

Africa: Vital to U.S. Security?


On November 15–16, 2005, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), in cooperation with the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, organized a symposium at the National Defense University (NDU) entitled *Africa: Vital to U.S. Security?* Over 350 participants from the United States and overseas attended, including a diverse group of senior officials, military officers, scholars, and journalists. This report outlines the main lines of discussion at the symposium in accordance with the NDU nonattribution policy.

Commitments by President George W. Bush and Group of Eight (G–8) leaders in 2005 to bolster African development, governance, and social conditions have raised the continent's profile on the foreign policy agenda, but advancing these goals will require sustained international efforts. This symposium considered Africa's strategic importance to the United States and how expanded U.S. and international engagement could best help African countries overcome key challenges and become stronger partners in addressing costly regional crises and mitigating global terrorism. Scholars and practitioners from the United States, Africa, and Europe examined the security environment in Africa, American strategic interests, the role of economic development in security, the global significance of Africa's energy sector, the impact of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), terrorism and other transnational challenges in the region, as well as the prospects for conflict prevention and peacekeeping programs.

Africa and U.S. Security in Context

Most of Africa's 53 states were born through a relatively brief process of European colonization, which established the borders of nearly every country there. Most of these countries inherited European models of governance and ruling elites trained in European traditions. Consequently, very few African states presently have homogeneous populations, coherent borders, or long traditions of multiethnic and multiparty democratic rule. The continent is massive in size and often underappreciated; there are several African countries each of a greater geographic size than Western Europe. Africa has the world's largest collection of land-locked states, many of which are small and consequently are struggling for economic viability. Additionally, there is a long, tortured history of slavery, economic exploitation, and disruption of local cultures, which has hindered the growth of strong, effective governments. Ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts abound, and almost every conflict in Africa has affected neighboring countries. Moreover, many security threats on the continent are transnational in nature, demanding coordination and cooperation by regional partners. HIV/AIDS, criminal and terrorist networks, proliferation of small arms, and problems of migration all cross over borders. The United States and other outside governments must help African countries strengthen state capacity to deal with these conflicts and transnational threats before further engagement can succeed. At the same time, there are limited resources available

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in the international community and donors must prioritize based on what issues their African partners are willing and able to tackle.

During the Cold War, Africa was a low priority among U.S. security interests, except in countering Soviet encroachment and support for insurgencies on the continent. U.S. security interests changed dramatically after 9/11, and today parts of Africa have become of significant concern in the war on terror.

There are numerous places on the continent where governments are simply unable to govern the full extent of their territory effectively, leaving vast ungoverned spaces where the rule of law does not apply. Competing governance also occurs, where the state has ceded authority to outside elements, such as countries that lack adequate resources to implement widespread education programs and increasingly rely by default on externally supported *madrassas* to educate children. Such situations make Africa particularly vulnerable to international terrorist organizations, which could take advantage of these situations to establish training bases, recruit cells, and smuggle goods as a means of funding activities. Many African governments have limited

or unreliable capacities for internal security, law enforcement, and border protection, while weak or corrupt judiciaries prevent the effective prosecution of criminals. All of these conditions increase the continent's vulnerability to individuals (whether local or foreign) or groups (whether state or nonstate actors) who fight a campaign of irregular warfare, using nontraditional means including terrorist tactics.

The stability of key strategic states, such as Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa, is particularly crucial



Keynote speaker Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer.

to U.S. security interests on the continent. Nigeria is important for its energy resources, size, and population (northern Nigeria has the world's eighth largest Muslim population), as well as its leadership role in peace-keeping operations and diplomacy. Panelists noted that Nigeria cannot be allowed to fail; it has the potential to be a future economic leader in Africa and it is essential that the current government continues to carry on the reforms that were initiated over the last year. Kenya plays an equally vital role in conflict resolution, and it has been the staging ground for U.S. military and international humanitarian operations (the United States has had a military access agreement with Kenya for decades). South Africa, one of the continent's most prosperous democracies, remains an important U.S. partner on a broad range

of regional and transnational issues including counterterrorism, as well as promoting democracy and human rights, and bilateral military cooperation has been particularly positive.

