While the comments captured in Chapter 3 highlight the advances made in developing NGO/military interfaces, many observations by workshop participants indicated that those efforts are only a beginning. Considerable work still needs to be done in all of the areas cited in previous chapters--planning, coordination, communication, and training--in order that civilian organizations, the military, and NGOs can work more effectively together. This chapter focuses on the problems identified by the workshop participants.
The vastly different objectives and perspectives the NGO and military/government communities bring to a complex humanitarian emergency are among the most pervasive problems confronting both communities. As Figure 1 in Chapter 2 illustrated, the NGO community has usually been involved in relief and development activities in the given country long before that country's internal condition gains the attention of the international community. The evolving crisis prevents the NGOs from carrying out their mission. As the situation deteriorates and the international community contemplates response, the military commences planning its response. When political authority determines to deploy military force to stabilize and provide security for humanitarian operations, it usually provides the armed forces with a limited mission and, often, limited time frame in which to complete the mission. Once in the field, the military mission--provide security to the overall operation--and the NGO mission--to carry out specific relief activities and return to normalcy--may clash. Both communities have a common goal in their response to the complex humanitarian emergency: stabilization of the situation and a return to normalcy, but have different perspectives on how the goal is to be achieved and how long it will take.
Figure 4 compares the different perspectives of the military and the NGO community as they approach the complex humanitarian emergency response. The figure roughly tracks the time periods of evolution of the crisis that were described in Figure 1. At Time B, as the situation deteriorates, the international community's political leaders monitor events and, increasingly, are called on to respond, providing assistance and security so that relief can be administered. The NGO community sees its efforts increasingly impeded by lack of stability/security and often joins in the call for international response. At Time C, military forces are deployed with a specific mission to provide a secure environment so that the NGO community and other responding agencies can continue operations and resume their individual organization missions. At this point, military and NGO goals are similar, but the means by which the common ends are achieved often put the two groups at odds. The military's first priority is stabilization and security. This often requires (and the military must be prepared for) use of decisive force. As it moves in, the military concentrates on establishing its own forces in secure areas and does not begin to extend its security umbrella to others until that has been accomplished. Moreover, following the tragic loss of life in Somalia, force protection has been a major concern to the military commander. In contrast, the NGOs' first priorities are to renew the humanitarian and development activities halted by the chaos and violence. NGOs want the security provided by the military force, but chafe at the accompanying constraints on their own movements. NGO expectations regarding the military's role in providing security for their operations may not be realistic if they do not fully understand or appreciate the military's mission, doctrine, or approach to the use of force. In some situations, NGOs at the workshop felt that the security provided by the military constrained their movements in-country and their ability to accomplish their mission. In addition, the NGO's focus on a desired end-state and the military's emphasis on a limited mission and successful exit strategy provide further opportunities for misunderstanding.
Despite the divergent focus of efforts, understanding of each community's "division of labor" has been realized in past operations. With a secure environment created by the military, the NGOs are able to resume limited operations (Time D). These efforts often take advantage of unique military capabilities and assets (excess defense articles, transport and heavy equipment availability) and serve to re-build the infrastructure within the country. As the overall situation continues to improve, the military deployment is no longer required and the forces withdraw (Time E), leaving the NGOs to resume their operations under close to pre-crisis conditions.
One of the weaknesses of the NGO/military interface involves planning. In some cases, NGO workshop representatives complained that U.S. Government or UN objectives are unclear, hampering planning efforts. They cited as examples the U.S. participation in Liberia and in the relief efforts following the Rwanda crisis. Complaints were levied at the UN as well. One participant noted that the UN Security Council does not always spell out its objectives, leading to confusing responses by both governments and NGOs working with it. An experienced ambassador pointed out that, because of unique domestic political considerations, member states sometimes prefer that the UN not be too definitive when identifying its objectives. This allows each country to tailor its response to a situation. This lack of clarity, however, complicates the planning process for all involved, including NGOs.
Generally speaking, the U.S. Ambassador in-country is the focal point for getting the process going. The government of the country where disaster occurs will request assistance from the United States. Once the Ambassador declares the situation a disaster, the U.S. embassy sets the process in motion with a cable to Washington (see Figure 5). The lead agency in disaster response is USAID/OFDA. OFDA will assess the situation and determine the most appropriate response from the U.S. Government, including providing relief commodities, deploying regional advisors, or a DART team and, finally, funding NGOs to conduct disaster relief in situations where they are needed. OFDA also works with the military in determining how U.S. forces can best support the effort. But real planning among civilian and military agencies remains weak.
