"Both sides need to see the situation as 'win-win.' But how do you change the current paradigm that does not track with a win-win approach? Everyone is trying to win, but collectively, you fail." - Workshop Participant
Crises of all kinds--natural, technological, and complex humanitarian--will continue unabated in the near future. Over the past 10 years, events identified as disasters by USAID/OFDA have averaged about 45 per year and ranged from as few as 33 to as many as 64 in 1996. Moreover, the trends indicate that complex emergencies may actually increase in number in the future. In 1986, OFDA classified three situations as complex emergencies; by 1995, the number had risen to 26. The implications are clear--NGOs, Government agencies, and the military must enhance efforts to coordinate responses to the growing needs created by these events.
But how do you achieve a "win-win" situation when participant goals, missions, and cultures vary greatly? Although workshop attendees expressed many different viewpoints on how to enhance the NGO/Interagency interface, three junctures in the process emerged as critical focal points for further investigation:
Workshop participants made numerous suggestions for enhancing joint planning. One participant suggested organizing the most "senior" NGOs into a coordinating committee and having them work out a plan, probably in coordination with the military. This idea addresses the need for NGOs to develop their own plans, as opposed to having the military or government agencies impose a plan on them, while at the same time cutting through the problem of dealing with hundreds of independent NGOs. According to one participant, "You cannot regulate or enforce the NGOs to follow a plan. They must see the clear-cut advantage to following it." By having the NGOs create the plan themselves, the assumption is that the process would be closer to achieving this goal. Another participant added that the coordinating committee could include or be solely comprised of the donor organizations. Because there are far fewer donor agencies than NGOs, it might be simpler to get donors involved in a planning committee.
In the planning process, several NGO participants encouraged the U.S. Government participants to expand their thinking about NGOs and not include just the large, well-known NGOs. The government planning process needs to expand to include the small NGOs as well. One way to accomplish this task was seen as better education of government planners about the NGO community.
Workshop suggestions to enhance in-country coordination ranged from very specific to very broad. What follows is a condensed description of these suggestions.
One of the key points stressed by NGO participants was to make better use of CMOCs, HOCs, and DARTs during a complex emergency. The NGOs encouraged the military to use the DARTs to identify NGO assets and foster communication with the NGO and donor communities. The NGO participants also urged the U.S. Government participants--civilian and military--to make use of the situation reports published by InterAction for its members. These reports describe what the NGOs are doing on the ground, including where they are operating and in what sectors, and provide the names and phone numbers of key contact personnel.
The participants repeatedly stressed the need for fostering closer working relations between HOCs and CMOCs, particularly "outside the wire." For the NGOs, it is important that the military and OFDA work with the NGOs in the HOC and not operate solely out of secure facilities, such as airfields.
Addressing the need to cut down on confusion among U.S. Government agencies, one individual suggested that the CMOCs and the NATO CIMIC Centers use secure video teleconferencing between and among CMOCs or CIMIC Centers in situations where multiple centers are located and used by the U.S. military, the UN, NATO, or other foreign militaries. This would enhance communication by providing a real-time information exchange and forcing a tete-a-tete among the various organizations.
The area of improving communications across organizations and distances encompasses many possibilities, ranging from defining actions and terms to increasing common understanding, to using technology to physically enhance the communication process.
All of the U.S. Government participants expressed a desire to find out more about the NGO community and to develop a central location for information about NGOs. The U.S. Government participants were almost unanimous in their desire to see the NGOs establish a central point of contact within the U.S. Government, for both the U.S. Government agencies and the NGO community to use. OFDA was mentioned as the logical government agency. This suggestion was carried further by some participants urging both the NGO and U.S. Government communities to explore the use of the Internet to facilitate communication.12
In a similar vein, many NGOs expressed a desire for the U.S. Government and the military to establish a central point of contact to facilitate communication. It was unclear whether this point of contact would be military or civilian. Some of the participants suggested that OFDA should be formally designated to fulfill this responsibility. Another suggestion was to publish point of contact information--identifying key players--and distribute it throughout both communities.
