge the assumptions the commands made during the preparations for war and the immediate postwar period. Whether the DOD Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs was stillborn, or its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority, was "amateurish" does not absolve military officers from planning and train-

ing for SASO as thoroughly as they would for combat.

Thus, despite sparse planning for postcombat missions, in mid-April I MEF received orders to undertake stability operations in Iraq. Reynolds describes the Marines' view of SASO as strictly the Army's business. Corps leaders felt it was time to leave "the sandbox" to "recock" for the next war. But where were the Marines planning to go when they "recocked"? Were the Corps' views on SASO in Iraq legitimate and credible given the strategic circumstances? In what other region were the risks to U.S. national security higher, in terms of the likelihood of severe consequences? Then, as now, are there other threats to America's strategic goals, or to the country's international credibility, as immediate and as great as the threat of failure to stabilize and secure Iraq? In subsequent versions of this history, Reynolds should examine whether the rapid redeployment of a substantial number of Marines to the United States impacted I MEF ability to provide security and contributed somehow to the rise of the Sunni insurgency or the expansion of the Shiite-backed militias.

Researching and writing history should not be viewed as an exercise to validate the status quo; well-written histories prompt questions and act as catalysts for change. Current Marine operations in Iraq, and particularly those in 2004 and 2005, are fueling questions about the training, equipping, and combat organization of the service. Notwithstanding his benevolent view of Marine operations in Iraq, Reynolds provides a service by developing a richer context for the continuing debate surrounding prewar strategic assumptions, the cultural dimensions of war, transformational initiatives, and concepts and doctrine for dealing with insurgencies. **JFQ**

Colonel Martin J. Sullivan, USMC (Ret.), is the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Planning at Hicks & Associates, Inc., and the former Director for Current Military Operations on the National Security Council (2003–2005).



**Rethinking the
Principles of War**

Edited by Anthony D. Mc Ivor
Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2005
272 pp. \$75
ISBN 1-59114-481-7

Reviewed by
GARY SHEFFIELD

Have the principles of war changed? Does the very notion of such principles have any relevance in the 21st century? These are the questions addressed by *Rethinking the Principles of War*, a product of a project begun in 2002 that was sponsored by the U.S. Office of Force Transformation and U.S. Navy. This book does not pretend to offer definitive pronouncements on these basic issues; as the preface states, it does not give “a prescription. . . . We are still asking questions” (p. xvi). The people asking the questions are an impressive group of some 30 thinkers, both civilian and military, drawn mainly but not entirely from the United States. Their 29 articles are loosely grouped into 5 parts, dealing with the concept of an American way of war, operational arts in conventional warfare, operational arts in irregular warfare, postconflict and stability operations, and intelligence. The inclusion of work by scholars such as Colin S. Gray, Jon T. Sumida, Milan N. Vejo, Wesley K. Wark, and many others provides an impressive and stimulating, if occasionally uneven, collection. All the authors have interesting things to say, and some individual articles are of excellent quality. The editor, Anthony D. Mc Ivor, is a defense and security analyst and editor of the *American Intelligence Journal* and is one of the progenitors of the *Rethinking* project.

The term *principles of war* is not without its problems because, as Antulio J. Echevarria convincingly demonstrates, the current Anglo-American selections are principles of *battle*, not war. They concentrate on the military defeat of the enemy, rather than holistically embracing political, social, and economic factors as well. Indeed, some of the most significant aspects of this book are the suggestions of new principles for various facets of conflict. Mary H. Kaldor, for example, proposes some “principles for the use of the military in human security operations” (p. 388). She gives primacy to human rights, which, in their emphasis on the rule of law, are not far away from the thinking traditionally employed in British counterinsurgency and peace support operations. Keith J. Masback and Sean Tytler, in their valuable piece “Refocusing Intelligence,” set out what seems at first glance to be blinding glimpses of the obvious—that intelligence agencies should develop “a culture of stewardship rather than ownership” (p. 541), for instance—but history shows that these basic principles *do* need to be restated.


Parts of the book are an assessment of where we have come from as much as where we are going, and as such, military historians will find much of value. It should also be required reading for military professionals and scholars concerned with current defense issues, as it

