

## THE ABCs OF JPME

There is a lot of misunderstanding about joint education. Part of it involves confusion over five interrelated terms, namely, *joint matters*, *Joint Professional Military Education* (JPME), the *Program of Joint Education* (PJE), the *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education* (PAJE), and *Professional Military Education* (PME). Another area of misunderstanding concerns educational requirements for promotion or designation as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). A third area centers on the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for education as opposed to those of the service chiefs. The following is an attempt to clarify these areas of misunderstanding.

## The Terminology

The terms mentioned above—namely, joint matters, JPME, PJE, PAJE, and PME—are defined in Chairman's Memorandum (CM) 1618-93, "Military Education Policy Document" (MEPD), which was issued on March 23, 1993. Together with the services, defense agencies, and CINC's, CJCS used the law and the intent of Congress to define these terms.

*Joint matters* relate to the integrated employment of active and Reserve component land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces, national security strategy, national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, command of combat operations under unified commands, and joint force development. The term *joint matters* is fundamental because of the emphasis put on it by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Title 10, chapter 38, of the act ("Joint Officer Management") makes several specific references to joint matters. It is important because an individual must be educationally qualified in joint matters to become a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO).

*Joint Professional Military Education* is focused on the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. It refers to PME taught in a joint environment, by a joint faculty, to a joint student body, and from a joint perspective. Normally when the term *joint* is used with PME it refers to equal representation from all services. The three JPME institutions are constituent colleges of the National Defense University (NDU): the National War College (NWC), the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). These colleges are supervised by CJCS through the President, NDU, and are fully joint in mission and orientation. A joint college, school, or course is used by two or more services and has a joint faculty. Both the Joint Military Intelligence College and the Defense Systems Management College are examples of joint colleges, but they are not JPME institutions. JPME colleges teach joint matters as part of their overall curricula and approach PME from a joint as opposed to a service perspective. Only JPME institutions offer phase II of the Program for Joint Education (PJE) because of the congressionally mandated requirement regarding the mix of students and faculty and the joint focus of their curricula which develops the joint attitudes and values required in phase II.

The *Program for Joint Education* prescribes the joint curricula, student-faculty mixes and ratios, seminar service mixes, standards, and learning objectives for all PME at both intermediate and senior levels designed to qualify officers for JSO designation. The NWC and ICAF curricula encompass both phases of PJE. Other institutions as approved by CJCS conduct PJE phase I and AFSC conducts PJE phase II. Officers must complete both phases of PJE to meet the educational requirements for JSO qualification. Phase I is incorporated into curricula both at intermediate and senior service colleges and in other appropriate educational programs which meet PJE criteria and are accredited by CJCS. Phase II complements phase I,

Corps to meticulous planning and deliberate synchronization required by NATO procedures. The rapid advance into Kuwait took advantage of the Marines' superior offensive capability. Further out on the arc, VII Corps had to travel a greater distance and wait for support units to catch up. The logistical problems are documented, including the limited ability of support units to operate at night. In retrospect any operation can be improved, but in this instance it is incorrect to fault the inflexibility of NATO procedures or lack of jointness.

—Gen James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.)  
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**To the Editor**—Both "Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War" by Bernard Trainor and "The Single Manager for Air in Vietnam" by Willard Webb (*JFQ*, Winter 93-94) highlight lessons learned—and relearned—on managing air assets, from World War II to Vietnam and the Gulf War. While acting as Battle Group O-5 JFACC representative in Dhahran during the final days of Desert Storm, I helped establish the first JFACC structure on *USS Lincoln* and participated in the JFACC doctrine working group. The perspectives provided by both Trainor and Webb would have been valuable in my daily interaction with the other services. I applaud *JFQ* for making this information and analysis on joint operations available.

—CAPT C.R. Rondestvedt, USN  
Commanding Officer  
Service Schools Command

**To the Editor**—I'm not surprised that some readers have quibbled over my essay on jointness and service culture (*JFQ*, Winter 93-94). It is a complex issue that defies digested treatment. The thrust of my piece was not that jointness failed in the Gulf, but rather that service culture was a driving influence. The lesson is that culture should not be suppressed or jointness abandoned, rather that jointness must harness the vitality of service culture.

I would suggest that critics suspend final judgment until they read my forthcoming book, *The Generals' War*, when it is published later this year. The points contained in my essay are fully addressed there and evidence supporting my thesis will, I trust, convince objective readers.