One individual pointed to the DoD publication that defines commonly used terms within the defense community. This participant suggested that such a dictionary ensures that all the actors in an operation speak the same organizational "language" in difficult areas, such as peace operations. The suggestion was made that the NGO community develop a similar dictionary of common terms used by NGOs in disaster situations. By sharing such publications, both the NGOs and the military could speak a common language when communicating during disaster situations.
Use of technology was viewed as an issue area where differences between the two communities were great, but the potential payoff in cooperating was just as great. Many NGOs were interested in finding new ways to use current, low-cost technologies to facilitate communication and planning. Almost all of the participants wanted to see the development of a system--relatively unsophisticated and unquestionably inexpensive--to get real-time information from the U.S. Government to the NGOs and vice versa. Despite agreement on developing such a system, the types of inputs were not resolved, nor were questions surrounding collection of the inputs. Other issues, such as system vulnerability and verification of data, were also raised.
Both NGOs and representatives from government organizations recognized that continuing to meet in workshops such as the one held at NDU would foster productive communication between the communities. Many of the participants agreed that meeting face-to-face and discussing differing perspectives helped to increase their understanding of the other community. Specific suggestions for enhancing planning, coordination, and communication emerged in these discussions.
Identifying transition and exit strategies, some participants emphasized the need for both the NGO and government communities to deal more seriously and concretely with the issue of identifying and working toward an "end-state." As part of this planning effort, both NGOs and the military need to start preparing for a role in conflict resolution, particularly given the increased need for complex humanitarian emergency responses. Along similar lines, there is a need to analyze and deal more effectively with the requirements along the relief-development continuum necessary for both communities. This is particularly true as the military formulates its own transition and exit strategies.
Following on the discussion of conflict resolution, one participant suggested establishing a database on NGOs who are currently mitigating entities in conflict situations. Lessons learned by these NGOs could be passed along, particularly as they relate to the difficulties associated with conflict resolution and operating in environments where the "rule of law" no longer exists. Another participant suggested that the military could learn more from NGO "capacity-building" efforts. This individual stated that these NGOs have learned how to use local materials for indigenous reconstruction while minimizing the adverse effect on the local economy. The military could be made aware of these efforts to effectively integrate the local economy in rebuilding communities.
The workshop discussion generated numerous ideas from both NGO and Government participants on ways to enhance joint efforts in complex humanitarian emergencies, but the feasibility of these ideas still must be evaluated. Many of the workshop suggestions were commendable, but difficult to implement at this point in time either because of resource constraints or deep differences among organizations. Other suggestions were within the realm of possibility, but the potential payoff may not justify the effort. Nevertheless, there was general agreement on the part of both NGO and U.S. Government attendees that various forms of joint training could help achieve progress in familiarizing the two communities with each other. In addition, all of the participants wanted to enhance communication and coordination, although their suggestions as to how to do this differed considerably. One method on which there was agreement was to develop an information tool that could serve as the conduit for knowledge, facts, and news among organizations involved in complex humanitarian emergencies.
Training--Fertile Ground for Development. Workshop participants agreed that the training area was one where their interests clearly coincided. One participant suggested that the military create a "traveling road show" that would explain how the military operates in humanitarian and peace operations and would perform outreach training to the NGOs. One individual suggested that the training provided by the military cover how NGOs can gain access to DoD excess property and other detailed issues. The NGOs emphasized that it is important that the military understand the serious time constraints that NGO personnel face in committing to training. In response to this, one participant recommended that the military develop educational videos. These videos, which would cover the same topics as a formal training program, would be a "low-tech" approach that could accommodate the NGOs' need for flexibility in training. Self-learning texts, used alone or in conjunction with the videos, could also accomplish the same goals of fostering understanding among communities while conserving on time.