pushes forward the debate on the future of warfare. But after finishing the book, I was confirmed in my view that less has changed than some pundits would have us believe. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 had much in common with other successful conventional maneuver campaigns of the past. The technology, while more advanced, was used essentially to do things better, rather than to do new things. The situation since the fall of Saddam has had much in common with earlier unsuccessful (or, to be more generous, partially successful) postconflict operations, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies. Looking to the future, new threats such as cyberwar undoubtedly will complicate matters, but whether they will bring about a fundamental transformation in warfare is extremely doubtful. Frank G. Hoffman correctly suggests in his article that in addition to Clausewitz, two other commentators “have much to offer today’s student of war” (p. 315): the 19th-century British writer on colonial warfare, Charles Callwell, and the writer and practitioner of guerrilla warfare, T.E. Lawrence. This is perhaps an obvious suggestion. Less obvious and more intriguing is Robert H. Leonhard’s recommendation that the career of Robert Clive, an effective ruler of British India in the 18th century, is worthy of study by modern military and political leaders. Clive was, as Leonhard points out, a practitioner of grand strategy “who viewed the military as only one of his tools—albeit an important one” (p. 222). The careful study of history, not to provide crude “lessons” but rather “approximate precedents,” as the British naval historian Andrew Gordon describes them, is a key theme that emerges from this volume.

In my view, the emphasis on whether the traditional principles of war remain fit for purpose is misplaced. They fairly obviously continue to provide common-sense guidance for the conduct of

battles and campaigns, but not, as this volume demonstrates, the higher direction of war in all its facets. Neither does a search for novelty take us very far. What is really needed is a concentration on what we might describe as the *fundamentals of war* that have remained constant for centuries. At one level, this is as straightforward as working out what political goal is to be achieved and how to achieve it, and ensuring that sufficient resources are made available to do so. At another level, it involves absorbing the hard-won lessons of previous campaigns, such as that a successful counterinsurgency requires a political as well as a military dimension. All this requires intensive and objective study of past wars and campaigns. Some of the articles in this collection provide models of how this should be done. As a minor complaint, there are a few annoying errors that suggest that proofreading could have been tightened up—*Gold-Water Nicolas* instead of *Goldwater-Nichols* is the worst. **JFQ**

Gary Sheffield, PhD, is Professor of War Studies at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom.



**The U.S.-Japan Alliance
in the 21st Century:
A View of the History and a
Rationale for Its Survival**
by Fumio Ota
Folkestone, UK:
Global Oriental, 2006
169 pp. \$60.00
ISBN: 1-905-24625-0

Reviewed by
MICHAEL J. GREEN

Most observers, even critics of the Bush administration, would acknowledge that the U.S. alliance with Japan has never been stronger. President George W. Bush developed a personal relationship with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that resembled the close partnerships American Presidents often develop with their British counterparts. The United States and Japan are so closely aligned in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea that Kim Jong-Il has blasted Japan as America's "51st state," and Japanese forces have served alongside their American and coalition partners in dangerous (if still carefully proscribed) missions in Iraq and the Indian Ocean. Japan's new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is a Koizumi protégé and has clearly signaled his intention to continue strengthening U.S.-Japan security ties.

There was a time, however, when most observers predicted that the United States and Japan would steadily move apart. In the early to mid-1990s, the relationship was plagued by heightened trade friction, confusion about missions with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and inattention from senior officials on both sides of the Pacific who saw maintenance of the alliance as work for junior officials at best, and as a burden at worst. This drift in the alliance ended with a series of crises from 1994 to 1996, including near-conflict

with North Korea over its nuclear programs, aggressive Chinese missile tests against Taiwan, and a backlash against U.S. bases that swept Japan after three U.S. Servicemen raped a young girl on Okinawa. In 1995, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye prevailed upon the White House to "reaffirm" and "redefine" the alliance for a new era, and in April 1996, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto issued a joint security declaration that set in motion enhanced cooperation in intelligence, operational planning, and logistics that laid the groundwork for the close Bush-Koizumi partnership in the war on terror.

Will this partnership last? Part of the answer lies in understanding its foundations and the phoenix-like resurgence of the alliance over the past decade. Political science has not always been useful in this regard, with many works focused on isolating specific variables such as "culture"—using the alliance history to test theories rather than generating theories to explain how the alliance evolved and where it is going. On the Japanese side, the ultimate insider's account is Yoichi Funabashi's *Alliance Adrift* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), which provides a Bob Woodward-style, blow-by-blow account of the pivotal shift in alliance relations from 1994 to 1996.

Although highly regarded and authoritative, Funabashi's book is not grounded in theory or prescriptive in any way, which is why Fumio Ota's new volume is a welcome contribution. Ota used the insider's perspective gained as Japan's defense attaché in Washington from 1996 to 1999 to produce a theoretically grounded dissertation at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. This book is his dissertation updated to reflect his experiences as a top policy and intelligence official in Japan's Defense Agency.

