This volume analyzes how the utility of various instruments of U.S. power has changed in recent years, primarily owing to the end of the Cold War. For that reason, we need to set forth our view of the changing international context within which the instruments are applied. Our perspective on the emerging new world order was set forth in the first chapter of Strategic Assessment 1995, which we summarize here with some changes in nuance to reflect developments during 1995 and with some additional material to extend the analysis beyond the realm of geostrategy.
The essential characteristics of the present strategic environment are uncertainty and change. The world is going through several types of dramatic changes. For heuristic purposes, those changes can be grouped into three broad categories--geostrategic, information, and, less clearly defined than the others, character of government.
The world geostrategic scene cannot be described as simply as during the Cold War, when the Western-Soviet confrontation was the prism through which all events had to be viewed. At least three perspectives are needed now to analyze the emerging international system: seen from the top down, the major powers have changed; seen cross-sectionally, states are arraying themselves into three categories depending upon their success at establishing democracy and free-market prosperity; and seen from the bottom up, transnational problems have become a more important part of the world scene.
Major Powers. In the past, the defining characteristic of a major shift from one world order to another was the transition in relations among the major powers (indeed, among the European powers). A shift in worlds was indicated by dramatic change in the answers to three questions: who were the major players, what they could do to one another, and what did they wish to do to one another. Perhaps the classic example is the French Revolution with its new player (democratic France), its new capability (the citizen army), and its new intentions (spreading liberty, equality, and fraternity). Similar transitions occurred with the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the unification of Germany in 1870, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and the developments following World War II, as well as with the end of the Cold War.
While the new world geostrategic environment is more complex than great power politics, one of the new order's basic defining characteristics remains the relationship among the major powers. Those powers are the U.S., Western Europe, Russia, China, and Japan, though India may join the group within a decade or so. At the end of the Cold War, some thought that the new world would be unipolar, that is, the U.S. would dominate the world scene. In fact, the American people have not been interested in that job. Instead of being unipolar, the world consists of asymmetric poles, in which one (the U.S.) is much the strongest but the others are nonetheless important independent actors.
($
trillions)
Note: Percent figure is U.S. share of world total.In the first blush of enthusiasm at the end of the Cold War, the great powers were all cooperating. Now, relations among some are cooler, and differences of perspective are more pronounced: U.S.-China relations are characterized by suspicions and disagreements on many issues, the hopes for a new strategic relationship between the U.S. and Russia have faded away, the tone in trade disputes between the U.S. and Japan has become sharper, and the U.S. and Western Europe have disagreed about how to handle the Bosnian crisis. But peace prevails, and that is a powerful force for stability in the world. None of the great powers is currently preparing for conflict with another. That might change over time. If the powers were to consolidate around themselves political and economic blocs that were exclusive rather than open, tensions could emerge at the edges of the blocs, such as between Russia and Western Europe or between China and the U.S. A clash among great powers, directly or through proxies, would be the greatest international threat the U.S. could face, though it is a remote possibility in the near term.
Factors shaping the behavior of the foreign great powers include the following:
* Russia is suffering from something similar to the Versailles Syndrome that hit Germany after World War I. It feels isolated, and it is bitter about the contrast between its post-Cold War situation and its past superpower status. Moscow thinks it is the victim, with others taking advantage of its temporary difficulties. It resents being treated as a loser in the Cold War when it feels that, rather than losing, it evolved in a way advantageous to all. Its military is in decline if not disarray. And, as important as any other factor, its economy has shrunk by half over the last decade, while the rest of the world has grown stronger. Yet Russia remains a nuclear power that can threaten the survival of the U.S. as a nation.