—LtGen Bernard Trainor, USMC (Ret.)  
Director, National Security Program  
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is taught at AFSC at the intermediate and senior levels, and is integrated, along with phase I, into both the NWC and ICAF curricula. In actuality PJE can be thought of as that part of the overall curriculum which covers the specific joint matters mentioned above.

The *Program for Accreditation of Joint Education* is a CJCS-approved process to assess the conduct of PJE. Though the Military Education Division (J-7), Joint Staff, is thoroughly involved in administering PAJE, it is not a J-7 process. PAJE teams gather data and make recommendations to CJCS who appoints PAJE team members based on nominations received from the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In addition, OSD plays a visible and continuous role in PAJE, from participating in visits to reviewing recommendations to CJCS. PAJE is designed to approximate the civilian education accreditation process. It begins with an extensive self-study by the institution under evaluation and then involves an on-site review by PAJE team members which is followed by a recurring cycle of continuous improvement. The process includes an independent advisor from the civilian sector who is included to ensure that a non-DOD opinion is considered in the overall recommendation. Additionally, all PAJE team members are given specific accreditation training prior to participation. Recommendations to CJCS either for or against accreditation as a phase I or phase II program come from a group including the independent advisor, Director of the Joint Staff, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Military Education, and a senior OSD official.

*Professional Military Education* is related to all of the above. PME provides individuals with skills, knowledge, understanding, and appreciation that enable them to make sound decisions in progressively more demanding command and staff positions within the national security environment. PME has as its primary theme the employment of combat forces, with strategy being increasingly emphasized at the intermediate, senior, and general/flag officer levels.

It considers the military, political, economic, social, and psychological dimensions of strategy with an emphasis on the planning and conduct of war, service organization, joint and combined operations, force employment and deployment concepts, and military leadership.

For simplicity, PME can be thought of as having two components: joint PME (JPME) and service PME. JPME, as previously discussed, has a joint focus in a joint environment while service PME has a service focus and is taught in a service environment. JPME and service PME must each include a component in their curriculum called the PJE. As part of that PJE there are specific goals for the composition of faculty and students and, most importantly, teaching joint matters (as defined above and verified by the PAJE).

#### Joint Education and Promotion

The second area of misunderstanding is the joint education requirement for promotion or designation as a JSO. These are personnel issues, not educational issues. Again, Goldwater-Nichols directed establishment of the joint officer specialty and specific requirements for JSOs. One requirement, mentioned earlier, is completion of PJE. Meeting the educational requirement, combined with a joint duty assignment and being nominated, leads to board selection for JSO designation. There are other paths to JSO designation, yet this is the most common and is preferred by Congress. While completing PJE phases I and II are key steps in the process of becoming a JSO, both the joint duty assignment and the nomination procedure are of equal importance. But simply completing both phases of the PJE does not make one qualified for a joint duty assignment or JSO nomination.

Specific rules established in the Goldwater Nichols Act govern assignment and promotion of officers with a joint specialty. The rules require that officers who either presently or previously served on the

Joint Staff as well as those who are JSOs must be promoted at a rate no less than that for officers who presently or previously were on service staffs. Officers who are not JSOs but who either are serving now or have served in joint duty assignments other than the Joint Staff must be promoted at a rate no less than service averages. Thus, with the exception of needing joint education to become a JSO, joint education does little to determine promotion. Additionally, nearly half of all joint duty assignments do not have to be filled by officers with a joint education or who intend being nominated for JSO designation. Furthermore, over 80 percent of the remaining joint duty assignments can be filled by JSO nominees. In sum, less than 11 percent of joint duty assignments must be filled by fully qualified JSOs. If one concludes that there is a better chance of getting promoted due to *jointness*, it is joint duty assignments (especially those on the Joint Staff) and not joint educational programs which are at cause. Having phases I and II can help get a joint duty assignment, but without JSO designation or assignment to the Joint Staff promotion rates are the same as service averages. Many select, competitive service positions (such as command) have higher promotion rates than those for joint positions.

#### The Role of CJCS

The third area of misunderstanding concerns the educational responsibilities of CJCS as opposed to those of the services. Here again the key sources are the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Skelton House panel report, and MEPD. Title 10, National Defense Authorization Act ("Doctrine, Training, and Education"), lists the responsibilities of CJCS as developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces, formulating policies and the joint training of the Armed Forces, and formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces.