Ota does not predict conclusively that the U.S.-Japan alliance will last, but he gives a Japanese strategist's argument for why it *should* last if both nations maintain a clear focus on their national interests. To explain why the partnership was strengthened in the late 1990s in spite of the end of the Soviet threat, he considers the possibilities of simple bureaucratic inertia, a response to China or North Korea, bandwagoning with the United States, or even common values. Ota, a hard-core realist, concludes that the alliance has flourished even after the Cold War because of three factors: its indispensability to regional stability, growing interdependence between the United States and Japan, and globalization—all of which spread Japan's security consciousness and appreciation for the alliance well beyond Asia.

These structural explanations work well. Ota draws on his operational background to describe how both militaries organized to maintain regional stability in this period, using specific case studies on ballistic missile defense, defense guidelines, and introduction of the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement. And while *interdependence* sounds similar to a liberal institutional explanation for alliances, Ota is really describing how the Japan Self-


Defense Forces (JSDF) worked to share the risk and try to make the U.S. military more reliant on Japan—a realist explanation that Thucydides would understand. Smaller states in alliance with larger ones always face a dilemma between entrapment by the larger state or abandonment if they do not cooperate enough. Ota demonstrates how the JSDF strove to make themselves indispensable to the U.S. side in order to empower Japan within the alliance and escape either unwilling entrapment in U.S. security policy or abandonment by Washington. Ota is justifiably proud of the growing proficiency of the JSDF, and his arguments reveal the growing realism and confidence of its commanders.

Ota ends by speculating on what might weaken the alliance: a U.S. shift to China, a crisis over bases, or a failure by Japan to measure up in a crisis because of constitutional or legal constraints. Ota gives specific operation examples of how these scenarios could damage the alliance.

I would have liked more attention to the specific action-reaction effect of the North Korean nuclear crisis or China's military buildup to understand specifically how the external structural environment shapes alliance behavior (since *stability* is an awfully broad concept for a realist to use). I would also have liked more attention to values, since there is a growing convergence of how Japan and the United States view the role of democracy and rule of law in the international system and vis-à-vis China. Both of these elements would have helped explain not only whether the alliance can or should survive, but also how strong and vibrant it will actually be.

On the whole, however, Vice Admiral Ota has provided a readable and useful contemporary history of the U.S.-Japan alliance that offers important insights and recommendations, particularly for those in the United States who want to understand Japanese strategic thinking on this critical relationship. **JFQ**

Michael J. Green is Associate Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University and Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.



Uncomfortable Wars Revisited
by John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring

Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2006
340 pp. \$45.00
ISBN-10: 0806137118

Reviewed by
WALTER LADWIG

Authors John Fishel and Max Manwaring have spent the past two decades studying insurgencies. From their early days with U.S. Southern Command's Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD), through the researching and writing of 10 books and numerous journal articles, they have refined their theories on internal conflict to identify the means by which the United States can best assist a threatened government in overcoming an insurgency. *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, the latest step in that evolution, encapsulates years of thinking on this timely subject.

From a quantitative factor analysis of 43 post-World War II insurgencies involving a Western power, Fishel and Manwaring identify seven strategic dimensions that are part of successful counterinsurgency strategies. These critical factors, collectively known as the SWORD model, are unity of effort, host government legitimacy, degree of outside support for insurgents, support actions of the intervening power, military actions of the intervening power, the host government's military actions, and actions versus subversion. Successful counterinsurgencies feature positive action in all seven dimensions (for example, reducing outside support for the insurgents while simultaneously enhancing host-government legitimacy). Further qualitative research by the authors not only confirms the importance of these strategic factors but also

identifies their relevance to other forms of low-intensity conflict, such as peacekeeping, combating terrorism, and counternarcotics operations—which Fishel and Manwaring refer to collectively as “uncomfortable wars.”

Through the SWORD model, the authors provide an important reminder that, particularly in the current security environment, victory is not simply the product of winning a series of military engagements with the enemy. Victory is brought about by the unified application of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power, in conjunction with military force. By emphasizing the importance of the psychological, social, political, and economic aspects of warfare, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited* provides a theory of conflict that includes what historian Michael Howard famously called “the forgotten dimensions of strategy.” Without adequate attention to these dimensions, a “small war” is likely to end poorly, despite the operational or technological advantages of the state involved.

Although the authors argue that all seven strategic dimensions must be accounted for in a successful strategy, their relative importance depends on the type of conflict. For example, in a counterinsurgency campaign, the “support actions of the intervening power” is one of the best predictors of success or failure, while in a peacekeeping operation, “unity of effort” plays that role. Nevertheless, a government's legitimacy is

the single factor with the greatest weight across all types of uncomfortable wars.