* China is feeling more powerful in world affairs because of its spectacular economic growth over the last fifteen years. By some estimates, China already has the world's third-largest output, after the U.S. and Japan. In contrast to the vibrant economy, the political system in China has been stagnant. The elite clings to a discredited ideology that even they do not practice. As the country hangs on the edge of a transition from one leadership generation to another, decision making seems paralyzed. The leaders seem to be afraid above all of anarchy, into which category they put democratization. In international affairs, China acts with ambiguity: sometimes like a normal player and sometimes like the stereotype of the Middle Kingdom --not well informed about what others are doing and how others behave, sure that its ways should prevail despite the objections of others, and assuming that it has a natural right to get what it wants.
* Japan is experiencing political turbulence about whether the old system of governance and economy is still the best. Five years of economic stagnation, with essentially no growth in 1990-95, has shaken national confidence. Meanwhile, the trade surplus with the rest of the world continues at levels that cause tensions in relations with the U.S., and to some extent with the European Union (EU) and tensions are increasing over the U.S. bases, especially those in Okinawa.
U.S. Air Force F-16s flying with a German Mig-29 in
Sardinia.
* Western Europe remains uncertain how it will structure itself
in the future, especially in the area of security and the
military. Whether agreement is reached upon a coherent system for
making decisions will determine if Western Europe has the same
weight in international affairs as it does in the world's
economy.
Three Categories of States. Another geostrategic
perspective is the cross-sectional view, in which the world can
be seen as divided among three categories of states. At the
height of the Cold War, there were also three worlds: a generally
industrialized and free First World, a communist Second World,
and an underdeveloped, largely unaligned Third World. By the late
1980s, these divisions had eroded, as some communist lands
developed freer institutions and some underdeveloped nations
evolved into industrial democracies.
In the new world order, the three categories of states are
characterized by how successful they are at achieving the almost
universally proclaimed goals of democracy and market-based
prosperity:
* The market democracies of free and prosperous--or at
least rapidly developing--nations, were once found only in North
America, Japan, and much of Europe. Large parts of Latin America,
the newly industrialized nations of East Asia, and Central Europe
are now joining this group.
* The transitional states of ex-communist lands, as well
as countries such as India and South Africa, are progressing from
a low economic baseline, which run the risk of becoming frozen
short of freedom and prosperity with authoritarian politics,
heavily politicized economies, and relatively low levels of
economic development.
* The troubled states, primarily in Africa, the Middle
East, and parts of Asia, are falling behind the rest of the globe
economically, politically, and ecologically, often plagued with
rampant ethnic and religious extremism.
These categories are not firm; some very important countries,
like China, combine characteristics of two or even three groups.
Some of the troubled or transitional states may be tempted to
divert attention from domestic problems by means of external
aggression aimed at establishing regional hegemony. It should be
no surprise were some such efforts by a rogue state, such as Iraq
or North Korea, to lead to a major regional conflict. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly
nuclear weapons, could increase the propensity of aggressive
states to threaten their neighbors and increase the risks for the
U.S.
Conflict within troubled states is likely to be a common
occurrence, and in some cases, the state will fail--the
government will cease to function effectively, and civil society
will degenerate into near chaos. In the 1990s, state failure
occurred to one degree or another in such places as Bosnia,
Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, and Haiti. Most such internal conflicts
will not pose a sharp threat to U.S. interests, though they may
trouble U.S. humanitarian values. The great powers are often
willing to provide humanitarian and peace operations for
failed states. They are increasingly reluctant to intervene
militarily in civil wars, however, unless a particular crisis
takes place in their backyard, threatens to escalate to engulf
other states, create a humanitarian disaster, or otherwise affect
great power interests. The U.S. will have neither the means nor
the will to intervene in every such case around the world, but it
will intervene in areas of its historic and strategic interest as
well as in situations of horrendous suffering that offend U.S.
sensibilities.
Transnational Issues. A third geostrategic perspective
looks from the bottom up at transnational problems, that is,
those which do not stem from the actions of governments. Some of
the major problems are:
* The internationalization of crime, especially drug cartels that
operate on such a large scale as to threaten governments.
