

Doctrine

JOINT PUBS
UPDATE

The following titles have recently been approved as part of the Joint Publication System:

▼ Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, provides basic doctrine on unified action and, with Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, serves as the capstone document for all joint doctrine; links joint doctrine to national security strategy and national military strategy; sets out concepts, relationships, and processes for unified action for joint operations; and outlines the nature of joint operations and the comprehensive exercise of command authority in conducting them (August 11, 1994; Joint Staff sponsor and lead agent: J-7).

▼ Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, describes the overall DOD counterdrug effort; emphasizes joint and interagency responsibilities and coordination; and addresses the threat, strategy, planning, organizations, and missions associated with counterdrug operations (August 9, 1994; Joint Staff sponsor: J-3, lead agent: ACOM).

▼ Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, provides the doctrinal foundation for planning the employment of joint forces; presents the responsibilities, principles, concepts, and integrated national process through which planning for joint operations is accomplished; covers the strategic framework in which joint operation plans are produced; emphasizes plans and processes that provide strategic direction to joint operational planning and that integrate the statutory functions of military departments and services into joint operation planning; focuses on the formal processes that govern the development and execution of operational plans by combatant, sub-unified, and JTF commanders both in deliberate and crisis action planning; and discusses the role of joint operational planning as a way of measuring warfighting capabilities and force development (August 15, 1994; Joint Staff sponsor and lead agent: J-7). JFQ

Lessons Learned

OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR

Since Desert Storm the CJCS execute order has required that lessons learned be reported in a total of 35 NCA-ordered joint operations per Joint Pub 1-03.30. The lessons are documented in Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) format as part of a supported CINC's after action report (AAR), entered in the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) database, and vetted for Remedial Action Projects (RAPs) to be resolved at the joint level. Not surprisingly each of the 35 operations falls under the rubric of Military Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The focus of this column is civil support operations as documented in several representative AARs.

As discussed in Joint Pub 3-0, OOTW cover a range of activities in which the military is used for purposes other than large-scale combat operations associated with war. Such operations usually involve a mix of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces (active and/or Reserve components) under the commander of a joint task force (JTF) who reports to a supported unified combatant commander. They may occur anywhere, from foreign territory to domestic urban areas as part of military support to the civil authority. OOTW include combating terrorism, support of counterdrug operations, nation assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, support to insurgency, and civil support operations. In addition to joint forces and DOD agencies, participants in OOTW can include other Federal agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations, NATO, combined or multinational forces, and state and local authorities.

Civil-military operations comprise worldwide humanitarian assistance operations, including disaster relief, support to displaced persons, and civil assistance. Support to the civil authorities includes domestic actions applicable to disaster-related

emergencies and civil defense for attacks directed against the territory of the United States. Included under assistance for civil disturbances is military support to domestic law enforcement agencies, protection of life and Federal property, and prevention of disruptions to governmental functions.

Doctrine covering OOTW is contained in the Joint Pub 3-07 series. The first draft of Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, should be distributed for comment in November 1994.

Among the various operational and exercise lessons learned during civil support operations in the period since the Gulf War are:

▼ Hurricane Iniki (PACOM/17 JULLS)—Disaster response operations conducted prior to and after the hurricane passed across Oahu and Kauai on September 11, 1992. The initial action included activating a Disaster Response Team (DRT) and standing-up a Crisis Action Team (CAT). In response to an execute order from the Director of Military Support and a Presidential declaration of a major disaster, CINC-PAC activated JTF Hawaii and appointed the Commander, U.S. Army Pacific, as JTF commander and Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). Many lessons concerned interagency procedures, especially regarding the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and initial coordination among Federal, state, and local agencies. Recommendations included:

- Potential JTF staff attend training on implementing the Federal Response Plan (FRP).
- FEMA should facilitate funding transfers including processing mission assignment letters (MAL) to expedite DOD relief operations and reimbursement.
- Collocate JTF, Federal, state, and local government agencies, and NGOs headquarters if possible; ensure full exchange of liaison officers (LNOs).
- Coordinate, publish, and disseminate FEMA support request procedures to Federal and state agencies, other civil activities, and NGOs affiliated with disaster relief operations.
- Centralize control of airlift operations.
- Include the Customs Service and Department of Agriculture among Federal agencies for coordination purposes.

• FEMA, in conjunction with state and local officials, should be responsible for approving the release of military emergency communications when no longer required.