U.S. Africa Policy

Senior administration officials stated that President Bush's strategy with regard to Africa is drawn directly from the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, which they characterized as a fully integrated, holistic approach to a variety of global challenges. The strategy identifies key functional issues (for example, economic freedom, trade expansion, counterterrorism, security, and the promotion of democracy on a global basis). Within this framework, the administration can address problems in any region in a variety of ways. These officials contend that the administration has not established a hierarchy of U.S.

regional interests and that President Bush sees Africa as vital to U.S. security—not just a humanitarian issue. They also contend that the President and other top officials have given African issues, particularly several conflicts, sustained attention. Nonetheless, these officials admitted that given the enormity of Africa's needs, along with other priorities, the competition for resources within the government to support a more robust U.S. engagement in Africa remains intense.

The Bush administration's top priorities in Africa have been dealing with the conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Liberia. In addressing each of these conflicts, the administration has followed a formula of working with a lead African country and a subregional organization, while the United States pursues various galvanizing actions.

There has been progress toward resolving some of these conflicts, and U.S. engagement has been crucial. However, the situation in all these countries remains extremely fragile and it is premature to label any of them a success.

Sudan. The goal in Sudan is to transform the government to protect the rights of all its citizens. Kenya has been the lead country and mediator on behalf of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, but American envoys, beginning with Ambassador John Danforth and continuing with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, have played key roles in the North-South peace talks, which produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. U.S. diplomacy has also engaged the African Union and the Arab League in efforts to protect citizens of the Darfur region and to promote conflict resolution. The ceasefire in Darfur is in place but remains very fragile. Rival rebel commanders are linked to ethnic struggles in Chad that may lead to war for the two countries. U.S. policy is to broaden the scope of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and use that as a model for resolving other conflict issues in the Sudan, though it is unclear whether the regime in Khartoum is committed to doing so. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) must attempt to establish an effective government in the totally undeveloped South while at the same time integrating with the regime in the North. There is a minority population ruling in Khartoum, and they feel that if they leave the government, their people will suffer retribution. The SPLM is looking to the United States for political support and help in reconstruction. Some panelists contended that Khartoum will not move forward on issues such as controlling the Janjaweed, unless the U.S. Government institutes some punitive measures and escalates pressure while engaging them diplomatically.

Northeastern DRC. The situation remains fragile in Northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where South Africa was the lead mediator. The peace process is moving forward slowly as a whole, but the spillover

effects of tensions in Rwanda and Burundi continue to cause trouble in the east. The United Nations Mission in the DRC has a vital peacekeeping role in the East, as well as an important role in the electoral process. Widespread genocide may have been averted in the DRC as all parties (including neighboring Uganda and Rwanda) sought an improved relationship with the United States, and they were told that they would have to pull back from the conflict in the DRC before any further discussions could take place.

Liberia. There have been two successful rounds of relatively peaceful elections in Liberia. The United States worked closely with Ghana, the lead mediator, and with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as the subregional organization, but it was Nigerian troops who played a vital role in helping to resolve that civil war. To move Liberia forward, the new government of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf must stimulate economic development, rebuild infrastructure, and extend its reach into the interior of the country, where rebels have been in control of key resources such as timber and diamonds.

Two other conflicts also remain of growing concern:

Côte d'Ivoire. The African Union–led mediation process has failed to break the deadlock between the Ivory Coast's President Gbagbo and rebel forces. Gbagbo no longer welcomes involvement by the French or the international community, and the conflict threatens to draw in neighboring states. United Nations (UN) peacekeepers play an important role.

Ethiopia and Eritrea. These nations field two of Africa's largest and most powerful militaries. The expulsion of some critical UN forces makes this a very unpredictable situation and tensions are rising again. The border needs to be demarcated, the United States is committed to assisting the two countries in resolving the issue.

Several panelists noted that there was bipartisan support for the Bush administration's trade and investment

policies toward Africa, which they characterized as realistic and balanced. However, some panelists suggested that resources were spread too thin and that the administration should devote more effort to conflict prevention, including developing early warning systems and putting countries on notice that violence will be sanctioned via economic, political, and diplomatic means.

of miscommunication between both sides based on subtle differences in definitions of terrorism, but all need to understand each other's concerns if they are to cooperate more effectively. There is a nexus between the two sets of security concerns, and that is the issue of ungoverned spaces. Extending the effective control or authority of African governments within their



Ambassador Princeton Lyman presented the findings of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report on Africa.

