

VIETNAM AS MILITARY HISTORY

A Review Essay by

MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS

A generation has passed since America's involvement in Vietnam ended, yet the question persists: how was our Nation, with superior technology, firepower, mobility, and air supremacy, unable to defeat a seemingly smaller, less well equipped enemy? To address this haunting question this essay will look at a number of books published in the decades since the end of that war.

The first theoretical framework for examining the war was provided by Harry Summers with publication of *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. The book revolutionized thinking about the role of the Army in Vietnam and why the United States had lost its first war. By using Clausewitz's well-known, oft-quoted, but seldom read *On War* as the basis for his analysis, Summers argued that America lacked an appreciation of strategy and did not apply the principles of war as did North Vietnam. The Armed Forces had won on the battlefield where their tactical and logistical superiority was overwhelming, but the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)—also known as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)—won at the strategic level which is what really counts.

Academic Theories and Military Fads

Summers contends that the strategic mindset that characterized American leaders during the Vietnam era resulted from two factors, in fact, from two sides of the same coin: the academic theory of *limited war* and *counterinsurgency* doctrine. Both factors were rooted in the development

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On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War

by Harry G. Summers, Jr.
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania:
U.S. Army War College, 1981.

The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam

by Bruce Palmer, Jr.
Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1984.

The Pentagon Papers:
The Defense Department History
of United States
Decisionmaking on Vietnam

Senator Gravel Edition. 5 volumes.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-72.

The Army and Vietnam

by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986.

First to Fight:
An Inside View of the
U.S. Marine Corps

by Victor H. Krulak
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984.

A Soldier Reports

by William C. Westmoreland
Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976.

We Were Soldiers Once . . .
and Young—Ia Drang:
The Battle That Changed the
War in Vietnam

by Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway
New York: Random House, 1992.

PAVN: People's Army
of Vietnam

by Douglas Pike
Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986.

The Limits of Air Power:
The American Bombing
of North Vietnam

by Mark Clodfelter
New York: Free Press, 1989.

After Tet: The Bloodiest
Year in Vietnam

by Ronald H. Spector
New York: Free Press, 1993.

(Note: Some of titles listed above are
out of print or have been reissued in
other editions.)

according to academic theorists,
the use of force in a limited war
was only acceptable to *signal*
resolve to one's adversaries

of thermonuclear weapons. Academic theory on war, he argued, displaced traditional understanding of strategy and the use of force. The Clausewitzian strategist believes that the purpose of war is to achieve certain objectives by force. The use of force, however, is structured by a strategic concept guided by the idea of victory. Tactical success in and of itself is only of minimal importance—to contribute to victory any such success must fulfill a strategic purpose and achieve a strategic goal.

The emergence of nuclear weapons led many defense experts to claim that previous notions of

strategy and force were rendered obsolete. Thus in 1946, Bernard Brodie wrote that heretofore "the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them." That assertion was echoed by Thomas Schelling some years later: "Military science can no longer be thought of . . . as the science of military victory."

According to academic theorists, using force in a limited war was only acceptable to *signal* resolve to one's adversaries or to force them back to the negotiating table. The pursuit of even limited victory in the traditional sense could lead to escalation of a conflict, culminating in nuclear war. Thus nuclear weapons and the concomitant theory of limited war had a corrosive effect on the Armed Forces, especially the Army. As limited war caught on and as classical understanding of strategy gave way



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to the economic paradigm of deterrence, the very existence of the Army came into question. In this climate *military affairs* increasingly meant *defense economics*, the attempt to achieve the “maximum deterrent at the least cost.”

Summers indicates that as the defense establishment became preoccupied with technical, managerial, and bureaucratic concerns, the Army, in self defense, adapted to the new environment. But the cost was high: officers turned into “neophyte political scientists and system analysts” and military influence on strategic thinking declined as soldiers were replaced by academic strategists. When Presidents called on the military for advice, they were

ill-prepared to provide it. Having lost the capacity to think strategically, the military could not properly identify the nature of the Vietnam War or recommend the appropriate military policy and strategy with which to conduct it.

Into this strategic vacuum flowed counterinsurgency doctrine which was less of a strategy than a military fad according to Summers. Counterinsurgency was the social scientists’ answer to limited war theory. It was in vogue among policymakers in the 1960s as a means of dealing with communist revolutionary warfare (or wars of national liberation as they were called on the left) and thus seemed tailor-made for the situation in Southeast Asia. The problem was, Summers says, that Vietnam was not a revolutionary war. Because of their preoccupation

with counterinsurgency, policymakers did not identify North Vietnam as the enemy and mobilize national will to defeat it. Instead, Vietnam was fought according to a limited war paradigm—including counterinsurgency—that was an economic rather than a strategic model. The objective was to inflict incremental pain on the North Vietnamese to convince them that the marginal cost of continued aggression against the South would exceed the marginal benefit. Every American action, from introducing ground troops to bombing the North, was taken in terms of economic cost-benefit analysis.

Summers identifies the two great strategic failures which characterized U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War. The first was failing to focus on the


main effort against North Vietnam, both on the ground and in the air. Instead, he points out, we “expended our energies against a secondary force—North Vietnam’s guerrilla screen.” The second was failing to recognize that the Cold War policy of containment meant that the military would always, as in the case of the Korean War, be limited to the strategic *defensive*. The best possible outcome of the strategic defensive is stalemate on the battlefield. This did not mean that the United States could not have achieved its ostensible political goal, the survival of South Vietnam. But to do so, Washington would have had to seal off Saigon from Hanoi. In this view Summers endorses an argument advanced by Bruce Palmer in *The Twenty-Five Year War* that “together with an expanded naval blockade, the Army should have taken the tactical offensive along the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] across Laos to the Thai border in order to isolate the battlefield and then *deliberately* assumed the strategic and tactical defensive.”

Such was the plan contemplated by General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, but rejected because the political “opportunity cost” was perceived to be too great: President Lyndon Johnson did not wish to endanger his domestic policy initiatives by mobilizing the Reserve components.