At the core of many threats facing the international community—whether transnational terrorist groups, narcotics traffickers, guerrilla bands, or Islamic extremists—is a violent challenge to an incumbent government's “moral right to govern.” The failure of weak or incompetent governments to provide economic opportunity, political participation, or basic security for their population feeds discontent that such groups can exploit for their own nefarious purposes. As a result, Fishel and Manwaring contend, when supporting an ally in a small war, the U.S. Government needs to ensure that all efforts and actions undertaken by Americans and the host nation contribute to the maintenance and expansion of that nation's ability to govern its territory and people with legitimacy. To this end, they advocate that U.S. foreign policy move beyond a mere focus on the spread of democracy to a pragmatic Wilsonian concept that emphasizes the long-term pursuit of responsible and competent government in regions of the world likely to serve as sources of instability. In carrying out such a strategy, they argue, the United States should serve as a facilitator, helping allied states achieve their “legitimacy” ends with means that they already possess rather than benevolently bestowing gifts of aid. The authors contend that “in the long term, the people and government of a fragile, failing, or failed state must save themselves from themselves” (p. 68).

While legitimacy plays a central role in winning “uncomfortable wars,” the other six factors of the SWORD model must not be neglected. Fishel and Manwaring frequently remind readers that once discontent and grievance evolve into armed rebellion, reform and development alone will not be enough to put the genie back in the bottle. Contrary to those who believe that an exclusive


focus on “root causes” can defeat terrorism and insurgency, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited* demonstrates that violent internal groups can be defeated only by “a superior organization, a holistic and unified strategy designed to promulgate deeper and more fundamental reforms, and carefully applied deadly force” (p. 44).

Not limiting themselves to counterinsurgency concerns, Fishel and Manwaring explore the applicability of the SWORD model to peace operations, homeland defense, and the war on drugs through case studies and examples, taking a broad world view throughout. In addition to such high-profile cases as the United States in Vietnam, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the 1990 Gulf War, and Italy's counterterrorism campaign of the 1970s and 1980s, they examine the insurgencies in El Salvador and Peru, Colombia's decades-long internal turmoil, and Operation *Just Cause* in Panama.

As with any work of the breadth and depth of *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, some quibbles can be raised. The basic presentation of the SWORD model could be enhanced by inclusion of the statistical analyses and case studies used to derive it; this would allow an independent assessment of the data that underpins the model's seven strategic dimensions. Also, it seems strange that, in a book on “small wars,” the 1991 Gulf War (a mid-intensity conventional conflict) is used to illustrate a successful example of unity of effort.

These minor points aside, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited* is a significant work that speaks directly to challenges presently faced by the United States. It is worthy of being read multiple times, with new insight gained with each reading. Given the importance of the SWORD model for contemporary conflicts and U.S. military doctrine, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited* belongs on the bookshelf of anyone interested in military strategy, low-intensity conflict, security assistance, or U.S. foreign policy in the global war on terror. **JFQ**

Walter Ladwig is pursuing a PhD at Merton College, Oxford, where his research focuses on the training of indigenous security forces for counterinsurgency.




New Books from **NDU Press**



In the Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus

Edited by Joseph McMillan

In the Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus is an attempt to diagnose the reasons for this lack of progress and suggest more productive ways of approaching this complex problem. The volume includes essays by nine leading experts from a variety of disciplines, each approaching the challenge from a different perspective:



- Mark Tessler (University of Michigan) on what the polls actually say about Muslim views on terrorism
- Steven Simon (Council on Foreign Relations) on the roots of anti-American attitudes
- Christine Fair (U.S. Institute of Peace) on where people in the Islamic world get their information
- Caroline Ziemke (Institute for Defense Analyses) on the social factors that foster support for terrorism
- Kumar Ramakrishna (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) on the relationship between educational styles and susceptibility to radicalism
- Scott Atran (CNRS Paris) on the way conflicting cultural frameworks complicate the struggle against terrorism
- Hady Amr and Peter W. Singer (Brookings Institution) on how America could restore its good name in the Islamic world.
- Joseph McMillan (Institute of National Strategic Studies) on the way ahead

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
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2006

Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security

by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

What is the current state of the global security system, and where is it headed? What challenges and opportunities do we face, and what dangers are emerging? How will various regions of the world be affected? How can the United States best act to help shape the future while protecting its security, interests, and values? How can the United States deal with the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction?

Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security, an intellectual history of U.S. national security thinking since the fall of the Soviet Union, is an attempt to see the evolving international security system and America's role in it through the eyes of more than 50 perceptive authors who have analyzed key aspects of the unfolding post-Cold War drama. These experts include Graham Allison, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Wesley K. Clark, Tommy Franks, Thomas L. Friedman, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert D. Kaplan, John Keegan, Paul M. Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, Bernard Lewis, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Michael E. O'Hanlon, Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, and Martin van Creveld. Its premise is that, like the blind men in the Buddhist fable who each feels a different part of an elephant, these authors and their assessments, taken together, can give us a better view of where the world is headed.



319 pp.

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