Senior officials noted that other key elements of Bush administration policy toward Africa include efforts to enhance governance and build democracy, develop regional cooperation on combating terrorism, increase African capabilities to engage in peacekeeping and stability operations, and promote trade and economic growth, which are discussed in more detail below.

Building Capacity to Combat Terrorism

Several participants noted that while the United States and other members of the international community are focused on al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks (more or less as defined in Title 22 of the U.S. Code), African countries are more concerned with rebel groups, organized crime, and domestic terrorism (as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism). There is a certain degree

borders may be a way to address both sets of concerns.

International terrorists seek out high visibility on a world stage, while domestic terrorists have more parochial interests, such as overthrowing a local government. Both seek hospitable environments in which to recruit, take refuge, and operate, and they find those opportune conditions where governance structures are weak or failing (as in Somalia), or in areas where religious extremism thrives (as in parts of Northern Nigeria), or where urban poverty abounds (such as Casablanca or Addis Ababa). Furthermore, civil war creates an ideal environment for the spread of terrorism. Within Sub-Saharan Africa, three subregions present the greatest potential threat of radical Islamic terrorism:

- Eastern Africa: Somalia down through Kenya, Tanzania, and even further south
- Western Africa: the international community still knows little about these impoverished Muslim

communities, especially in northern Nigeria

- Southern Africa: long-standing elements of extremist political Islam have long held anti-American agendas, with access to resources and technology.

According to some estimates, 46 to 49 percent of Africa today is Muslim. Many Muslim charities are supporting radical and fundamentalist movements across the continent, and highly intolerant Salafist and Wahabist groups are active in building mosques and schools. However, it is important to remember that although the discussion in the Western world focuses on Islamic terrorism, many of the groups in Africa who engage in terrorist acts have little or no affiliation to Islam (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy; the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda; the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA]; the Mozambique National Resistance [RENAMO]; and Interahamwe in Eastern Congo). These are rebel groups, representing sizeable proportions of the populace who have real political, social, or economic grievances that must be addressed and who use terrorist tactics to bring attention to their causes.

Not enough research has been done on the very important links between terrorism and organized crime, although there is evidence of links between al Qaeda and the gold and diamond trade, Hizballah's efforts to raise money among the Arab immigrant populations in West Africa, and the El Barakat money ring in Somalia funneling millions of dollars to al Qaeda. The drug trade is also tied into terrorist networks; heroin, for instance, moves from South Asia to Nigeria and from there to Europe and North America, with significant refining of heroin and other drugs in South Africa.

The African Union (AU) has adopted a Plan of Action (2002 and 2004), which includes strengthening antiterrorism capacities through improved border control, regional judicial measures (involving extradition and other measures), the suppression of terrorist financing, the exchange of

information on individuals and groups involved in terrorism, and multilevel coordination mechanisms. The AU has also established a center for research and study on terrorism, while the development of an African counterterrorism unit in Addis Ababa is currently under discussion. It is anticipated that this unit would receive national reports from the member states and establish lists of individuals and groups involved in terrorism as well as leaders of transnational financing and identify logistical support networks. Panelists noted there is a growing awareness among African countries about what they have to do to address the problem of terrorism.

The United States has supported several counterterrorism projects on the continent over the past few years. One is the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa based in Djibouti, which helps monitor terrorism in the region (including Yemen) and provides counterterrorism training among other duties. In 2003, the United States launched the East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative and the Pan-Sahel Initiative (covering Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad), which in 2004 was transformed into the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) with the additions of Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. TSCTI marks a major increase in funding from previous efforts, with projects for development including the building of schools, working on border control and customs, training security forces, and improving airports. Still, panelists noted more has to be done to reduce corruption in the police departments of these countries, which cripples efforts. Similarly, counterterrorism capacity cannot be developed without considering how that capacity may otherwise be used (for example, to repress political enemies of the state rather than legitimate terrorist organizations). Overall, panelists felt that the United States has important shortfalls in intelligence gathering in key areas including Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania, where terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have been active in the past.