The questions about Vietnam that both civilian and military policymakers should have been asking, says Summers, were strategic ones: how do we achieve our political objectives by the use of force? How do we destroy the enemy’s strategy? How do we use tactical successes to obtain strategic goals in the theater of operations? These questions were precluded by the academic theory of limited war. But the failure to ask, much less answer, such questions in the context of Vietnam, argues Summers, rendered our superiority in firepower and logistics ultimately useless.

Strategic Vacuum?

How persuasive is the explanatory paradigm presented by Summers? Was there a strategic vacuum



Navy PBR operating in Vietnamese waters.

U.S. Navy

created by adherence to the academic theory of war? Did the United States fight the wrong war, mistaking what was essentially a conventional conflict in which the Viet Cong guerrillas were used merely as

recommending the dispatch of a detachment of Air Force fighter aircraft to Thailand, not for military purposes but “with a view toward . . . potential deterrence and signalling impacts on communist activities in Laos.” The Central Intelligence Agency was maintaining that the proposal to simultaneously bomb targets in North Vietnam and negotiate “would not seriously affect communist capabilities to continue that insurrection,” but would affect North Vietnam’s will.

the *Pentagon Papers* attest to the “how much is enough” mentality of the policymakers responsible for Vietnam

an economy of force measure for an insurgency? The *Pentagon Papers* support the argument concerning a lack of strategic thinking on the part of the American leadership, at least after 1962. Before then, planners were concerned about how to win in South Vietnam, albeit what they thought was an insurgency. But once U.S. troop strength began to increase, emphasis shifted from military strategy to *signalling* North Vietnam and China. Thus in late 1964, Walt Rostow was claiming that “too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough to the signal we wish to send.” The State Department was

Westmoreland reports a particularly egregious example of the signalling mentality. When the military sought permission in early 1965 to destroy the first surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been discovered in North Vietnam in order to reduce U.S. casualties, the request was denied. “[John] McNaughton ridiculed the idea,” writes Westmoreland.

“You don’t think the North Vietnamese are going to use them!” he scoffed to General Moore. “Putting them in is just a political ploy by the Russians to appease Hanoi.” It was all a matter of signals said the clever civilian theorists in Washington. We won’t bomb the SAM sites, which signals the North Vietnamese not to use them.


The emphasis on signalling as opposed to traditional military strategy continued as the commitment increased and the intensity of combat escalated.

Time and again, the *Pentagon Papers* attest to the “how much is enough” mentality of the policymakers responsible for Vietnam, which was an economic rather than a strategic model. As a result, the U.S. leadership failed to define a clear mission for the military or, until 1968, to clearly establish limits on the resources that would be made available to the military to pursue the war. Yet aligning ends and means is the essence of strategy. Ironically, when the failure of the limited war signalling strategy became apparent in 1968, and President Johnson finally did limit the troop level for Vietnam, the military could finally formulate a strategy to best employ the resources available. The result was the policy of Vietnamization.

Insurgency or Conventional War?

The most serious challenge to Summers’ thesis concerns his claim that the Vietnam War was primarily a conventional conflict as opposed to an insurgency. In *The Army and Vietnam*, Andrew Krepinevich agrees with Summers that America fought the wrong war in Vietnam. But he stands Summers on his head by arguing that this was because the Army paid *too little* attention to counterinsurgency, not too much. Summers writes that in the early 1960s, “counterinsurgency became not so much the Army’s doctrine as the Army’s dogma, and (as nuclear weapons had earlier) stultified military strategic thinking for the next decade.” Krepinevich, on the other hand, argues that a rhetorical commitment to counterinsurgency was not matched by substantive change in doctrine, training, or force structure.

Unable to fit [President Kennedy’s] prescriptions into its force structure, oriented on mid- and high-intensity conflict in Europe, the Army either ignored them or watered them down to prevent its superiors from infringing upon what the service felt were its proper priorities.



SAC B-52 releasing bombs over coastal target in South Vietnam.

U.S. Air Force

Thus the Army never emphasized the skills that constitute “the essence of counterinsurgency—long-term patrolling of a small area, the pervasive use of night operations, emphasis on intelligence pertaining to the insurgents’ infrastructure,” instead relying upon tactics which were derived from “the Army Concept: . . . a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional, war and a reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties. . . .”

Krepinevich argues that the doctrine stemming from the Army Concept had hardened into dogma and, as a result, the Army was not prepared for the war in Vietnam. The debate between Summers and Krepinevich mirrors the clash between the Army and Marine Corps from 1965 to 1967 over how to pursue the war. In *First to Fight: An Inside view of the U.S. Marine Corps*, Victor Krulak—who was Commanding General of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (1964 to 1968)—entitles two chapters on Vietnam “A New Kind of War” and “A Conflict of Strategies.” Unlike the Army, the Marines took counterinsurgency seriously. What Samuel Huntington has identified as the strategic concept of the Marine Corps emphasizes *small*

wars. As Krulak notes, the Combined Action Program which Krepinevich lauds originated in Haiti (1915–34), Nicaragua (1926–33), and Santo Domingo (1916–22). “Marine Corps experience in stabilizing governments and combatting guerrilla forces was distilled in lecture form at the Marine Corps Schools . . . beginning in 1920.” The lectures appeared in *Small Wars Manual* in 1940 which was later adopted as an official publication.

The Marine Corps approach in Vietnam had three elements, according to Krulak: emphasis on pacification of the coastal areas in which 80 percent of the people lived; degradation of the ability of the North Vietnamese to fight by cutting off supplies before they left Northern ports of entry; and engagement of NVA and VC main force units on terms favorable to American forces. The Marines soon came into conflict with Westmoreland over how to fight the war. In *A Soldier Reports*, Westmoreland writes:

During those early months [1965], I was concerned with the tactical methods that General Walt and the Marines employed. They had established beachheads at Chu

Evacuating wounded marine during Operation Taylor Common.



U.S. Marine Corps (G. W. Wright)

Lai and Da Nang and were reluctant to go outside them, not through any lack of courage but through a different conception of how to fight an anti-insurgency war. They were assiduously [sic] combing the countryside within the beachhead, trying to establish firm control in hamlets and villages, and planning to expand the beachhead up and down the coast.