Another participant suggested that representatives from the military join the annual training events and conferences that InterAction provides to its member NGOs. Others wanted to see the successful joint training at Ft. Polk continue and perhaps be expanded. This would assist the military in developing their understanding of the NGO community and would help bridge cultural gaps between the communities. One participant observed that training in the military should not be restricted to the officer corps. Enlisted personnel need to be educated about NGOs as they are very likely to be the first to encounter NGOs when deployed in the field.
Using Technology to Further Communication. Like training, enhancing communication through technology is a potentially productive approach that could yield high payoffs. Almost all of the workshop participants expressed an interest in seeing the development of an information tool that would allow effective, timely, and efficient communication between communities. As mentioned earlier, ACTIS has funded a pilot project in this area to develop a real-time communication system that can incorporate information relevant to both the NGO community and the military.
Researchers from the U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) presented a first version of its Coalition Forces C2 Decision-Aids Storyboard for review by participants at the workshop. The storyboard is the product of CECOM work on a set of tools to support the exchange of information and the creation of a common perception of the situation among NGOs and U.S. and coalition military forces. In general, the workshop participants saw utility in the system, and many agreed to work with ACTIS to help tailor the next version, particularly in those aspects related to NGO information requirements. Participants described the desired system as one that
Building on these ideas, ACTIS will work with CECOM and the NGO community to identify useful data fields and presentation modes. Once an enhanced version of the prototype is developed, ACTIS will review and analyze the efficiency, effectiveness, and simplicity of the system, testing it in user sessions with NGOs and others. ACTIS will also consider the compatibility of the design with military and coalition forces' needs. It is anticipated that this iterative process will be completed by the end of 1996.
In the final analysis, both communities have identifiable obligations to fulfill in order to improve the NGO/Interagency interface. The U.S. Government (especially the military) needs to develop a better understanding of the NGO community--to include NGOs of all sizes and national origins. The military needs to ensure that its programs for supporting NGOs in the field are known to that entire community. The NGO community needs to develop a better understanding of the process by which the U.S. Government gets involved in a disaster response situation and the scope of the roles that the military will play in that process. The ACTIS workshop demonstrated a willingness among all parties to work to resolve obstacles to coordination.
Participation Encouraged. ACTIS invites those individuals and organizations who would like to participate in the endeavor to enhance the NGO/Interagency interface to contact Dr. David S. Alberts, Director of ACTIS, at (202) 685-2262.
1 Each ACTIS workshop to date has built upon the lessons learned from previous sessions. The first workshop focused on identifying unique command and control requirements and essential functions of coalition peace operations. The second dealt with designing ideal command arrangements for peace operations involving a U.S. combined joint task force, and the third expanded this perspective to include the experience of other Western Hemisphere nations. While the first two workshops looked at the issues from the U.S. perspective only, the third validated concepts and added new insights from an experienced group of senior operators from seven other countries in the Western Hemisphere. The fourth workshop examined OOTW issues and related technologies. Another area identified in the previous workshops that warranted additional study was interagency, civilian, and military organization communication. Hence, the fifth workshop explored interagency relations within the context of Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti. Publications from all of these workshops are available from NDU Press, or from ACTIS.
2 Frederick M. Burkle, Jr. "Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Concepts and Participants," in Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January-March 1995), 55-63.
3 UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
4 U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, The AID-PVO Partnership (Washington, D.C., 1992), 5.
5 For a full description of AID's interface with the NGO community, see U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, The AID-PVO Partnership (Washington, D.C., 1992).
6 The Code of Conduct was sponsored by Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Relief Services, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Save the Children Alliance, the Lutheran World Federation, OXFAM, and the World Council of Churches, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross.
7 Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, Peacekeeping Institute, 1966), 47.
8 Chris Seiple, op cit.
9 Interagency planning problems associated with Operation Uphold Democracy, as detailed in the ACTIS book, Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti ~ A Case Study.
10 See Chris Seiple, 41.
11 Seiple, op cit. Chapter Four.
12 InterAction has created a Web site - www.interaction.org - to facilitate communication.