Forging a stable security environment in Africa (to include promoting

security sector and defense reforms), forming professional militaries, and building national and regional capacity to deal with ungoverned spaces are pillars of U.S. policy in the fight against terrorism. But if progress is to be made in Sub-Saharan Africa, any long-term U.S. counterterrorism plan must also take into account poverty, governance reform, and building strong judiciaries. Panelists agreed that poverty is a key enabling factor for terrorism, and if the United States and the international community give additional weight to the economic development dimension of their plans to fight terrorism, they will find many more willing partners in Africa. While it is true that many suicide bombers come from what might be called middle class backgrounds, terrorism is a broader phenomenon, and the masses of people who lend haven or other forms of support to terrorists often have long-standing socioeconomic grievances. Panelists contended that in order to enhance understanding of Islam and other key issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, U.S. personnel posted in these locations should have longer assignments, more local language training (for example, Arabic, Swahili, Somali), and travel extensively throughout the countries in which they are assigned, beyond diplomatic circles in the capital cities.

Conflict Management, Resolution, and Prevention

Africa's conflicts have produced more deaths than all the other wars in the world combined. A country such as Rwanda would normally have relatively little strategic value for the United States in a national security sense, but when a violent situation goes ignored and genocide occurs, it has ripple effects across the region and across the continent. There is a spectrum of stability, from strong states (South Africa) to failing or weakened states (Somalia). On the other hand, Mali and Ghana, widely considered to be failed states 15 or 20 years ago, are now relatively stable and successful. Uganda has been stabilized but suffers continuing problems in the north.

Sometimes conflicts arise from certain intractable ethnic disputes, but often a shortage of land or resources is involved, which is especially problematic when it results in vast numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Conflicts can take the form of a classic *civil war*, where the various sides have very real grievances with deep roots in the country's social and political history, and they can see no way out except through violent action (for example, Southern Sudan, UNITA in Angola, and RENAMO in Mozambique). On the other hand, in a *surrogate war*, rebel groups are recruited, armed, financed, and sent over the border in an attempt to change the regime of a neighboring state whose government is often weak, failing, or corrupt.

Some of the panelists highlighted the many surrogate conflicts in Africa's recent history, noting that these conflicts have contributed significantly to instability and violence in countries that fell victim to outside interference. It is often difficult to distinguish which groups are surrogate forces and which are rebels, especially in a country where the government came to power through illegitimate means. Even though many people once thought surrogate conflicts could be used to remove authoritarian or corrupt regimes and prevent national reconciliation, history has proven that the end often results in prolonged conflict and bloodshed. For example, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire sponsored Charles Taylor in Liberia, the Ugandan government provided arms, financing, and safe haven to the Rwanda Patriotic Army, and both Rwanda and Uganda sponsored rebels in the Eastern Congo, resulting in tremendous problems, destruction, and loss of life.

Suggested solutions to deter African countries from supporting surrogate rebel groups include imposing sanctions and cutting off multilateral and bilateral assistance. The AU should play a more concrete and proactive role in dealing with sponsors of surrogate armies, but African leaders must play a more constructive role in this regard,

building on progress being made within the context of the New Partnership for African Development. U.S. Government officials present at the symposium contended that they are willing to work with the AU and the African governments as partners in this effort, but ultimately it is the Africans' responsibility to bring about change on the continent.

Peacekeeping Operations and Training Initiatives

Peacekeeping operations offer a temporary opportunity for security while a more viable political solution moves forward. At the end of 2005, the UN had an unprecedented 16 operations open, with 8 of them in Africa (mostly operating under the UN Charter's compulsory authori-



ties of Chapter 7). About 75 percent of UN-assigned peacekeeping forces are on the African continent and somewhere between one-quarter to one-half are comprised of African troops. Among the other contributors to peacekeeping operations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has provided valuable support to the AU in Sudan, and the European Union (EU) provided vital support in its 2003 mission in Eastern Congo. The AU has led important operations in Burundi and Darfur, and ECOWAS has carried out major operations

in Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia. Each of these five major organizations has examined the lessons learned from their past experiences, and the UN just went through a vigorous reform process which is seeing some results in the areas of better planning and management, as well as more rapid and effective deployment. The United Nations also is in the process of writing a common doctrine and strategy. It has approved a Peace-Building Commission that would bring together various actors to advise the Security Council, but there is an ongoing debate over staffing. The State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has a White House mandate to integrate planning of U.S. civilian agencies for postconflict situations, but the office has yet to receive adequate funding to fully undertake this effort.