He believed the Marines “should have been trying to find the enemy’s main forces and bring them to battle, thereby putting them on the run and reducing the threat they posed to the population.” Westmoreland, according to Krulak, made the “third point the primary undertaking, even while deemphasizing the need for clearly favorable conditions before engaging the enemy.”

Westmoreland’s concept is illustrated by the battle of Ia Drang in November 1965. The North Vietnamese planned to attack across the Central Highlands and cut South Vietnam in two, hoping to cause the collapse of the Saigon government before massive American combat power could be introduced. Ia Drang was the single bloodiest battle of the war. The definitive account of the action is contained in a recent book, *We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young*

by Moore and Galloway [see the reflection on this book which immediately follows this review].

Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, USA (Ret.), commanded a battalion in the battle, and Joseph Galloway was a UPI correspondent accompanying the unit. Moore’s battalion of 450 men landed in the middle of 1600 members of a NVA regiment. *We Were Soldiers Once* describes two parts of the battle, one successful—the defense of Landing Zone X-Ray—another a debacle—the ambush of Moore’s sister battalion at Landing Zone Albany—in which 155 Americans died in a 16-hour period, “the most savage one-day battle of the Vietnam War.”

The battle in the Ia Drang Valley convinced Westmoreland the Army Concept was correct. Summers would agree. In a head to head clash, an outnumbered U.S. force had spoiled an enemy operation and sent a major NVA force reeling back in defeat. But Krepinevich and Krulak would demur. For Krulak, Ia

Drang represented an example of fighting the enemy’s war—what North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap predicted would be “a protracted war of attrition.” And says Krulak, a “war of attrition it turned out to be . . . [by] 1972, we had managed to reduce the enemy’s manpower pool by perhaps 25 percent at a cost of over 220,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese dead. Of these, 59,000 were Americans. . . .”

The question remains, who is right? Both Krepinevich and Krulak seem persuasive, but Summers in his observation that “. . . it was four North Vietnamese Army Corps, not *dialectical materialism* that ultimately conquered South Vietnam” cannot be gainsaid. How is it possible to reconcile these two apparently conflicting points of view?

Hanoi’s Strategy

One possible answer can be found in *PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam* by Douglas Pike. Through an examination of communist strategy, he demonstrates that different elements prevailed at different times which accounts for differing the perceptions of the war. In the event, however, Pike’s analysis provides

there were roles for both the Army Concept and counterinsurgency doctrine during the war

substantial support to Summers. According to Pike, PAVN successfully followed a strategy called *dau tranh* (struggle), consisting of two operational elements: *dau tranh vu trang* (armed struggle) and *dau tranh chinh tri* (political struggle) which were envisioned as a hammer and anvil or pincers that crush the enemy. Armed *dau tranh* had a strategy “for regular forces” and another for “protracted conflict.” Regular force strategy included both high tech and limited offensive warfare; protracted conflict included both Maoist and neo-revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Political *dau tranh* included *dich van* (action among the enemy), *binh van* (action

among the military) and *dan van* (action among the people). As Pike observes, to defeat *dau tranh* both arms of the pincer had to be blunted. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces defeated armed *dau tranh*. Echoing Summers, Pike writes that “the American military’s performance in this respect was particularly impressive. It won every significant battle fought, a record virtually unparalleled in the history of warfare.” But the Allies never dealt successfully with political *dau tranh*, which led ultimately to defeat.

Pike argues that a constant struggle existed between Giap and *professional* generals on one hand and Truong Chinh, the party, and *political* generals on the other over which arm of the pincer should predominate. After 1959, when the Lao Dong party in Hanoi decided to launch *dau tranh* in the South, until 1965, political *dau tranh* prevailed. Then it shifted to armed *dau tranh* until mid-1968. And two more full cycles followed according to Pike: political *dau tranh* from 1969 to 71, armed *dau tranh* from 1972 to 73, political *dau tranh* from 1974 to 75, and a hurried shift to armed *dau tranh* as Saigon collapsed in 1975.

Several conclusions can be drawn from Pike’s work. One is that there were roles for both the Army Concept and counterinsurgency doctrine during the war. There were major conventional aspects of the war. The strategic thrust that culminated in the battle of Ia Drang was part of armed *dau tranh* regular force strategy, as was the 1972 Easter Offensive, and the final push in the spring of 1975. But after Ia Drang until 1967, armed *dau tranh* seems to have followed a protracted war rather than regular force strategy. In periods in which political *dau tranh* or protracted war armed *dau tranh* predominated, and given the political constraints placed on U.S. forces in Vietnam, there is much to be said for counterinsurgency doctrine as applied by the Marines from 1965 until 1967.

On the other hand Pike demonstrates the weakness of the contention that counterinsurgency was the only means by which America

could have won. While Krepinevich successfully refutes the claim made by Summers that the Army had succumbed to the siren song of counterinsurgency, he is not convincing when he argues that a lack of counterinsurgency doctrine was the proximate cause of the defeat in Vietnam. To accept this claim, one would have to believe that the insurgency in the South was independent of the North, a claim that Pike absolutely demolishes.

This is where Krulak parts company with Krepinevich. While he is closer to Krepinevich than Summers on the issue of counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics—like most defenders of the Marine Corps approach—he argues that the insurgency in the South was only part of the problem: a “multipronged concept” was necessary to achieve victory in Vietnam. Accordingly, he was an early advocate of taking the air war to the North for reasons of military strategy rather than merely as part of limited war signalling. In 1965, Krulak recommended addressing “our attritional efforts primarily to the source of North Vietnamese material introduction, fabrication, and distribution; destroy the port areas, mine the ports, destroy the rail lines, destroy power, fuel, and heavy industry. . . .”

The Air War

Krulak’s proposal raises the issue of the effectiveness of air power in the Vietnam war. He is not alone among military leaders of the time who claim that intensive bombing of North Vietnam could have proved decisive in 1965. That claim is disputed by Mark Clodfelter in his 1989 book, *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*. Clodfelter indicates that the U.S. strategy for employment of air power failed until 1972 when two changes occurred to create conditions favorable to an air power strategy. The first change, he argues, was the shift in North Vietnamese strategy to what Pike calls armed *dau*

tranh, this time in a conventional (regular force) mode. Hanoi’s decision to mount a large-scale conventional invasion of the South meant that the North Vietnamese, unlike the Viet Cong in 1965–67, became dependent on logistic support to an extent that made them vulnerable to American air power.