* Terrorists take advantage of more open societies to mount
increasingly brazen attacks, such as the 1993 bombing of New
York's World Trade Center. The March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by
the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which caused twelve deaths and five
thousand injuries, "demonstrates the threat a well financed,
sophisticated and international terrorist group poses [in what
could be the United States's] greatest national security concern
in the years ahead," to quote Senator Sam Nunn (D., Georgia).
* Ethnic hatreds that erupt into genocide or ethnic cleansing, as
in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia. A related phenomenon has been
the collapse of organized government under the pressure of
warlords and clan rivalries.
* Sudden mass migrations becoming more common, partly in response
to state failure and ethnic violence. These waves of people, who
may or may not fit the traditional definition of refugee, can
overwhelm poor neighbors. As illustrated by the experience with
Haitians and Cubans, migrants can pose an unacceptable burden on
industrial nations like the U.S. that are concerned that the
refugees may become permanent residents.
Coast Guard vessel picking up Haitian migrants.
* Environmental problems spilling over from one nation to another
as the planet's resources are used more intensively. Dangers to
the global commons multiply: all nations are affected by
depletion of the ozone layer and global warming.
Some of these threats seem to call for military forces to back up
police forces that are outmaneuvered, overwhelmed, or outgunned.
Constabulary operations, such as picking up illegal
immigrants, intercepting narcotics shipments, and protecting
delivery of relief supplies in failed states, do not require the
specialized equipment and training needed for combat, but they
can tie up multibillion dollar aircraft carriers and
high-readiness troops unless a more cost effective rapid response
force is developed.
The pulse of the planet has quickened. Computers, faxes, fiber
optic cables, and satellites speed the flow of information across
frontiers, as illustrated by the explosive growth of the
Internet. Faster and larger information flows reinforce the
political trend towards increasingly open societies. Ideas,
people, and goods are moving across borders at an unprecedented
rate.
Internet Hosts in the World
Technology progress is not a new phenomenon. Historically,
longbows, stirrups, gunpowder, steam engines, airplanes, and a
host of other technological advances dramatically changed the
nature of warfare. What makes the information explosion so
revolutionary is not that technology is advancing but the pace at
which it improves. While societies have often been confronted
with profound social changes owing to advancing technologies,
never before have societies been forced to adapt to a technology
which for decades has been improving by an order of magnitude
every three or four years. The speed at which computers
function--the rate at which information can be transmitted over
long distances--looks set to continue increasing at the rate of
tenfold every three to four years, which translates into up to
1,000-fold per decade.
No one can foretell all the ways in which information
technologies will enhance (or mitigate) traditional venues of
national power, but some themes are beginning to emerge.
One is that access to information is being recognized as a
sine qua non of economic growth. Mastery of information
technology is surpassing mastery of heavy industry as the primary
source of national power, whether exercised through commercial or
military channels. A useful concept in this regard is "waves" of
technology, popularized by Alan and Heidi Toffler. The new wave
of computers and communications will be the key to future
economic growth, but the older waves of agriculture and industry
will remain indispensable elements of national economic life.
Because the United States possesses the richest information flux,
other countries have become increasingly interested in tapping
into these flows. Linkages to sources of expertise (e.g., Silicon
Valley), sources of finance (e.g., Wall Street), or sources of
knowledge (e.g., universities, think tanks, and selected
government agencies) are considered desirable and one more reason
for nations to cultivate good relations with the United States.
Another trend is that the ubiquity of global communications is
creating new avenues for the interests, culture, and values of
the United States to percolate overseas (and vice versa).
For the most part, this influence exists independent of national
policy; in some cases, however, the existence of these channels
makes it easier for the United States government to go over the
heads of other governments and communicate directly to their
citizens.
On the other end of the spectrum, the ability of the Defense
Department (DOD) to generate and distribute vast quantities of
intelligence permits the United States to influence the outcomes
of conflicts in which it chooses not to intervene directly. At
little direct risk, the United States can provide an "information
umbrella" to its friends by providing imagery and weather data,
software and other systems integration services, and, within the
next few years, simulation and other training tools. All these
methods, taken collectively, intensify the ability of the United
States to exercise what Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Joseph Nye calls "soft power."