Among the problems that these peacekeeping organizations face are:

- **Funding:** Organizations such as the AU and ECOWAS will continue to depend on funding from the international community, since member states are currently unable to sustain them on their own.
- **Peacebuilding/Rule of Law:** The people working to create a stable economy, fair elections, and civilian police forces combine to form what can be called peacebuilding. There needs to be a better integration between peacekeeping forces and

peacebuilding units, with rule of law experts in the peacekeeping mission itself.

- **Coordination:** Humanitarian and development organizations need to be better coordinated with international and regional security efforts, with an integrated chain of command.
- **Resources:** Right now, with so many missions operating worldwide, all the major international players are overstretched in terms of resources and personnel.
- **Transition:** Peacekeeping missions, such as those led by ECOWAS and the AU in recent years, have been launched into conflicts under the premise that they would eventually hand-off to the United Nations. More work has to be done to improve that transition.
- **Mandates:** UN mandates have grown over the years, with the addition of numerous “soft” tasks such as support of elections, human rights efforts, and quick impact projects. At the same time, these missions are often under Chapter 7–type rules of engagement, assigned to protect civilians with the use of force as necessary. It is hard for any peacekeeping organization to manage both of these sets of tasks at once.

The U.S. Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a 5-year plan to train and equip 75,000 troops worldwide for peacekeeping and stability operations. GPOI emphasizes “training the trainers,” as a way to sustain and extend the reach of this program. A major challenge is that many countries do not have the equipment necessary to undertake a UN mission. Therefore, an effort has been made by the U.S. Government to purchase and preposition the type of all-purpose equipment that can be used by any unit, wherever it may be going. The GPOI program does not require a country that receives training or equipment to deploy to any particular place with that capability. While there are no obligations in accepting this training or equipment, the United States has found that once a country has trained units, they tend to be willing to commit them. Regarding the issue of gendarme forces, Italy has

been a great help with the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, which seeks to raise the number of gendarme and stability police units who fill a critical security gap in peace support operations. They have begun a program in Vicenza, Italy, to train more police trainers (Kenya



Keynote speaker Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Special Envoy of the African Union for the Peace Talks in Darfur.

and Senegal are among the countries participating in this first class of trainers).

The United States has helped African countries with military training assistance for the deployment of peace support operations through the African Crisis Response Initiative, now known as African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), which is the African component of the GPOI program. In the past, ACOTA has included providing equipment, lift capability, maintenance of peace support troops in the field, amphibious training, and the sponsorship of African troops at U.S. military institutions under the International Military Education and Training program. It is not just about creating forces; it is about creating the structures to command and plan for those forces, with programs to train headquarters staff and senior level officers. One

administration official suggested that institutionalizing the Africa Center for Strategic Studies on the continent and increasing the center’s contact with military institutions and war colleges throughout Africa would be the next step to build on current education and training efforts.

Public Health

HIV/AIDS is a major threat to global security, and it is likely to get much worse before it gets better. Some 60 million people have been infected over the last two decades, 26 million have died, 40 million are living with AIDS (mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa), and another 55 million will die by 2020 if they are not provided treatment or a cure. It is spreading rapidly in the highly populated countries of Nigeria and Ethiopia, which will have prevalence rates exceeding 25 percent by 2010 according to a National Intelligence Estimate. Diseases threaten U.S. civilians at home and abroad, endanger armed forces deployed on the African continent, and encourage instability in key regions. The combination of AIDS orphans and radical Islam creates a ready pool of recruits for terrorist activities and violent gangs, while diseases decrease military readiness and create a dearth of peacekeepers to respond to those problems. There are over 14 million AIDS orphans in Africa, and these children are easily exploited, as has been seen among child-soldiers in Sierra Leone and Uganda and the street-gangs in Nairobi and Johannesburg.