Many NGO participants raised questions about the process by which the U.S. Government gets involved in disaster relief operations. While some of the participants--both government and NGOs--were exceptionally well versed in the bureaucratic trappings of crisis/disaster response, others were less well informed. Moreover, despite the straightforward description given at the workshop, many of the participants stated that in their experience, the process was often muddled and the system did not always function smoothly.
NGOs are principally concerned about planning for participation in humanitarian relief aspects of the emergency response, and not with military planning. Until Operation Uphold Democracy, the two planning processes were distinct and compartmented.
One participant summed up the root of many problems: "The biggest problem I see is with communication. The NGOs are not consulted about an operation until after the decisions have already been made by the military." Many of the NGO participants expressed similar feelings about the planning, coordination, and communication processes.
The discussion on planning revealed a number of sub-issues that require further development. According to one participant, the planning process is too closed and relevant NGOs "cannot get in the door to participate." Some NGO participants were critical of current U.S. guidance on Government involvement in humanitarian emergencies, as stated in Presidential Decision Directive 25. This was "skewed during the drafting process," they observed, and NGOs did not have an opportunity to provide adequate input to the directive. A new PDD which will address these issues is being contemplated.
Another concern was that NGOs often are asked too late and too infrequently to participate in the planning process, affecting the accurate assessment of root causes and conditions contributing to conflict within a country. One participant maintained that both NGOs and governments need to perform on-the-ground assessments using information from people who live there. "Planning won't work unless you correctly assess the situation." In any case, failure to plan in advance at senior levels of government leaves greater responsibility to the HOC and CMOC coordination efforts on the ground, once all parties are in the field.
Many comments regarding the lack of NGO participation in the government planning process reflected concerns about disruption of established relations by a military presence, particularly by a force whose mission focuses on stability rather than other elements of the crisis. One NGO observed that once the military was involved, the potential for disrupting informal--albeit effective--channels of communication among NGOs in-country was considerable. Participants agreed that it is particularly important that military units that have not had civil affairs training be exposed to these concerns.
Because of the more diffuse NGO approach to their mission, the military participants in the workshop expressed a need for "more complete information on the NGOs" to execute proper planning. Yet, given the independent nature of NGOs and the sheer size of the NGO community--for example, more than 400 NGOs are operating now in Haiti--"there are just too many moving parts--there cannot be much of a coordinated effort. Once you start to try to integrate numerous actors, it gets very complicated," according to another participant. As one NGO representative recognized, the "commander's intent" is critical to any military planning. "If you can't identify the commander--and you can't on the NGO side--this will be a problem." On the other hand, an experienced disaster assistance official observed that "the crisis response challenge is great enough to require everyone's effort. The job is to channel the efforts efficiently."
The problem of accurately assessing a situation and its short- and long-term needs was raised in other contexts, as well. The different tasking of relief and development agencies within the U.S. Government was noted, as well as the fact that many NGOs are oriented primarily toward development and not emergency relief. These organizations need to "retool" to carry out a disaster relief role. Other international organizations and NGOs focus principally on relief missions. Several participants observed that accurately assessing the needs of a population in an emergency situation is critical to identifying the most appropriate NGOs to respond to an emergency. Along with making better assessments of a situation, it is necessary to accurately identify NGO capabilities and resources. Both of these tasks fall under the purview of OFDA and the DART team, not the military.
Workshop participants also discussed the idea of developing "score cards" to help make better long-term assessments. One participant identified a NATO program that seeks to identify "normality indicators" to serve as a guidepost for assessing the effectiveness of NATO initiatives in restoring the peace in Bosnia. Some participants felt that such indicators are irrelevant at best and misleading at worst, particularly as the forces responding to a crisis have a profound impact on local conditions. One workshop participant noted that, because local procurement contracts tend to inflate normality indicators, the military's very presence would skew its own indicators and mask real development problems. Several NGOs recognized that the NGO presence also affects local "normality" indicators, though perhaps on a different scale.
On the other hand, some participants indicated that many NGOs are already using indicators of measurements of effectiveness. One participant thought that NGOs take a "more realistic" approach by focusing on tangible indicators, such as tons of food delivered or number of meals served. Another participant suggested that indicators are really more useful at the development end of the relief-development spectrum: "It is premature to develop (indicators) in the early response to a crisis or disaster because it usually takes years for a real impact to be noticeable." These comments reflect the NGOs' long-term commitment to the situation and their philosophy that almost any action is a positive step toward long-term goals.