USS Roosevelt and carrier group
The extension of the rapid communication and computer
technological advances to the battlefield suggests that
information-based warfare will become more widespread within a
decade or two. Defense requirements will demand more investment
in information systems and less in industrial-era configurations
of tanks, planes, and ships. Information may come to rival
explosive force as a factor in warfare. The development of an
integrated approach--a system of systems--that combines sensors,
communications, and processors with weapons delivery will allow
further advances in the precision with which U.S. forces can
strike. Improvements in precision are not new--on average, a
target that took one bomb to destroy during Desert Storm required
170 bombs during the Vietnam War and 9,000 bombs during World War
II--but the cumulative effect is becoming revolutionary. With
more precise information about where to strike, weapons delivery
systems can shrink in size, facilitating the trend towards
striking from a long distance, possibly directly from the
continental U.S. to the battlefield.
The nature and conduct of information warfare is becoming a
subject of intense interest to defense analysts. Information
looks set to be a new dimension in which warfare can be
conducted, requiring defense against enemy actions that cause
vital computer nets to malfunction and providing new
opportunities for immobilizing an enemy.
After decades of increasing state involvement in area after area
of society in country after country, central governments have
been on the retreat since the late days of the Cold War. Publics
in many countries seem to have changed their views about national
priorities and the role of the government in achieving those
national goals.
The Devolution of Power. The most obvious characteristic
of the retreat of the state has been the end of the totalitarian
systems in the Warsaw Pact, in which the state dominated all
aspects of life, stifling the institutions of civil society. But
in many other countries as well, a dramatic change has taken
place in what citizens expect from their governments. After
decades in which the power of central governments grew steadily,
those central governments are now reinventing themselves, and
power is diffusing from the center. Two changes stand out in
particular.
First, central governments are ceding more power to regional and
local governments. For instance, not only did the Soviet Union
break up into its constituent republics, but Moscow has had to
permit regions more free reign. In post-Mao China, the provinces
acquired a large measure of economic independence that they used
to deny resources to the central government, which finds that its
budget is growing only modestly while the national economy races
ahead. In the EU, after years of defining detailed unionwide
directives, the new principle is "subsidiarity," under which
responsibility for each problem is to be assigned to as local a
level of government as possible--preferably local rather than
national, and then national rather than EU-wide. In the U.S., the
1994 House Republicans' Contract with America exemplifies the
strong interest in devolving to the states responsibility for
programs that the federal government previously controlled.
Secondly, central governments are shedding functions, partly to
reduce expenditures and thereby contain budget deficits. The most
important reduction in the role of the state has been a wave of
privatization that swept Western Europe, the ex-Soviet bloc, and
Latin America, and created ripples elsewhere. In 1994,
governments privatized about $80 billion in assets. The general
mood is that states are poor managers of factories, and that
selling off such enterprises is a way to raise growth rates. The
change in attitudes in Latin America has been particularly sharp,
from a general assumption that the state must organize economic
development to enthusiasm for the rule of the markets.
National Defense and International Affairs in the FY 1995
Budget
A related phenomenon has been a greater attention to the domestic
side of national power, especially the economic foundations of
power, relative to the projection of national power abroad. A
focus on domestic issues, especially economic problems,
characterizes Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and Brussels (that is, the
EU) as much as Washington. To some extent, that is a reflection
of the less threatening international environment. But there is
also dissatisfaction about growth rates, which in the U.S. and
the rest of the industrialized world have been much lower in the
two decades since the oil shock of 1973 than in the preceding
postwar decades. It seems likely that the highest priority in
U.S. politics in the next few years will be long-term economic
growth in a manner consistent with providing appropriate safety
nets for the unfortunate, and addressing social problems, such as
race relations. Concern about international and military affairs
will be seen in large part through this optic. In addition, the
U.S. body politic is of many minds about what issues are worth
risking blood and treasure for: which values are so fundamental
that they must be defended irrespective of the importance of the
geostrategic interests at stake, which areas of the world are the
most vital to the U.S., and which geostrategic interests are the
most important.
