Chapter 2

Haiti: A Chronology of Events

The evolution of the Haiti crisis was defined by a complex combination of U.S. domestic and international political considerations. Political events impacted the military planning process in many ways and are critical to under-standing the evolution and idiosyncrasies of the operation. In particular, the operation developed over a protracted period in which political decision makers pursued a diplomatic course of action that did not admit to possible U.S. military action.

Table 1 at the end of this chapter summarizes the chronology of events between October 1993 and January 1995.

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of Haiti in December 1990 in that country's first open and fair election. A populist priest whose followers came mostly from the poor communities of Haiti, Aristide experienced difficulties in governing from the beginning - in part because he did not control the legislative branch of his government and in part because he was resisted by elements of the status quo. Street violence broke out shortly after Aristide was elected. Because he appeared to sanction his own followers' violence against political opponents, Aristide enjoyed only lukewarm support within the U.S. government.

On September 30, 1991, after only seven months in office, Aristide's government was over-thrown by officers of the Haitian army, and Aristide was flown into exile, first to Caracas and then to the United States. Henceforth, U.S. and international policy was focused on restoring elected civilian government in Haiti. The United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) took up Aristide's cause and sought to mediate between Aristide and the military. The OAS sought a voluntary trade embargo from its members without good results. On June 16, 1993, the UN Security Council passed a binding resolution imposing an embargo on all petroleum and arms sales to Haiti and ordering a freeze on overseas financial assets of Haitian officials and business elite. Sanctions took effect on June 23.

Shortly thereafter, in July 1993, representatives of the Aristide government and the military met separately with U.S. and UN mediators at Governors Island, New York, where an agreement was reached on a process and a time frame for the transition back to democratic government. Under the accord, the sanctions would be lifted immediately; the military leaders would step aside and Aristide would be restored to power by October 30, 1993, or sanctions would be re-imposed.

Early in the fall of 1993, in preparation for implementing the Governors Island accord, the U.S. sent a contingent of 193 U.S. and 25 Canadian troops, engineers and trainers, to Haiti aboard the USS Harlan County. The group was an advance of a 1267-man UN police and military mission to train Haitian police and army and rebuild the Haitian infrastructure, as agreed under the accord. Arriving in Port-au-Prince a week after 18 U.S. soldiers had been killed by tribal guerrilla forces in Somalia, the Harlan County was greeted by angry, chanting crowds and denied entry to the dock. After a day of stand-off, on October 12, 1993, the Harlan County was ordered to depart Haiti. Inside Haiti, the pullback was taken as a sign of weakened U.S. resolve to implement the Governors Island agreement. Violence increased sharply. On October 13, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to re-impose the oil and arms embargo. Although DoD continued to insist that it was unwise to use U.S. troops in Haiti, a 20-member planning cell was established at the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) to prepare for such a contingency.

On December 22, 1993, the U.S. issued an ultimatum to the Haitian military that unless they stepped down by January 15, 1994, the fuel and arms embargo would be expanded. Again, the deadline passed. In ensuing weeks, the U.S. government wavered, uncertain about Aristide's ability to govern or his commitment to reconciliation. Policy focused on building support for a broad moderate coalition within Haiti. The U.S. briefly considered whether Aristide should step aside in favor of a figure more acceptable to Haiti's business elite and military.

By early spring, the Defense Department, which continued to be opposed to using military force in Haiti, began to assess possible scenarios. Papers were prepared comparing and contrasting recent operations in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia. The after-action reports of lessons learned from Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Provide Hope in Somalia were circulated within the Pentagon. This caused Secretary of Defense Perry to become concerned that failure to be actively involved in the early decision stages might impact negatively on his department as events progressed. He instructed the department to begin interagency planning. In April, USACOM briefed Secretary Perry on military planning accomplished to date.

In March, responding to the Haitian military leaders' continuing intransigence, President Clinton pledged a "more aggressive effort" to restore Aristide. In mid-April the UN mediator, Dante Caputo, was rebuffed by the Haitian military, who rejected the latest terms for transition.

