Given the limited goals and objectives of Operation Restore Democracy, the UN-sanctioned, U.S.-led Haitian intervention was a success. The mission was clearly defined. An exit strategy was identified and adhered to. Transfer to UN authority occurred according to schedule. Interagency political-military planning occurred at a higher and more integrated level than in any earlier similar operation. Indeed, Haiti marked the first time in recent memory that the U.S. government had undertaken to develop a formal interagency political-military plan in advance. Military forces demonstrated remarkable flexibility, adjusting plans at the final hour to accommodate changed circumstances brought about by the Carter mission. Civilian and military forces on the ground cooperated well, after a brief few days of confusion. While the operation did not make Haiti's systemic problems go away, it did break the debilitating control of a military dictatorship, restored the democratically elected leader, and created an opportunity for a new start. Moreover, it did so with surprisingly few casualties or unpleasant incidents.
In part because the Haiti operation was successful, it provides an excellent case study for exploring "what more needs to be done" to make planning for these kinds of operations_which are expected to occur with greater frequency in the coming years_more effective. Table 5 summarizes the lessons learned from the workshop analysis, while solutions offered by workshop participants are discussed below.
Throughout the workshop, senior civilian participants argued that the U.S. government needs to develop both doctrine and procedures for civil-military planning for emergencies like disaster assistance, humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping operations in which civilian and military are likely to be co-equal and coterminous participants. Without a more formal interagency planning process, planning and execution of interagency missions will continue to be haphazard and incomplete. Political military planning for civilian agencies needs to parallel military planning, but in lesser detail and with flexible adjustments. In Haiti, the ExCom worked well once the decision to go forward with military operation was made in late August, but precious time for interagency coordination had been lost during the previous months. While work-arounds, flexibility, and innovation were successful in Haiti, in future operations, the insufficient interagency planning and coordination could contribute to dangerous omissions and situations.
Both structural and operational differences between civilian and military organizations require greater mutual understanding and demand more systematic coordination. They also have implications for military operations themselves. The workshop identified three areas of structural and operational differences that need to be addressed: planning capabilities, surge capabilities, and security requirements.
Planning Capabilities. One of the key differences between the civilian and military organizations is the approach to planning. Planning is an integral part of military procedure and officers at all levels are exposed to mission planning and complex mobilization exercises throughout their careers. The military plan in detail and expect to meet planning targets. Civilian agencies do not have a similar cadre of experienced crisis response mission planners (Indeed, they often rely on seconded military officers to accomplish this task.), and they do not plan at the level of detail that the military plans. Civilian agencies generally fund activities that are then contracted out to nongovernment organizations. The contracting out does not begin until mission is underway, meaning that the anticipated civilian services are delayed in arriving on scene. Military support, in contrast, accompanies the operation, or is phased in, according to the detailed plans developed in advance. While the military_especially Special Operations personnel_are aware of the need for interface with civilian counterparts, civilian agencies may not be as aware of the capabilities of their military counterparts.
Security Requirements. The workshop participants agreed that the security requirements imposed on planners had been a major factor complicating effective interagency coordination, especially at the operational level. One senior workshop member observed:
A major obstacle to effective interagency planning of prospective peacekeeping missions is the necessity of maintaining operational security. Planning, and even more so, interagency planning, calls for inclusion, while security militates exclusion. In peacekeeping missions, where the initial resistance is often minimal (as was the case in both Haiti and Somalia), the withholding from civilian agencies, by the military, of basic information on its operational intentions may actually increase rather than minimize the risk of casualties. In such instances, the most serious challenges may arise well after the initial entry of forces and may result from political or economic developments which in turn may be decisively shaped by the action or inaction of civilian agencies in carrying out their respective parts of the operations. The desirability of achieving, from the start, a maximum synchronization of action by military and civilian elements may militate in favor of a wider sharing of information than is otherwise the norm.
When the U.S. military forces arrived in Haiti, because of the incomplete operational planning, they were unaware that many of the other agencies were already in country or about to enter shortly. The force commander was not in charge of the civilians, other than to insure the safety of those he knew about. The Ambassador, on the other hand, was swept up in a myriad of events not directly related to the military mission. Neither the force commander nor the Ambassador had total command of the situation. The Haitian operation worked because they coordinated and cooperated well enough to get things done, a lesson learned from Operation Just Cause in Panama. However, the operation might have been smoother had command arrangements been better defined and communicated beforehand; had the Ambassador and Force Commander set up a combined war room; had the U.S. Embassy staffed up in order to handle the additional load; or had a CONUS-based task force, responsible to the Ambassador, been established to facilitate interagency coordination. This lesson should be carefully considered before another operation, rather than rely on the ad-hoc solutions that are invented each time.