The second change was the shift in political goals and the international environment. While Lyndon Johnson sought an independent, stable, noncommunist South, capable of standing alone against future aggression by Hanoi, Richard Nixon

the political leadership did not take strategy seriously because they were not intellectually equipped to do so

was willing to disengage without achieving those goals. Additionally, in accordance with the theory of limited war, Johnson believed he had to worry about the effect on China and the Soviet Union of massive airstrikes against the North. Détente with the Soviet Union and China gave Nixon freedom to effectively employ air power, an option that Johnson lacked.

Clodfelter’s argument is compelling, but there is evidence that the North Vietnamese would disagree with him on the effectiveness of air power. Pike has indicated elsewhere in his writings that “the initial reaction of Hanoi’s leaders to the strategic bombings and air strikes that began in February 1965—documented later by defectors and other witnesses—was enormous dismay and apprehension. They feared the North was to be visited by intolerable destruction which it simply could not endure.” Based on interviews and archival research, Pike concludes, “while conditions had changed vastly in seven years, the dismaying conclusion to suggest itself from the 1972 Christmas bombing was that had this kind of air assault been launched in February of 1965, the Vietnam war as we know

it might have been over within a matter of months, even weeks.”

Surveying the historical literature on military aspects of the Vietnam conflict reveals that the war was multifaceted. Accordingly, a comprehensive framework is needed to analyze it. Without such a framework, there will always be a tendency to mistake one phase of the war for the whole. I believe that Summers comes closest to providing such a framework although as Krepinevich and Pike show even he commits the error of treating a phase of the North Vietnam strategy (armed *dau tranh* regular force strategy) as the whole. As Pike explains, the war was neither conventional nor an insurgency when seen as a whole. As one form or other of *dau tranh* dominated Hanoi's strategy, the war took on a more or less conventional aspect for the United States.

But in his overall assessment Summers holds up very well under scrutiny. The American defeat in Vietnam was the result of a strategic failure. The political leadership did not take strategy seriously because they were not intellectually equipped to do so. Imbued with the academic theory of limited war, they confused economics with strategy and were far more comfortable dealing with hypothetical nuclear exchanges than with how to employ military force to achieve political goals. The military leadership, for whatever reason, did not fill the strategic vacuum.

The argument about the effects of the strategic defensive on operations seems vindicated as well. In *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam*, Ronald Spector says that “an examination of the events of 1968 makes clear that . . . the most appropriate analogy to Vietnam is World War I. As in World War I on the Western front, the war in Vietnam was a stalemate [but] as in World War I, neither side was prepared to admit this fact.” Both sides, he observes, made maximum efforts to break the stalemate during 1968.

The strategic vacuum at the top—including the failure to recognize that the military had no other choice than to pursue the strategic

defensive—had implications for the operational and tactical conduct of the Vietnam War. The operational level of war consists of operational *art* and *planning*. Accordingly, it involves using available military assets to attain strategic objectives in a theater of war, with or without hostilities; designing operations to meet strategic objectives; and conducting campaigns. Tactics involves winning battles and should serve operational ends which themselves should have strategic goals. Yet absent coherent strategic objectives, tactics and operations become their own justification. This is what occurred in Vietnam. Lacking strategic guidance, each service fought the war in accordance with its own *strategic concept*. In Krepinevich's words, the United States conducted the war in accordance with a “strategy of tactics.”

Debate over the conduct of the Vietnam War illustrates the necessity for having a military that thinks strategically. Operational art and tactical skill are of little value without an overarching concept about how and when military force should be applied to defend national interests, and how military force can achieve political goals with limited resources.

Military professionals must understand strategic reasoning and also be able to convey to the Nation's leaders an understanding of the resulting relationship between political ends and military means. The great legacy of Vietnam, to coin a phrase, is the military's recognition of the fact that articulating strategy is too important to be left to the likes of civilian analysts. JFQ

As part of an annual program of events the National Defense University (NDU) will sponsor two symposia on Asian/Pacific and NATO/European security affairs in the first quarter of 1994:

THE PACIFIC SYMPOSIUM

“Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities”

will convene in Washington, D.C., on February 15 and 16, an event presented in cooperation with the U.S. Pacific Command.

THE NATO SYMPOSIUM

“Reshaping the Trans-Atlantic Relationship: Forging a New Strategic Bargain”

will be held in Rome, Italy, on March 28 and 29 with the cosponsorship of the NATO Defense College.

To obtain registration information for either of the above events—or to be placed on the mailing list for announcements about future NDU symposia—write or call:

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National Defense University
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Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

(202) 287-9230/9231 or DSN 667-9230/9231
FAX: (202) 287-9239 or DSN 667-9239

**A REFLECTION ON
WE WERE SOLDIERS
ONCE . . . AND YOUNG**

By DAVID J. ANDRE

Dear Friend,

You asked to borrow the Vietnam remembrance, *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young*. I sat down this evening to pen a quick cover note to you, but memories took over and these pages are the result. Please indulge me for just a few minutes.

The book was coauthored by Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, USA (Ret.), and Joseph L. Galloway.

It recounts four days of incredibly intense and desperate combat between the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and three regiments of North Vietnamese infantry in the Ia Drang Valley of Pleiku Province in November 1965. Then-Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore commanded the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, whose saga is recalled in the first part of the book. Joe Galloway, a young UPI war correspondent, was on the ground with Moore's unit. A sister battalion, the 2/7 Cavalry, is the major focus of the balance of the book, beginning with a section entitled "Albany." Elements of several other cavalry regiments were also involved. All told, during a four-day period, 234 young Americans lost their lives in the action. The 2/7 alone had 155 killed in just six hours. But together, the two battalions killed perhaps ten times as many of the enemy.

Colonel David J. Andre, USA (Ret.), was an infantry officer who capped his career as a strategic analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as chairman of the Department of Military Strategy at the National War College.

Sky troopers of the 1st Cav.