Beginning in March and continuing through April, domestic U.S. political forces began aggressive lobbying against the Administration's policy of returning refugees to Haiti and delaying the restoration of Aristide. The Congressional Black Caucus criticized the Administration on both counts, and in April Randall Robinson of TransAfrica began a highly-visible hunger strike protesting the refugee return policy. Aristide criticized U.S. policy and publicly disagreed with Special Advisor Lawrence Pezullo's negotiating strategy. On April 22, 1994, the Administration announced its intention to seek a total economic embargo of Haiti and stated that the "use of force is not ruled out." Pezullo resigned in protest over this change of policy direction. Two weeks later, former Congressman and Congressional Black Caucus head William Gray was named Special Advisor in his place. His focus was to be on resolving the refugee question.

On May 5, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding the resignation of the Haitian military leaders, instituting a global trade embargo, and implementing other financial and travel restrictions. With the strong possibility that hostile military action would take place, USACOM tasked the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (SOCOM) at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, to develop a plan (Plan 2370) for a military operation to forcibly remove the Haitian military and establish a secure environment so that Aristide could be restored. The Agency for International Development (AID) began developing its own plans for assisting democratic forces and for training a new police force.

By July, policymakers still entertained the hope that the Haitian military would step aside. USACOM instructed the Army's 10th Infantry Division (Mountain) at Ft. Drum, New York, to develop an alternative plan (Plan 2380) for permissive entry into Haiti. The Coast Guard became actively involved in the planning for the military operation for the first time in August.

Meanwhile, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24 MEU) deployed aboard USS Inchon to the waters off Haiti to send a signal of imminent threat of force. Several other Army and Navy units conducted military operations off the coast of Haiti and in South Florida. Elements of a multinational force began training in Puerto Rico for support to the transition. U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships began to stop boats attempting to violate the embargo.

On July 30, the last commercial aircraft left Haiti - essentially closing the country to the out-side world. Haiti's military leaders launched a trial balloon proposing General Cedras' resignation by the end of the year. This was strongly rejected.

On July 31, the UN Security Council authorized use of "all necessary means" to restore Aristide to his elected position and authorized the creation of a multinational force for that purpose. Within the U.S. Government, a series of inter-agency working groups was established with JTF- level coordination. Preparations for military action moved forward on the parallel tracks of Plans 2370 and 2380 during August. The Administration refused to set a deadline by which time Cedras and his cronies had to leave and continued to express publicly their hope that military force would not be necessary. Planning for the Haiti operation was interrupted in late August by a Cuba crisis, when hundreds of Cubans began leaving that island in rickety rafts and boats.

On September 12, USACOM chaired an inter-agency planning rehearsal intended to inform interagency principals of military plan details, to coordinate the activities of various agencies, and to broker any differences among the elements focusing on Haiti. The meeting marked the first time that all of the senior civilian and military players met to discuss the pending Haiti operation. The meeting was widely regarded as too large and unfocussed, but it highlighted the coordination that remained to be done. A subsequent smaller meeting, chaired by the NSC staff, brought key players together again and resolved much of the confusion. Press reports continued to suggest that the U.S. might find a diplomatic solution, but, beginning September 13, U.S. forces began to deploy to Haiti from Norfolk aboard the aircraft carriers America and Dwight D. Eisenhower. On September 15, President Clinton spoke to the press saying "there is no point in going any further with the present policy."

The next day, former President Jimmy Carter, accompanied by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and former Chairman of The Joint Staff, General Colin Powell, departed for Haiti for one last effort to persuade General Cedras and his allies to step aside peacefully. The Carter mission was ultimately successful in negotiating the resignation and departure from Haiti of top military leaders, though only at the last minute and after U.S. 18th ABN Corps units had already embarked from Ft. Bragg for the invasion.