As a result of the refocus on domestic issues, the U.S. public
and publics in many other countries have less of an
internationalist outlook and are less willing to spend money on
foreign affairs. Calls are being heard to restructure the
foreign-policy and national-security establishments to reflect
the decreasing interest in international issues compared to
domestic ones.
A Perspective on Isolationism and Unilateralism. The
debate over the U.S. approach towards national security could be
thought of as a compass, with two pairs of polar opposites. If
the north pole is engagement, then the south pole is isolation,
while the east is unilateralism and the west is multilateralism.
The strength of this analogy is that there are distinct and
powerful groups pointing in each of the four directions. For
instance, there are those (generally on the left) who believe
that no matter whether the U.S. intervenes regularly or seldom,
it should always do so through international institutions.
Meanwhile there are those (generally on the right) who believe
that the most important issue is that the U.S. always act in
defense of its own interests and under its own direction,
irrespective of how often the U.S. decides to intervene abroad.
That is, to the extent that the U.S. engages internationally,
they want it done unilaterally, but they are not sure how much
the U.S. should engage abroad.
Another phenomenon illustrated by the compass analogy is
that a policy like isolationism can be approached from either
right or left. The Right tends to believe that the triumph of
democratic and free market ideals removes the rationale for
active intervention abroad (building upon the thesis of the "end
of history"). The Left is sympathetic to the argument that
military and foreign expenditures are a drain on resources that
could be better used at home (the theory of "imperial
overstretch" as a cause for national decline). As one pundit
described isolationists, those on the right do not want to
inflict the world on America while those on the left do not want
to inflict America on the world.
The compass analogy can be extended to include the groups at the
intermediate points, e.g., those on the southeast who want the
U.S. generally to remain aloof from foreign problems but to act
on its own (or with its close allies in a subordinate position)
when it does move.
On the whole, the mood in American politics in the immediate
aftermath of the Cold War seems to have put the compass arrow
towards north, or engagement. In the early days of the Clinton
administration, the arrow swung so strongly towards
multilateralism that it was in danger of going right on through
towards isolation--that is, the popular reaction to the failures
of multilateral institutions caused many to think that the U.S.
should dramatically reduce its involvement in world affairs.
Since then, the arrow has swung again. In 1995, the new
Republican majority in Congress seemed to move the arrow to the
right, towards unilateralism (e.g., the votes to lift the arms
embargo on Bosnia irrespective of the U.N. sanctions). Given
these wild swings, it is by no means clear where the compass will
end up over the five to seven year time-frame of this report.
From the perspective of U.S. national security, an assessment of
major trends in the unfolding world order includes grounds for
both optimism and pessimism.
On the optimistic side:
On the pessimistic side:
There is still much that the U.S. can do to affect the character
of the new international system emerging from the end of the Cold
War system. But history suggests that shaping the character of
the new international system will become more and more difficult
as time goes by. International systems typically have a life
cycle in which the relations among the major powers start out
flexible and become more rigid. One of the more extreme examples
was the early years of the Cold War. Right after World War II,
the West and the Soviet Union had differences (for instance, over
the Marshall Plan or elections in Poland), but it was not
apparent to many that those differences would escalate into
all-out political confrontation. In 1945-48, several European
countries were attracted to both the U.S. and Soviet systems
(Czechoslovakia, Italy, and France all had large communist
parties but also large anti-communist groups), and it was by no
means clear that states would become aligned with one camp to the
exclusion of the other. But within six years, the lines were
drawn, to remain largely unchanged for another thirty-five years.
National Security Budget Authority, in percent of GDP
Sources: Budget of the U.S. 1996 and
Congressional Concurrent
Resolution.
Note: The 1993 increase in international affairs funding was due
to an IMF quota increas.