U.S. Army (Howard C. Breedlove)

The book is one of the most important and painstakingly researched, lovingly created, and vividly described first-person accounts of infantry combat ever written. Over the years, I've read widely in this genre from across the expanse of military history. Many were skillfully and even inspirationally rendered by soldiers and scholars of deserved renown. But none surpasses what the authors have achieved here. It is absolutely stunning—even riveting. Please excuse the underlined passages and marginal comments that I made in the book. Some are rather personal and, I must say, not always measured. I never anticipated that anyone else would read them.

Experiencing this book—and that is really the best way to put it—was an intense personal catharsis for me. I have deliberately avoided Vietnam, when I could, for over 25 years now. I've read very little about it and have seen none of the films that feature it. I guess I've been waiting all of these years for something to happen that would cause me to say, finally, it's ended—those of us who served so loyally and sacrificed so greatly, only to return to ignominy

and harsh, unfair, and mean-spirited criticism from our fellow citizens, at last have been fondly remembered and richly memorialized with genuine feeling and ennobling dignity. The wait has been rewarded in full measure.

I have never visited the Vietnam Memorial on the Mall. I have no plans to go there—ever. Many (certainly not all, perhaps not even most) of my buddies—largely the former rifle platoon leaders and company commanders who led units that did most of the hard ground fighting in Vietnam—feel the same way, albeit for many different and complex reasons. But, profoundly moved by Moore and Galloway's immense and touching labor of love, we have talked a great deal. We believe that this inspired creation is a truly fitting memorial to the thousands of soldiers who served, bled, suffered, were maimed, and died on the field of battle in Vietnam, and for those who continue to wage that war in their minds . . . because they cannot forget. This splendidly written remembrance graphically tells their story and poignantly honors their gallantry, heroism, and appalling sacrifice as no carved stone monolith ever can.

In the autumn of 1965, South Vietnamese and Americans were fighting hard to prevent the forced cleaving of the Republic of Vietnam across Route 19 through the Central Highlands by Viet Cong guerrilla and main force units and their recently arrived allies of the People's Army of North Vietnam. Thousands of other North Vietnamese soldiers were streaming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia toward South Vietnam. The war had reached a major turning point, and we knew it.

I was a first lieutenant and executive officer, and then the commander, of an airborne infantry rifle company (B 2/502) in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Our battalion was involved in a number of sharp actions

during the two months prior to the bloody campaign recounted in this book. Even though they had just arrived in country and were not yet well established, elements of the 1st Cavalry nonetheless supported us and even came to our relief on several occasions.

Although my battalion was committed elsewhere when the hellish battles in the Ia Drang Valley were raging that November, I personally knew many of the officers and men who were involved, including their families. I had gone to college, the Infantry Officers Basic Course, and Airborne and Ranger Schools with some of them. Others had worked with or for me in earlier assignments. Many more I would meet in the years to come.



One was a fine young infantry officer who, a decade hence, was my colleague at West Point and a dear friend. He died tragically a few years ago, just days after we had enjoyed lunch together. My profound sadness at his loss is heightened by the realization that his premature death prevented him from reading this book, in which his and his buddies' selflessness and suffering are so heart-rendingly chronicled. In sum, this work recalls for me—and for many others, I am sure—a gut-wrenching personal experience of truly epic proportions.

Let me add that the only real differences between the combat actions described in this book and many others that we participated in before and after were the size of the forces engaged and the magnitude of the carnage. Battles between small units can be equally horrendous and profoundly alter the minds and being of those who fight them. The phrase "hell in a very small place" (which is also the title of a superb book by Bernard Fall on the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu) is an apt metaphor for the infantryman in time of war. And for all too many, the hell never ends.

The often sanguinary passages found in *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young* cry out for public attention. I hope they prompt no small measure of soul searching by Americans, and especially in our Nation's capital, by our political leaders. Washington is full of people interested in national security, and with a passion for righting all manner of injustice throughout the world, who stop well short of wearing a uniform themselves much less putting their lives on the line in combat. No political party occupies the moral high ground when it comes to the use of force. In fact, some of the most vocal hawks on defense matters and other reputed pillars of American society tend to be the biggest hypocrites on this score.

Those removed from the reality of war are sometimes the first to talk in glib terms about applying the military instrument when unfortunate and even grotesque things happen abroad that they determine can only be redressed by force of arms. Such ill-advised impetuosity seldom is heard from those who have survived the terrifying baptism of fire, borne the awesome responsibility for the lives of others in battle, filled body bags with the remains of their comrades, and known the reality of going in harm's way. Sadly, Erasmus got it right in the title of his treatise against war: *Dulce Bellum Inexpertis* (war is sweet to those unacquainted with it).

More to the point, policymakers of this ilk at virtually every level in Washington seem far too eager to argue for sending others, including no small number of essentially economic draftees, to fight and die in distant, lonely



Sources: Map (above) American Embassy, Saigon. Map (left) Joel D. Meyerson, *Images of a Lengthy War* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986).

places. This they do even for vague, ill-conceived policies which—however well intentioned—often cannot even be articulated adequately in terms of risks to our vital national interests or the desired outcome. It is not surprising then that the American people do not buy into these policies. As we know only too well this is what happened in the case of Vietnam.

It's disturbing that many otherwise well-informed people, along with others who should know better, see a combat-wizened soldier's insistence on receiving reasonably clear and militarily actionable political objectives prior to commitment to battle as a nuisance, if not an impossibility.

How can this be? If Clausewitz had not finished *On War*, we would have learned the fallacy—even the moral bankruptcy—of such thinking through the many wars and smaller actions in our Nation’s two-centuries of history. Tragically this includes a few conflicts that have occurred since the war in Vietnam officially ended and its lessons were finely distilled, gently decanted, and widely distributed for public consumption. Here Moore and Galloway give us reason for pause.

Those who would use the military as a test bed for all manner of social experimentation—as is the vogue today—need to understand what the “sky troopers” of the 1st Cavalry experienced in the Ia Drang. They need to understand it clearly since, in the course of events, what happened there is only a variation on a theme: it is what soldiers experience whenever they are committed to battle. No amount of political and technological change in the world is likely to significantly alter this basic fact.