On September 19, U.S. forces disembarked in Port-au-Prince and entered the city without resistance. The 10th Mountain Division forces were substituted for the 18th ABN Corps as permissive entry was ensured. In the following week, violence occurred on several occasions. A series of police beatings took place in Port-au-Prince while U.S. soldiers looked on, apparently constrained by rules of engagement (ROE) that precluded interference with the Haitian police. On September 24, a USMC patrol engaged Haitian forces in a firefight in Cap-Haitien, and ten Haitians were killed. In the aftermath, the local military and police disengaged and simply disappeared. Finally, a group of Aristide supporters marched on September 30 and were attacked by hostile opposition elements. After these incidents, U.S. forces slowly acquired responsibility for island security, and no further significant violence occurred.

On October 15, President Aristide arrived back in Haiti. The reduction in U.S. forces in Haiti started almost immediately with the Marines departing Cap-Haitien beginning in early October.

In January 1995, the U.S. turned command of the Haiti operation over to the UN.

Table 1:
Chronology of Operation Uphold Democracy

(This Chronology is constructed from press reports from The Washington Post; "A Haitian Chronology," Congressional Quarterly, September 21, 1994, page 2579; and from the workshop discussion.)

26 Dec 90
Jean-Bertrand Aristide elected president of Haiti by a landslide.

7 Feb 91
Aristide sworn in; announces reorganization of Haiti army.

1991
ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) initiated.

30 Sep 91
Aristide government overthrown.OAS invokes Resolution 1080 (Santiago Resolution) and calls for economic sanctions against Haiti to be observed by all members.

24 May 92
Faced with surge of Haiti refugees, President Bush orders interception and repatriation of Haitian "boat people."

16 Jun 93
UNSC binding resolution imposing fuel and arms embargo and freeze of Haiti assets abroad.

23 Jun 93
UN embargo commences; U.S. freezes Haiti assets.

3 Jul 93
At Governors Island, military agree to UN plan for Aristide's return to Haiti on 30 Oct. Limited embargo lifted pending compliance with agreement.

12 Oct 93
USS Harlan County, with U.S. and Canadian trainers, part of Governors Island plan, departs Port-au-Prince. 20-member Planning Cell established at USACOM.

30 Oct 93
Governors Island deadline passes and Aristide remains in exile in U.S. USN and Coast Guard vessels deploy with elements of French, British, Argentine, and Canadian navies to enforce embargo on Haiti.

Dec 93 - Jan 94
U.S. declares it will broaden sanctions unless Gen. Cedras steps down by 15 Jan 94. Prime Minister Malval resigns; prospects for broadening Parliamentary alliance fail.

15 Jan 95
U.S. deadline passes; U.S. pursues diplomatic efforts; proposes broadened coalition government to Aristide.

Jan 94 - Mar 94
Panama, Somalia after-action reports circulated in DoD; SecDef instructs to start interagency planning.

15 Feb 94
U.S. urges Aristide to accept Haiti Parliament peace plan in which Aristide would name Prime Minister to form broad coalition; Cedras would resign; Parliament would grant amnesty to military. Aristide rejects plan for centrist coalition government and insists on departure of military.

Mar 94
Public opinion campaign opposing Administration begins; Congressional Black Caucus exhorts Administration.

12 Apr 94
Randall Robinson begins hunger strike against U.S. Haitian refugee policy. SecDef briefed by ADM Miller re USACOM planning.

21 Apr 94
Aristide criticizes U.S. policy and Special Advisor Pezullo.

22 Apr 94
Administration announces it will seek total economic embargo; date uncertain. Internal meeting held; use of force in Haiti considered.

26 Apr 94
Ambassador Pezullo resigns.

28 Apr 94
U.S. introduces resolution to UNSC demanding resignation of military and seeking global trade embargo.

2-3 May 94
President states he "won't rule out force." Administration spokesmen discuss "robust" military option in play.

6 May 94
UN Security Council approves full economic embargo and bans travel by Haiti military and their families; embargo to take effect May 27.