Publishing MEPD fulfills these responsibilities under Title 10 with

respect to *formulating policies*. One of the most important elements of MEPD is the military framework chart outlining education from pre-commissioning through general/flag officer. The Skelton panel report tasked CJCS to review and revise curricula at NDU colleges and joint matters (PJE) at service colleges. Also, CJCS was tasked to establish criteria and standards for PJE phases I and II and to determine through PAJE which programs were accredited for PJE credit (that is, educationally qualifying for JSO designation).

The Chairman's responsibilities do not overlap with service responsibilities. The Chairman is not responsible for developing or accrediting the service portion of PME. Service-unique PME continues to be a responsibility of the service secretaries and chiefs, and extends to issues ranging from curricular design to selection and tenure of commandants. This distinction is important when discussing PJE, PAJE, and MEPD. The Chairman is only one user of the graduates from the PME institutions administered by the services.

Additionally, there are several types of military education other than intermediate (command and staff) and senior (war) colleges, including other educational and technical institutions, enlisted PME courses, branch and specialty schools, and service academies, ROTC, and OCS programs. Technically, CJCS has responsibility for coordinating the policies affecting these educational areas, but past chairmen and the current CJCS have left close oversight to the parent services. However, MEPD addresses these areas, and contact between the Joint Staff and these institutions is ongoing.

In attempting to clarify the common misunderstanding about joint education it has not been possible to offer an exhaustive treatment of the subject. Many other issues, such as the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL), joint credit for service in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, waivers, and Critical Occupational Specialties, also affect officers.

Perhaps discussing JPME terminology will open the way. Further information may be found in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, House panel report, or MEPD. Questions on JPME should be directed to military personnel offices.

—Contributed by

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Military Education Division (J-7)  
Joint Staff

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## INSTITUTE FOR JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS

The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, is developing a program in Joint Warfare Analysis. Its main thrust is to introduce joint warfare into academic courses in order to graduate military and civilian students who are familiar with joint matters. In support of this effort NPS has established the Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis to serve as a focal point for faculty and student research. Each student is required to complete a research thesis to receive the Master's Degree at NPS, and the institute will direct research in the area of joint and combined warfare.

To facilitate research certain focus issues are being developed. These issues cross not only service lines, but also the boundaries of academic disciplines. For instance, a campus-wide group has been studying theater ballistic missile defense which fostered theses in the fields of operations research, combat systems, joint C<sup>4</sup>I, and space operations. Proposed focus issues for future study include information warfare, joint logistics, offensive operations, and expeditionary warfare.

In addition to research, the institute will assist in course development and the publication of joint material as well as serve as a center for visiting scholars working in the joint arena. For more information concerning this program, contact the Dean of Instruction, Richard Elster, at (408) 656-2391, or the Director of the Institute, CAPT George Conner, USN, at (408) 656-3306.

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## POSTGRADUATE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Starting this autumn the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) will offer a Postgraduate Intelligence Program and Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence Program on a structured part-time basis. JMIC is an accredited institution located on Bolling Air Force Base in Washington.

The curriculum will include courses in intelligence and national security policy, intelligence and strategy, intelligence analysis, intelligence organization and resource management, intelligence collection, the international environment, and electives. Students can complete the Master's degree in two years. Classes include two three-hour sessions each Saturday for ten weeks per academic term, four terms each year. Course work can be completed in seven consecutive quarters with an eighth quarter dedicated to completing the thesis.

Admissions are competitive; the tentative deadline for application packages is July 1, 1994. For more information, please contact the Admissions Officer, LT Thomas Van Wagner, USN, at (202) 373-3299.

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## MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM

The U.S. Air Force Academy will hold the 16<sup>th</sup> Military History Symposium, "Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age," on September 21-23, 1994. For more details contact Major John T. Farquhar, USAF, at HQ USAFA/DFH, 2354 Fairchild Drive (Suite 6F37), U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado 80840-6246; or call: (719) 472-3230/FAX (719) 472-2970.

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Documentation

## JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

The following tables were included in the DOD Joint Officer Management Annual Report for FY93 which was published as appendix E ("Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report") to the *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress* (January 1994).

### Summary of Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) and Joint Specialty Officer Nominee Designations for FY93

Category	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Number of officers designated as JSOs*	234	33 *	0	0	267
Number of officers designated as JSO nominees	388	207	703	0	1,298
Number of JSO nominees designated under Critical Occupational Specialty provisions	309	138	387	0	834

\* A total of 108 Navy officers designated as JSOs on October 21, 1993 will be reported in FY94.