Recent experience suggests that in many "failed states" like Somalia or Haiti, the forces arriving first on the scene, whether in hostile or permissive entry, are likely to have to play significant roles providing for basic government services. With few exceptions, workshop participants felt that neither civilians nor the military were fully prepared for the devastated conditions they found in Haiti. Workshop participants commented: "We expected things to be bad, but we couldn't believe how bad it really was." The combination of corruption, lawlessness, and neglect created an economic decline that had been exacerbated by the economic embargo imposed on the military dictatorship. Institutions and infrastructure were for the most part non-existent. All that was holding the country together was fear of the FAd'H which, once deposed, was impotent and ignored by the Haitian people. Under these and similar circumstances, the operational concept under which military forces provide needed functions and gradually turn them over to civilians (assistance groups or local nationals) needs to be fleshed out.
A logical conclusion of the lack of surge capacity on the civilian side and the inherent delays in mobilizing the contractor community is that the military will be called upon to assume responsibilities for domestic security and nation-assistance for a limited period of time in most complex emergency operations. While policy and preference may dictate that civilian agencies should manage civic assistance activities, in fact, the military often end up taking on the tasks because they arrive first and have the manpower, surge capacity, and flexibility to act. Operations Other Than War are likely to be common in the future, and the U.S. armed forces will be called upon to respond to many non-traditional situations. The acceptable range of military missions must evolve to meet current threats and likely contingencies. Doctrine and training should evolve as well.
Two specific issues related to preparation for OOTW emerged in the workshop discussion.
Local Security Forces. In the case of domestic security, the workshop noted, "in situations where governments are in transition, you need police." "In Haiti we didn't need the military after the first week, we needed police. If we'd had more MPs at the beginning, or more police, we could have established security much more quickly." Because of the standing and reserve structure of the military, it will often be easier to meet short-term demands for police with trained military police than with ad hoc police forces. The International Police Monitors organized for the Haiti operation provided a successful solution, but a similar force may not be available in all circumstances. These considerations have implications for U.S. reserve and force structure.
Rules of Engagement Training. Related to the above, rules of engagement for complex political-military operations require careful crafting and extensive training. Different interpretations of ROE are not necessarily bad. In Haiti, they contributed to the tactical commanders' flexibility mentioned as a factor for success. The Haitian experience suggests that ROE interpretation also can contain hidden dangers if the troops on the ground have a different understanding of the ROE than their chain of command. ROE training is one way to avoid these potential pitfalls. Future operations may become more involved and complicated. The addition of things like non-lethal weapons may further complicate the issues and problems for the soldier facing a crowd. Careful ROE development, testing and training are essential to prevent putting our own forces into untenable situations.
To facilitate interagency planning, workshop participants argued for institutionalizing a series of political-military peace operation gaming exercises. These would allow both civilians and military to learn how the other is able to respond to complex emergencies and how each must modify expectations to accommodate the different operating styles. There was near universal agreement that inter-agency/military/PVO/NGO relationships, from planning to actual operations, could be enhanced by exercises and gaming. Not only would gaming and exercises bring together different agencies to explore typical problems and solutions, but they also would open a dialogue that is presently missing. In the area of nation-assistance, in particular, military specialists and civilian development specialists need exposure to one another and to the different approaches that each brings to the field. For example, Department of State personnel were critical of the military's approach to Haiti, arguing that there was too great an urge to "fix what was broken in Haiti." The political approach is more often to "encourage locals to figure it out themselves." In a similar vein, the military and PVO participants, recognized that they were mutually ignorant about each other and the ways they do business. They were unanimous about the need for, and potential value of, getting to know one another. Gaming and exercises could create a valuable venue for communication and improved cooperation.
The workshop agreed that gaming of peace operations should cover strategic, operational and tactical levels of planning and implementation. The government should make a high level commitment to these exercises, ensuring participation by appropriate level senior civilians and military officers. In addition, the workshop encouraged inclusion of senior representatives of private voluntary organizations so that they could better understand what to expect during a political-military operation and to begin to bridge the gap of understanding between the military and PVO community.
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