8 May 94
President halts forced repatriation of boat people; will hold hearings aboard U.S. ships or in third country. USACOM establishes interagency working groups; JTF-level coordination; U.S. Army Special Operations Command tasked to develop Plan 2380. Former Congressman William Gray named Special Advisor re Haiti refugees; Randall Robinson ends fast. AID begins planning for democratic transition. U.S. begins building international peacekeeping coalition force to aid orderly transition.

12 May 94
Haiti military installs provisional president with responsibility to name prime minister and organize Feb 95 presidential elections.

21 May 94
UN trade embargo takes effect.

25 May 94
USN ship fires at ship running embargo.

8 Jun 94
OAS adopts resolution to reinforce embargo.

10 Jun 94
U.S. halts commercial flights to Haiti beginning 25 June; tightens sanctions.

6 Jul 94
Faced with thousands of refugees, U.S. announces application for asylum must be from Haiti; boat people will be taken to third country "safe havens."

July 94
Haiti military leaders order remaining international human rights monitor to leave. 24 MEU departs LeJeune to show force in Haiti OpArea; 10 MTN DIV designated to develop permissive entry plan.

12 Jul 94
104 UN observers depart Haiti. USMC exercise in Haiti OpArea.

16 Jul 94
SecState Christopher states U.S. "not decided whether U.S. interests warrant invasion." UN SecGen states UN cannot afford to operate peace-keeping force; Further discussion of holding new elections in Haiti. Administration spokes-man states that "detailed OpPlans are in place."

19-21 Jul 94
U.S. discusses/requests resolution authorizing "all necessary means" to restore Aristide to power and disarmament of Haitian military.

19-21 Jul 94
Special Negotiator Gray states in press interview that "by October we expect them to be gone," later clarifies this is not a formal deadline.

27 Jul 94
Haiti military leaders float "trial balloon" proposing Cedras resignation, local elections, in hopes of softening embargo. U.S. rejects ploy.

30 July 94
Last commercial flight out of Haiti under expanded UN embargo.

31 Jul 94
UNSC Resolution authorizes U.S. to use "all necessary means" to restore democracy; establishes authority for U.S. peacekeeping force to enter following U.S. disarmament of military and paramilitary.

Aug 94
Military option assumes greater probability.

31 Aug 94
Deputy SecState Talbott and Dep SecDef Deutch state, "the multi- national force is going to Haiti ... under permissive or contested circumstances." Arrest and trial of military leaders implied.

12 Sep 94
USACOM chairs inter- agency meeting to brief military plan and coordinate interagency efforts.

13-14 Sep 94
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower departs Norfolk 14 Sep carrying elements of 10 MTN DIV; USS America departs Norfolk 13 Sep carrying troops of 18 ABN Corps and Special Forces. Reserve cargo carriers (14) called up.

15 Sep 94
President Clinton speaks to press of need for use of force. (I have) "exhausted every available alternative... There is no point in going any further with the present policy. The time has come for them to go, one way or another." Aides speak of contingency plan to send emissary "in final hours." President Carter departs for Haiti.

19-20 Sep 94
U.S. forces disembark at Port-au- Prince. 10 MTN DIV leads invasion force; 18th ABN Corps left at Ft. Bragg or aboard America.

20 Sep 94
Haiti security forces beat pro-democracy demonstrators in Port-au-Prince. Guidelines issued to clarify ROE.

22 Sep 94
Firefight between USMC and Haitian forces in Cap-Haitien leaves 10 Haitians dead.

25-28 Sep 94
Looting in Cap-Haitien, Port-au-Prince and Gonaives.

30 Sep 94
Aristide supporters clash with anti- Aristide elements in Port-au-Prince; Haitian police fail to maintain order.

3 Oct 94
USMC begins withdrawal from Cap-Haitien; replaced by 10 MTN DIV; Intl Police Monitors arrive in Port-au-Prince.

15 Oct 94
President Aristide arrives in Haiti.

Return to the ACTIS Home Page