National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

Workshop Report:

"Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam's Rule"

Sponsored by
The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
in collaboration with the Naval Postgraduate School
20-21 November 2002

Purpose: The workshop, "Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam's Rule," brought together more than seventy scholars, experts and practitioners to discuss post-intervention challenges confronting U.S. policymakers in Iraq; how U.S. efforts should relate to the overall post-intervention reconstruction and political stabilization of the country; and the role of allies and partners in this effort. In an unclassified, not for attribution setting, the workshop focused on critical issues that would shape Iraq's post-Saddam stability and security environment. The workshop did not present or debate official thinking or policy.

Working Group Process: Following a series of overview presentations, workshop participants broke into three groups. Utilizing some basic assumptions regarding the post-regime security environment Iraq, these groups discussed, respectively, the tasks of military and security stabilization; political stabilization; and humanitarian, infrastructure, and economic stabilization. The breakout groups' discussions were the center of gravity for the workshop, and each group presented its findings to a senior panel of U.S. government officials in the final session of the workshop.

Key Findings & Policy Recommendations: The following recommendations were presented by each of the three groups:

Military & Security Stabilization Group:

1. Given the potential for internal disorder and conflict, the *primary post-intervention focus of US military operations must be on establishing and maintaining a secure environment* in which all other post-intervention activities can operate.

2. Given the heavy operational demands of post-Saddam stabilization, the international security force should be drawn predominantly from the world's most capable nations. Within the region, Egypt and Jordan are the best-prepared to contribute military forces; it is uncertain whether they would be willing to participate in or be accepted by Iraq as part of an occupation force. EU and Russian participation might be more easily tolerated.

3. A UN Security Council mandate authorizing a multinational force in Iraq is highly desirable in building an international presence that enjoys broad legitimacy and possesses a robust security capability. Mobilizing multinational resources (especially constabularies) for this task will take months; no stand-by capacity currently exists.

4. The United States should provide initial internal security as part of its Fourth Geneva Convention obligations as an occupying power. Over time, the U.S. can work to broaden multinational contributions, so as to reduce its own military presence, *but a full U.S. hand-off of lead responsibility is not advisable for as long as international forces remain in Iraq.*

5. The U.S. military will require (in addition to its combat forces) substantial assets from its reserve components, especially military police, engineers, medical, and transportation units, to conduct operations necessary to stabilize the internal functions of the country until other appropriate authorities can assume those duties. Securing Iraq's borders, both to prevent the outward leakage of WMD materials or the ingress of criminal or terrorist elements, will be a vital task.

6. Following hostilities, the group recommends paroling low-ranking enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) captured on the battlefield, detaining and interrogating/vetting mid- to senior-ranking officers, detaining all intelligence and security forces personnel (except the local police), and disarming and maintaining surrendered military units in their barracks. The distinction between the Regular Army and the elite Republican Guard units is important. The former will be relatively apolitical and poorly prepared for war or peace. The latter are composed primarily of Sunni Arabs chosen for their loyalty and ability to endure. Realistically, building a new, high-quality Iraqi force on the foundations of the regular army will be difficult. It may ultimately be feasible to incorporate selected elements of the former Republican Guard into a reconstituted Iraqi Army depending on the outcome of a careful evaluation of the personnel involved. (The Special Republican Guard is too closely identified with the present regime and should not be considered salvageable.)

7. Planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the Iraqi military must precede an intervention, and should envisage a phased downsizing and supervised use of selected former Iraqi Regular Army troops in civil works and public order.

8. Most Iraqi intelligence and security forces will not be usable in a reconstituted Iraqi force. However, local Iraqi police forces should be used, to the greatest extent possible, under the supervision initially of U.S. military police, and later under the supervision of international constabulary forces and police to conduct local law enforcement activities.

9. In reconstituting the Iraqi military, the goal should be a smaller, higher quality, non-offensively oriented force led by a de-politicized officer corps that is capable of securing Iraqi territory (maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and domestic security).

10. Given the overriding importance of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a well-planned and resourced effort must be made to locate, seize, secure and dispose of WMD munitions, materials, and weapons employment systems and to detain key Iraqi personnel who might otherwise try to sell or smuggle these weapons systems to terrorists or interested third parties. These efforts should be subject to international monitoring. The U.S. also should be prepared to conduct consequence management operations, mobilizing available Iraqi and international resources for this task, in the event of WMD release.

11. Over the longer term, the U.S. should lead the effort to establish a threat reduction program that will strip Iraq of any capacity to develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, or use any form of WMD.

Political Stabilization Group:

1. The political goal should be "transformation": in essence, a new Iraqi government that is in full compliance with UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and establishes its sovereign legitimacy with its citizens, its neighbors, and the international community.

