

Letters

To the Editor—Although I tend to agree with Stephen Rosen's basic theme (see "Service Redundancy: Waste or Hidden Capability?," *JFQ*, Summer 1993) that interservice rivalry is not necessarily bad unless it degenerates into parochialism, many of the examples he chooses to buttress his argument are flimsy. Here are a few specifics:

Roughly proportional cuts to all services is a good way to effect downsizing. Few people really believe that equal reductions are the right thing to do, simply the easiest.

America benefitted during World War II by not giving the mission of homeland defense to a single service. His reasoning introduces a *non sequitur* in that there is no reason to assume an independent Air Force would have hurt the Army's P-38 or B-17 aircraft. Besides, the P-38, as Rosen notes, was designed as an interceptor. But it was never used in this role and it was sheer luck that it was useful as a long-range escort fighter. This leaves one to wonder if Rosen advocates building weapons serendipitously because we might get lucky again.

Had the Marines been absorbed into the Army in the interwar years, "the invention of amphibious assault would not have come about until World War II broke out—inevitably at considerable strategic and human cost." But some would question whether it was even necessary to storm most of those Pacific islands. Besides, the largest amphibious operations of the war were actually conducted by the Army in Europe and North Africa. I seriously doubt it took a great deal of training to teach soldiers how to climb down rope ladders and hit the beach.

"We afforded redundant Air Forces and a redundant Marine Corps during the 1930s when defense spending as a whole was, at most, 1.5 percent of GNP. . ." However, just because we may have been foolish enough to buy redundant forces during the 1930s it does not mean that we should repeat that mistake in the 1990s.

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To the Editor—In an otherwise well-written article about whether the Persian Gulf War represented joint *control* of air assets or joint *command*, Winnefeld and Johnson ("Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf," *JFQ*, Summer 1993) miss some of the important lessons.

The authors go too easy on the Navy, which made some big mistakes in the 1980s regarding

jointness. The Navy consistently refused to participate in serious joint efforts because doing so would have interfered with its "war at sea" concepts. The recent shift to "war from the sea" seems to tacitly recognize that the Navy almost made itself irrelevant by the time of the Gulf War. Moreover, the authors missed one of the Navy's most glaring mistakes: the failure to develop any realistic mine warfare capabilities. That, more than anything else, endangered both naval air and Marine operations and could have been a real problem for sealift as well, had Iraq's mining been more extensive.

Regarding the Strategic Air Command, the authors again avoid the key lesson of the Gulf War for the future of the Air Force: neither of SAC's modern intercontinental bombers (B-1B or B-2) were available. More importantly, General Horner's post-war statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee among others notwithstanding, no one missed them. As almost happened to the Navy, SAC's insistence on remaining the "first line of defense" left it a dinosaur when the Soviet threat collapsed.

Finally, the authors' discussion of allies misses two important points. First, was there really any payoff from all those years of interoperability within NATO? And, second, what if we had not convinced the Saudis to overbuild their military infrastructure?

Despite these points, the authors ultimately make a valuable point: does employing assets from various services to implement the concepts of only one really make an operation "joint"?

Caroline F. Ziemke
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To the Editor—While the authors of "Operation *Weserübung* and the Origins of Joint Warfare" (*JFQ*, Summer 1993) succeed in presenting the German invasion of Norway as a study in maneuver warfare at the operational level, they do not live up to the title of the article on several counts.

First, they fail to define operational art, instead linking it to maneuver warfare. Exception must be taken to calling Operation *Weserübung* "the first ever joint operation involving significant land, sea, and air forces under unified command." Perhaps it may qualify as the first modern operation, but it was not under unified command, unless Hitler is to be seriously considered as the unified commander.

Second, the relationship of strategic and operational planning is confused. While the strategic objectives are identified as securing raw materials, protecting the "northern flank for subsequent operations in the west," and keeping German naval forces free for operations in the open sea," the operational objectives that they

cite are geographical entities. This does not tie the strategic goal to the military aim of the campaign. It represents a failure to adhere to the paradigm of the operation being a campaign.

Third, even though they provide useful insights, particularly on German planning and the need to quickly attain objectives, the authors omit any discussion of strategic and operational decisionmaking. Was this an extemporized campaign as some historians claim?

Despite these criticisms, the authors do provide a very useful summary of a neglected chapter in joint history. This rare German campaign should be contrasted with Allied joint and combined planning carried out later in World War II.

COL Michael D. Krause, USA (Ret.)

To the Editor—Allow me to compliment you and the staff of *JFQ* for producing an excellent addition to the ranks of military journals. Your new publication fills an immense void that has existed since at least World War II. Finally there is a forum where joint issues can be addressed from a joint perspective.

Having had the opportunity to look through the inaugural edition, I am doubly impressed by the list of distinguished authors and the range of topics covered. You have properly set very high standards for *JFQ*. At this time of great change—at home, overseas, and in the American military—your new publication can make a significant contribution to improving coverage of joint matters. I especially applaud the inclusion of articles dealing with jointness from an historical approach.

Lord Ernest Rutherford, the British nuclear physicist and Nobel Prize winner, was once quoted as saying "We are short of money, so we must think." As defense budgets get smaller, the premium on thinking will increase. Your new journal should help promote the kind of original, even controversial, thinking on joint matters that will help maintain today's Armed Forces as, in the words of General Powell, "the finest in the world."

Ike Skelton
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