This heart-breaking yet incredibly inspiring book breathes new life into the meaning of unit cohesion in ways that no research study, academic treatise, or field manual could approach. It demonstrates how critical, precious, and, perhaps most importantly, fragile cohesion truly is. That a superbly organized, trained, and led unit like Hal Moore’s could hover so close to utter destruction for so long and survive not only to recover, but also to fight again another day, is both a lesson and a warning for those who would tinker, even at the margins, with the fabric of the military, the profession of arms, and the warrior ethic as we know it in the United States.

I later served with the 1st Cavalry during my second tour in Vietnam. After taking command of my second rifle company (A 2/5 Cavalry), we air assaulted into a hot landing zone north of Saigon near the Cambodian border; an action not unlike the one described by Moore and Galloway.

But there were differences worth recalling. We had learned from the experiences of others and the terrain, weather, and tactical situation allowed us to promptly and effectively bring to bear just about every kind of fire support available—mortars, artillery, rockets, gunships, and fighter-bombers. And the division piled on quickly, inserting almost an entire brigade by helicopter. By day’s end we had overwhelmed and destroyed a North Vietnamese regiment, albeit at considerable cost. My company took heavy casualties and I spent most of the next year in hospital and several more recovering.

Still some things never change. Leading-edge technology, world-class combat systems, and new and innovative organizational and operational concepts have served to make the military more effective than we were back then. But it has made war more intense and the task of ground combat potentially more deadly. Much of what I and other members of the 1st Cavalry experienced in combat in Vietnam could easily occur again—for many of the same reasons. Neither the end of history nor the end of the vital role that we mortals must play in its often painfully costly and not infrequently disastrous results is close at hand.

I was going to close by saying that I hope you enjoy this book. But it is not something to be enjoyed. Instead it must be experienced, reflected upon, remembered, and then cherished. It is an inspired story of the victory of human spirit against overwhelming odds. It should be read in the hope that we learn from what *We Were Soldiers* Once . . . and Young has to tell us.

Sincerely,

David

MANAGING THE SCHWARZKOPF ACCOUNT: ATKINSON AS CRUSADER

Two Book Reviews by

PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ and RONALD H. COLE

The release this past autumn of yet another post-mortem on the Persian Gulf War received the kind of hype normally reserved for exposés by Washington insiders. While Crusade by Rick Atkinson does indeed retail a variety of personality quirks and expletives undeleted, it also raises serious questions about the purpose and aftermath of Desert Storm. In the tandem politico-military reviews that follow, a former senior policymaker and a military historian take separate looks at Atkinson as a crusader in the quest to capture the lessons of the Gulf War.

PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ

The Persian Gulf War occupies a unique place in American military history. It is unique particularly from the standpoint of the casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces. No major war in our history has resulted in so few friendly casualties, a number that the U.S. Commander in Chief, General Norman Schwarzkopf, aptly called "miraculously" low.

That very uniqueness seems to have made it difficult for many people to grasp the broader significance of the event. It was a war that transformed the security structure of the Persian Gulf—a region that will remain the principal source of world energy needs well into the next century. Its impact has also been felt more widely throughout the Middle East, with dramatic effects on the Arab-Israeli peace process. And it appears to have foreshadowed a truly revolutionary change in military technology and its accompanying doctrine and tactics, even though most of the technology demonstrated was ten or fifteen years old.

Yet in a good deal of popular discourse the Gulf War seems to be dismissed as a kind of peripheral incident at the end of the Cold War,

Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz is dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, and also holds the George F. Kennan Chair in National Security Strategy at the National War College.

Crusade: The Untold Story of the
Persian Gulf War

by Rick Atkinson
Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1993.
575 pp. \$24.95
[ISBN 0-395-60290-4]

about which the most significant observation is that Saddam Hussein survived it.

Ironically, if the conflict had been more costly, its significance might be better appreciated today. Probably at no other time in our history has the Nation so overestimated the dangers of war before the fact or so underestimated them afterwards. Largely because of the fear over thousands or even tens of thousands of body bags, the resolution authorizing the use of force to evict the Iraqi army from Kuwait almost failed to gain a majority in the U.S. Senate. Afterwards, however, it all seemed so easy that President Bush was subjected to a drumbeat of criticism for not having gone all the way to Baghdad to round up Saddam Hussein.

In his book, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*, Rick Atkinson offers us a helpful corrective to this *ex post facto* underestimation. It is a volume that is impressive not only for the breadth of its research, but also for the drama of its narrative. In particular, by bringing to life the fears of commanders and the heroism of individual warriors,

(continues on page 124/column 1)

RONALD H. COLE

Rick Atkinson won the Pulitzer Prize for a series of articles on West Point's Class of 1966 which were published as *The Long Gray Line*. Like that earlier book, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* features anecdotal accounts of people, both great and small, to survey the conflict. Personalities dominate this volume—especially those of the Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT), General Norman Schwarzkopf, and his senior commanders.

Crusade recounts Operation Desert Storm, the 43-day military operation, in detail but only sketches in, by way of periodic digressions, the critical period of five and half months of planning and preparation during Operation Desert Shield. Atkinson leaves to others substantive treatment of U.S. strategy in Southwest Asia; crisis action in the first week of August 1990; the unprecedented air and sealift of half a million personnel, 3,800 aircraft, and three million tons of cargo over 8,000 miles; the problems of peacetime understaffing at the headquarters of both U.S. Central Command

(continues on page 124/column 3)

Ronald H. Cole is a member of the Office of Joint History where he is currently doing work on the Persian Gulf War. He is also the coauthor of a forthcoming book entitled *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1878-1945*.

(Wolfowitz continued from page 123)

Atkinson makes clear that this war was no cake-walk for those who actually had to fight it.

He brings the story alive with a technique that is in vogue among investigative reporters but scorned by rigorous historians—the use of quotations to give readers the feeling of being present in crucial conversations, even though most of the quotes probably come from later recollections of participants rather than from contemporaneous records. This means that many things end up inside quotation marks that probably do not belong there. The result, nevertheless, is a far more complete picture than one which limits itself to things that can be precisely documented.

As someone who was present in a number of the meetings which Atkinson describes, I am impressed by the overall accuracy of his portrayal of events, even where I might question the use of a particular word or phrase. In general, the historical record will be much richer for having this body of information, which could not have been assembled by any other method.