The professional classes are also being ravaged by AIDS, as health care workers are dying faster than they can be replaced. Civil servants are experiencing high infection rates, endangering the capacity of governments to provide services and adding to pervasive corruption as they look for funds to secure treatment and provide for their families should they die prematurely. In some countries, three-quarters of the police forces have been infected. Mining, agriculture, and the oil sector all depend on healthy labor. As the higher levels of military and political ranks fall victim to AIDS, there will be a rapid rise in

the struggle to control scarce state resources.

Although the UN encourages all of its prospective peacekeepers to be tested for HIV infection prior to deployment, this is difficult to control. Some African nations are reluctant to deploy their troops on peacekeeping missions because they fear those troops will return with higher infection rates. A soldier's risk of infection doubles for each year he is deployed. At the same time, many countries in need of peacekeepers will be reluctant to accept them from nations with high infection rates.

The Bush administration has tripled funding for AIDS prevention and treatment to \$15 billion over 5 years, while the G-8 at their 2005 summit agreed to double funding on AIDS by the year 2010 and to provide treatment for all who require it. This turnaround in support for fighting HIV/AIDS is in part a result of the American evangelical religious community (a key electoral constituency) putting its support behind the issue and in part a result of bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress.

The epidemic has been transitioning from a period of massive new infections in the 1990s to an advanced stage today in which people are becoming symptomatic and dying on a mass scale. It is not clear what effect this will have on lifestyles in those African communities where the effects of the late stages of AIDS will be most visible. Uganda saw a massive wave of deaths in recent years, but that country's infection rate has fallen from a high of almost 21 percent to an estimated 8 percent. The Ugandan government attributes the decline to an effective combination of the "Abstinence, Being Faithful, and Condoms" program, and certainly such a plan is effective if those measures are taken in combination. Where religious communities have been brought into a civic process of organizing a prevention campaign, the programs have been effective, but where the local communities have not coordinated with the religious institutions from the outset, programs have not been as successful. Part of the battle is in educating

people, but preventing infection is hard in much of Africa, where gender inequality and cultural practices fuel the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Most people in developing countries have access to neither prevention nor treatment options. The number of people receiving antiviral therapy in Sub-Saharan Africa is around 500,000, which is only 10 percent of the 5 million who need it. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS says the cost of dealing with HIV/AIDS will rise 50 percent in the next 4 years. Ultimately, there has to be a focus on improving all three elements of prevention, care for the sick, and treatment for those who are eligible, but the high levels of international donor assistance cannot be sustained indefinitely. A transition toward bolstering the ability of African governments to sustain the prevention and treatment efforts currently underway is needed. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) did not migrate into Africa, but that was purely accidental. If Avian flu were to break out in Africa, the segment of the population already afflicted with AIDS would act as a petri dish for the spread of a pandemic. In November 2005, President Bush submitted a \$7.1 billion request to address Avian flu, including an additional \$300 million to help poor countries deal with Avian flu issues. The President's proposed budget of \$1.5 billion is for a global public health infrastructure, which could potentially become a key component of global security.

Energy and Security

Although the Middle East will continue to be a relatively important supplier of petroleum products for U.S. security interests, Africa promises to be a viable alternative as America seeks to diversify supply in the short term (and potentially in the medium term). Capacity is not growing in the Middle East, and most oil-producing countries in that region are closed to investment, making Africa very attractive for international oil companies. Right now, West Africa is an important supplier of oil to U.S. markets, and that role is expected to increase in the next few years as

more production comes on line. The demand for natural gas in the world will double over the next 20 years, and Africa can be an important player, with countries such as Algeria and Nigeria taking the lead right now in exporting capability of liquefied natural gas. There is a window of opportunity for Africa in energy, especially with oil prices being so high, but that window could close if other countries opened their markets more or if oil companies launched major new investments in Latin America, for instance.

Africa does not actually rank very high in the world for oil production: of the top 10 producers, none is from Africa, and only Nigeria is in the top 10 of exporters. In fact, Nigeria only produces about 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd), Angola about 1 million, Equatorial Guinea around 350,000, and Sudan around 300,000, compared with Saudi Arabia, which produces over 9 billion bpd. So African oil is not vital to U.S. interests, but it is strategically important. Africa currently accounts for 16 percent of U.S. oil imports; this figure is estimated to climb to 25 percent over the next 5 years. Additionally, the United States is seeking to diversify its supply away from the Middle East, making Africa's 12 percent of the world market significant. Lastly, African countries welcome foreign investment, allowing outside investors to come in and develop oil production, whereas most other countries around the world either keep a monopoly on oil for their national company, or they require partnerships with local companies that basically serve as proxies for the government. Five countries that currently limit access—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Mexico—control 53 percent of the world's proven oil reserves.