### Critical Occupational Specialties (COS)

Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps
Infantry	Surface	Pilot	Infantry
Armor	Submariner	Navigator	Tanks/Amphibious Armored Vehicle
Artillery	Aviation	Air Weapons Director*	Artillery*
Air Defense Artillery	SEALS	Missile Operations	Air Control/Air Support/Anti-air*
Aviation	Special Operations	Space Operations	Aviation
Special Operations		Operations Management	Engineers
Combat Engineers			

\* Specialties with a severe shortage of officers.

### Summary of Officers on Active Duty with a Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) as of September 30, 1993

Category	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
COS officers who have completed the Program for Joint Education (PJE)	1,542	1,196	1,626	490	4,854
COS officers designated as JSOs	1,537	1,220	1,269	574	4,600
COS officers designated as JSO nominees	1,481	1,337	2,122	344	5,284
COS officers designated as JSO nominees who have not completed PJE	1,071	1,042	1,427	199	3,739
COS JSO nominees currently serving in a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA)	686	645	925	135	2,391
COS JSO nominees who completed a JDA and are currently attending PJE	3	1	10	1	15

### Average Length of Tours of Duty in Joint Duty Assignments (JDAs) for FY93 (in months)

	Joint Staff	Other Joint	Joint Total
<b>General/Flag Officers</b>			
Army	26.7	27.6	27.3
Navy	20.3	27.1	26.0
Air Force	24.1	29.6	28.5
Marine Corps	24.9	20.2	22.2
All services	24.5	27.7	26.9
<b>Field Grade Officers</b>			
Army	36.3	38.4	38.1
Navy	34.6	38.9	38.3
Air Force	37.1	40.0	39.7
Marine Corps	37.8	38.7	38.6
All services	36.3	39.2	38.9

Documentation—continued

Joint Duty Position Distribution by Service as of September 30, 1993

	Joint Staff	Other Joint Duty	Total Joint Duty	Total JDAs %	Total Officers % *
Army	274	2,866	3,140	34.5 %	30.3 %
Navy	221	1,723	1,944	21.4 %	26.0 %
Air Force	282	3,204	3,486	38.3 %	37.8 %
Marine Corps	64	461	525	5.8 %	5.9 %
All services	841	8,254	9,095	100 %	100 %

\* Total officers O3 through O10.

Critical Positions Summary as of September 30, 1993

Category	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	All services
Total critical positions	387	188	364	61	1,000
Number of vacant positions	63	19	85	7	174
Number of critical positions filled by JSOs (percent filled)	277 (87 %)	138 (82 %)	239 (86 %)	38 (75 %)	692 (84 %)
Number of critical positions not filled by JSOs	43	30	38	16	127
Percent critical positions filled by JSOs (since January 1, 1989)	85 %	82 %	86 %	70 %	84 %

Program for Joint Education (PJE) Phase II Summary (FY93)

Category	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	All services
Total critical positions	387	188	364	61	1,000
Students graduating from Armed Forces Staff College in FY93	292	169	333	47	841
Students who had not completed resident PME (percent of total)	0 (0 %)	10 (5.9 %)	54 (16.2 %)	15 (32 %)	79 (9 %)*
Students who had completed nonresident PME (percent of total)	0 (0 %)	9 (5.4 %)	54 (16.2 %)	14 (29.8 %)	77 (9.2 %)
Students who had not completed nonresident PME (percent of total)	0 (0 %)	1 (0.6 %)	0 (0 %)	1 (2.1 %)	2 (0.1 %)

\* Reasons for not completing resident Professional Military Education (PME) prior to attending phase II (with number of officers): completed phase I by correspondence/seminar (60), completed phase I equivalent program (17), and career path did not allow attendance at a resident PME program (2).

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## The Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON

# Revolutions in Military Affairs

JFQ announces an annual essay contest cosponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment) and the National Defense University Foundation to encourage innovative thinking on Revolutions in Military Affairs and how the Armed Forces can best prepare to remain dominant as the nature of warfare changes. All essays will be considered for publication in JFQ.

The contest will be open to both military officers and civilians from this country as well as abroad. Cash prizes of \$2,000, \$1,000, and \$500 will be awarded to the three top entrants. In addition, a prize of \$500 will be awarded for the best essay submitted by either an officer or officer candidate in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below (and equivalent grades). All winners will also receive a selection of books dealing with innovation.

Look for entry rules and other details in the next issue of JFQ (Summer 94).