▼ Eligible Receiver 94-1 (PACOM/25 JULLs/Secret)—Part of a No Notice Interoperability Exercise (NIEX) program focused on responding to a request for natural disaster assistance. Since responsibility for foreign disaster assistance falls under the Department of State, the scenario led to an Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) request for defense support through the National Security Council. NCA designated CINCPAC as the supported CINC, who in turn designated the Commander, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as JTF commander. Issues addressed include using trained JDISS operators, WWMCCS, Special Assignment Airlift Missions prior to TPFDD development, lack of joint pubs at JTF level, Special Operations Forces, command awareness of OFDA activities, Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), early command and control of airlift, and clear NCA guidance to CINCs on the transition to civilian control of disaster relief/humanitarian operations. The exercise highlighted PACOM Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell and written guidance contained in instructions covering crisis command and control and establishment of a contingency JTF and JTF SOP. Clear guidance and joint expertise personnel augmentation from the combatant command-level avoids the numerous problems associated with an ad-hoc approach to establishing a contingency JTF.

▼ JTF-LA/Garden Plot (FORSCOM/36 JULLs)—After the outbreak of civil disturbances in Los Angeles, JTF-LA was activated following Federalization of selected Army National Guard units and a Presidential declaration of the city and county of Los Angeles as a major disaster area. Deployed in May 1992, active component forces included 7th Infantry Division, I MEF, and other units stationed in California. The response was authorized by DOD Directive 3025.12, Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot), and the draft CINCFOR Civil Disturbance Plan. The AAR is a comprehensive document on problems and lessons associated with Federalizing the National Guard (especially for short periods), the fact that Federal forces act in support of—not in lieu of—civil author-

ity, and limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act. Throughout the operation the JTF had to constantly monitor missions so that Federal troops did not get inadvertently drawn into law enforcement which is the province of civil authority, even when local authorities wanted such action. Major lessons included that there is a need for civil disturbance operations in unit training; that short-term Federalization of Guard personnel does not justify the enormous efforts required to conduct physical exams and administrative actions when de-Federalizing troops; that sizeable public affairs elements should accompany deploying forces; that civil disturbance plans must provide for Federalizing and de-Federalizing the Guard (including combat support and combat service support) and contain an annex on Posse Comitatus and the differences in National Guard authority under Title 32 (state active duty) versus Federal authority under Title 10 (including UCMJ authority); and the large number of LNOs needed due to extensive coordination in support of law enforcement agencies and civil authorities.

▼ Hurricane Andrew Relief (FORSCOM/185 JULLs)—AAR represents the seminal report on support to civil authorities for domestic disaster related civil emergencies and execution of FRP. It contains a summary and JULLs for CINCFOR, CJTF, component commanders, and supporting CINCs on a full range of strategic to tactical issues. Over 400 RAPs were generated for corrective action on the joint, OSD, and interagency level as a result of the worst American disaster in terms of financial losses and property damage which occurred in August 1992. The resolution of many problems, especially with FRP/FEMA and the need for governing joint doctrine, has been or is in the process of being completed. Others, such as access to Reserve component civil affairs experts and the need for clear NCA guidance on an operational end state, remain open. Though there have been significant changes written since, it is required reading for any command that may be tasked as part of a joint force conducting military support for civil authorities during a domestic disaster.

▼ Operation GTMO (ACOM/89 JULLs)—Covering a period of almost two years, the JTF GTMO AAR addresses Haitian migrant operations at NAS Guantanamo through various

build ups and draw downs ending in June 1993. At a peak population of 13,392 in May 1992, measurable operational costs were almost \$59 million. This operation presented unusual challenges, such as testing thousands of migrants and treating HIV-positive individuals as well as actual AIDS cases. Extensive coordination with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was necessitated in the face of legal challenges to American policy that seriously impacted on JTF operations. Lessons cover a range of issues, from the need for linguists, integrating Reserve volunteers, rules of engagement to cover security requirements (for example, potential for mass breakouts, hostage taking, or rioting), to problems created by INS working hours. Also contained are recommendations from combatant ships on berthing and feeding hundreds of men, women, and children awaiting further processing. One of the most difficult aspects of Operation GTMO was the demand placed on military medicine. The report identifies a lack of understanding on the part of Federal agencies concerning the ability of military medicine to care for HIV patients at small, out-of-CONUS medical treatment facilities. In addition, it has detailed JULLs on how the JTF provided medical support with limited resources while screening, handling, and treating HIV-positive migrants. It makes recommendations on how to organize military medical personnel (including short-term augmentation by active and Reserve components), obtain adequate supplies, ensure relief operations are integrated under the JTF, and handle the medical records of migrants that may be used in future legal procedures.