Atkinson's detection of a "jaundiced discontent" after the Gulf War reveals a phenomenon that has been common following other wars, certainly the Korean War, but even World War II. Some perspective is needed to form an accurate historical judgment. Current assessments of the significance of the Persian Gulf War are colored heavily by the popular disillusionment that began to set in afterward, as Saddam Hussein retained his grasp on power and continued to provoke and defy the international community.

In trying to answer the question why the "sweet savor of victory" so quickly turned "to the taste of ashes," Atkinson places the emphasis on the critique which is implicit in his title, *Crusade*. President Bush, in his view, so "encouraged the Nation to consider the war a great moral crusade," that people were bound to be disappointed by the limited results.

That view, it seems to me, exaggerates Bush's rhetoric and, even more, exaggerates the influence of his rhetoric. Bush's accomplishments as Commander in Chief during the Gulf War were enormous, but his rhetorical powers of persuasion were not foremost among them. For all of his mastery in commanding the military and leading the coalition, the President was distinctly not a master of rhetoric. It is a real stretch to say that the public formed its view of the conflict largely based on Bush's rhetoric. Moreover, by any standard of a democracy at war, the rhetoric of this conflict was not particularly *crusading*. Indeed, it was characterized at least as much by emphasis on limited goals as by emphasis on the morality of the cause for which we were fighting.

It became almost a cliché even before the war to criticize President Bush for "demonizing" Saddam Hussein and "overpersonalizing" the conflict. But it was Saddam Hussein's actions much more than the President's rhetoric that demonized him in the eyes of Americans. That demonic quality became even more clear in the wake of the war, with the terrible environmental destruction he visited on Kuwait, his horrendous attacks on Iraq's Kurdish and Shia populations, revelations about the extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, and Saddam's defiance of U.N. inspections. It was these things, and not earlier Presidential rhetoric, that caused the public to ask what the war had accomplished if Saddam Hussein remained in power, even as the administration attempted rhetorically to downplay his importance.

In this respect, the problem arose more from the spectacular ease of the victory than from the President's alleged rhetorical excess. Having achieved so much at a relatively low cost, many Americans began to assume that we could have had more simply for the taking.

But there is also a failure to fully understand what the war did accomplish. By and large, wars are not constructive acts and are best judged by what they prevent rather than by


what they accomplish. The Gulf War prevented something truly terrible, as we now know even more clearly from post-war revelations about Saddam's nuclear program. It seems virtually certain that—if this program had not been stopped—he would have controlled the entire Arabian peninsula and would have turned his nuclear arsenal against either Iran or Israel, if not both countries in succession. To have prevented a nuclear war by a tyrant in control of most of the energy supplies that are the lifeblood of the industrialized democracies of the world was no mean accomplishment. By that measure, the Persian Gulf War achieved a great deal and the sacrifices of those who fought it have a much larger meaning. Perhaps that is what Atkinson has in mind when he closes his account by stating that the war was neither the "greatest moral challenge" since 1945—as Bush had claimed—nor a "pointless exercise in gunboat diplomacy" as some critics saw it, but rather that "the truth lay somewhere on the high middle ground awaiting discovery." JFQ

(Cole continued from page 123)

(CENTCOM) and Third Army; creating a vast multinational coalition; and the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) for a complex theater of operations.

By deemphasizing Desert Shield, Atkinson also understates the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. During Desert Shield he helped CINCCENT set up his command; advised President George Bush and his staff on policy; monitored CENTCOM's operational, logistical, and diplomatic requirements; supervised the parallel planning efforts of the Joint Staff; and tutored the President and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney on the strategic and technical aspects of joint and combined warfare to ensure that, in Cheney's words, Schwarzkopf's plans "passed the sanity test."

Fortunately, Atkinson buttresses the frequent quotations and personal remarks in his book (which



General Norman Schwarzkopf (CINCENT) flanked by General Colin Powell (CJCS) and the Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) at a U.S.-Saudi press conference in January 1991.

U.S. Navy (Susan Cant)

the previous reviewer, Dr. Wolfowitz, commented on) with material from published and unpublished secondary sources and occasionally with documentation. In addition to Woodward's *The Commanders* and autobiographies by both Generals Schwarzkopf and de la Billière, Atkinson has made extensive use of the Department of Defense's *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* and two other official histories, the Air Force's *Gulf War Air Power Survey* and the draft of the Army's *Certain Victory*. In all three accounts teams of authors perused mountains of documents that would have been impossible for any one person to read in the two years Atkinson spent researching *Crusade*. It does appear from the notes, however, that Atkinson has at least reviewed enough documentary material to have seen the tip of the evidentiary iceberg.

Atkinson devotes the first half of *Crusade* to examining the personalities and salient events of the air

campaign that comprised the first 39 days of Desert Storm. His focus is largely on how Lieutenant General Charles Horner, the CENTCOM air component commander, and his planner, Brigadier General Buster Glosson, dominated every aspect of the operation and managed until the last two weeks to deflect attempts to shift resources away from the strategic air campaign against Baghdad and central Iraq.

The book refers in glowing terms to Colonel John Warden of the Air Staff's Checkmate division in the Pentagon. He praises Warden as the principal architect of the air war; but in truth, Warden was one of several fathers of the final air plan. Following the operational philosophy put forth in his own book, *Air Campaign*, Warden and his staff did produce Instant Thunder, a plan to destroy 84 strategic targets in six days in response to a request from the

CINC for a campaign to punish Iraq if its troops invaded Saudi Arabia.

Schwarzkopf later decided to make Instant Thunder the first of a four phase battle plan to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. After Warden briefed Horner and Glosson on the plan in August, Glosson and his team in the "Black Hole" spent the next few months expanding the strategic phase and developing three other phases: air superiority in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, preparation of the battlefield, and close air support of the ground campaign. By means of a daily secure-line phone call to Rear Admiral Mike McConnell (the Chairman's intelligence advisor who coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency), Glosson got substantial targeting data that became part of the mature plan. The plan eventually included 600 targets, half of which would be struck in a war that lasted six weeks instead of six days.