NGO workshop participants added that, in addition to trying to coordinate among the various U.S. NGOs, it is necessary to coordinate with the local government and local NGOs. The complexity of the situation on the ground--with many government organizations and NGOs of different nationalities as well as indigenous NGOs--is not readily apparent to planners in Washington. NGO representatives felt that not enough effort is made to coordinate with and support local, indigenous NGOs who are already on the ground and working effectively.
Despite the call for common structures for planning, communication, and implementation, many of the participants recognized that cultural barriers impede coordination. Many NGOs do not favor the military's standardized way of approaching a problem, believing that it diminishes flexibility, which NGOs view as their strength. Participants generally agreed that even if a logical structure for coordination and planning could be developed, the "NGOs do not necessarily want a planning structure imposed on them," and thus their desire for early and meaningful involvement in the planning process.
Problems of coordination with diffuse authority are not confined to the NGO community. Many participants--NGO, military, and U.S. Government--commented on the conflicts among U.S. Government agencies involved in humanitarian and peace operations.
Organizational conflicts are not limited to the U.S. Government. Participants stated that turf battles occur among UNDP, UNHCR, and other international bodies as well. According to one participant, command and control arrangements among these organizations are "impossible."
Trust among these different organizational cultures was an important concern for both military and NGOs, but especially for the latter. According to a participant, the breakdown of trust is a result of "tensions between the NGOs and the military because they have different objectives." A military peace-enforcement operation may conflict with the humanitarian goals of an NGO. Many NGO participants raised a concern about being too closely associated with the military because of the NGOs' desire to stay neutral in a conflict. They made the point that the local population's or local government's view of the U.S. military or coalition forces greatly affect the success of an operation and accordingly, an NGO's willingness to be associated with the military. In Bangladesh, the local populace had a positive view of the U.S. military role, greatly enhancing the chances of operational success and ensuring a positive NGO response to cooperating with the military. Clearly, trust will be situation dependent, as well as dependent upon individual NGOs' outlooks.
Another problem within the NGO/military interface involves the degree of communication. Some NGO participants stated that there exist situations during which an NGO will be reluctant to communicate its plans to the military. The NGOs expressed concern that in the process of sharing their plans with the military, they would be broadcasting their intentions to indigenous armed groups. For example, if the NGOs were preparing to transport supplies in a conflict-torn area, they would want to keep this information tightly held to avoid ambushes and looting.
There also are situations when it is physically impossible for NGOs and the military to communicate. Several participants cited problems of communication interoperability between the communities. Most NGOs operate under the consent of the host government, which allocates communication frequencies. In the case of the Red Cross, frequencies are assigned by the International Telecommunications Union. The UN currently does not share its frequencies with NGOs. Some NGO participants "beg, borrow, and steal" their equipment, which means that their communications "network" is a system patched together with whatever they can find. Another participant commented on the lack of interoperability among U.S. Government agencies. In Haiti, for example, members of the HAC could not contact the CMOC except through satellite communication equipment provided by OFDA.
Communications capability also affects the host government perspective on the NGO-military interface. During discussion of the desirability of communications interoperability, one participant voiced his perception that "the host government gets very suspicious when there is too much interoperability [among the international community or with the military]. NGOs must strictly ensure their neutrality at all times."
Problems of communication are exacerbated by the varying levels of technologies available to different organizations. As mentioned before, the need for and use of technology enhancements vary considerably between the NGO and military communities and within the NGO community itself. Access to technology is affected by resource constraints. Large NGOs, by virtue of their resource base, will be better equipped and have more recent technology than the smaller ones. In contrast to the military's high-tech approach, one participant described much of the NGO community as "very low-tech." "We work in an austere environment. We use old, donated equipment and man it with locals." Another participant added, "The problem with computers is that they get ripped off; there are not many of them; they are in poor repair; and there exist linguistic problems."
Both the NGO and government participants agreed that joint training was a worthy goal that should be addressed, but all the participants acknowledged that shortages of time and money constrain efforts in this area. According to one participant, "There is not a lack of desire to train...it is simply a lack of resources." Similarly, as evidenced by the debate on planning, both NGOs and the military need to think about how they can incorporate the other community into their training. For example, one participant stated that the military needs to understand the real time and resource constraints under which NGOs operate if it is to effectively incorporate NGOs into its training mission. NGOs cannot afford to send key personnel to extended training exercises like those often carried out in the military.