By 2010, 1 in 5 new barrels of oil will come from Africa, especially from deep off-shore drilling in Nigeria and Angola and new production in Equatorial Guinea and Chad. Oil production is set to grow by 45 to 50 percent in the next decade, which will bring a boon in cash for the countries concerned. It will either be a tremendous opportunity to invest in infrastructure, education, and health care, or it will be

a crisis with different actors moving to take control of the situation by force. The stability of African oil production is jeopardized more by internal threats—such as striking workers, local conflict, or changes in government—than external threats. There is a low probability of al Qaeda ever attacking an African oil installation. At the same time, none of these governments have very sizeable militaries, much less coast guards or effective customs systems, so many question the continent's ability to detect and adequately respond to criminal or terrorist activity.

If revenues grow as projected (an anticipated \$350 billion will flow into Africa's petroleum-producing countries between 2002 and 2019), those countries must be prepared to handle the increase, which often has had the effect of exacerbating problems of internal instability and corruption. Proper management of revenues will require accountable officials, efficient civil servants and tax authorities, as well as transparent legal systems. Not enough is being done to prepare those African governments that will experience a substantial increase in revenues from oil production, but do not yet have the necessary levels of transparency, accountability, or capacity to manage the profits. The experts noted that China and others are willing to invest in infrastructure in conjunction with oil contracts, and the United States has to be willing to do the same. America can provide technical assistance to governments on how to manage oil wealth, especially in helping to establish good fundamentals in finance ministries and central banks.

Discussions also considered measures to enhance transparency in Africa's petroleum sector. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a voluntary program that encourages governments to publish data on oil, gas, and mining revenues. Currently, there are no measures in place to ensure that governments or petroleum companies are providing accurate information or to validate compliance. Although most African producers have shown interest in participating, most have not taken tangible steps to implement measures

to improve governance in this sector. EITI does not require the publication of contracts, even though, in general, the failure to disclose contracts leads to further problems of corruption. EITI does not accompany governance reforms, and it must do this in order to be effective on a broad scale. Moreover, local governments often cite energy security as their rationale for interference, regulation, or involvement in energy markets. To encourage African governments to pursue good governance and better manage their profits, the experts suggested that the U.S. Government must send consistent and coherent policy messages on the importance of transparent and accountable revenue management. In addition, multilateral partners (such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) should require demonstrable progress on transparency and published audits relative to oil revenue management and allocation, prior to providing additional lending or macroeconomic support. Finally, oil companies need to break the secrecy by publishing what they pay African host governments.

Trade and Development

There are certain African governments today who receive 50 percent or more of their budget from international aid, and this is not sustainable. Foreign aid has not fundamentally changed the continent, and many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who have done exceptional work in Africa are feeding second and third generations of the same families. This is the manifestation of a problem, and NGOs will have to evolve because if the international community is only capable of feeding Africa on a constant basis, then it will have failed. Most of the increase in U.S. aid to Africa over the last 4 years has come in the form of emergency aid, not projects that generate sustained development. The United States is trying to use the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act to stimulate investment and break down trade barriers, allowing exports to come into the United States duty-free (this has had some success in South Africa already). America is seeking to reduce or eliminate subsidies, promote private-sector growth, and provide support for small and medium

enterprises. The ultimate goal is to create conditions where international businesses want to invest and where African farmers and entrepreneurs are able to get their products into the global marketplace.

An administration official emphasized that increasing development assistance is also a priority for President Bush, but that assistance is being targeted to support countries that are committed to serious structural reforms and good governance. The official noted that the Millennium Challenge Account is really investment, not aid. The countries themselves write the proposals for Millennium Challenge grants, and they have to be able to put forth strong development plans of their own, with clear pros and cons as well as realistic projections of the likelihood of success. Some very large and powerful countries simply have not presented a business plan for success, while countries such as Ghana and Senegal, for example, have presented a clear plan backed up by expert advisors. In theory, the countries receiving Millennium Challenge grants will lift up their neighbors as they prosper and develop. However, some experts questioned whether the few African countries that have actually received Millennium Challenge funds to date, such as Cape Verde and Madagascar, are capable of having much of an impact on the prosperity of their neighbors.