Overall Atkinson offers a balanced summary judgment of the impact of the air war on the campaign, including the fact that while stealth and laser-guided munitions greatly enhanced lethality they didn't negate the need for both traditional weapons and ground forces to finish the campaign. To illustrate the point he writes that, during the first five days, the vaunted F-117As successfully struck 46 percent of their targets, missing the rest because of some common bugaboos such as pilot error, malfunctions, and poor weather. Atkinson cites himself and another journalist as the source of this statistic which, if correct, still reflects phenomenal accuracy. According to the *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, "the F-117 alone, with two percent of the total attack sorties, struck nearly forty percent of the strategic targets and remained the centerpiece of the strategic air campaign."

When he argues that the strategic campaign wasn't critical to the coalition's ultimate success Atkinson is on far shakier ground. A closer look at the evidence including the *Gulf War Air Power Survey* reveals a contrary view, namely, that allied air supremacy and the resulting six-week period of uninterrupted bombing frequently disrupted Iraqi command and control, paralyzed a good part of Iraqi efforts to supply front line troops, and deprived Iraqi intelligence of aerial reconnaissance. Owing to the absence of strategic or tactical intelligence, neither the Iraqi general staff nor the field commanders detected the repositioning of hundreds of thousands of coalition troops to execute the decisive envelopment. On the other hand, Atkinson is correct in stating that the 22,000 airstrikes used to prepare the battlefield were effective. They battered and demoralized the front lines of Iraqi defenders and enabled the allies to move north in force before the commanders of enemy armored divisions could effectively organize their still potent forces in an effective defense.

In *Crusade* Atkinson initially describes General Powell as a talented officer who "managed the Schwarzkopf account" and picked up "broken crockery" left by a volatile theater commander. Powell insisted that Lieutenant General Calvin Waller join Schwarzkopf as Deputy CINC to assist and calm the "bear." In Desert Storm Powell did far more. According to Atkinson's account, Powell routinely played George Marshall—the commander's commander—to Schwarzkopf's Dwight Eisenhower. When F-117s bombed the military intelligence command bunker at Al Firdos on February 13, 1991, inadvertently killing over 200 civilians, Powell insisted that the Joint Staff review all future strategic targets. He also supported ground force commanders when they called for a shift of sorties away from Baghdad to the Saddam Hussein line in southern Kuwait. The Chairman played a critical role in resolving a dispute over battle damage assessment that threatened to delay the start of the ground war. Powell convinced his political superiors that the higher rates of attrition claimed by Schwarzkopf's headquarters were probably more accurate than the lower rates shown by satellite imagery.

Based on Atkinson's interviews we learn, in gossipy detail, that Powell's deft handling of Schwarzkopf was not mirrored by the CINC's treatment of his ground force commanders, notably Lieutenant Generals John Yeosock and Fred Franks. Atkinson takes pains to depict Schwarzkopf as overbearing and the sole cause of friction both within and between headquarters. However that is only part of the story and Atkinson fails to address the institutional factors. Early in Desert Shield Schwarzkopf designated himself, not Yeosock, supreme land force commander. Perhaps to contain possible interservice resentment over a theater headquarters that was top heavy with Army generals, Schwarzkopf

thought it prudent not to have a third Army general occupy a top post in CENTCOM. This unintentionally turned Yeosock's headquarters into an unwanted filter between the CINC and his field forces. Also, impatient with Yeosock's methodical style, Schwarzkopf often bypassed him and dealt directly with the corps commanders.

From the moment Franks arrived in Saudi Arabia, if not before, Schwarzkopf took an immediate dislike to the man. Atkinson says that Schwarzkopf privately dismissed Franks as a pedant with an ability to mask battlefield timidity with verbose and theoretical lectures on tactics and operational maneuvering. On G-Day, after ordering Franks to move his attack forward by 15 hours, Schwarzkopf fumed over the slow pace of the armored corps, especially when contrasted with the progress of XVIII Corps, the Marines, and the Arab corps.

Atkinson defends Franks as commander of the principal attack on four counts: he had the largest corps, his divisions needed to stop frequently to refuel their M1A1 tanks, he had to wheel his corps around a potent force of Iraqi armor, and he had to assure that division movements were synchronized to avoid fratricide and to clench the fist to smash the Republican Guard. Moreover, Franks alone can't be blamed for failing to encircle the Republican Guard. Schwarzkopf halted the advance of the 24th Division. Yeosock couldn't coordinate attacks by XVIII and VII Corps across the rear of the Republican Guard in time. Similarly, owing to the fog of war, Franks shouldn't be blamed for Schwarzkopf's mistaken assumption on the final day of the war that Franks' troops physically controlled Safwan, the Iraqi airfield which had been chosen for the ceasefire talks.

Is *Crusade* the great classic of military history as claimed on the dust jacket, or a gossipy account of the names and faces in the news? The answer, like Atkinson's appraisal of the overall significance of the Per-

sian Gulf War itself, lies somewhere on the "high middle ground." Perhaps the greatest fault of *Crusade* is an overemphasis on Schwarzkopf's personality, especially his famous temper. Atkinson blames Schwarzkopf for many of the problems and setbacks during the war. But as Clausewitz has noted such things are part of the friction found in every war. Two British observers, General Sir Peter de la Billière and the distinguished military historian John Keegan, have reminded us that it is often desirable for a commander to focus the attention of his subordinates on orders rather than to allow them to dwell on the enemy. Schwarzkopf's temper notwithstanding, the Gulf War was in military terms—from the magnitude of the enemy's defeat to the exceedingly low level of allied casualties—a triumph of joint and combined warfare.

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
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To facilitate editorial review, provide two copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and avoid identifying the author (or authors) in the body of the manuscript. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should be used; both the manuscript and the endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins.

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The back cover displays the flag of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is medium blue and white—also the colors of the flags of both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense—with an American eagle holding three crossed gold arrows to represent the Army, Navy, and Air Force and a shield with 13 red and white stripes. It was made for General Omar N. Bradley, USA, when he became the first CJCS in August 1949. After being promoted to five-star rank in September 1950, Bradley indicated that he did not think another flag was needed since it represented the position of CJCS, not the rank of the incumbent. The Secretary of Defense acceded to this wish of General of the Army Bradley and consequently a five-star CJCS flag was never designed.