▼ Somalia—Joint operations covering civil support (CENTCOM AARs on Provide Relief and Restore Hope/256 JULLs) and peace operations conducted under the United Nations. JCLL has CENTCOM AAR on JTF Somalia/UNITAF (chapter 6, peacekeeping operations) and interim report on UNISOM II (chapter 7, peace enforcement). The final AAR on UNISOM II should be forwarded from CENTCOM by October 1994. Though not a joint report, the Army Somalia AAR, which documents findings of the Montgomery Board (named for the commander of U.S. Forces in UNISOM II), is an excellent source. (Since the lessons learned from Somalia encompass a wide range of concerns, they will be the theme of a separate TJW column in a subsequent issue of *JFQ*.)

Perhaps the simplest yet most fundamental lesson learned from OOTW is that they support civil authorities and are conducted under a joint organization and commander. This supporting role may present a challenge to commanders and a significant change for those accustomed to unilateral military operations. In domestic operations, the change involves U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) as the joint force integrator. Because of a change in the Unified Command Plan, the incorporation of Forces Command (FORSCOM) under ACOM gives unified combatant command responsibility to ACOM that formerly fell under FORSCOM as a specified combatant command. The Secretary of the Army remains executive agent for military support to civil authorities (MSCA) and military assistance for civil disturbances (MACDIS). Under a CJCS-approved implementation plan ACOM is responsible for preparing assigned forces to provide both MSCA and MACDIS, as directed by the Secretary of the Army, within the 48 contiguous states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands. With regard to OOTW, ACOM is also responsible for integrating CONUS medical contingency planning, acting as executive agent for the Key Asset Protection Program, providing military support for counterdrug operations within CONUS and geographic areas of responsibility, and providing CONUS forces to support peace and humanitarian assistance operations not already assigned to other combatant commands. As the ACOM Army component, however, FORSCOM has been delegated lead operational authority to plan and execute many functions outlined above, including operational control of JTF 6.

From relief efforts in Rwanda to the Haitian migrant operations, experience in OOTW has increased dramatically since the Persian Gulf War. While AARs on operations carried out in the wake of floods and earthquakes in 1992 have not yet been received, they should reflect progress in military support to civil

authorities, especially interagency coordination. As lessons in operational AARs are forwarded for review as potential RAPs and inclusion in the JCLL database, they will be made available for planning OOTW missions, refining doctrine, and resolving problems.

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Education

JOINT WARFIGHTING FOR GENERAL/FLAG OFFICERS

The Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course (JFOWC) is administered by the Commandant, U.S. Army War College; President, Naval War College; President, Marine Corps University; and Commander, Air University, and conducted at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The two-week course is offered three times a year to prepare major generals and rear admirals for theater-level combat leadership responsibilities. JFOWC provides future CINCs, service component commanders, and JTF commanders with an appreciation of the strategic and operational levels of war. Eighteen officers (six Army, four Navy, two Marine Corps, and six Air Force) are enrolled in each course and study the application of joint and combined forces to meet crises.

The objectives of JFOWC are to promote understanding of the operational level of war and associated decisionmaking; joint and combined operations as well as coalition warfare; and force employment at component, JTF, and theater levels. The course exposes participants to both active and retired CINCs, component and JTF commanders, and officials of the Departments of Defense and State as well as other civilian leaders.

The origins of JFOWC are found in the Army General Officer Warfighting Course which began in

1984 and the Air Force Senior Officer Combat Employment Course which was started the following year. These courses led to the creation of a joint Army-Air Force program in 1986 that was expanded to include officers from the Navy and Marine Corps in 1987. The September 1994 JFOWC was the 22^d course to include general and flag officers of all four services. **JFQ**

COMMAND AND CONTROL PRIZE

The Center for Advanced Command Concepts and Technology has announced the creation of the NDU Command and Control Prize to recognize work which significantly improves the field. Papers should describe the results of work substantially performed within two years of submission and that has not been published. Papers must be received no later than April 15, 1995. For details write to the Director, Center for Advanced Command Concepts and Technology, NDU-NSS-RD, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000. **JFQ**

JOINT ESSAY CONTEST

The U.S. Naval Institute published the winning essays in the first annual Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest in the September 1994 issue of *Proceedings*. The top prize was awarded to Lt Col Jay L. Lorenzen, USAF, for an essay entitled "Marshall-ing Joint Leadership"; first honorable mention went to CPT Dean T. Katsiyannis, USA, for "Combined Arms, Combined Services"; and second honorable mention went to CAPT Powell A. Fraser, USN, for "Reengineering Combat Readiness." The deadline for entries in the next contest is April 1, 1995. For details call Bert Hubinger, (410) 268-6110; or write U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5035. **JFQ**