By most measures, the Haitian intervention was a success. Operation Uphold Democracy had finite, limited goals which included: 1) decapitate the military dictatorship, 2) restore the elected President of Haiti, and 3) turn the operation over to UN control in six months. All these were accomplished in good order and with very few casualties among either the U.S. forces or the Haitian population. Table 2 lists some of the things that workshop participants believed went right in the operation.
Second, U.S. military forces were given adequate resources and the sector commanders had the latitude to make timely and appropriate decisions.
Third, a potentially disastrous situation with the deposed and leaderless Force Armée d'Haiti (FAd'H) was controlled. Through a combination of factors, including U.S. military action, transition strategy, and the presence of International Police Monitors (IPM), the FAd'H was prevented from re-emerging as a creditable force. While several of the workshop members commented that the process was flawed, it nevertheless worked, and, given the circumstances, the FAd'H was taken down effectively. Security was provided by a combination of newly-formed Haitian police and several hundred international police monitors with support from U.S. and other multinational force military elements.
Table 3 lists some of the factors that the workshop believed contributed to the success.
While DoD balked at involvement in Haiti, military commanders knew that they needed to begin planning on the chance that they might be called. They took the initiative to start the planning process early on. Thelessons learned in both Panama and Somalia were still fresh and were reviewed and incorporated as appropriate. Although the situation in Haiti was not exactly like the earlier operations, the planning process was better.
Second, the Carter mission succeeded in convincing General Cedras to step aside. This eliminated armed resistance and saved lives on both sides. Faced with this last-minute shift in Haiti, the U.S. military showed superb flexibility both in shifting from the forceful entry to the unopposed entry, and in later operations on the ground. One workshop participant who was on the ground in Haiti at the time stated that: "From the bottom-up point of view, the shift was transparent. USACOM did a superb job of handling the shift including re-configuring the aircraft carrier from a strike asset to a support platform." Initial confusion with airlift and supply was quickly sorted out and corrected. At the tactical level the military and available civilian counterparts found each other and cooperated well.
The fact that the U.S. ran the entire operation for the first six months made the transition to the UN much easier and smoother. The U.S. lead made it possible for the UN to stand up its own force with sufficient time and knowledge of the environment. UN planners worked side by side with U.S. elements to accomplish the smooth transition. The International Police Monitors were an effective surrogate police force deftly managed by former New York City Police Commissioner, Ray Kelly, who supervised the recruitment, training, and management of the force.
Return to the NDU Home Page
Return to the INSS Home Page
Return to the ACTIS Home Page