This workshop examined issues relating to OOTW technologies at a number of different levels. The participants came to a correspondingly diverse set of conclusions, some very specific, others broader and further-reaching.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS:
TECHNOLOGIES NEEDED TODAY
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that the U.S. will be involved in more, not fewer, OOTW missions, the value of technology in OOTW must be carefully examined. The workshop concluded that while technology itself is important, it cannot solve all the problems faced in OOTW. Properly applied, technology can be used to minimize (but cannot eliminate) risk and to provide the force commander with more options with which to respond to the wide variety of OOTW situations.
The process should start with a better way to frame operational MCP technology requirements. The agencies and people working on OOTW technologies are responding to a very wide range of operational requirements that are not all well articulated. The requirements process needs to be better focused; there is presently too little coordination among organizations dealing with OOTW issues. While understanding that different agencies have different time horizons, the workshop agreed that there must be better coordination and less duplication of effort in the research and development of OOTW technologies. Those technologies developed primarily by and for law enforcement also need to be evaluated carefully. This workshop was a good first step towards requirements analysis and should be repeated at appropriate intervals.
Once requirements are identified, the full MCP framework should be applied to each OOTW problem and operational environment. Solutions that best match the MCP criteria (e.g., systems, training, doctrine) should be developed first. Technologies that show promise should be tailored to the MCP approach.
Non-lethal weapons offer the promise of reduced casualties, but they also create real problems that can greatly complicate the commander's life. Properly employed as part of a system to buy time and space to protect people and things (e.g., crowd control) they can add to the commander's options. But NLW alternatives require employment doctrine, training, ROE, C2, and they must not cause the commander to forfeit the ability to use lethal force.
Further, before the U.S. military will invest in and adopt NLW, the technologies must have "dual-use" (both warfighting and OOTW) applications. It is unlikely that technologies with only OOTW applications will be championed or accepted by the military services. On the other hand, if the system does fill a valid military requirement, the services will use and train with it. Procurement will still be a matter of prioritization of scarce defense dollars, with warfighting requirements receiving the highest priority.
Rules of engagement require careful analysis and must be tailored to each operation. What worked in the last operation may be completely irrelevant in subsequent ones. Each new technology and application may require new or modified ROE.
Environmental conditions complicate OOTW technology applications. In many applications the environment is the overriding factor in effectiveness.
OOTW create their own specific training requirements. Systems that improve and expand OOTW training are sorely needed. The training also needs to be transferable to coalition partners. Virtual-reality systems offer promise for both training effectiveness and affordability.
In summary, technology has much to offer the OOTW operator. But there is much work to be done before the promise of technology can be realized. Requirements analysis must be focused and feedback from field operators integrated. Technologies must be assessed, and the implications of their use (both positive and negative) clearly under-stood. The U.S. is in OOTW to stay; we should use our technological advantages to make our operations safer and more effective.