In addition to development assistance and aid, human capital is essential for growth and progress in Africa. The proportions of highly educated people who have left Sub-Saharan Africa are higher than almost anywhere else in the world. African expatriates have the highest level of education of any immigrant group in the United States; as an example, there are 4 million Nigerians working in America, many of whom are professionals. A whole generation of children across Africa has grown up with no electricity, no running water or fresh water, and no education. The Bush administration gave \$200 million to the African Education Initiative, and has pledged to double that amount during its second term (all in

addition to U.S. bilateral aid). Many African expatriates would return to their countries, but they have to be assured that they can invest in their native lands freely and fairly.

Other International Players

Other international players are now heavily involved in extracting resources, commercial ventures, and economic development projects in Africa, and the experts and officials discussed international involvement and its implications for the continent and for the United States throughout the symposium. It was noted that engagement by other governments can both complement and compete with U.S. policy goals in Africa and that this engagement poses potentially serious challenges for African governments as well. In the midst of this competition, many African countries may find themselves in a race to the bottom. International players are driving up the prices of resources (not just oil, but also manganese, copper, and other minerals) which is good for the African suppliers if they have the infrastructure to handle it. But a key question is whether some countries (China was mentioned) are giving African countries fair market prices for their resources. Also, African countries have to evaluate the deals they are making and be aware of what conditions, either explicit or implicit, are attached to these agreements. For example, some panelists argued that a deal for new infrastructure should do more than to build a road from the refinery to the port; it should also address some of the needs of the local population.

It was noted that China and other countries now involved in Africa do not share U.S. interests in promoting transparency, human rights, or democracy. Others argued that China has taken a neomercantilist approach to its resource extraction and economic

activities in the region. Thus, an African country with transparency and governance problems may avoid heavily conditioned U.S., International Monetary Fund, or World Bank assistance, in favor of less restrictive Chinese assistance that is often tied to oil or resource development contracts. This lack of conditionality on assistance from China and other countries could undermine long-term development in some African countries, as well as the development and governance policies supported by the United States, European donor states, and the international financial institutions.



The real competition as far as the United States is concerned is in political access. China and India have legitimate energy security reasons for being interested in African resources, but some concerns were expressed about the modalities they employ in competing for these resources, particularly since these often compromise domestic commitment to good governance and transparency. Some experts emphasized the need to engage China and India in a discussion of these concerns. They argued that China and India share U.S. concerns with open markets and stability in the Gulf of Guinea, but right now both governments are treated as adversaries and competitors, rather than potential partners in promoting some mutual interests.

In addition to China and India, other countries are pursuing various national agendas in Africa, including Brazil, Malaysia, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Russia, and key European nations. The EU has significant interests in Africa (Europe is still Africa's largest trading partner), and the partnership between the EU and the AU is one manifestation of this relationship. A wave of immigrants from Africa is transforming the workforce in Europe as African immigrants are filling a vast number of low-paying jobs. Europe is short of manpower, and it is very aware that it may have to rely

on African immigrants for certain sectors of the workforce well into the future. The European Union is a partner with the United States on every major peacebuilding and peacekeeping initiative, and its work in Northeastern Congo may have prevented genocide there. It may be a good idea for the U.S. to consider how it can partner with the Arab League on issues that are of a joint concern on the African continent (this is particularly relevant for Sudan in the next few years, where it will be useful to have the Arab

League fully on board to enlist cooperation from the Egyptians). There was consensus that the United States has to work with non-African partners to a much greater extent as the important challenges facing Africa are addressed. As one expert noted, we will all benefit from Africa's successes, and we will all pay for Africa's failures.

Rapporteur: Joshua Yaphe. Final report reviewed and revised by the symposium's panel moderators, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, NDU Senior Vice President; Dr. Stephen Flanagan, Director of INSS; and Marianne Oliva and Gerald Faber, INSS. Final editing and layout by NDU Press.