2. A legal basis for transitional government must be established, preferably through a UNSC resolution, with a clear mandate to orchestrate the process of the political transformation of Iraq.

3. A senior American civilian should be appointed as civil governor responsible for administering post-intervention Iraq; the governor should report directly to the commander of U.S. forces until a stable security environment is established; at a later stage, a non-U.S. civilian (perhaps an Iraqi) should be appointed, and the international administration could operate in close coordination with U.S.-led international forces. At this later stage, the relationship between the civil and military authorities should emphasize *unity of effort* over *unity of command*.

4. Assisting the Iraqis in establishing a political framework that takes them from the initial stages of post-intervention through to the realization of a stable indigenous government should be a paramount task for the civil transition authority.

5. The transformation process must provide for Iraqi participation, initially as a sovereignty council to advise the civil governor, later as a constitutional council and ultimately as functional councils along ministerial lines. Whenever possible, local and national governmental structures providing essential public services (e.g., power, water/sanitation, health care, etc.) should be retained.

6. The U.S. and its partners should make it clear – both in planning and execution - that there are no hidden agendas regarding a Kurdish state or control of Iraqi oil. Specifically, a separate Kurdish state will not be established. Oil decisions will be made in the best interests of the transformed Iraqi state by a properly constituted commission. The coalition should emphasize its support for the political and territorial integrity of Iraq within its existing borders.

7. For the civil governor to be effective, that office must be authorized and resourced with appropriate quick-impact funds to cover the costs of emergency stabilization requirements.

8. The U.S. should take whatever steps are necessary to review, adjust and/or repeal its policies or laws that restrict the ability of nations or groups to provide humanitarian or economic aid to Iraq. The UN should take similar steps.

9. A major task for the international civil authority will be to transform Iraq's judicial system from one based on corrupt preferential treatment of Saddam's friends to one based on fair and equitable application of a legal code that recognizes and protects the basic rights of all individuals.

10. The U.S. and its partners must head-off any independent action to establish a *de facto* Kurdish state by immediately placing U.S. forces in Kirkuk and its surrounding oil fields. Returning Iraqi refugees from Iran and Saudi Arabia may also pose severe logistical challenges that may destabilize efforts to reconstitute the national civil authority in southern Iraq.

11. As the oil industry is a key element in the country's economy and in binding Iraq's various factions together, the civil transition authority must be ready to assume control of the oil industry to assure a continuation of its operations, so necessary for funding the humanitarian relief of the Iraqi people. International monitoring is essential to give transparency to the oil sector and to prevent any perception that the U.S. is running the sector for its own benefit.

Humanitarian, Infrastructure and Economic Stabilization Group:

1. The U.S. should press for more effective contingency preplanning and coordination among various international humanitarian actors, including the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the European Union and major NGOs, with a view to identifying requirements, priorities and available resources. At the earliest appropriate time, both a donors conference and a coordinating conference of NGOs, PVO's and IO's should be held.

2. The U.S. should lift the restrictions imposed by the Office of Foreign Asset Control that currently hinder the abilities of NGOs to provide relief to Iraq.

3. To address the anticipated needs created by an upsurge of Iraqi refugees and IDPs, the U.S. should identify military and non-military assets that would be required to provide necessary relief operations (including consequence management assets) and coordinate its plans with those of the NGO community.

4. The uncertainty of the security environment will require that the humanitarian relief actors coordinate their activities with military forces in their sector, via well-established procedures for civil-military operations coordination.

5. All attempts should be taken to refrain from destroying Iraq's non-military infrastructure to enable a rapid resumption of services to the civilian community; alternatively, if attacks on some dual-use infrastructure prove to be necessary, preparations should be made to restore services (such as radio transmitters) that are vital to minimizing post-intervention dislocations.

6. Ensure that trained and experienced Iraqis who are politically reliable remain in charge of the Iraqi oil production and distribution systems so as to ensure as much stability as possible in an otherwise uncertain environment.

7. To minimize population dislocations, the UN's Oil-For-Food program should be maintained. Concurrently, post-intervention authorities should select reliable and experienced Iraqi officials to operate a fair and equitable distribution system to ensure that both food and medicine are no longer used as a means of control and integrate NGO assistance into this distribution system.

8. To head off debilitating inflationary pressures, take steps to establish a micro-credit system to aid local merchants and businesses to re-establish themselves and contribute to the economic recovery of Iraq.

9. Ensure that agricultural assistance is geared to the seasonal needs of the market so that the agricultural sector provides stability through employment.

Supporting Materials and Presentations: More detailed discussion elaborating upon these findings and recommendations will be included in the full report, to follow shortly. Additionally, a section of final observations will also be found along with annexes containing the presentations of the invited speakers, notes of the breakout groups, and the groups' briefing slides.

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