In other international systems, the clarification came more
slowly. For instance, Napoleon and Bismarck were able to start
with opportunistic alliances that picked off their targets one at
a time. But eventually the other countries realized that their
salvation lay in alliance despite differences, and so the world
order became structured around alliances with and against France
and Germany, respectively. In other cases, the great powers
agreed to maintain a balance of power in which no one state
dominated the others, but over time they were unable to maintain
the commitment, so the world order moved toward a system of
alliances. (This is what happened to the post-Napoleonic "Concert
of Europe," which fell apart when the price of that commitment
became clear in the Crimean War; and also to the post-1919 League
of Nations, which proved powerless when challenged by a resurgent
Germany.)
If these historic analogies hold, then there is some urgency to
resolving the domestic debates about what the U.S. wants from the
new international system, because the international system may be
more malleable in the mid 1990s now than it will be in a few
years.
On the other hand, it would seem that one of the main differences
between this international system and that of the Cold War will
be greater ambiguity and more ad hocism. With regard to the
U.S.'s friends, the new order is likely to see the U.S.
increasingly acting with pick-up coalitions and outside of
long-standing alliances. Greater reliance on coalitions, as
distinct from alliances, poses problems such as coalition
cohesiveness, interoperability with forces of other nations, and
decision making at the top level (e.g., rules of engagement,
strategic goals, and decisions to initiate and to terminate
conflict). With regard to the enemy, the most likely conflicts in
the new international system will be those with poorly defined
enemies who may switch back and forth from being dubiously
neutral to actively opposed. In a high intensity conflict with a
clearly defined enemy, such as a major regional contingency in
the Persian Gulf, there may be significant ambiguity about
whether the enemy has or will use chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons.
An 82nd Airborne mortar drill
The challenge for the U.S. military is to balance the demands of
preparing for the several types of conflict possible in the new
system, while staying within the envelope of the resources that
will be made available in this era of limited government. As we
explained in Strategic Assessment 1995, in our view, the
tasks for which the military must prepare are, in order of
priority:
* Hedging against the emergence of a peer competitor
equipped with the new information technologies. This requires
investing in the future, through research and development and
procurement. The percentage of the defense budget dedicated to
this investment fell from 45 percent in FY 1986 to 30 percent in
FY 1996. Reversing this trend will not be cheap.
* Preparing for major regional conflict (MRC). The
Bottom-Up Review concluded that the U.S. must be ready for
two nearly simultaneous conflicts of this scale. Current force
structure allows for only a small margin of error in executing
the two MRC strategy. A high degree of readiness, force
enhancements, strong overseas presence (both to provide
confidence and to serve as forward staging areas), and increased
preparation for coalition warfare would serve to increase that
margin.
* Countering proliferation. Despite positive developments
(the North Korea agreement, inspections in Iraq, elimination of
nuclear arsenals in ex-Soviet states other than Russia,
elimination of South Africa's programs, termination of Argentina
and Brazil's efforts, and extension of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), at least twenty
countries--many hostile to the U.S.--are still seeking to produce
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver
them.
* Developing cost-effective responses to transnational
threats, that is, undertaking constabulary operations that
back up local police forces, and addressing environmental
problems without diverting military assets from their primary
missions.
* Engaging selectively in peace operations for failed
states. The selectivity should be both geographic and topical.
Geographically, the U.S. will engage more readily in areas of
vital national interest or of historic commitment. Topically, the
U.S. will concentrate on humanitarian relief and conflict
containment, rather than nation building or seeking to end
age-old ethnic tensions.
These tasks for the U.S. military reflect the geostrategic
developments, the information revolution, and the changing
character of government in the post-Cold War era. In order to
make its will felt most effectively in this new environment, the
U.S. government is changing the way it uses its instruments of
power. The rest of this volume examines in turn the non-military,
political military, and war-fighting instruments.
Information Technology
(millions)
Source: International
Data Corporation.
The Changing Character of Government
Source: 1996 Budget.
Reorienting U.S. Priorities
